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

Engraved by W. Sharp

Dum brevis esse laboro, obscurus fio.

Published Jan. 1, 1798 by John Heaviside, Wimbledon Surry

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ.

OR, THE

DIVERSIONS

OF

PURLEY.

PART I.

By JOHN HORNE TOOKE, A. M.
LATE OF ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

SECOND EDITION.

LONDON:
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TO THE

UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE.

ONE of her grateful Sons,—who always conſiders acts of voluntary juſtice towards himſelf as Favours *,—dedicates this humble offering. And particularly to her chief ornament for virtue and talents, the Reverend Doctor Beadon, Maſter of Jeſus College.

---

* Notwithſtanding the additional authority of Plato's deſpicable ſaying—*Cum omnibus ſolvam quod cum omnibus debeo* [1]—the aſſertion of Machiavel, that—*Niſſuno confeſſera mai haver obligo con uno chi non l'offenda* [2]—and the repetition of it by Father Paul, that—*Mai alcuno ſi pretende obligato a chi l'habbi fatto giuſtitia; ſtimandolo tenuto per ſe ſteſſo di farla* [3]—are not true. They are not true either with reſpect to nations or to individuals: for the experience of much injuſtice will cauſe the forbearance of injury to appear like kindneſs.

[1] Senec. de benefic. lib. VI.

[2] Diſcor. lib. I. cap. XVI.

[3] Opinione del Padre Fra Paolo, in qual modo debba governarſi la Republica Veneta per haver perpetuo dominio.

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Non

Non ut laudemur, ſed ut proſimus.

Equidem ſic propè ab adoleſcentia animatus fui, ut inania famæ contemnam, veraque conſecter bona. In qua cogitatione ſæpius defixus, facilius ab animo meo potui impetrare, ut (quamvis ſcirem ſordeſcere magis & magis ſtudia Literarum, maximéque ea quæ propriè artem Grammaticen ſpectant) nihilominus pauliſper, non quidem ſeponerem, ſed remiſſius tamen tractarem ſtudia graviora; iterumque in manus ſumerem veteres adoleſcentiæ labores, laboreque novo inter tot Curas divulgarem.

G. J. Vossius.

Le grand objet de l'art etymologique n'eſt pas de rendre raiſon de l'origine de tous les mots ſans exception, & j'oſe dire que ce ſeroit un but aſſez frivole. Cet art eſt principalement recommandable en ce qu'il fournit à la philoſophie des materiaux & des obſervations pour elever le grand edifice de la theorie generale des Langues.

M. Le Preſident de Brosses.

ERRATA.

Page 59, Note, Line 19, for *ille* read *elle*.
—— 90, Note, —— 18, 23, and 27, for *Wharton* read *Warton*.
—— 123, Note, —— 19, ſhould be effaced.
—— 145, Note, —— 16, for *Prepoſitions* read *Propoſitions*.
—— 174, Note, —— 16, dele *or Loſs*.
—— 181, —— 9, for *Wharton* read *Warton*.
—— 197, —— 4, for *but* put BUT.
—— 200, —— 6, for BUT read BOT.
—— 243, —— 3, for *diſtinctis* read *diſtinctio*.
—— 281, Note, —— 14, *ſhe* read *ſheer*.
—— 321, —— 4, for *it* read *its*.
—— 322, Note, —— 4, for *correſondent* read *correſpondent*.
—— 10, for *longe* read *long*.
—— 381, —— 6, for *for* put FOR.
—— 416, Note, —— 7, for *heis* read *he is*.
—— 422, —— 13, for MYDDIT read MYDLIT.
—— 531, Note, —— 10, for *pourdes* read *pour des*.



ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ:

OR, THE

DIVERSIONS OF PURLEY.

INTRODUCTION.

B.

—THE myſtery is at laſt unravelled. I ſhall no more wonder now that you engroſs his company at Purley *, whilſt his other friends can ſcarce get a ſight of him. This, you ſay, was Preſident Bradſhaw's ſeat. That is the ſecret of his attachment to the place. You hold him by the beſt ſecurity, his political prejudices and enthuſiaſm. But do not let his veneration for the memory of the antient poſſeſſor paſs upon you for affection to the preſent.

* The ſeat of William Tooke, Eſq. near Croydon, Surrey.

H.

Should you be altogether ſo ſevere upon my politics; when you reflect that, merely for attempting to prevent the effuſion of brother's blood and the final diſmemberment of the empire, I ſtand the ſingle legal victim during the conteſt, and the ſingle inſtance of proſcription after it? But I am well contented that my principles, which have made ſo many of your way of thinking angry, ſhould only make you laugh. Such however as they are, they need not now to be defended by me: for they have ſtood the teſt of ages; and they will keep their ground in the general *commendation* of the world, till men forget to love themſelves; though, till then perhaps, they are not likely to be ſeen (nor credited if ſeen) in the *practice* of many individuals.

But are you really forced to go above a hundred years back to account for my attachment to Purley? Without conſidering the many ſtrong public and private ties by which I am bound to its preſent poſſeſſor, can you find nothing in the beautiful proſpect from theſe windows? nothing in the entertainment every one receives in this houſe? nothing in the delightful rides and walks we have taken round it? nothing in the cheerful diſpoſition and

eaſy

eaſy kindneſs of its owner, to make a rational man partial to this habitation?

T.

Sir, you are making him tranſgreſs our only ſtanding rules. Politics and compliments are ſtrangers here. We always put them off when we put on our boots; and leave them behind us in their proper atmoſphere, the ſmoke of London.

B.

Is it poſſible! Can either of you—Engliſhmen and patriots!—abſtain for four and twenty hours together from politics? You cannot be always on horſeback or at piquet. What, in the name of wonder, your favourite topic excluded, can be the ſubject of your ſo frequent converſations?

T.

You have a ſtrange notion of us. But I aſſure you we find more difficulty to finiſh than to begin our converſations. As for our ſubjects, their variety cannot be remembered; but I will tell you on what we were diſcourſing yeſterday when you came in; and I believe you are the fitteſt perſon in the world to decide between us. He inſiſts, contrary to my opinion, that all ſorts of wiſdom and uſeful knowledge may be obtained by a plain man of ſenſe without what is

commonly called Learning. And when I took the eaſieſt inſtance, as I thought, and the foundation of all other knowledge, (becauſe it is the beginning of education, and that in which children are firſt employed) he declined the proof of his aſſertion in this inſtance, and maintained that I had choſen the moſt difficult: for, he ſays, that, though Grammar be uſually amongſt the firſt things taught, it is always one of the laſt underſtood.

B.

I muſt confeſs I differ from Mr. H. concerning the difficulty of grammar: if indeed what you have reported be really his opinion. But might he not poſſibly give you that anſwer to eſcape the diſcuſſion of a diſagreeable, dry ſubject, remote from the courſe of his ſtudies and the objects of his inquiry and purſuit? By his general expreſſion of—*what is commonly called Learning*—and his declared opinion of that, I can pretty well gueſs what he thinks of grammatical learning in particular. I dare ſwear (though he will not perhaps pay me ſo indifferent a compliment) he does not in his mind allow us even the poor conſolation which we find in Athenæus—ει μη ιαλροι ησαν; but concludes, without a ſingle exception, ϖδεν των Γραμματικων μωρολερον *.

* Ου γαρ κακως τινι των ιδιωτων ημων ελεγχθη το, ει μη ιατροι ησαν ϖδεν αι ην των γραμματικων μωρολερον. Deipnoſoph. Lib. 15.

I muſt however intreat him to recollect, (and at the ſame time whoſe authority it bears,) that—*Qui Sapientiæ & literarum divortium faciunt, nunquam ad ſolidam ſapientiam pertingent. Qui verò alios etiam à literarum linguarumque ſtudio abſterrent, non antiquæ ſapientiæ ſed novæ ſtultitiæ Doctores ſunt habendi.*

H.

Indeed I ſpoke my real ſentiments. I think Grammar difficult, but I am very far from looking upon it as fooliſh: indeed ſo far, that I conſider it as abſolutely neceſſary in the ſearch after philoſophical truth; which if not the moſt uſeful perhaps, is at leaſt the moſt pleaſing employment of the human mind. And I think it no leſs neceſſary in the moſt important queſtions concerning religion and civil ſociety. But ſince you ſay it is eaſy, tell me where it may be learned.

B.

If your look and the tone of your voice were leſs ſerious, the extravagance of your compliment to grammar would incline me to ſuſpect that you were taking your revenge, and bantering me in your turn by an ironical encomium on my favourite ſtudy. But, if I am to ſuppoſe you in earneſt, I anſwer, that our Engliſh grammar may be ſufficiently

ficiently and eaſily learned from the excellent Introduction of Doctor Lowth: or from the *firſt* (as well as the *beſt*) Engliſh grammar, given by Ben Johnſon.

H.

True, Sir. And that was my firſt ſlight anſwer to our friend's inſtance. But his inquiry is of a much larger compaſs than you at preſent ſeem to imagine. He aſks after the cauſes or reaſons of Grammar *: and for ſatisfaction in them I know not where to ſend him; for I aſſure you, he has a troubleſome, inquiſitive, ſcrupulous mind of his own that will not take mere words in current payment.

B.

I ſhould think that difficulty eaſily removed. Dr. Lowth in his preface has done it ready to your hands. "Thoſe,"

---

* *Duplex Grammatica: alia* CIVILIS, *alia* PHILOSOPHICA.

CIVILIS, *peritia eſt, non ſcientia: conſtat enim ex auctoritate uſuque clarorum ſcriptorum.*

PHILOSOPHICA *vero, ratione conſtat; & hæc ſcientiam olet.*

Grammatica CIVILIS *habet ætatem, in qua viget, & illam amplectuntur Grammatici, dicunt enim ſub Cicerone & Cæſare adultam linguam,* &c. *At* PHILOSOPHICA *non agnoſcit ætatem linguæ, ſed rationalitatem; amplectiturque vocabula bona omnium temporum.*

he

he ſays, " who would enter more deeply into this ſubject, " will find it fully and accurately handled with the greateſt " acuteneſs of inveſtigation, perſpicuity of explication, and " elegance of method, in a treatiſe intitled *Hermes*, by " *James Harris*, Eſq. the moſt beautiful and perfect ex- " ample of Analyſis that has been exhibited ſince the days " of Ariſtotle."

T.

The recommendation no doubt is full, and the authority great; but I cannot ſay that I have found the performance to correſpond: nor can I boaſt of any acquiſition from its peruſal, except indeed of hard words and frivolous or unintelligible diſtinctions. And I have learned from a moſt excellent authority, that " Tout ce qui varie, tout ce qui " ſe charge de termes douteux & envelopés, à toujours " paru ſuſpect; & non ſeulement frauduleux, mais encore " abſolument faux: parcequ'il marque un embarras que " la verité ne connoit point *."

B.

And you, Sir?

---

* Bossuet des variations des Egliſes Proteſtantes.

H.

I am really in the ſame ſituation.

B.

Have you tried any other of our Engliſh authors on the ſubject?

H.

I believe all of them, for they are not numerous *; but none with ſatisfaction.

B. You

---

* The authors who have written profeſſedly on this ſubject, in any language, are not numerous. Caramuel, in the beginning of his Grammatica Audax, ſays,—" *Solus, ut puto,* SCOTUS, *& poſt eum* SCALIGER & CAMPANELLA " (*alios enim non vidi*) *Grammaticam ſpeculativam evulgarunt; vias tamen* " *omnino diverſas ingreſſi. Multa mibi in Scaligero, & plura in Campanella* " *diſplicuerunt; & pauciora in Scoto, qui vix alibi ſubtilius ſcripſit quam cum* " *de Grammaticis modis ſignificandi.*"

The reader of Caramuel (who, together with Campanella, may be found in the Bodleian Library) will not be diſappointed in him; but moſt egregiouſly by him, if the ſmalleſt expectations of information are excited by the character which is here given of Scotus: whoſe *De Modis Significandi*, ſhould be intitled, not *Grammatica Speculativa*, but—an Exemplar of the ſubtle art of ſaving appearances, and of diſcourſing deeply and learnedly on a ſubject with which we are totally unacquainted. *Quid enim ſubtilius vel magis tenue, quam quod nihil eſt.*

Wilkins, Part 3. Chap. 1. of his Eſſay towards a Real Character, ſays, after Caramuel,—" *The firſt of theſe* (i. e. philoſophical, rational, univerſal " Grammar) *hath been treated of but by few; which makes our learned* " *Verulam*

B.

You muſt then give up one at leaſt of your poſitions. For if, as you make it out, Grammar is ſo difficult that a

---

" *Verulam put it among his* Deſiderata. *I do not know any more that have* " *purpoſely written of it, but Scotus in his* Grammatica Speculativa, *and* " *Caramuel in his* Grammatica Audax, *and Campanella in his* Grammatica " Philoſophica. (*As for Scioppius his Grammar of this title, that doth* " *wholly concern the Latin tongue.*) *Beſides which ſomething hath been occa-* " *ſionally ſpoken of it by Scaliger in his book* De Cauſis Linguæ Latinæ; *and* " *by Voſſius in his* Ariſtarchus." So far Wilkins: who, for what reaſon I know not, has omitted the *Minerva* of *Sanctius*; though well deſerving his notice; and the declared foundation of Scioppius. But he who ſhould confine himſelf to theſe authors, and to thoſe who, with Wilkins, have ſince that time written profeſſedly on this ſubject, would fall very ſhort of the aſſiſtance he might have, and the leading hints and foundations of reaſoning which he might obtain, by reading even all the authors who have confined themſelves to particular languages.

The great Bacon put this ſubject amongſt his *Deſiderata*, not, as Wilkins ſays, becauſe " *few* had treated of it;" but becauſe *none* had given a ſatisfactory account of it. At the ſame time Bacon, though evidently wide of the mark himſelf, yet conjectured beſt how this knowledge might moſt probably be attained; and pointed out the moſt proper materials for reflection to work upon. " *Illa demum* (ſays he) *ut arbitramur, foret nobi-* " *liſſima Grammaticæ ſpecies, ſi quis in linguis plurimis, tam eruditis quam* " *vulgaribus eximiè doctus, de variis linguarum proprietatibus tractaret; in* " *quibus quæque excellat, in quibus deficiat oſtendens. Ita enim & linguæ* " *mutuo commercio locupletari poſſint; & fiet ex iis quæ in ſingulis linguis* " *pulchra ſunt* (*tanquam Venus Apellis*) *orationis ipſius quædam formoſiſſima* " *imago, & exemplar quoddam inſigne, ad ſenſus animi ritè exprimendos.*" De augment. Scient. Lib. 6. Cap. 1.

knowledge of it cannot be obtained by a man of ſenſe from any authors in his own language, you muſt ſend him to what is commonly called Learning, to the Greek and Latin authors, for the attainment of it. So true, in this ſcience at leaſt, if not in all others, is that ſaying of Roger Aſcham; that—" Even as a hawke fleeth not hie with " one wing, even ſo a man reacheth not to excellency " with one tongue."

H.

On the contrary, I am rather confirmed by this inſtance in my firſt poſition. I acknowledge philoſophical Grammar (to which only my ſuſpected compliment was intended) to be a moſt neceſſary ſtep towards wiſdom and true knowledge. From the innumerable and inveterate miſtakes which have been made concerning it by the wiſeſt philoſophers and moſt diligent inquirers of all ages, and from the thick darkneſs in which they have hitherto left it, I imagine it to be one of the moſt difficult ſpeculations. Yet, I ſuppoſe, a man of plain common ſenſe may obtain it, if he will dig for it; but I cannot think that what is commonly called Learning, is the mine in which it will be found. Truth, in my opinion, has been improperly imagined at the bottom of a well: it lies much nearer to the ſurface; though buried indeed at preſent under mountains of

learned rubbiſh; in which there is nothing to admire but the amazing ſtrength of thoſe vaſt giants of literature who have been able thus to heap Pelion upon Oſſa. This at preſent is only my opinion, which perhaps I have entertained too lightly. Since therefore the queſtion has been ſtarted, I am pleaſed at this occaſion of being confirmed or corrected by you; whoſe application, opportunities, extenſive reading, acknowledged abilities, and univerſal learning enable you to inform us of all that the antients have left or the moderns have written on the ſubject.

B.

Oh! Sir, your humble ſervant! compliments, I perceive, are baniſhed from Purley. But I ſhall not be at all inticed by them to take upon my ſhoulders a burthen which you ſeem deſirous to ſhift off upon me. Beſides, Sir, with all your caution, you have ſaid too much now to expect it from me. It is too late to recall what has paſſed your lips: and if Mr. T. is of my ſentiments you ſhall not be permitted to explain yourſelf away. The ſatisfaction which he ſeeks after, you ſay *is to be had*; and you tell us the mine where you think it is *not to be found*. Now I ſhall not eaſily be perſuaded that you are ſo raſh and take up your opinions ſo lightly, as to advance or even to imagine this; unleſs you had firſt ſearched that mine your-

ſelf, and formed a conjecture at leaſt concerning the place where you ſuppoſe this knowledge is to be found. Inſtead therefore of making me diſplay to Mr. T. my reading, which you have already declared inſufficient for the purpoſe, is it not much more reaſonable that you ſhould communicate to us the reſult of your reflection?

H.

With all my heart, if you chuſe it ſhould be ſo, and think you ſhall have patience to hear me through. I own I prefer inſtruction to correction, and had rather have been informed without the hazard of expoſing myſelf; but if you make the one a condition of the other, I think it ſtill worth my acceptance; and will not loſe this opportunity of your judgment for a little ſhame. I acknowledge then that the ſubject is not intirely new to my thoughts: for, though languages themſelves may be and uſually are acquired without any regard to their principles; I very early found it, or thought I found it, impoſſible to make many ſteps in the ſearch after *truth* and the nature of *human underſtanding*, of *good* and *evil*, of *right* and *wrong*, without well conſidering the nature of language, which appeared to me to be inſeparably connected with them. I own therefore I long ſince formed to myſelf a kind of ſyſtem, which ſeemed to me of ſingular uſe in the very ſmall extent

of my younger ſtudies to keep my mind from confuſion and the impoſition of words. After too long an interval of idleneſs and pleaſure, it was my chance to have occaſion to apply to ſome of the modern languages; and, not being acquainted with any other more ſatisfactory, I tried my ſyſtem with theſe, and tried it with ſucceſs. I afterwards found it equally uſeful to me with ſome of the dead languages. Whilſt I was thus amuſing myſelf the political ſtruggle commenced; for my ſhare in which you ſo far juſtly banter me, as I do acknowledge that, both in the outſet and the progreſs of it, I was guilty of two moſt egregious blunders; by attributing a much greater portion of virtue to individuals and of underſtanding to the generality than any experience of mankind can juſtify. After another interval therefore (not of idleneſs and pleaſure) I was again called by the queſtions of our friend Mr. T. (for yeſterday is not the firſt time by many that he has mentioned it) to the conſideration of this ſubject. I have hitherto declined attempting to give him the ſatisfaction he required: for, though the notion I had of language had ſatisfied my own mind and anſwered my own purpoſes, I could not venture to detail to him my crude conceptions without having ever made the leaſt inquiry into the opinions of others. Beſides, I did not at all ſuſpect that my notions, if juſt, could be peculiar to myſelf: and

I hoped

I hoped to find ſome author who might give him a clearer, fuller, and more methodical account than I could, free from thoſe errors and omiſſions to which I muſt be liable. Having therefore ſome ſmall intervals of leiſure and a great deſire to give him the beſt information; I confeſs I have employed ſome part of that leiſure in reading every thing I could eaſily and readily procure that has been ſuggeſted by others.

——I am afraid I have already ſpoken with too much preſumption: But when I tell you that I differ from all thoſe who with ſuch infinite labour and erudition have gone before me on this ſubject; what apology——

B.

Oh! make none. When men think modeſtly they may be allowed to ſpeak freely. Come—Where will you begin?—*Alpha*—Go on.

H.

Not with the organical part of language, I aſſure you. For, though in many reſpects it has been and is to this moment groſsly miſtaken, (and the miſtakes might, with the help of ſome of the firſt principles of natural philoſophy and anatomy, be eaſily corrected) yet it is an inquiry more of curioſity than immediate uſefulneſs.

B. You

You will begin then either with *things* or *ideas:* for it is impoſſible we ſhould ever thoroughly underſtand the nature of the *ſigns*, unleſs we firſt properly conſider and arrange the *things ſignified.* Whoſe ſyſtem of philoſophy will you build upon?

H.

What you ſay is true. And yet I ſhall not begin there. Hermes, you know, put out the eyes of Argus: and I ſuſpect that he has likewiſe blinded philoſophy: and if I had not imagined ſo, I ſhould never have caſt away a thought upon this ſubject. If therefore Philoſophy herſelf has been miſled by Language, how ſhall ſhe teach us to detect his tricks?

B.

Begin then as you pleaſe. Only begin.

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ, &c.

PART I.

CHAP. I.

OF THE DIVISION, OR DISTRIBUTION OF LANGUAGE.

H.

THE purpoſe of Language is to communicate our thoughts ——

B.

You do not mention this, I hope, as ſomething new, or wherein you differ from others?

H.

You are too haſty with me. No. But I mention it as that principle, which, being kept *ſingly* in contemplation, has miſled all thoſe who have reaſoned on this ſubject.

B.

Is it not true then?

H.

I think it is. And that on which the whole matter reſts.

B.

And yet the confining themſelves to this true principle, upon which the whole matter reſts, has miſled them!

H.

Indeed I think ſo.

B.

This is curious!

H.

Yet I hope to convince you of it. For thus they reaſoned——Words are the *ſigns* of *things*. There muſt therefore be as many ſorts of words, or *parts of ſpeech*, as there are ſorts of *things* *. The earlieſt inquirers into language proceeded then to ſettle how many ſorts there

* *Diffia rerum nota: pro rerum ſpeciebus partes quotque ſuas ſortietur.*
J. C. SCALIGER de Cauſis L. L.

were

were of things; and from thence how many ſorts of words, or parts of ſpeech. Whilſt this method of ſearch *ſtrictly* prevailed, the parts of ſpeech were very few in number: but *two*. At moſt *three*, or *four*.

All things, ſaid they, muſt have names*. But there are two ſorts of things:

1. *Res quæ permanent.*
2. *Res quæ fluunt.*

There muſt therefore be *two* ſorts of words or *parts of ſpeech:* viz.

1. *Notæ rerum quæ permanent.*
2. *Notæ rerum quæ fluunt.*

Well; but ſurely there are words which are neither *notæ rerum permanentium*, nor yet *notæ rerum fluentium*. What will you do with them?—We cannot tell: we can find but theſe two ſorts *in rerum natura:* call therefore thoſe other words, if you will, for the preſent, *particles* †, or

* From this moment Grammar quits the day-light; and plunges into an abyſs of utter darkneſs.

† A good convenient name for all the words which we do not underſtand: for as the denomination means nothing in particular, and contains no de-

 ſcription,

or inferior parts of ſpeech, till we can find out what they are. Or, as we ſee they are conſtantly interſperſed between nouns and verbs, and ſeem therefore in a manner to hold our ſpeech together, ſuppoſe you call them *conjunctions* or *connectives* *.

This ſeems to have been the utmoſt progreſs that philoſophical Grammar had made till about the time of Ariſtotle, when a *fourth* part of ſpeech was added,—the *definitive*, or *article*.

ſcription, it will equally ſuit any ſhort word we may pleaſe to refer thither. There has latterly been much diſpute amongſt Grammarians concerning the uſe of this word, *particle*, in the diviſion and diſtribution of ſpeech: particularly by Girard, Dangeau, the authors of the Encyclopedie, &c. In which it is ſingular that they ſhould all be right in their arguments againſt the uſe made of it by others; and all wrong, in the uſe which each of them would make of it himſelf. Dr. S. Johnſon adopts N. Bailey's definition of a *particle*—" A word unvaried by inflexion." And Locke defines *particles* to be—" The words whereby the mind ſignifies what connection it gives " to the ſeveral affirmations and negations, that it unites in one continued " reaſoning or narration."

* The Latin Grammarians amuſe themſelves with debating whether Συνδεσμος ſhould be tranſlated *Convinctio* or *Conjunctio*. The Danes and the Dutch ſeem to have taken different ſides of the queſtion: for the Daniſh language terms it *Bindeord*, and the Dutch *Köppelweord*.

Here

Here concluded the ſearch after the different ſorts of words, or parts of ſpeech, from the difference of things: for none other apparently rational, acknowledged, or accepted difference has been ſuggeſted.

According to this ſyſtem it was neceſſary that all ſorts of words ſhould belong to one of theſe four claſſes. For words being the *ſigns* of things, their ſorts muſt neceſſarily follow the ſorts of the things *ſignified*. And there being no more than four differences of things, there could be but four parts of ſpeech. The difficulty and controverſy now was, to determine to which of theſe four claſſes each word belonged. In the attempting of which, ſucceeding Grammarians could neither ſatisfy themſelves nor others: for they ſoon diſcovered ſome words ſo ſtubborn, that no ſophiſtry nor violence could by any means reduce them to any one of theſe claſſes. However, by this attempt and diſpute they became better acquainted with the differences of words, though they could not account for them; and they found the old ſyſtem deficient, though they knew not how to ſupply its defects. They ſeem therefore to have reverſed the method of proceeding from things to ſigns, purſued by the philoſophers; and, ſtill allowing the principle, (*viz.* that there muſt be as many ſorts of words as of things,) they travelled backwards, and ſought for the things

things from the ſigns: adopting the converſe of the principle; namely, that there muſt be as many differences of things as of ſigns. Miſled therefore by the uſeful contrivances of language, they ſuppoſed many imaginary differences of things: and thus added greatly to the number of parts of ſpeech, and in conſequence to the errors of philoſophy.

Add to this, that the greater and more laborious part of Grammarians (to whoſe genius it is always more obvious to remark a multitude of effects than to trace out one cauſe) confined themſelves merely to notice the differences obſervable in words, without any regard to the things ſignified.

From this time the number of parts of ſpeech has been variouſly reckoned: you will find different Grammarians contending for more than thirty. But moſt of thoſe who admitted the feweſt, acknowledged *eight*. This was long a favourite number; and has been kept to by many who yet did not include the ſame parts to make up that number. For thoſe who rejected the *article*, reckoned eight: and thoſe who did not allow the *interjection* ſtill reckoned eight. But what ſort of difference in words ſhould intitle them to hold a ſeparate rank by themſelves, has not to this moment been ſettled.

B. You

B.

You ſeem to forget, that it is ſome time ſince words have been no longer allowed to be the ſigns of *things*. Modern Grammarians acknowledge them to be (as indeed Ariſtotle called them, συμβολα παθημαλων) the ſigns of *ideas*: at the ſame time denying the other aſſertion of Ariſtotle, that *ideas* are the *likeneſſes of things* *. And this has made a great alteration in the manner of accounting for the differences of words.

H.

That has not much mended the matter. No doubt this alteration approached ſo far nearer to the truth; but the nature of Language has not been much better underſtood by it. For Grammarians have ſince purſued juſt the ſame method with *mind*, as had before been done with *things*. The different operations of the mind, are to account now for what the different things were to account before: and when they are not found ſufficiently numerous for the purpoſe; it is only ſuppoſing an imaginary operation or two, and the difficulties are for the time ſhuffled over.

* Εσι μεν ων τα εν τη φωνη των εν τη ψυχη παθημαλων συμβολα—ων δε ταυλα ομοιωμαλα, πραγμαλα.

ARISTOT. de Interpretat.

So that the very ſame game has been played over again with *ideas*, which was before played with *things*. No ſatisfaction, no agreement has been obtained: But all has been diſpute, diverſity, and darkneſs. Inſomuch that many of the moſt learned and judicious Grammarians, diſguſted with abſurdity and contradictions, have prudently contented themſelves with remarking the differences of words, and have left the cauſes of language to ſhift for themſelves.

B.

That the methods of accounting for Language remain to this day various, uncertain and unſatisfactory, cannot be denied. But you have ſaid nothing yet to clear up the paradox you ſet out with; nor a ſingle word to unfold to us by what means you ſuppoſe Hermes has blinded philoſophy.

H.

I imagine that it is, in ſome meaſure, with the vehicle of our thoughts, as with the vehicles for our bodies. Neceſſity produced both. The firſt carriage for men was no doubt invented to tranſport the bodies of thoſe who from infirmity, or otherwiſe, could not move themſelves: But ſhould any one, deſirous of underſtanding the purpoſe and meaning of all the parts of our modern elegant carriages,

carriages, attempt to explain them upon this one principle alone, *viz.*—That they were neceſſary for conveyance——; he would find himſelf wofully puzzled to account for the wheels, the ſeats, the ſprings, the blinds, the glaſſes, the lining, &c. Not to mention the mere ornamental parts of gilding, varniſh, &c.

Abbreviations are the *wheels* of language, the *wings* of Mercury. And though we might be dragged along without them, it would be with much difficulty, very heavily and tediouſly.

There is nothing more admirable nor more uſeful than the invention of ſigns: at the ſame time there is nothing more productive of error when we neglect to obſerve their complication. Into what blunders, and conſequently into what diſputes and difficulties, might not the excellent art of Short-hand writing (practiſed almoſt excluſively by the Engliſh *) lead foreign philoſophers; who, not knowing that

* "The art of Short-hand is, in its kind, an ingenious device, and of "conſiderable uſefulneſs, applicable to any language, much wondered at by "travellers that have ſeen the experience of it in England: and yet, though "it be above threeſcore years ſince it was firſt invented, it is not to this "day (for ought I can learn) brought into common practice in any other "nation." WILKINS. *Epiſt. Dedicatory. Eſſay towards a Real Character.*

that we had any other alphabet, ſhould ſuppoſe each mark to be the ſign of a ſingle ſound. If they were very laborious and very learned indeed, it is likely they would write as many volumes on the ſubject, and with as much bitterneſs againſt each other, as Grammarians have done from the ſame ſort of miſtake concerning Language: until perhaps it ſhould be ſuggeſted to them, that there may be not only ſigns of ſounds; but again, for the ſake of abbreviation, ſigns of thoſe ſigns, one under another in a continued progreſſion.

B.

I think I begin to comprehend you. You mean to ſay that the errors of Grammarians have ariſen from ſuppoſing

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" Short-hand, an art, as I have been told, known only in England."
LOCKE *on Education.*

In the *Courier de l'Europe,* No. 41, November 20, 1787, is the following article:

" Le Sieur *Coulon de Thevenot,* a eu l'honneur de preſenter au roi ſa " methode d' ecrire auſſi vite que l'on parle, approuvée par l'Academie " Royale des ſciences, et dont ſa Majeſté a deigné accepter la dedicace. " On ſait que les *Anglois* ſont depuis très-long temps en poſſeſſion d'une " pareille methode adaptée à leur langage, et qu' elle leur eſt devenue " extrêmement commode et utile pour recueillir avec beaucoup de preciſion " les diſcours publics: la methode du Sieur Coulon doit donc étre très- " avantageux à la langue Françoiſe."

all

all words to be *immediately* either the ſigns of things or the ſigns of ideas: whereas in fact many words are merely *abbreviations* employed for diſpatch, and are the ſigns of other words. And that theſe are the artificial wings of Mercury, by means of which the Argus eyes of philoſophy have been cheated.

H.

It is my meaning.

B.

Well. We can only judge of your opinion after we have heard how you maintain it. Proceed, and ſtrip him of his wings. They ſeem eaſy enough to be taken off: for it ſtrikes me now, after what you have ſaid, that they are indeed put on in a peculiar manner, and do not, like thoſe of other winged deities, make a part of his body. You have only to looſe the ſtrings from his feet, and take off his cap. Come—Let us ſee what ſort of figure he will make without them.

H.

The firſt aim of Language was to *communicate* our thoughts: the ſecond, to do it with *diſpatch*. (I mean intirely to diſregard whatever additions or alterations have

been made for the ſake of beauty, or ornament, eaſe, gracefulneſs, or pleaſure.) The difficulties and diſputes concerning Language have ariſen almoſt intirely from neglecting the conſideration of the latter purpoſe of ſpeech: which, though ſubordinate to the former, is almoſt as neceſſary in the commerce of mankind, and has a much greater ſhare in accounting for the different ſorts of words *. Words have been called *winged:* and they well deſerve that name, when their abbreviations are compared with the progreſs which ſpeech could make without theſe inventions; but compared with the rapidity of thought, they have not the ſmalleſt claim to that title. Philoſophers have calculated the difference of velocity between ſound and light: But who will attempt to calculate the difference between ſpeech and thought! What wonder then that the invention of all ages ſhould have been upon the ſtretch to add ſuch wings

* M. Le Preſident de Broſſes, in his excellent treatiſe *De la formation mechanique des Langues*, tom. 2. ſays—" On ne parle que pour etre entendu. " Le plus grand avantage d'une langue eſt d'etre claire. Tous les procedés " de Grammaire ne devroient aller qu' à ce but." And again—" Le vul- " gaire & les philoſophes n'ont d'autre but en parlant que de s'expliquer " clairement." Art. 160. Pour le vulgaire, he ſhould have added—& *promptement*. And indeed he is afterwards well aware of this: for Art. 173, he ſays, " L'eſprit humain veut aller vite dans ſon operation; plus empreſsé " de s'exprimer *promptement*, que curieux de s'exprimer avec une juſteſſe " exacte & refléchie. S'il n'a pas l'inſtrument qu'il faudroit employer, il " ſe ſert de celui qu'il a tout prêt."

to their converſation as might enable it, if poſſible, to keep pace in ſome meaſure with their minds.—Hence chiefly the variety of words.

Abbreviations are employed in language three ways:

1. In terms.
2. In ſorts of words.
3. In conſtruction.

Mr. Locke's Eſſay is the beſt *guide* to the *firſt:* and numberleſs are the authors who have given particular explanations of the *laſt.* The *ſecond* only I take for my province at preſent; becauſe I believe it has hitherto eſcaped the proper notice of all.

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ, &c.

CHAP. II.

SOME CONSIDERATION OF MR. LOCKE'S ESSAY.

B.

I CANNOT recollect one word of Mr. Locke's that correſponds at all with any thing that you have ſaid. The *third* Book of his Eſſay is indeed expreſsly written—"*On the Nature, Uſe and Signification of Language.*" But there is nothing in it concerning *abbreviations*.

H.

I conſider the *whole* of Mr. Locke's Eſſay as a philoſophical account of the *firſt* ſort of abbreviations in Language.

B.

Whatever you may think of it, it is certain, not only from the *title*, but from his own declaration, that Mr. Locke did not intend or conſider it as ſuch: for he ſays,—"When I firſt began this diſcourſe of the *Underſtanding*,

" and a *good while after*, I had not the leaſt thought that " any conſideration of *words* was at all neceſſary to it *."

H.

True. And it is very ſtrange he ſhould ſo have imagined †.

But

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* Perhaps it was for mankind a lucky miſtake (for it was a miſtake) which Mr. Locke made when he called his book, An Eſſay on Human *Underſtanding*. For ſome part of the ineſtimable benefit of that book has, merely on account of its title, reached to many thouſands more than, I fear, it would have done, had he called it (what it is merely) A *Grammatical* Eſſay, or a Treatiſe on *Words*, or on *Language*. The human *mind*, or the human *underſtanding*, appears to be a grand and noble theme; and all men, even the moſt inſufficient, conceive that to be a proper object for their contemplation: whilſt inquiries into the nature of *Language* (through which alone they can obtain any knowledge beyond the beaſts) are fallen into ſuch extreme diſrepute and contempt, that even thoſe who " neither have the " accent of chriſtian, pagan, or man," nor can ſpeak ſo many words together with as much propriety as Balaam's aſs did, do yet imagine *words* to be infinitely beneath the concern of their exalted underſtanding.

† " Ariſtotelis profectò judicio Grammaticam non ſolum eſſe *Philoſophiæ* " partem, (id quod nemo ſanus negat): ſed ne ab ejus quidem cognitione " diſſolvi poſſe intelligeremus." J. C. SCALIGER *de Cauſis. Præfat.*

" And laſtly," ſays Bacon, " let us conſider the falſe appearances that " are impoſed upon us by words, which are framed and applied according " to the conceit and capacities of the vulgar ſort: and although we think " we govern our words, and preſcribe it well—*loquendum ut vulgus, ſenti-* " *endum ut ſapientes*;—yet certain it is, that words, as a Tartar's bow, do " ſhoot back upon the underſtanding of the wiſeſt, and mightily entangle

" and

But what immediately follows?—" But when, having " paſſed over the original and compoſition of our * ideas, " I began to examine the extent and certainty of our " knowledge; I found it had ſo near a connexion with " words, that unleſs their *force* and *manner* of ſignification " were firſt well obſerved, there could be very little ſaid " clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge: which " being converſant about truth, had conſtantly to do with " propoſitions. And though it terminated in things, yet " it was for the moſt part ſo much by the intervention of " words, that they ſeemed ſcarce ſeparable from our general " knowledge."

And again,—" I am apt to imagine that, were the *im-* " *perfections* of Language, as the inſtrument of knowledge,

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" and pervert the judgment. So as it is almoſt neceſſary in all contro- " verſies and diſputations to imitate the wiſdom of the mathematicians, in " ſetting down *in the very beginning* the definitions of our words and terms, " that others may know how we accept and underſtand them, and whether " they concur with us or no. For it cometh to paſs, for want of this, that " we are ſure to end there where we ought to have begun, which is in " queſtions and differences about words."

Of the Advancement of Learning.

* It may appear preſumptuous, but it is neceſſary here to declare my opinion; that Mr. Locke in his Eſſay never did advance one ſtep beyond the origin of Ideas and the compoſition of Terms.

" more

" more thoroughly weighed, a great many of the contro-
" verſies that make ſuch a noiſe in the world would of
" themſelves ceaſe; and the way to knowledge, and per-
" haps peace too, lie a great deal opener than it does *."

So that, from theſe and a great many other paſſages throughout the Eſſay, you may perceive that the more he reflected and ſearched into the human underſtanding, the more he was convinced of the neceſſity of an attention to Language; and of the inſeparable connexion between words and knowledge.

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* " This deſign (ſays Wilkins) will likewiſe contribute much to the
" clearing of ſome of our modern differences in religion;" (and he might have added, in all other diſputable ſubjects; eſpecially in matters of *law* and *civil government*;)—" by unmaſking many wild errors, that ſhelter
" themſelves under the diſguiſe of affected phraſes; which, being phi-
" loſophically unfolded, and rendered according to the genuine and natural
" importance of words, will appear to be inconſiſtencies and contradictions.
" And ſeveral of thoſe pretended myſterious, profound notions, expreſſed
" in great ſwelling words, whereby ſome men ſet up for reputation, being
" this way examined, will appear to be either nonſenſe, or very flat and
" jejune. And though it ſhould be of no other uſe but this, yet were
" it in theſe days well worth a man's pains and ſtudy; conſidering the
" common miſchief that is done, and the many impoſtures and cheats that
" are put upon men, under the diſguiſe of affected, inſignificant phraſes."
Epiſt. Dedicat.

B.

Yes. And therefore he wrote the *third* Book of his Eſſay, on—" the Nature, Uſe, and Signification of Language." But you ſay, the *whole* of the Eſſay concerns Language: whereas the two firſt Books concern the *Origin* and *Compoſition* of *Ideas*: and he expreſsly declares that it was not till *after* he had paſſed over them, that he thought any conſideration of *words* was at all neceſſary.

H.

If he had been aware of this ſooner, that is, *before* he had treated of (what he calls) the origin and *compoſition* of Ideas; I think it would have made a great difference in his Eſſay. And therefore I ſaid, Mr. Locke's Eſſay is the beſt *Guide* to the firſt ſort of Abbreviations.

B.

Perhaps you imagine that, if he had been aware that he was only writing concerning Language, he might have avoided treating of the origin of Ideas; and ſo have eſcaped the quantity of abuſe which has been unjuſtly poured upon him for his opinion on that ſubject.

H.

No. I think he would have ſet out juſt as he did, with the origin of Ideas; the proper ſtarting-poſt of a Gram-

marian who is to treat of their ſigns. Nor is he ſingular in referring them all to the Senſes; and in beginning an account of Language in that manner *.

B. What

* Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in ſenſu, is, as well as its converſe, an antient and well known poſition.

Sicut in ſpeculo ea quæ videntur non ſunt, ſed eorum ſpecies; ita quæ intelligimus, ea ſunt re ipsâ extra nos, eorumque ſpecies in nobis. Eſt enim *quaſi rerum ſpeculum intellectus noſter; cui, niſi per ſenſum repreſententur res, nihil ſcit ipſe.* J. C. Scaliger, de cauſis, L. I. *Cap.* lxvi.

" I ſenſi (ſays Buonmattei) in un certo modo potrebbon dirſi Miniſtri, " Nunzj, Famigliari, o Segretarj dello 'ntelletto. E acciochè lo Eſempio " ce ne faccia più capaci,—Imaginianci di vedere alcun Principe, ilqual ſe " ne ſtia nella ſua corte, nel ſuo palazzo. Non vede egli con gli occhi " propj, ne ode co' propj orecchi quel che per lo ſtato ſi faccia: ma col " tenere in diverſi luoghi varj Miniſtri che lo ragguagliono di cio che ſegue, " viene a ſapere intender per cotal relazione ogni coſa, e bene ſpeſſo molto " più minutamente e più perfettamente degli ſteſſi miniſtri: Perchè quegli " avendo ſemplicemente notizia di quel che avvenuto ſia nella lor città o " provincia, rimangon di tutto 'l reſto ignoranti, e di facile poſſon fin delle " coſe vedute ingannarſi. Dove il principe può aver di tutto il ſeguito " cognizione in un ſubito, che ſervendogli per riprova d' ogni particolar " riferitogli, non lo laſcia coſi facilmente ingannare. Coſi, dico, è l' In- " telletto umano; ilquale eſſendo di tutte l' altre potenze e Signore e Prin- " cipe, ſe ne ſta nella ſua ordinaria reſidenza ripoſto, e non vede nè ode " coſa che ſi faccia di fuori: Ma avendo cinque miniſtri che lo ragguaglian " di quel che ſuccede, uno nella region della viſta, un altro nella giuriſdizion " dell' udito, quello nella provincia del guſto, queſto ne' paeſi dell' odorato, " e queſt' altro nel diſtretto del tatto, viene a ſapere per mezzo del diſcorſo " ogni coſa in univerſale, tanto più de' ſenſi perfettamente, quanto i ſenſi

B.

What difference then do you imagine it would have made in Mr. Locke's Eſſay, if he had ſooner been aware of the inſeparable connexion between words and knowledge; or, in the language of Sir Hugh, in Shakeſpeare, that "the "lips is *parcel* of the *mind* * ?"

H.

Much. And amongſt many other things, I think he would not have talked of the *compoſition* of *ideas*; but

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"ciaſcuno intendendo nella ſua pura potenza, non poſſon per tutte come lo "'ntelletto diſcorrere. E ſiccome il Principe, ſenza laſciarſi vedere o ſen- "tire, fa noto altrui la ſua volontà per mezzo degli ſteſſi miniſtri; coſi an "cora l' Intelletto fa intenderſi per via de medeſimi Senſi."

BUONMATTEI. *Tratt.* 2. *Cap.* 2.

* "Divers philoſophers hold that the lips is parcel of the mind."
Merry Wives of Windſor, Act 1. Scene 4.

Rowland Jones agrees with his countryman, Sir Hugh Evans. In his "Origin of Language and Nations," Preface, page 17, he ſays (after others)—"I think that Language ought not to be conſidered as mere arbi- "trary ſounds; or any thing leſs than a part, *at leaſt*, of that living ſoul "which God is ſaid to have breathed into man." This method of referring words *immediately* to God as their framer, is a ſhort cut to eſcape inquiry and explanation. It ſaves the philoſopher much trouble; but leaves mankind in great ignorance, and leads to great error.—*Non dignus vindice nodus.*—God having furniſhed man with ſenſes and with organs of articulation; as he has alſo with water, lime and ſand; it ſhould ſeem no more neceſſary to form the words for man, than to temper the mortar.

would

would have ſeen that it was merely a contrivance of Language: and that the only compoſition was in the *terms*; and conſequently that it was as improper to ſpeak of a *complex idea*, as it would be to call a conſtellation a complex ſtar: And that they are not ideas, but merely *terms*, which are *general* and *abſtract*. I think too that he would have ſeen the advantage of "thoroughly weighing" not only (as he ſays) "the *imperfections* of Language;" but its *perfections* alſo: For the perfections of Language, not properly underſtood, have been one of the chief cauſes of the imperfections of our philoſophy. And indeed, from numberleſs paſſages throughout his Eſſay, Mr. Locke ſeems to me to have ſuſpected ſomething of this ſort: and eſpecially from what he hints in his laſt chapter; where, ſpeaking of the doctrine of ſigns, he ſays—"The conſideration then "of Ideas and Words, as the great inſtruments of know-"ledge, makes no deſpicable part of their contemplation "who would take a view of human knowledge in the "whole extent of it. And perhaps, if they were *diſtinctly* "weighed and *duly* conſidered, they would afford us *another* "*ſort* of *Logick* and *Critick* than what we have hitherto "been acquainted with."

B.

Do not you think that what you now advance will bear a diſpute: and that ſome better arguments than your

your bare aſſertion are neceſſary to make us adopt your opinion?

H.

Yes. To many perſons much more would be neceſſary; but not to you. I only deſire you to read the Eſſay over again with attention, and ſee whether all that its immortal author has juſtly concluded will not hold equally true and clear, if you ſubſtitute the compoſition, &c. of *terms* wherever he has ſuppoſed a compoſition, &c. of *ideas*. And if that ſhall upon ſtrict examination appear to you to be the caſe, you will need no other argument againſt the compoſition of Ideas: It being exactly ſimilar to that unanſwerable one which Mr. Locke himſelf declares to be ſufficient againſt their being innate. For the ſuppoſition is unneceſſary: Every purpoſe for which the compoſition of Ideas was imagined being more eaſily and naturally anſwered by the compoſition of Terms: whilſt at the ſame time it does likewiſe clear up many difficulties in which the ſuppoſed compoſition of Ideas neceſſarily involves us. And, though this is the only argument I mean to uſe at preſent, (becauſe I would not willingly digreſs too far, and it is not the neceſſary foundation for what I have undertaken) yet I will venture to ſay, that it is an eaſy matter, upon Mr. Locke's own principles and a phyſical conſideration of the

Senſes

Senſes and the Mind, to prove the impoſſibility of the compoſition of Ideas.

B.

Well. Since you do not intend to build any thing upon it, we may ſafely for the preſent ſuppoſe what you have advanced; and take it for granted that the greateſt part of Mr. Locke's Eſſay, that is, all which relates to what he calls the compoſition, abſtraction, complexity, generalization, relation, &c. of Ideas, does indeed merely concern *Language*. But, pray, let me aſk you; If ſo, what has Mr. Locke done in the *Third* Book of his Eſſay? In which he *profeſſedly* treats of the nature, uſe, and ſignification of *Language?*

H.

He has really done little elſe but enlarge upon what he had ſaid before, when he thought he was treating only of *Ideas:* that is, he has continued to treat of the compoſition of *Terms*. For though, in the paſſage I have before quoted, he ſays, that "unleſs the *force* and *manner* of "ſignification of words are firſt well obſerved, there can "be very little ſaid clearly and pertinently concerning "knowledge;"—and though this is the declared reaſon of writing his *Third* Book concerning Language, as *diſtinct* from

from Ideas; yet he continues to treat ſingly, as before, concerning the *Force* * of words; and has not advanced one ſyllable concerning their *Manner* of ſignification.

The only Diviſion Mr. Locke has made of words, is, into—*Names* of Ideas and *Particles*. This diviſion is not made regularly and formally; but is reſerved to his *ſeventh* Chapter. And even there it is done in a very cautious, doubting, looſe, uncertain manner, very different from that incomparable author's uſual method of proceeding. For, though the general title of the *ſeventh* Chapter is,—*Of Particles*;—yet he ſeems to chuſe to leave it uncertain whether he does or does not include *Verbs* in that title, and particularly what he calls "*the Marks of the Mind's* "*affirming or denying*." And indeed he himſelf acknowledges, in a letter to Mr. Molyneux, that—"Some parts "of that *Third* Book concerning Words, though the "thoughts were eaſy and clear enough, yet coſt him more "pains to expreſs than all the reſt of his Eſſay. And that "therefore he ſhould not much wonder if there were in "ſome parts of it obſcurity and doubtfulneſs." Now whenever any man finds this difficulty to expreſs himſelf,

* The Force of a word depends upon the number of Ideas of which that word is the ſign.

in

in a language with which he is well acquainted, let him be perſuaded that his thoughts are *not* clear enough: for, as Swift (I think) has ſomewhere obſerved, "When the "water is clear you will eaſily ſee to the bottom."

The whole of this vague Chapter—*Of Particles*—(which ſhould have contained an account of every thing but *Nouns*) is comprized in *two pages* and a half: and all the reſt of the Third Book concerns only, as before, the *Force* of the names of Ideas.

B.

How is this to be accounted for? Do you ſuppoſe he was unacquainted with the opinions of Grammarians, or that he deſpiſed the ſubject?

H.

No. I am very ſure of the contrary. For it is plain he did not deſpiſe the ſubject; ſince he repeatedly and ſtrongly recommends it to others: and at every ſtep throughout his Eſſay, I find the moſt evident marks of the journey he had himſelf taken through all their works. But it appears that he was by no means ſatisfied with what he found there concerning *Particles*: For he complains that "this part of Grammar has been as much neglected,

" as ſome others over-diligently cultivated." And ſays, " that " He who would ſhew the right uſe of Particles, " and what ſignificancy and force they have," (that is, according to his own diviſion, the right uſe, ſignificancy, and force of ALL words except the names of Ideas) " muſt " take a little more pains, enter into his own thoughts, " and obſerve nicely the ſeveral poſtures of his mind in " diſcourſing." For theſe *Particles*, he ſays,—" are all " marks of ſome *action* or *intimation* of the *Mind*; and " therefore, to underſtand them rightly, the ſeveral views, " poſtures, ſtands, turns, limitations and exceptions, and " *ſeveral other thoughts* of the Mind, *for which we have* " *either none or very deficient names*, are diligently to be " ſtudied. Of theſe there are a great variety, much " exceeding the number of Particles." For himſelf, he declines the taſk, however neceſſary and neglected by all others; and that for no better reaſon than—" I *intend* " not *here* a *full* explication of this ſort of ſigns." And yet he was (as he profeſſed and thought) writing on the human *Underſtanding*; and therefore ſhould not ſurely have left mankind ſtill in the ſame darkneſs in which he found them, concerning theſe hitherto *unnamed* and (but by himſelf) *undiſcovered* operations of the Mind.

In

In ſhort, this ſeventh Chapter is, to me, a full confeſſion and proof that he had not ſettled his own opinion concerning the *manner* of ſignification of Words: that it ſtill remained (though he did not chuſe to have it ſo underſtood) a *Deſideratum* with him, as it did with our great Bacon before him: and therefore that he would not decide any thing about it; but confined himſelf to the proſecution of his original inquiry concerning the firſt ſort of *Abbreviations*, which is by far the moſt important to knowledge, and which he ſuppoſed to belong to *Ideas*.

But though he declined the ſubject, he evidently leaned towards the opinion of Ariſtotle, Scaliger, and Meſſ. de Port Royal: and therefore, without having ſufficiently examined their poſition, he too haſtily adopted their notion concerning the pretended *Copula*—"*Is*, and *Is not*." He ſuppoſed with them, that *affirming* and *denying* were operations of the *Mind*; and referred all the other ſorts of Words to the ſame ſource. Though, if the different ſorts of Words had been (as he was willing to believe) to be accounted for by the different operations of the Mind, it was almoſt impoſſible they ſhould have eſcaped the penetrating eyes of Mr. Locke.

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ, &c.

CHAP. III.

OF THE PARTS OF SPEECH.

B.

YOU ſaid ſome time ago, very truly, that the number of Parts of Speech was variouſly reckoned: and that it has not to this moment been ſettled, what ſort of difference in words ſhould entitle them to hold a ſeparate rank by themſelves.

By what you have ſince advanced, this matter ſeems to be ten times more unſettled than it was before: for you have diſcarded the differences of *Things*, and the differences of *Ideas*, and the different *operations* of the *Mind*, as guides to a diviſion of Language. Now I cannot for my life imagine any other principle that you have left to conduct us to the *Parts* of Speech.

H.

I thought I had laid down in the beginning, the principles upon which we were to proceed in our inquiry into the *manner of ſignification* of words.

B.

Which do you mean?

H.

The ſame which Mr. Locke employs in his inquiry into the *Force* of words: viz.—The two great purpoſes of ſpeech.

B.

And to what diſtribution do they lead you?

H.

1. To words *neceſſary* for the *communication* of our Thoughts. And

2. To *Abbreviations*, employed for the ſake of diſpatch.

B.

How many of each do you reckon? And which are they?

H. In

H.

In what particular language do you mean? For, if you do not confine your queſtion, you might as reaſonably expect me (according to the fable) "to make a coat to fit "the moon in all her changes."

B.

Why? Are they not the ſame in all languages?

H.

Thoſe *neceſſary* to the communication of our thoughts are.

B.

And are not the others alſo?

H.

No. Very different.

B.

I thought we were talking of Univerſal Grammar.

H.

I mean ſo too. But I cannot anſwer the whole of your queſtion, unleſs you confine it to ſome particular language

with which I am acquainted. However, that need not diſturb you: for you will find afterwards that the principles will apply univerſally.

B.

Well. For the preſent then confine yourſelf to the *neceſſary* Parts: and exemplify in the Engliſh.

H.

In Engliſh, and in all Languages, there are only *two* ſorts of words which are *neceſſary* for the communication of our thoughts.

B.

And they are?

H.

1. Noun, and
2. Verb.

B.

Theſe are the common names, and I ſuppoſe you uſe them according to the common acceptation.

H.

I ſhould not otherwiſe have choſen them, but becauſe they are commonly employed; and it would not be eaſy to

to diſpoſſeſs them of their preſcriptive title: beſides, without doing any miſchief, it ſaves time in our diſcourſe. And I uſe them according to their common acceptation.

B.

But you have not all this while informed me how many *Parts of Speech* you mean to lay down.

H.

That ſhall be as you pleaſe. Either *Two*, or *Twenty*, or more. In the ſtrict ſenſe of the term, no doubt both the neceſſary words and the Abbreviations are all of them Parts of Speech; becauſe they are all uſeful in Language, and each has a different manner of ſignification. But I think it of great conſequence both to knowledge and to Languages, to keep the words employed for the different purpoſes of ſpeech, as diſtinct as poſſible. And therefore I am inclined to allow that rank only to the *neceſſary* words *: and to include all the others (which are not neceſſary to ſpeech, but merely *ſubſtitutes* of the firſt ſort) under the title of *Abbreviations*.

* " Res neceſſarias Philoſophus primo loco ſtatuit: acceſſorias autem & " vicarias, mox."

I. C. Scaliger de Cauſis L. L. cap. 110.

B.

Merely Subſtitutes! You do not mean that you can diſcourſe as well without as with them?

H.

Not as well. A ſledge cannot be drawn along as ſmoothly, and eaſily, and ſwiftly, as a carriage with wheels; but it may be dragged.

B.

Do you mean then that, without uſing any other ſort of word whatever, and merely by the means of the Noun and Verb alone, you can relate or communicate any thing that I can relate or communicate with the help of all the others?

H.

Yes. It is the great proof of all I have advanced. And, upon trial, you will find that you may do the ſame. But, after the long habit and familiar uſe of *Abbreviations*, your firſt attempts to do without them will ſeem very aukward to you; and you will ſtumble as often as a horſe, long uſed to be ſhod, that has newly caſt his ſhoes. Though indeed (even with thoſe who have not the habit to ſtruggle againſt) without *Abbreviations*, Language can

get on but lamely: and therefore they have been introduced, in different plenty, and more or leſs happily, in all Languages. And upon theſe two points—*Abbreviation* of *Terms*, and *Abbreviation* in the *manner of ſignification* of words—depends the reſpective excellence of every Language. All their other comparative advantages are trifling.

B.

I like your method of proof very well; and will certainly put it to the trial. But before I can do that properly, you muſt explain your Abbreviations: that I may know what they ſtand for, and what words to put in their room.

H.

Would you have me then paſs over the *two neceſſary Parts* of Speech; and proceed immediately to their Abbreviations?

B.

If you will. For I ſuppoſe you agree with the common opinion, concerning the words which you have diſtinguiſhed as neceſſary to the communication of our thoughts. Thoſe you call neceſſary, I ſuppoſe you allow to be the *ſigns* of different ſorts of *Ideas*, or of different *operations* of the mind.

H.

Indeed I do not. The buſineſs of the mind, as far as it concerns Language, appears to me to be very ſimple. It extends no farther than to receive Impreſſions, that is, to have Senſations or Feelings. What are called its operations, are merely the operations of Language. A conſideration of *Ideas*, or of the *Mind*, or of *Things* (relative to the Parts of Speech) will lead us no farther than to *Nouns*: i. e. the ſigns of thoſe impreſſions, or names of ideas. The other Part of Speech, the *Verb*, muſt be accounted for from the neceſſary uſe of it in communication. It is in fact the communication itſelf: and therefore well denominated Ρημα, *dictum*. For the Verb is QUOD *loquimur* *; the *Noun*, DE QUO.

B.

Let us proceed then regularly; and hear what you have to ſay on each of your *two* neceſſary Parts of Speech.

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* "Alterum eſt quod loquimur; alterum de quo loquimur."
Quinctil. lib. i. cap. 4.

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ, &c.

CHAP. IV.

OF THE NOUN.

H.

OF the firſt Part of Speech—the Noun,—it being the beſt underſtood, and therefore the moſt ſpoken of by others, I ſhall need *at preſent* to ſay little more than that it is the *ſimple* or *complex*, the *particular* or *general ſign* or *name* of *one* or *more Ideas*.

I ſhall only remind you, that at this ſtage of our inquiry concerning Language, comes in moſt properly the conſideration of the Force of terms: which is the whole buſineſs of Mr. Locke's Eſſay; to which I refer you. And I imagine that Mr. Locke's *intention* of confining himſelf to the conſideration of the *Mind* only, was the reaſon that he went no farther than to the *Force* of Terms; and did not meddle with their *Manner* of ſignification, to which the Mind alone could never lead him.

B.

Do you ſay nothing of the Declenſion, Number, Caſe and Gender of Nouns?

H.

At preſent nothing. There is no pains-worthy difficulty nor diſpute about them.

B.

Surely there is about the Gender. And Mr. Harris particularly has thought it worth his while to treat at large of what others have ſlightly hinted concerning it *: and has ſupported his reaſoning by a long liſt of poetical authorities. What think you of that part of his book?

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* "Pythagorici *ſexum* in *cunctis* agnoſcunt, &c. *Agens*, Mas; *Patiens*, "Fœmina. Quapropter *Deus* dicunt maſculinè; *Terra*, fœmininè; & "*Ignis*, maſculinè; & *Aqua*, fœmininè: quoniam in his *Actio*, in iſtis "*Paſſio* relucebat."

Campanella.

"In rebus inveniuntur duæ proprietates generales, ſcilicet proprietas "*Agentis*, & proprietas *Patientis*. Genus eſt modus ſignificandi nominis "ſumptus a proprietate activa vel paſſiva. Genus maſculinum eſt modus "ſignificandi rem ſub proprietate agentis: Genus femininum eſt modus "ſignificandi rem ſub proprietate patientis."

Scotus-Gram. Spec. Cap. xvi.

H. That,

H.

That, with the reſt of it, he had much better have let it alone. And as for his poetical authorities; the Muſes (as I have heard Mrs. Peachum ſay of her own ſex in caſes of murder) are bitter bad judges in matters of philoſophy. Beſides that Reaſon is an arrant Deſpot; who, in his own dominions, admits of no authority but his own. And Mr. Harris is particularly unfortunate in the very outſet of that—" ſubtle kind of reaſoning (as he calls it) which " diſcerns even in things without ſex, a diſtant analogy to " that great natural diſtinction." For his very firſt inſtances,—the SUN and the MOON,—deſtroy the whole ſubtilty of this kind of reaſoning *. For Mr. Harris ought to have known, that in many Aſiatic Languages, and in all the northern Languages of this part of the globe which we inhabit, and particularly in our Mother-language the Anglo-ſaxon (from which SUN and MOON are immediately

* It can only have been Mr. Harris's authority, and the ill-founded praiſes laviſhed on his performance, that could miſlead Dr. Prieſtley, in his thirteenth lecture, haſtily and without examination, to ſay——" Thus, for example, " the SUN having a ſtronger, and the MOON a weaker influence over the " world, and there being but two celeſtial bodies ſo remarkable; *All nations*, " I believe, that uſe genders, have aſcribed to the Sun the gender of the " *Male*, and to the Moon that of the *Female*."

In the Gothic, Anglo-ſaxon, German, Dutch, Daniſh and Swediſh, SUN is *feminine*: In modern Ruſſian it is *neuter*.

derived

derived to us) SUN is *Feminine*, and MOON is *Maſculine* *. So feminine is the Sun, ["that fair hot wench in flame-"colour'd taffata"] † that our northern Mythology makes her the *Wife* of Tuiſco.

And if our Engliſh Poets, Shakeſpeare, Milton, &c. have, by a familiar Proſopopeia, made them of different genders; it is only becauſe, from their claſſical reading, they adopted the ſouthern not the northern mythology; and followed the pattern of their Greek and Roman maſters.

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* "Apud Saxones, Luna, *Mona*. *Mona* autem Germanis ſuperioribus "*Mon*, alias *Man*; a *Mon*, alias *Man* veterrimo ipſorum rege & Deo "patrio, quem Tacitus meminit, & in *Luna* celebrabant.—Ex hoc Lunam "maſculino (ut *Hebræi*) dicunt genere, *Der Mon:* Dominamque ejus & "Amaſiam, e cujus aſpectu aliàs languet, aliàs reſipiſcit, *Die Son*; quaſi "*hunc* Lunam, *hanc* Solem. Hinc & Idolum Lunæ viri fingebant ſpecie; "non, ut Verſtegan opinatur, fœminæ." Spelman's Gloſſ. MONA.

"De generibus Nominum (quæ per articulos, adjectiva, participia, & "pronomina indicantur) hic nihil tradimus. Obiter tamen obſervet Lector, "ut ut minuta res eſt, *Solem* (*Sunna* vel *Sunne*) in Anglo-ſaxonica eſſe "*fœminini* generis, & *Lunam* (*Mona*) eſſe *maſculini.*" G. Hickes.

"Quomodo item *Sol* eſt *virile*, Germanicum *Sunn*, *fœmininum*. Dicunt "enim *Die Sunn*, non *Der Sunn*. Unde & Solem Tuiſconis uxorem fuiſſe "fabulantur." G. J. Voſſius.

† 1ſt. part of Henry 4th.

Figure

Figure apart, in our Language, the names of things without ſex are alſo without gender *. And this, not becauſe our Reaſoning or Underſtanding differs from theirs who gave them gender; (which muſt be the caſe, if the

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* " Sexus enim non niſi in Animali, aut in iis quæ Animalis naturam " imitantur, ut Arbores. Sed ab uſu hoc factum eſt; qui nunc maſculinum " ſexum, nunc fœmininum attribuiſſet.——Proprium autem generum eſſe " pati mutationem, ſatis patet ex genere incerto; ut etiam *Armentas* dixerit " Ennius, quæ nos *Armenta*." J. C. Scaliger de cauſis, cap. lxxix.

" Nominum quoque genera mutantur adeo, ut privatim libros ſuper hac " re veteres confecerint. Alterum argumentum eſt ex iis quæ *Dubia* ſive " *Incerta* vocant. Sic enim dictum eſt, *Hic* vel *Hæc* dies. Tertium teſti- " monium eſt in quibuſdam: nam Plautus *collum* maſculino dixit. Item " *Jubar*, *Palumbem*, atque alia, diverſis quam nos generibus eſſe a priſcis " pronunciata." Id. cap. ciii.

" *Amour* qui eſt maſculin au ſingulier, eſt quelquefois feminin au pluriel; " *de folles amours*. On dit au maſculin *Un Comté*, *Un Duché*; & au feminin " *Une Comté pairie*, *Une Duché pairie*. On dit encore *De bonnes gens*, & " *Des gens malheureux*. Par où vous voyez que le ſubſtantif *Gens* eſt " feminin, lorſqu' il eſt précédé d' un adjectif; & qu'il eſt maſculin, lorſqu' " il en eſt ſuivi." L' Abbé de Condillac, P. 2. chap. iv.

The ingenious author of—Notes on the Grammatica Sinica of M. Fourmont—ſays, " According to the Grammaire Raiſonnée, *les genres ont eté* " *inventés pour les terminaiſons*. But the Meſſ. du Port Royal have diſ- " covered a different origin; they tell us that—*Arbor eſt feminine, parceque* " *comme une bonne mere elle porte du fruit*.—Miratur non ſua. How could " Frenchmen forget that in their own *la meilleure des langues poſſibles*, Fruit- " trees are maſculine, and their fruits feminine? Mr. Harris has adopted " this idea: he might as well have left it to its legitimate parents." P. 47.

Mind

Mind or Reaſon was concerned in it *.) But becauſe with us the relation of words to each other is denoted by the place or by Prepoſitions; which denotation in their language uſually made a part of the words themſelves, and was ſhewn by caſes or terminations. This contrivance of theirs, allowing them a more varied conſtruction, made the terminating genders of Adjectives uſeful, in order to avoid miſtake and miſapplication.

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* "Sane in ſexu ſeu genere phyſico omnes nationes convenire debebunt; "quoniam natura eſt eadem, nec ad placitum ſcriptorum mutatur. At "Poetæ & Pictores in coloribus non ſemper conveniunt. Ventos Romani "non ſolum finxerunt eſſe viros, ſed & Deos: at Hebræi contra eos ut "Nymphas pinxerunt. Arbores Latini ſpecie fœmineâ pinxerunt; virili "Hiſpani, &c. Regiones urbeſque Deas eſſe voluit Gentilium Latinorum "Theologia: at Germani omnia hæc ad neutrum rejecerunt. Et quidem "in Genere, ſeu ſexûs diſtinctione grammaticâ, magna eſt inter authores "differentia; non ſolum in diverſis linguis, ſed etiam in eadem. In La-"tina, ne ad alias, recurram, aliter Oratores, & aliter Poetæ: aliter ve-"teres, & aliter juniores ſentiunt, &c. Iberes in Aſia florere dicuntur, "& linguam habere elegantem, & tamen nullam generum varietatem "agnoſcunt." Caramuel, lxii.

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ, &c.

CHAP. V.

OF THE ARTICLE AND INTERJECTION.

B.

HOWEVER connected with the *Noun*, and generally treated of at the ſame time, I ſuppoſe you forbear to mention the *Articles* at preſent, as not allowing them to be a ſeparate Part of Speech; at leaſt not a neceſſay Part; becauſe, as Wilkins tells us, "the Latin is without them *." Notwithſtanding which, when you conſider with him that "they are ſo convenient for the greater diſtinctneſs of "ſpeech; and that upon this account, the Hebrew, Greek, "Sclavonic, and moſt other languages have them;" perhaps you will not think it improper to follow the example of many other Grammarians: who, though like you, they deny them to be any part of ſpeech, have yet treated of them ſeparately from thoſe parts which they enumerate. And this you may very conſiſtently do, even though you

* Eſſay, Part 3. Chap. 3.

ſhould

ſhould conſider them, as the Abbé Girard calls them, merely the *avant-coureurs* to announce the approach or entrance of a Noun *.

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* " J'abandonne l'art de copier des mots dits & répétés mille fois avant " moi; puiſqu'ils n'expliquent pas les choſes eſſentielles que j'ai deſſein de " faire entendre à mes lecteurs. Une étude attentive, faite d'apres l'uſage " m'inſtruit bien mieux. Elle m'apprend que l'Article eſt un mot établi " pour annoncer & particulariſer ſimplement la choſe ſans la nommer: c'eſt " à dire, qu'il eſt une expreſſion indefinie, quoique poſitive, dont la juſte " valeur n'eſt que de faire naitre l'idée d'une eſpece ſubſiſtente qu'on " diſtingue de la totalité des etres, pour être enſuite nommée. Cette de- " finition en expoſe clairement la nature & le ſervice propre, au quel on " le voit conſtamment attaché dans quelque circonſtance que ce ſoit. Elle " m'en donne une idée nette & déterminée: me le fait reconnoitre par " tout: & m'empeche de le confondre avec tout autre mot d'eſpece diffé- " rente. Je ſens parfaitement que lorſque je veux parler d'un objet, qui " ſe préſente à mes yeux ou à mon imagination, le génie de ma langue ne " m'en fournit pas toujours là denomination préciſe dans le premier inſtant " de l'exécution de la parole: que le plus ſouvent il m'offre d'abord un " autre mot, comme un commencement de ſujet proposé & de diſtinction " des autres objets; enſorte que ce mot eſt un vrai préparatoire à la deno- " mination, par lequel elle eſt annoncée, avant que de ſe préſenter ille " même: Et voilà l'*Article* tel que je l'ai defini. Si cet *Avant-coureur* " diminue la vivacité du langage, il y met in récompenſe une certaine po- " liteſſe & une délicateſſe qui naiſſent de cette idée préparatoire & indéfinie " d'un objet qu'on va nommer: car par ce moyen l'eſprit étant rendu at- " tentif avant que d'être inſtruit, il a le plaiſir d'aller au devant de la déno- " mination, de la deſirer, & de l'attendre avant que de la poſſéder. Plaiſir " qui a ici, comme ailleurs, un mérite flateur, propre à piquer le gout.— " Qu'on me paſſe cette metaphore; puiſqu'elle a de la juſteſſe, & fait con- " noitre d'une maniere ſenſible une choſe *tres-metaphyſique*." *Diſc.* iv.

H.

Of all the accounts which have been given of the Article, I muſt own I think that of the very ingenious Abbé Girard to be the moſt fantaſtic and abſurd. The fate of this very neceſſary word has been moſt ſingularly hard and unfortunate. For though without it, or ſome equivalent invention *, men could not communicate their thoughts at all; yet (like many of the moſt uſeful things in this world) from its unaffected ſimplicity and want of brilliancy, it has been ungratefully neglected and degraded. It has been conſidered, after Scaliger, as "*otioſum loquaciſſimæ gentis* "*Inſtrumentum*;" or, at beſt, as a mere *vaunt-courier* to announce the coming of his maſter: whilſt the brutiſh inarticulate *Interjection*, which has nothing to do with ſpeech, and is only the miſerable refuge of the ſpeechleſs, has been permitted, becauſe beautiful and gaudy, to uſurp a place amongſt words, and to exclude the Article from its well-earned dignity. But though the Article is denied by many Grammarians to be a Part of Speech; it is yet, as you ſay, treated of by many, ſeparately from thoſe parts

* For ſome equivalent invention, ſee the Perſian and other Eaſtern languages; which ſupply the place of our Article by a termination to thoſe Nouns which they would indefinitely particularize.

This circumſtance of fact (if there were not other reaſons) ſufficiently explodes Girard's notion of *Avant-coureurs*.

which they allow. This inconſiſtency * and the cauſe of it are pleaſantly ridiculed by Buonmattei, whoſe underſtanding had courage ſufficient to reſtore the Article; and to launch out beyond *quelle fatali colonne che gli antichi avevan ſegnate col—Non plus ultra.* " Dodici" ſays he, " Tratt. 7. Cap. 22, 23.) " affermiamo eſſer le Parti dell' " orazione nella noſtra lingua. Nè ci ſiam curati che gli " altri quaſi tutti non ne voglion conceder piu d' otto; " moſſi, come ſi vede, da una certa ſopraſtizioſa oſtinazione " (ſia detto con pace e riverenza loro) che gli autori piu " antichi hanno ſtabilito tal numero: Quaſi che abbiano " in tal modo proibito a noi il paſſar quelle fatali colonne " che gli antichi avevan ſegnate col—*Non plus ultra.* Onde " perchè i Latini dicevan tutti con una voce uniforme— " *Partes Orationis ſunt octo :*—quei che intorno a cent anni " ſono ſcriſſon le regole di queſta lingua, cominciavan con " la medeſima cantilena. Il che ſe ſia da commendare o " da biaſimare non dirò: Baſta che a me par una coſa " ridicoloſa, dire—*Otto ſon le parti dell' orazione,*—e ſubito " ſoggiugnere—*Ma innanzi che io di quelle incominci a* " *ragionare, fa meſtiero che ſopra gli Articoli alcuna coſa* " *ti dica.*

* What Scaliger ſays of the Participle may very juſtly be applied to this manner of treating the Article. " Si non eſt *Nota*, imo verò ſi nonnullis " ne pars quidem orationis ulla, ab aliis ſeparata, judicata eſt; quo conſilio " ei rei, quæ nuſquam extat, ſedem ſtatuunt." *Lib.* 7. *Cap.* cxl.

" Queſto

" Queſto è il medeſimo che ſe diceſſimo—Tre ſon le " parti del mondo: Ma prima ch' io ti ragioni di quelle, " ſa meſtiero che ſopra l'Europa alcuna coſa ti dica."

B.

As far as reſpects the Article I think you are right. But why ſuch bitterneſs againſt the Interjection? Why do you not rather follow Buonmattei's example; and, inſtead of excluding both, admit them both to be Parts of Speech? *

H.

Becauſe the dominion of Speech is erected upon the downfall of Interjections. Without the artful contrivances of Language, mankind would have nothing but Interjections with which to communicate, orally, any of their feelings. The neighing of a horſe, the lowing of a cow,

* " Interjectionem non eſſe partem orationis, ſic oſtends. Quod naturale eſt, idem eſt apud omnes: ſed gemitus et ſigna lætitiæ idem ſunt apud omnes: ſunt igitur naturales. Si vero naturales non ſunt partes orationis. Nam eæ partes, ſecundum Ariſtotelem *ex inſtituto*, non *natura*, debent conſtare. Interjectionem Græci adverbiis adnumerant, ſed falſo: nam neque Græcis literis ſcribantur, ſed ſigna triſtitiæ, aut lætitiæ, qualia in avibus, aut quadrupedibus, quibus tamen nec vocem nec orationem concedimus. Valla interjectionem a partibus orationis rejicit. Itaque Interjectionem a partibus orationis excludimus: tantum abeſt, ut eam primam et precipuam cum Cæſare Scaligero conſtituamus." Sanctii Minerva. Lib. i. Cap. 2. De partibus orationis. Page 17. Edit. Amſt. 1714.

the barking of a dog, the purring of a cat, ſneezing, coughing, groaning, ſhrieking, and every other involuntary convulſion with oral ſound, have almoſt as good a title to be called Parts of Speech, as Interjections have. Voluntary Interjections are only employed when the ſuddenneſs or vehemence of ſome affection or paſſion returns men to their natural ſtate; and makes them, for a moment forget the uſe of ſpeech *: or when, from ſome circumſtance, the

* The induſtrious and exact *Cinonio*, who does not appear ever to have had a ſingle glimpſe of reaſon, ſpeaks thus of *one* interjection:—

" I varj affetti cui ſerve queſta interiezzione *Ah* et *Abi*, ſono piu di " venti: ma v' abbiſogna d'un avvertimento; che nell' eſprimerli ſempre " diverſificano il ſuono, e vagliono quel tanto che, preſſo i Latini, Ah. " Proh. Oh. Vah. Hei. Pape, &c. Ma queſta è parte ſpettante a chi " pronunzia, che ſappia dar loro l'accento di quell' affetto cui ſervono; " e ſono

" d'eſclamazione.
" di dolerſi.
" di ſvillaveggiare.
" di pregare.
" di gridare minacciando.
" di minacciare.
" di ſoſpirare.
" di ſgarare.
" di maravigliarſi.
" d' incitare.
" di ſdegno.
" di deſiderare.

" di re-

the ſhortneſs of time will not permit them to exerciſe it. And in books they are only uſed for embelliſhment, and to mark ſtrongly the above ſituations. But where Speech can be employed, they are totally uſeleſs; and are always inſufficient for the purpoſe of communicating our thoughts. And indeed where will you look for the Interjection? Will you find it amongſt laws, or in books of civil inſtitutions, in hiſtory, or in any treatiſe of uſeful arts or ſciences? No. You muſt ſeek for it in rhetorick and poetry, in novels, plays and romances.

B.

If what you ſay is true, I muſt acknowledge that the Article has had hard meaſure to be diſplaced for the Interjection. For by your declamation, and the zeal you have ſhewn in its defence, it is evident that you do not intend we ſhould, with Scaliger, conſider it merely as *otioſum Inſtrumentum*.

" di reprendere.
" di vendicarſi.
" di raccomandazione.
" di commovimento per allegrezza.
" di lamentarſi.
" di beffare.
" et altri varj."

Annotazioni all' trattato, delle Particelle, di Cinonio. Capitolo xi.

H. Moſt

H.

Moſt aſſuredly not: though I acknowledge that it has been uſed *otiosè* by many nations *. And I do not wonder that, keeping his eyes ſolely on the ſuperfluous uſe (or rather abuſe) of it, he ſhould too haſtily conclude againſt this very neceſſary inſtrument itſelf.

B.

Say you ſo! very *neceſſary* inſtrument! Since then you have, contrary to my expectation, allowed its neceſſity, I ſhould be glad to know how the Article comes to be ſo neceſſary to Speech: and, if neceſſary, how can the Latin language be without it, as moſt authors agree that it is †? And

* " Il ſeroit à ſouhaiter qu'on ſupprimât l'Article, toutes les fois que les " noms ſont ſuffiſamment determinés par la nature de la choſe ou par les " circonſtances; le diſcours en ſeroit plus vif. Mais la grande habitude " que nous nous en ſommes faite, ne le permet pas: & ce n'eſt que dans " des proverbes, plus anciens que cette habitude, que nous nous faiſons " une loi de le ſupprimer. On dit—*Pauvreté n'eſt pas vice:* au lieu de " dire—*La pauvreté n'eſt pas un vice.*" CONDILLAC. *Gram. Part* 2. *Chap.* 14.

Without any injury to the meaning of the paſſage, the *article* might have been omitted here by Condillac, twelve or thirteen times.

† Ὡς δοκει μοι περι Ρωμαιων λεγειν ὁρωμελλω νυν ὁμως τι παντες ανθρωποι χρωνται. προθεσεις τε γαρ αφηρηκε, πλην ολιγων απασας, των τε καλουμενων αρθρων, ωθεν προσδιχεται το παραπαν. Πλατωνικα Ζητηματα 9.

And when you have given me ſatisfaction on thoſe points, you will permit me to aſk you a few queſtions farther.

H.

You may learn its neceſſity, if you pleaſe, from Mr. Locke. And that once proved, it follows of conſequence that I muſt deny its abſence from the Latin or from any other language *.

B. Mr.

" *Articulus* nobis nullus & Græcis ſuperfluus."

" Satis conſtat Græcorum *Articulos* non neglectos a nobis, ſed eorum " uſum ſuperfluum."

J. C. Scaliger de C. L. L. Cap. lxxii.—cxxxi.

It is pleaſant after this to have Scaliger's authority againſt himſelf, and to hear him prove that the Latin not only has *Articles*; but even the very identical Article Ὁ of the Greeks: for he ſays (and, notwithſtanding the etymological diſſent of Voſſius, ſays truly) that the Latin *Qui* is no other than the Greek ὃς ἥ ὅ.

" *Articulum*, Fabio teſte, Latinus ſermo non deſiderat: imo, me judice, " planè ignorat."

G. J. Vossius.

" Diſpleaſed with the redundance of Particles in the Greek, the Romans " extended their diſpleaſure to the *Article*, which they totally baniſhed." *Notes on the* Grammatica Sinica *of* Monſ. Fourmont, p. 54.

* " L'Article indicatif ſe ſupplée ſur tout par la terminaiſon, dans les " langues à terminaiſons, comme la langue Latine. C'eſt ce qui avoit fait

B.

Mr. Locke! He has not ſo much as even once mentioned the Article.

H.

Notwithſtanding which he has ſufficiently proved its neceſſity; and conducted us directly to its uſe and purpoſe. For in the eleventh Chapter of the ſecond Book of his Eſſay, Sect. 9, he ſays,—" The uſe of words being to " ſtand as outward marks of our internal ideas, and thoſe " ideas being taken from particular things; if every par- " ticular idea ſhould have a diſtinct name, names would " be endleſs." So again, Book 3. Chap. 3. treating of *General Terms*, he ſays,—" All things that exiſt being " particulars, it may perhaps be thought reaſonable that " words, which ought to be conformed to things, ſhould " be ſo too; I mean in their ſignification. But yet we " find the quite contrary. The far greateſt part of words

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" croire mal-à-propos que les Latins n'avoient aucun Article; & qui avoit " fait conclure plus mal-à-propos encore que l'Article n'etoit pas une partie " du diſcours."

COURT de GEBELIN, *Gram. Univerſelle*, p. 192.

The Latin quis is evidently ὅς τις; and the Latin terminations us. a. um, no other than the Greek article ος, η. ον.

" that make all languages, are *General Terms*. Which " has not been the effect of neglect, or chance, but of " reaſon and neceſſity. For, firſt, it is impoſſible that " every particular thing ſhould have a diſtinct peculiar " name. For the ſignification and uſe of words depend- " ing on that connection which the mind makes between " its ideas and the ſounds it uſes as ſigns of them; it is " neceſſary, in the application of names to things, that " the mind ſhould have diſtinct ideas of the things, and " retain alſo the peculiar name that belongs to every " one, with its peculiar appropriation to that idea. We " may therefore eaſily find a reaſon why men have never " attempted to give names to each ſheep in their flock, or " crow that flies over their heads; much leſs to call every " leaf of plants or grain of ſand that came in their way " by a peculiar name.—Secondly, If it were poſſible, it " would be uſeleſs: becauſe it would not ſerve to the " chief end of Language. Men would in vain heap up " names of particular things, that would not ſerve them " to communicate their thoughts. Men learn names, and " uſe them in talk with others, only that they may be " underſtood; which is then only done, when by uſe or " conſent, the ſound I make by the organs of ſpeech " excites in another man's mind who hears it, the idea I " apply to it in mine when I ſpeak it. This cannot be

" done

" done by names applied to particular things, whereof I " alone having the ideas in my mind, the names of them " could not be ſignificant or intelligible to another who " was not acquainted with all thoſe very particular things " which had fallen under my notice."—And again, Sect. 11.—" General and Univerſal belong not to the real " exiſtence of things; but are the inventions and creatures " of the Underſtanding, made by it for its own uſe, and " concern only *ſigns*. Univerſality belongs not to things " themſelves which are all of them particular in their " exiſtence. When therefore we quit Particulars, the " *Generals* that reſt are only creatures of our own making; " their *general* nature being nothing but the capacity they " are put into of ſignifying or repreſenting many Parti- " culars."

Now from this neceſſity of *General Terms*, follows immediately the neceſſity of the *Article*: whoſe buſineſs it is to reduce their generality, and upon occaſion to enable us to employ *general* terms for *Particulars*.

So that the Article alſo, *in combination with a general term*, is merely a *ſubſtitute*. But then it differs from thoſe ſubſtitutes which we have ranked under the general head of *Abbreviations*: becauſe it is *neceſſary* for the communi-

cation.

cation of our thoughts, and ſupplies the place of words which *are not* in the language. Whereas *Abbreviations* are *not neceſſary* for communication; and ſupply the place of words which *are* in the language.

B.

As far then as regards the *Article*, Mr. Harris ſeems at preſent to be the author moſt likely to meet with your approbation: for he not only eſtabliſhes its neceſſity, in order "to circumſcribe the latitude of genera and ſpecies," and therefore treats of it ſeparately; but has raiſed it to a degree of importance much beyond all other modern Grammarians. And though he admits of only two Articles, "properly and ſtrictly ſo called," viz. A and THE; yet has he aſſigned to theſe two little words full one fourth part in his diſtribution of language: which, you know, is into—"Subſtantives, Attributives, Definitives, and Connectives."

H.

If Mr. Harris has not intirely ſecured my concurrence with his Doctrine of *Definitives*, I muſt confeſs he has at leaſt taken effectual care to place it compleatly beyond the reach of confutation. He ſays,

1. "The

1. " The Articles have no meaning, but when aſſociated " to ſome other word."

2. " Nothing can be more nearly related than the Greek " article Ὁ to the Engliſh article THE."

3. " But the article A defines in an imperfect manner."

4. " *Therefore* the Greeks have no article correſpondent " to our article A."

5. However " they ſupply its place."

—And *How*, think you?

6. " By a *Negation*"—(obſerve well their method of ſupply)—" by a *negation* of their article Ὁ;" (that is, as he well explains himſelf,)—" without " any thing prefixed, but only the article Ὁ " withdrawn."

7. " Even in Engliſh, we alſo *expreſs* the force of the " article A, in plurals, by the ſame *negation* of the " article THE *."

Now

* " It is perhaps owing to the imperfect manner in which the Article A " defines, that the Greeks have no article correſpondent to it, but ſupply " its place, by a negation of their Article Ὁ.—Ὁ ανθρωπος επεσεν, THE man " fell; ανθρωπος επεσεν, A man fell;—without any thing prefixed, but only " the Article withdrawn."

" Even

Now here I acknowledge myſelf to be compleatly thrown out; and, like the philoſopher of old, merely for want of a firm reſting-place on which to fix my machine: for it would have been as eaſy for him to raiſe the earth with a fulcrum of ether, as for me to eſtabliſh any reaſoning or argument on this ſort of *negation*. For, "*nothing being* "*prefixed*," I cannot imagine in what manner or in what reſpect a *negation* of 'O or of THE, differs from a *negation* of *Harris* or of *Pudding*. For lack however of the light of comprehenſion, I muſt do, as other Grammarians do in ſimilar ſituations; attempt to illuſtrate by a parallel.

I will ſuppoſe Mr. Harris (when one of the Lords of the Treaſury) to have addreſſed the Miniſter in the ſame ſtyle of reaſoning.——"Salaries, Sir, produce no benefit, "unleſs aſſociated to ſome receiver: my ſalary at preſent "is but an imperfect proviſion for myſelf and family: "but your ſalary as Miniſter is much more compleat.

"Even in Engliſh, where the Article A cannot be uſed, as in plurals, "its force is expreſſed by the ſame negation.—*Thoſe are* THE *men*, means, "Thoſe are individuals of which we poſſeſs ſome previous knowledge.— "*Thoſe are men*, the Article apart, means no more than they are ſo many "vague and uncertain individuals; juſt as the phraſe,—*A man*, in the "ſingular, implies one of the ſame number."

Book 2. Chap. 1.

"Oblige

" Oblige me therefore by withdrawing my preſent ſcanty " pittance; and ſupply its place to me, by a *negation* of " your ſalary."—I think this requeſt could not reaſonably have been denied: and what ſatisfaction Mr. Harris would have felt by finding his theory thus reduced to practice, no perſon can better judge than myſelf; becauſe I have experienced a conduct not much diſſimilar from the Rulers of the Inner Temple: who having firſt *inticed* me to quit one profeſſion, after many years of expectation, have very handſomely ſupplied its place to me by a *negation* of the other.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE three following chapters (except ſome ſmall alterations and additions) have already been given to the public in *A Letter to Mr.* DUNNING in the year 1778: which, though publiſhed, was not written on the ſpur of the occaſion. The ſubſtance of that Letter, and of all that I have farther to communicate on the ſubject of Language, has been amongſt the looſe papers in my cloſet now upwards of thirty years; and would probably have remained there ſome years longer, and have been finally conſigned with myſelf to oblivion, if I had not been made the miſerable victim of—*Two Prepoſitions and a Conjunction.*

The officiating Prieſts indeed * were themſelves of rank and eminence ſufficient to dignify and grace my fall. But

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* Attorney General *Thurlow*—ſince Chancellor and a Peer.
Solicitor General *Wedderburne*—ſince Chancellor and a Peer.
Earl Mansfield, Chief Juſtice.
Mr. Buller—ſince a Judge.
Wr. Wallace—ſince Attorney General.
Mr. Mansfield—ſince Solicitor General.
Mr. Bearcroft—ſince Chief Juſtice of Cheſter.

that the Conjunction THAT, and the Prepoſitions OF and CONCERNING (words which have hitherto been held to have NO meaning) ſhould be made the abject inſtruments of my *civil extinction*, (for ſuch was the *intention*, and ſuch has been the *conſequence* of my proſecution); appeared to me to make my exit from civil life as degrading as if I had been brained by a lady's fan. For mankind in general are not ſufficiently aware that words without meaning, or of equivocal meaning, are the everlaſting engines of fraud and injuſtice: and that the *grimgribber* of Weſtminſter-Hall is a more fertile, and a much more formidable, ſource of impoſture than the *abracadabra* of magicians.

Upon a motion made by me in arreſt of judgment in the court of King's-Bench in the year 1777, the Chief Juſtice adjourned the deciſion: and inſtead of arguments on the merits of my objection, (which however by a ſide-wind were falſely repreſented by him as merely *literal flaws* *) deſired that *Precedents* might be brought by the Attorney General on a future day. None were however adduced, but by the Chief Juſtice himſelf; who indeed

* " *Lord Mansfield*,
" If the Defendant has a legal advantage from a *Literal* flaw, *God forbid* " that he ſhould not have the benefit of it."
Proceedings in K. B. The King againſt Horne.

produced two. (Thereby depriving me of the opportunity of combating the Precedents and their application, which I ſhould have had if they had been produced by the Attorney General *. And on the ſtrength of theſe two Precedents alone, (forgetting his own deſcription and diſtinction of the crime to the Jury) he decided againſt me †.

I ſay,

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* " Lord Mansfield
" I fancy the Attorney General was *ſurprized* with the objection."

† The Attorney General, in his reply, ſaid to the Jury, " Let us a little " ſee what is the nature of the obſervations he makes. In the firſt place, " that I left it exceedingly ſhort: and the objection to my having left it " ſhort, was ſimply this; that I had ſtated no more to you but this, that of " imputing to the conduct of the King's troops the crime of murder. *Now I ſtated it, as imputed to the troops,* ORDERED *as they were upon the* " PUBLIC SERVICE."

Lord Mansfield to the Jury
" Read the paper. What is it? Why it is this; that our beloved Ame- " rican Fellow-ſubjects—*in* REBELLION *againſt the ſtate*—not beloved ſo as " to be *abetted in their* REBELLION." Again,—" What is the employment " they (the troops) are ORDERED upon? Why then what are *they who gave* " *the* ORDERS? Draw the concluſion." Again,—" The unhappy reſiſtance " to the LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY of this kingdom by many of our Fellow- " ſubjects in America: the LEGISLATURE of this kingdom have avowed " that the Americans REBELLED: Troops are EMPLOYED *upon this ground.* " The caſe is here between a *juſt Government and* REBELLIOUS *ſubjects.*"— Again,—" You will read this paper; you will judge whether it is not " *denying the Government and Legiſlative authority of England.*" And again, —" If you are of opinion that they were all murdered (like the caſes of " *undoubted*

I ſay, on the ſtrength of theſe two precedents alone. For the groſs perverſion and miſapplication of the technical term *de bene eſſe*, was merely *pour eblouir*, to introduce the proceedings on the trial, and to divert the attention from the only point in queſtion—the ſufficiency of the charge in the Record.—And I cannot believe that any man breathing (except Lord Mansfield) either in the profeſſion or out of it, will think it an argument againſt the validity of my objection; that it was brought forward only by myſelf, and *had not been alleged before by the learned Counſel for the Printers*. This however I can truly tell his lordſhip; that the moſt learned of them all, (*abſit invidia*) Mr. Dunning, was not

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" *undoubted murders*, of Glenco, and twenty other maſſacres that might be " named) why then you may form a different concluſion."

And again—" If ſome ſoldiers, *Without authority*, had got in a drunken " fray, and murder had enſued, and that this paper could relate to that, it " would be quite a different thing from the charge in the information: " BECAUSE it is *charged—as a ſeditious Libel tending to diſquiet the minds of " the People.*" See the Trial.

A man muſt be not only well practiſed, but even *hackneyed* in *our* Courts of Juſtice to diſcover the above deſcription of my crime in the *Prepoſitions*, OF and CONCERNING. Be that as it may: It is evident that the Attorney General and the Chief Juſtice did not expect the Jury to be ſo enlightened; and therefore (*when I had no longer a right to open my lips*) they deſcribed a crime to them in that plain language which I ſtill contend I had a right to expect in the *Information*; BECAUSE—" *A ſeditious Libel tending to diſ- " quiet the minds of the people*,"—has been determined to be mere *paper and packthread*, and no part of the *Charge*.

aware of the objection when I firſt mentioned it to him; that he would not believe the information could be ſo defective in all its Counts, till I produced to him an Office Copy: when to his aſtoniſhment he found it ſo, he felt no jealouſy that the objection had been miſſed by himſelf; but declared it to be *inſuperable* and *fatal:* and bad me reſt aſſured, that whatever might be Lord Mansfield's wiſhes, and his *courage* on ſuch occaſions, he would not *dare* to overrule the objection. And when after the cloſe of the firſt day, I hinted to him my ſuſpicions of Lord Mansfield's intentions by the "*God forbid*;" and by the perverted and miſapplied "*De bene eſſe*," in order to mix the proceedings on the trial with the queſtion of record; he ſmiled at it, as merely a method which his lordſhip took of letting the matter down gently, and breaking the abruptneſs of his fall.

Strange as it may appear! One of thoſe Precedents was was merely *imagined* by the Chief Juſtice, but never really exiſted. And the other (through ignorance of the meaning of the Conjunction THAT) had never been truly underſtood; neither by the Counſel who originally took the exception, nor perhaps by the Judges who made the deciſion, nor by the Reporter of it, nor by the preſent Chief Juſtice who quoted and miſapplied it.

Mr.

Mr. Dunning undertook to prove (and did actually prove in the Houſe of Lords) the *non-exiſtence* of the main precedent. And I undertook, in that Letter to Mr. Dunning, to ſhew the real merits and foundation, and conſequently Lord Mansfield's miſapplication of the other. And I undertook this, becauſe it afforded a very ſtriking inſtance of the importance of the meaning of words; not only (as has been too lightly ſuppoſed) to Metaphyſicians and Schoolmen, but to the rights and happineſs of mankind in their deareſt concerns—the deciſions of Courts of Juſtice.

In the Houſe of Lords theſe two Precedents (the foundation of the Judgment in the Court of King's Bench) were abandoned: and the deſcription of my crime againſt Government was adjudged to be ſufficiently ſet forth by the Prepoſitions OF and CONCERNING.

Perhaps it may make my readers ſmile; but I mention it as a farther inſtance of the importance of inquiry into the meaning of words;—that in the deciſion of the Judges in the Houſe of Lords, the Chief Juſtice De Grey (who found OF and CONCERNING ſo comprehenſive, clear, and definite) began by declaring that—"the word *Certainty* "[which the Law requires in the deſcription of Crimes] "is as indefinite [that is, as *Uncertain*] as any word that

"could

" could be uſed." Now though *certainty* is ſo *uncertain*, we muſt ſuppoſe the word *Libel* to be very *definite:* and yet if I were called upon for an equivalent term, I believe I could not find in our language any word more popularly appoſite than *Calumny*; which is defined by Cicero, in his Offices, to be—" *callida & malitioſa Juris interpretatio.*"

If there was any *Miſtake* (which however I am very far from believing) in this deciſion, ſanctioned by the Judges and the Houſe of Lords; I ſhall be juſtified in applying (with the ſubſtitution of the ſingle word *Grammatici* for *Iſtorici*) what Giannone, who was himſelf an excellent lawyer, ſays of his countrymen of the ſame profeſſion:—
" Tanta ignoranza avea loro bendati gli occhi, che ſi pre-
" giavano d'eſſere ſolamente Legiſti, e non Grammatici;
" non accorgendoſi, che perché non erano Grammatici,
" eran perciò CATTIVI LEGISTI."

Iſt. civil. di Napoli. Intro.

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ, &c.

CHAP. VI.

OF THE WORD *THAT*.

B.

BUT beſides the Articles "properly and ſtrictly ſo called," I think Mr. Harris and other Grammarians ſay that there are ſome words which, according to the different manner of uſing them, are ſometimes *Articles* and ſometimes *Pronouns*: and that it is difficult to determine to which claſs they ought to be referred *.

H. They

* "It muſt be confeſſed indeed that all theſe words do not always appear "as Pronouns. When they ſtand by themſelves and repreſent ſome Noun, "(as when we ſay—THIS *is virtue*, or δικλικως, *Give me* THAT) then are "they *Pronouns*. But when they are aſſociated to ſome Noun, (as when we "ſay—THIS *habit* is virtue, or δικλικως, THAT *man defrauded me*) then as "they ſupply not the place of a Noun, but only ſerve to aſcertain one, "they fall rather into the ſpecies of *Definitives* or *Articles*. That there is "indeed a near relation between Pronouns and Articles, the old gramma-"rians have all acknowledged; and ſome words it has been doubtful to "which claſs to refer. The beſt rule to diſtinguiſh them is this.—The

"genuine

H.

They do ſo. And by ſo doing, ſufficiently inſtruct us (if we will but uſe our common ſenſe) what value we ought to put upon ſuch claſſes and ſuch definitions.

B.

Can you give us any general rule by which to diſtinguiſh when they are of the one ſort, and when of the other?

H.

Let them give the rule who thus confound together the *Manner* of ſignification of words, and the Abbreviations in their *Conſtruction*: than which no two things in Language are more diſtinct, or ought to be more carefully diſtinguiſhed. I do not allow that *Any* words change their nature in this manner, ſo as to belong ſometimes to one Part of Speech, and ſometimes to another, from the different ways of uſing them. I never could perceive any ſuch fluctuation in any word whatever: though I know it is a general charge brought erroneouſly againſt words of

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" genuine Pronoun always ſtands by itſelf, aſſuming the power of a noun,
" and ſupplying its place.—The genuine Article never ſtands by itſelf, but
" appears at all times aſſociated to ſomething elſe, requiring a noun for its
" ſupport, as much as Attributives or Adjectives."

HERMES, Book I. Chap. V.

almoſt

almoſt every denomination *. But it appears to me to be all, Error: ariſing from the falſe meaſure which has been taken of almoſt every ſort of words. Whilſt the words themſelves appear to me to continue faithfully and ſteadily attached, each to the ſtandard under which it was originally inliſted. But I deſire to wave this matter for the preſent; becauſe I think it will be cleared up by what is to follow concerning the other ſorts of words: at leaſt, if that ſhould not convince you, I ſhall be able more eaſily to ſatisfy you on this head hereafter.

B.

I would not willingly put you out of your own way, and am contented to wait for the explanation of many things till you ſhall arrive at the place which you may think proper for it. But really what you have now advanced ſeems to me ſo very extraordinary and contrary to fact, as well as to the uniform declaration of all Grammarians; that you muſt excuſe me, if, before we proceed any farther, I mention to you one inſtance.

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* "Certains mots ſont *Adverbes*, *Prepoſitions*, & *Conjonctions* en même "temps: & repondent ainſi au même temps à diverſes parties d'oraiſon "ſelon que la grammaire les emploie diverſement." BUFFIER, Art. 150.

And ſo ſay all other Grammarians.

Mr. Harris and other Grammarians ſay that the word THAT, is ſometimes an *Article* and ſometimes a *Pronoun*. However I do not deſire an explanation of *that* [point]: becauſe I ſee how you will eaſily reconcile *that* [difference], by a *ſubauditur* or an abbreviation of Conſtruction: and I agree with you there. But what will you do with the *Conjunction* THAT?

Is not this a very conſiderable and manifeſt fluctuation and difference of ſignification in the ſame word? Has the *Conjunction* THAT, any the ſmalleſt correſpondence or ſimilarity of ſignification with THAT, the *Article*, or *Pronoun*?

H

In my opinion the word THAT (call it as you pleaſe, either *Article*, or *Pronoun*, or *Conjunction*) retains always one and the ſame ſignification. Unnoticed abbreviation in conſtruction and difference of poſition have cauſed this appearance of fluctuation; and miſled the Grammarians of all languages both antient and modern: for in all they make the ſame miſtake. Pray, anſwer me a queſtion. Is it not ſtrange and improper that we ſhould, without any reaſon or neceſſity, employ in Engliſh the ſame word for two different meanings and purpoſes?

B.

I think it wrong: and I ſee no reaſon for it, but many reaſons againſt it.

H.

Well! Then is it not more ſtrange that this ſame impropriety, in this ſame caſe ſhould run through ALL languages? And that they ſhould ALL uſe an *Article*, without any reaſon, unneceſſarily, and improperly, for this ſame *Conjunction*; with which it has, as you ſay, no correſpondence nor ſimilarity of ſignification?

B.

If they do ſo it is ſtrange.

H.

They certainly do; as you will eaſily find by inquiry. Now does not the uniformity and univerſality of this ſuppoſed miſtake, and unneceſſary impropriety, in languages, which have no connexion with each other, naturally lead us to ſuſpect that this uſage of the *Article* may perhaps be neither miſtaken nor improper? But that the miſtake may lie only with us, who do not underſtand it?

B.

No doubt what you have ſaid, if true, would afford ground for ſuſpicion.

H. If

H.

If true! Examine any languages you pleaſe, and ſee whether they alſo, as well as the Engliſh, have not a ſuppoſed *Conjunction* which they employ as we do THAT; and which is alſo the ſame word as their ſuppoſed *Article*, or *Pronoun*. Does not this look as if there was ſome reaſon for employing the *Article* in this manner? And as if there was ſome connexion and ſimilarity of ſignification between it and this *Conjunction*?

B.

The appearances, I own, are ſtrongly in favour of your opinion. But how ſhall we find out what that connexion is?

H.

Suppoſe we examine ſome inſtances; and, ſtill keeping the ſame ſignification of the ſentences, try whether we cannot, by a reſolution of their conſtruction, diſcover what we want.

EXAMPLE.

I wiſh you to believe THAT I would not wilfully hurt a fly.

RESOLUTION.

I would not wilfully hurt a fly; I wiſh you to believe THAT [aſſertion].

EXAM-

EXAMPLE.

She knowing THAT Crooke had been indicted for forgery, did ſo and ſo.

RESOLUTION.

Crooke had been indicted for forgery; ſhe, knowing THAT, [fact] did ſo and ſo *.

EXAMPLE.

You ſay THAT the ſame arm which, when contracted, can lift—; when extended to its utmoſt reach, will not be able to raiſe—. You mean THAT we ſhould never forget our ſituation, and THAT we ſhould be prudently contented to do good within our own ſphere, where it can have an effect: and THAT we ſhould not be miſled even by a virtuous benevolence and public ſpirit, to waſte ourſelves in fruitleſs efforts beyond our power of influence.

RESOLUTION.

The ſame arm which, when contracted, can lift—; when extended to its utmoſt reach, will not be able to raiſe—:

* King v. Lawley. Strange's Reports. Eaſter T. 4 Geo. II.

you ſay THAT. We ſhould never forget our ſituation; you mean THAT: and we ſhould be contented to do good within our own ſphere where it can have an effect; you mean THAT: and we ſhould not be miſled even by a virtuous benevolence and public ſpirit to waſte ourſelves in fruitleſs efforts beyond our power of influence; you mean THAT.

EXAMPLE.

They who have well conſidered THAT kingdoms riſe or fall, and THAT their inhabitants are happy or miſerable, not ſo much from any local or accidental advantages or diſadvantages; but accordingly as they are well or ill governed; may beſt determine how far a virtuous mind can be neutral in politics.

RESOLUTION.

Kingdoms riſe or fall, not ſo much from any local or accidental advantages or diſadvantages, but accordingly as they are well or ill governed; they who have well conſidered THAT (maxim), may beſt determine how far a virtuous mind can be neutral in politics. And the inhabitants of kingdoms are happy or miſerable, not ſo much from any local or accidental advantages or diſadvantages, but accordingly as they are well or ill governed; they who

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She knowing THAT Crooke had been indicted for forgery, did ſo and ſo.

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RESOLUTION.

The ſame arm which, when contracted, can lift—; when extended to its utmoſt reach, will not be able to raiſe—:

* King v. Lawley. Strange's Reports. Eaſter T. 4 Geo. II.

EXAMPLE.

Thieves riſe by night THAT they may cut men's throats.

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to be as well rewarded) as our late Poet Laureat; who, upon the following paſſage of Milton's Comus,

" *And ſits as ſafe as in a Senate houſe,*"

adds this flagitious note:

" Not many years after this was written, MILTON'S FRIENDS ſhewed " that the ſafety of a Senate houſe was not inviolable. But when the people " turn Legiſlators, what place is ſafe againſt the tumults of innovation, and " the inſults of diſobedience."

I believe our late Laureat meant not ſo much to cavil at Milton's expreſſion, as to ſeize an impertinent opportunity of recommending himſelf to the *powers which be*, by a cowardly inſult on the dead and perſecuted author's memory, and on the aged, defenceleſs conſtitution of his country.

A critic who ſhould really be diſpleaſed at Milton's expreſſion, would rather ſhew its impropriety by an event which had happened *before* it was uſed, than by an event which the poet could not at that time foreſee. Such a critic adverting to the 5th of November, 1605, and to the 4th of January, 1641, might more truly ſay——" Not many years both *before and after* " this was written, WHARTON'S FRIENDS ſhewed that the ſafety of a Senate " houſe was not inviolable."

With equal impertinence and malignity (pages 496, 538.) has he raked up the aſhes of Queen Caroline and Queen Elizabeth; whoſe private characters and inoffenſive amuſements were as little connected with Milton's poems, as this animadverſion on Wharton is with the ſubject I am now treating.

Perhaps, after all, the concluding line of Milton's epitaph,

" Rege ſub *auguſto* fas ſit *laudare* Catonem,"

is artfully made by Mr. Wharton the concluding line alſo of his Notes; in order to account for his preſent virulence, and to ſoften the reſentment of his readers, at the expence of his patron.

RESOLUTION.

Thieves may cut men's throats, (*for*) THAT (*purpoſe*) they riſe by night.

After the ſame manner, I imagine, may all ſentences be reſolved (in all languages) where the *Conjunction* THAT (or its equivalent) is employed: and by ſuch reſolution it will always be diſcovered to have merely the ſame force and ſignification, and to be in fact nothing elſe but the very ſame word which in other places is called an *Article* or a *Pronoun*.

B.

For any thing that immediately occurs to me, this may perhaps be the caſe in Engliſh, where THAT is the only Conjunction of the ſame ſignification which we employ in this manner. But your laſt example makes me believe that this method of reſolution will not take place in thoſe languages which have different Conjunctions for this ſame purpoſe. And if ſo, I ſuſpect that your whole reaſoning on this ſubject may be without foundation. For how can you reſolve the original of your laſt example; where (unfortunately for your notion) UT is employed, and not the neuter *Article* QUOD?

"Ut jugulent homines ſurgunt de nocte latrones."

I ſuppoſe you will not ſay that UT is the Latin neuter Article. For even Sanctius, who ſtruggled ſo hard to withdraw QUOD from amongſt the Conjunctions, yet ſtill left UT amongſt them without moleſtation *.

H. You

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* It is not at all extraordinary that UT and QUOD ſhould be indifferently uſed for the ſame conjunctive purpoſe: for as UT (originally written UTI) is nothing but ὅτι: So is QUOD (anciently written QUODDE) merely Καὶ ὅτι.

"*Quodde* tuas laudes culpas, nil proficis hilum."

LUCILIUS.

(See Note in Havercamp's and Creech's Lucretius; where QUODDE is miſtakenly derived from ὅτιδε.) QU, in Latin, being ſounded (not as the Engliſh but as the French pronounce QU, that is) as the Greek Κ; Καὶ (by a change of the character, not of the ſound) became the Latin *Que*, (uſed only enclitically indeed in modern Latin). Hence Καὶ ὅτι became in Latin *Qu' otti—Quoddi—Quodde—Quod.* Of which if Sanctius had been aware, he would not have attempted a diſtinction between UT and QUOD: ſince the two words, though differently corrupted, are in ſubſtance and origin the ſame.

The perpetual change of T into D, and *vice verſa*, is ſo very familiar to all who have ever paid the ſmalleſt attention to Language, that I ſhould not think it worth while to notice it in the preſent inſtance; if all the etymological canoniſts, whom I have ſeen, had not been remarkably inattentive to the *organical* cauſes of thoſe literal changes of which they treat.

Skinner (who was a Phyſician) in his Prolegomena Etymologica, ſpeaking of the frequent tranſmutation of s into z, ſays very truly——"Sunt "ſanè literæ ſono *ferè* eædem."

But

H.

You are not to expect from me that I ſhould, in this place, account etymologically for the different words which ſome

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But in what does that *ferè* conſiſt? For s is not nearer in ſound to z, than p is to b, or than t is to d, or than f is to v, or than k is to g, or than th (Θ) in *Thing*, is to th (Ð) in *That*, or than sh is to the French j.

(N. B. th and sh are ſimple conſonants, and ſhould be marked by ſingle letters. j, as the Engliſh pronounce it, is a double conſonant; and ſhould have two characters.)

For theſe ſeven couple of ſimple conſonants, viz.

With the Compreſſion	B	—	P	Without the Compreſſion
	G	—	K	
	D	—	T	
	Z	—	S	
	Ð	—	Θ	
	V	—	F	
	J	—	SH	

differ each from its partner, by no variation whatever of articulation; but ſingly by a certain unnoticed and almoſt imperceptible motion or compreſſion of or near the Larynx; which cauſes what Wilkins calls "*ſome kind* "*of murmure.*" This compreſſion the Welch never uſe. So that when a Welchman, inſtead of

"I vow, by God, Ðat Jenkin iz a Wizzard,"

pronounces it thus,

"I fow, py Cot, Θat Shenkin iſs a Wiſſart;"

he

ſome languages (for there are others beſide the Latin) may ſometimes borrow and employ it this manner inſtead of their own common Article. But if you ſhould hereafter exact it, I ſhall not refuſe the undertaking: although it is not the eaſieſt part of Etymology: for *Abbreviation and Corruption are always buſieſt with the words which are moſt frequently in uſe.* Letters, like ſoldiers, being very apt to deſert and drop off in a long march, and eſpecially if their paſſage happens to lie near the confines of an enemy's country *. Yet I doubt not that, with this clue,

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he articulates in every other reſpect exactly as we do; but omits the compreſſion nine times in this ſentence. And for failing in this one point only, changes ſeven of our conſonants: for we owe ſeven additional letters, (i. e. ſeven additional ſounds in our language) ſolely to the addition of this one compreſſion to ſeven different articulations.

* " Nous avons deja dit, que l'alteration du derivé augmentoit à meſure " que le temps l'eloignoit du primitif; & nous avons ajouté—*toutes choſes* " *d'ailleurs egales*,—parceque la quantité de cette alteration depend auſſi " du cours que ce mot a dans le public. Il s'uſe, pour ainſi dire, en " paſſant dans un plus grand nombre de bouches, ſur tout dans la bouche " du peuple: & la rapidité de cette circulation equivaut à une plus longue " durée. Les noms des Saints & les noms de baptême les plus communs, " en ſont un exemple. Les mots qui reviennent le plus ſouvent dans les " langues, tels que les verbes *Etre, faire, vouloir, aller*, & tous ceux qui " ſervent à lier les autres mots dans le diſcours, ſont ſujets à de plus grandes " alterations. Ce ſont ceux qui ont le plus beſoin d'etre fixes par la langue " ecrite."

Encyclopedie (*Etymologie*) *par* M. De Brosses.

you

you will yourſelf be able, upon inquiry, to account as eaſily (and in the ſame manner) for the uſe of all the others, as I know you can for UT; which is merely the Greek neuter Article ὅτι *, adopted for this conjunctive purpoſe by the Latins, and by them originally written UTI: the O being changed into U, from that propenſity which both the ancient Romans had †, and the modern Italians ſtill have ‡, upon many occaſions, to pronounce even their

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* "UTI eſt mutata ὅτι."

J. C. SCALIGER, de C. L. L. Cap. 173.

† So in the antient form of ſelf-devotion.

"VTEI. EGO. AXIM. PRAI. ME. FORMIDINEM. METOM. QUE. OMNIOM. "DIRAS. SIC. VTEI. VERBEIS. NONCOPASO. ITA. PRO. REPOBLICA. POPOLI. "ROMANI. QUIRITIOM. VITAM. SALUTEM. QUE. MEAM. LEGIONES. AUX- "SILIA. QUE. HOSTIOM. MEOM. DIVEIS. MANEBOUS. TELLOURI. QUE. DE- "VOVEO."

So in the laws of Numa, and in the twelve tables, and in all antient inſcriptions, O is perpetually found where the modern Latin uſes U. And it is but reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that the pronunciation preceded the change of the orthography.

‡ "Quant à la voyelle u pour ce qu'ils (les Italiens) l'aiment fort, ainſi "que nous cognoiſſons par ces mots *Ufficio, ubrigato*, &c. je penſe bien "qu'ils la reſpectent plus que les autres."

HENRI ESTIENE, *de la precell. de la L. F.*

own o like an u. Of which I need not produce any inſtances *.

The Reſolution therefore of the original will be like that of the tranſlation;

" Latrones jugulent homines (Δι) ὅτι furgunt de nocte."

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* " L' o a ſtretta amicizia coll' v, uſandoſi in molte voci ſcambievol-
" mente."

Menage. Cambiamenti delle lettere. page 16.

Menage quotes Quinctilian, Feſtus, Velius Longus, Victorinus, Caſſiodorus, Servius, Priſcian, Virgil, Jul. C. Scaliger.

" La v par che prevaleſſe ne'primi tempi e piu remoti, quando i Latini
" memori della Eolica origine, o imitando gli umbri e gli Etruſchi, *literam*
" v *pro* o *efferebant:* (1.) e pronunziavano *Funtes*, *Frundes*, *Acherunte*,
" *Humones*, *e* ſimili. (2.) Quindi Ovidio, avendo detto che una volta il
" nome di *Orione* era *Urion*, ſoggiugne—*perdidit antiquum litera prima*
" *ſonum*. (3.) Ne' tempi poſteriori ſi andò all' altro eſtremo; e all' antica
" lettera fu ſoſtituita quaſi ſempre la o, come vedeſi in *Novios Plautios*,
" e in altre voci della tavola ſeconda. Priſciano ne dà per ragione: *quia*
" *multis Italiæ populis* v *in uſu non erat, ſed e contrario utebantur* o: (4.)
" dicendovi verbigrazia, *Colpa*, *Exſoles*, per *Culpa*, *Exules*, &c. (5.)"

Lanzi Saggio di Lingua Etruſca, Tom. i. Pag. 124.

(1.) Feſt. vid. Orcus.
(2.) Quinct. L. 4.
(3.) Faſt. v.
(4.) Pag. 554.
(5.) Caſſiod. 2284.

B.

You have extricated yourſelf pretty well out of this ſcrape with UT. And perhaps have done prudently, to decline the ſame ſort of explanation in thoſe other languages which, as well as the Latin, have likewiſe a double Conjunction for this purpoſe, not quite ſo eaſily accounted for, becauſe not ready derived to your hands. But I have not yet done with the Engliſh: for though your method of reſolution will anſwer with moſt ſentences, yet I doubt much whether it will with all. I think there is one uſage of the conjunction THAT which it will not explain.

H.

Produce an inſtance.

B.

The inſtances are common enough. But I chuſe to take one from your favourite *ſad Shepherd:* in hopes that the difficulty it may cauſe you, will abate ſomething of your extreme partiality for that piece. Which, though it be

——————" ſuch wool
" As from mere Engliſh flocks his Muſe could pull,"

you have always contended obſtinately, with its author, is

——————" a Fleece
" To match or thoſe of Sicily or Greece."

EXAMPLE.

" I wonder he can move! that he's not fix'd!
" IF THAT his feelings be the ſame with mine."

So again in Shakeſpeare *,

——————" IF THAT the king
" Have any way your good deſerts forgot,
" He bids you name your griefs."——

How will you bring out the *Article* THAT, when two Conjunctions (for I muſt ſtill call THAT a Conjunction, till all my ſcruples are ſatisfied) come in this manner together?

* 1ſt Part of Henry IV. Act IV. Scene 5.

ADVERTISEMENT.

I PRESUME my readers to be acquainted with French, Latin, Italian and Greek: which are unfortunately the uſual boundaries of an Engliſh ſcholar's acquiſition. On this ſuppoſition, a friend of mine lamented that, in my Letter to Mr. Dunning, I had not confined myſelf to the common Engliſh character for the Anglo-ſaxon and Gothic derivations.

In the preſent publication I ſhould undoubtedly have conformed to his wiſhes, if I had not imagined that, by inſerting the Anglo-ſaxon and Gothic characters in this place, I might poſſibly allure ſome of my readers to familiarize themſelves with thoſe characters, by an application of them to the few words of thoſe languages which are here introduced: and thus lead the way to their better acquaintance with the parent language, which ought long ago to have made a part of the education of our youth. And I flatter myſelf that one of the conſequences of my preſent inquiry will be, to facilitate and abridge the tedious and miſtaken method of inſtruction which has too long continued in our ſeminaries: the time which is at preſent allotted to Latin and Greek, being amply ſufficient for the

acquirement alſo of French, Italian, Anglo-ſaxon, Dutch, German, Daniſh and Swediſh. Which will not ſeem at all extraordinary, when it is conſidered that the five laſt mentioned (together with the Engliſh) are little more than different dialects of one and the ſame language. And though this was by no means the leading motive, nor is the preſent object of my inquiry; yet I think it of conſiderable importance: although I do not hold the acquiſition of languages in ſo very great eſtimation as the Emperor Charles the Vth did. Who, as Brantome tells us, "diſoit "& repetoit ſouvent, quand il tomboit ſur la beautè des "langues, (ſelon l'opinion des Turcs)—qu' autant de lan-"gues que l'homme ſçait parler, autant de fois eſt-il "homme."

Anglo-

Anglo-Saxon.			Mœso-Gothic.	
A	a	a	A	a
B	b	b	B	b
C	c	k	*	*
D	ð	d	D	d
E	e	e	E	e
F	f	f	F	f
G	ȝ	g	G	g
H	h	h	H	h
*	*	*	Θ	hw
I	ı	i	I	i
*	*	*	J	j and y
K	k	k	K	k
L	l	l	L	l
M	m	m	M	m
N	n	n	N	n
O	o	o	O	o
P	p	p	P	p
*	*	*	Q	cw
R	ꝛ	r	R	r
S	ſ	s	S	s
T	ꞇ	t	T	t
Þ	þ	th	Þ	th
U	u	u	U	u
Ƿ	ƿ	w	V	w
X	x	x	X	ch
Y	ẏ	y	*	*
Z	z	z	Z	z

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ, &c.

CHAP. VII.

OF CONJUNCTIONS.

H.

I WAS afraid of ſome ſuch inſtances as theſe, when I wiſhed to poſtpone the whole conſideration of this ſubject till after we had diſcuſſed the other received Parts of Speech. Becauſe, in order to explain it, I muſt foreſtall ſomething of what I had to ſay concerning *Conjunctions*. However, ſince the queſtion is ſtarted, perhaps it may be as well to give it here.

The truth of the matter is, that IF is merely a *Verb*. It is merely the Imperative of the Gothic and Anglo-ſaxon verb ᚷᛁᚠᚨᚾ, Giſan. And in thoſe languages, as well as in the Engliſh formerly, this ſuppoſed *Conjunction* was pronounced and written as the common Imperative, purely ᚷᛁᚠ, Giſ, *Gif*. Thus

—" My

——— " My largeſſe
" Hath lotted her to be your brother's miſtreſſe
" GIF ſhee can be reclaim'd; GIF not, his prey *."

And accordingly our corrupted IF has always the ſignification of the Engliſh Imperative *Give*; and no other. So that the reſolution of the conſtruction in the inſtances you have produced, will be as before in the others.

RESOLUTION.

" His feelings be the ſame with mine, GIVE THAT, I " wonder he can move, &c."

" The King may have forgotten your good deſerts, " GIVE THAT in any way, he bids you name your griefs."

And here, as an additional proof, we may obſerve, that whenever the *Datum*, upon which any concluſion depends, is a ſentence, the Article THAT, if not expreſſed, is always underſtood, and may be inſerted after IF. As in the inſtance I have produced above, the Poet might have ſaid,

" *Gif that* ſhe can be reclaimed," &c.

For the reſolution is—" She can be reclaimed, *Give* " *that*; my largeſſe hath lotted her to be your brother's

* Sad Shepherd, Act II. Scene 1.

" miſtreſſe. She cannot be reclaimed, *Give that*; my largeſſe " hath lotted her to be your brother's prey."

But the Article THAT is not underſtood, and cannot be inſerted after IF, where the *Datum* is not a ſentence, but ſome Noun governed by the Verb IF or GIVE. As,—

EXAMPLE.

" How will the weather diſpoſe of you to-morrow? IF " fair, it will ſend me abroad; IF foul, it will keep me " at home."

Here we cannot ſay—" IF THAT fair it will ſend me " abroad; IF THAT foul it will keep me at home."—Becauſe in this caſe the verb IF governs the Noun; and the reſolved conſtruction is,

" GIVE fair weather, it will ſend me abroad; GIVE foul " weather, it will keep me at home."

But make the *Datum* a ſentence, As—" IF it is fair " weather, it will ſend me abroad; IF it is foul weather, " it will keep me at home."

And then the article THAT is underſtood, and may be inſerted after IF; As—" IF THAT it is fair weather, it will

" ſend me abroad; IF THAT it is foul weather, it will keep
" me at home."

The reſolution then being,
" It is fair weather, GIVE THAT; it will ſend me abroad;
" It is foul weather, GIVE THAT; it will keep me at home."

And this you will find to hold univerſally, not only with IF; but with many other ſuppoſed *Conjunctions*, ſuch as, *But that*, *Unleſs that*, *Though that*, *Left that*, &c. (which are really *Verbs*) put in this manner before the *Article* THAT.

B.

One word more to clear up a difficulty which occurs to me concerning your account of IF, and I have done.

We have in Engliſh another word which (though now rather obſolete) uſed frequently to ſupply the place of IF. As—" AN you had any eye behind you, you might ſee more
" detraction at your heels, than fortunes before you *."

In this and in all ſimilar inſtances, what is AN? For I can by no means agree with the account which Dr. S. Johnſon

* Twelfth Night, Act II. Scene 8.

gives of it in his Dictionary: and I do not know that any other perſon has ever attempted to explain it.

H.

How does he account for it?

B.

He ſays,—" AN is ſometimes in old authors a contraction of *And if.*" Of which he gives a very unlucky inſtance from Shakeſpeare *; where both AN and IF are uſed in the ſame line.

——" He cannot flatter, He!
" An honeſt mind and plain: he muſt ſpeak Truth:
" AN they will take it,—So. IF not; He's plain."

Where, if AN was a contraction of AND IF; AN and IF ſhould rather change places.

H.

I can no more agree with Dr. S. Johnſon than you do. A part of one word only, employed to ſhew that another word is compounded with it, would indeed be a curious method of *con-traction*. Though even this account of it would ſerve my purpoſe. But the truth will ſerve it better:

* Lear, Act II. Scene 6.

and

and therefore I thank you for your difficulty. It is a freſh proof, and a very ſtrong one in my favour. AN is alſo a *Verb*, and may very well ſupply the place of IF; it being nothing elſe but the Imperative of the Anglo-ſaxon verb Anan, which likewiſe means to *Give*, or to *Grant*.

B.

It ſeems indeed to be ſo. But, if ſo, how can it ever be made to ſignify AS IF? For which alſo, as well as for *And if*, Johnſon ſays AN is a con-traction *.

H.

It never ſignifies *As if*: nor is ever a contraction of them.

B.

Johnſon however advances Addiſon's authority for it. ——" My next pretty correſpondent, like Shakeſpeare's " Lion in Pyramus and Thiſbe, roars AN it were any " nightingale."

H.

If Addiſon had ſo written, I ſhould anſwer roundly, that he had written falſe Engliſh. But he never did ſo write.

* This arbitrary method of *contraction* is very uſeful to an idle or ignorant expoſitor. It will ſuit any thing. S. Johnſon alſo ſays——

" AN'T, a contraction for *And it*; or rather *And if it*; as—An't pleaſe " you—that is, *And if it pleaſe you.*" It is merely—AN *it pleaſe you.*

He only quoted it in mirth and ridicule, as the author wrote it. And Johnſon, an Editor of Shakeſpeare, ought to have known and obſerved it. And then, inſtead of Addiſon's or even Shakeſpeare's authority, from whom the expreſſion is borrowed; he ſhould have quoted *Bottom*'s, the Weaver: whoſe Language correſponds with the character Shakeſpeare has given him,—

" *The ſhallow'ſt thickſcull of that barren ſort*, viz.
" *A crew of Patches, rude Mechanicals,*
" *That work for Bread upon Athenian Stalls* *."

" I will aggravate my voice ſo (ſays Bottom) that I will " roar you as gently as any ſucking Dove: I will roar you " AN 'twere any nightingale †."

If Johnſon is ſatisfied with ſuch authority as this, for the different ſignification and propriety of Engliſh words, he will find enough of it amongſt the clowns in all our comedies; and *Maſter Bottom* in particular in this very ſentence will furniſh him with many new meanings. But, I believe, Johnſon will not find AN uſed for *As if*, either ſeriouſly or clowniſhly, in any other part of Addiſon or Shakeſpeare; except in this ſpeech of *Bottom*, and in

* Midſummer Night's Dream, Act III. Scene 2.

† Midſummer Night's Dream, Act I. Scene 2.

another

another of Hoſteſs *Quickly*—" He made a finer end, and " went away AN it had been any Chriſtom child *."

B.

In Engliſh then, it ſeems, theſe two words which have been called *conditional* Conjunctions (and whoſe *force* and *manner* of ſignification, as well as of all the others, we are directed by Mr. Locke to ſearch after in " the ſeveral " views, poſtures, ſtands, turns, limitations, and excep- " tions, and ſeveral other thoughts of the mind, for which " we have *either none or very deficient names*") are, according to you, merely the original Imperatives of the *verbs* to *Give* or to *Grant*.

Now let me underſtand you. I do not mean to divert you into an etymological explanation of each particular word of other languages, or even of the Engliſh, and ſo to change our converſation from a philoſophical inquiry concerning the nature of Language in general, into the particular buſineſs of a polyglot Lexicon. But, as you have ſaid that your principles will apply univerſally, I deſire to know whether you mean that the *conditional conjunctions* of all other languages are likewiſe to be found, like IF and

* Henry V. Act II. Scene 3.

AN,

AN, in the original Imperatives of ſome of their own or derived *verbs*, meaning to *Give*?

H.

No. If that was my opinion I know you are ready inſtantly to confute it by the Conditionals of the Greek and Latin and Iriſh, the French, Italian, Spaniſh, Portugueze and many other Languages. But I mean, that thoſe words which are called *conditional conjunctions*, are to be accounted for in ALL languages in the ſame manner as I have accounted for IF and AN. Not indeed that they muſt all mean preciſely as theſe two do,—*Give* and *Grant*; but ſome word equivalent: Such as,—*Be it*, *Suppoſe*, *Allow*, *Permit*, *Put*, *Suffer*, &c. Which meaning is to be ſought for from the particular etymology of each reſpective language, not from ſome *un-named* and *un-known* "Turns, Stands, Poſ-"tures, &c. of the mind." In ſhort, to put this matter out of doubt, I mean to diſcard all ſuppoſed myſtery, not only about theſe *Conditionals*, but about all thoſe words alſo which Mr. Harris and others diſtinguiſh from Prepoſitions, and call *Conjunctions* of Sentences. I deny them to be a ſeparate ſort of words or Part of Speech by themſelves. For they have not a ſeparate *manner of ſignification*: although they are not *devoid* of ſignification. And the particular ſignification of each muſt be ſought for from amongſt the

the other parts of Speech, by the help of the particular etymology of each reſpective language. By ſuch means alone can we clear away the obſcurity and errors in which Grammarians and Philoſophers have been involved by the corruption of ſome common words, and the uſeful Abbreviations of Conſtruction. And at the ſame time we ſhall get rid of that farrago of uſeleſs diſtinctions into *Conjunctive, Adjunctive, Disjunctive, Subdisjunctive, Copulative, Negative copulative* *, *Continuative, Subcontinuative, Poſitive, Suppoſitive, Cauſal, Collective, Effective, Approbative, Diſcretive, Ablative, Preſumptive, Abnegative, Completive, Augmentative, Alternative, Hypothetical, Extenſive, Periodical, Motival, Concluſive, Explicative, Tranſitive, Interrogative, Comparative, Diminutive, Preventive, Adequate Preventive, Adverſative, Conditional, Suſpenſive, Illative, Conductive, Declarative*, &c. &c. &c. which explain nothing; and (as moſt other technical terms are abuſed) ſerve only to throw a veil over the ignorance of thoſe who employ them †.

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* "*Non, Non*, non minus disjungit, quam *Nec, Nec*. Quanquam neutrum ego *Disjunctivum* appello, ſed *copulativum* potius *negativum*."

Ariſtarchus Anti-Bentleianus. Pars ſecunda. Pag. 12.

† Technical terms are not invariably abuſed to cover the *ignorance* only of thoſe who employ them. In matters of law, politicks, and Government, they are more frequently abuſed in attempting to impoſe upon the ignorance of *others*; and to cover the injuſtice and knavery of thoſe who employ them.

B. You

B.

You mean, then, by what you have ſaid, flatly to contradict Mr. Harris's definition of a *Conjunction*; which he ſays, is—" a Part of Speech devoid of ſignification itſelf, " but ſo formed as to help ſignification, by making two or " more ſignificant ſentences to be one ſignificant ſentence."

H.

I have the leſs ſcruple to do that, becauſe Mr. Harris makes no ſcruple to contradict himſelf. For he afterwards acknowledges that *ſome* of them—" have a kind of ob- " ſcure ſignification when taken alone; and appear in " Grammar, like Zoophytes * in nature, a kind of middle " Beings of amphibious character; which, by ſharing the " attributes of the higher and the lower, conduce to link " the whole together."

Now I ſuppoſe it is impoſſible to convey a *Nothing* in a more ingenious manner. How much ſuperior is this to

* Theſe *Zoophytes* have made a wonderful impreſſion on Lord Monboddo, I believe (for I ſurely have not counted them) that he has uſed the alluſion at leaſt twenty times in his progreſs of language; and ſeems to be always hunting after extremes merely for the ſake of introducing them. But they have been ſo often placed between two ſtools, that it is no wonder they ſhould at laſt come to the ground.

the oracular Saw of another learned author on Language (typified by Shakeſpeare in *Sir Topaz* *) who, amongſt much other intelligence of equal importance, tells us with a very ſolemn face, and aſcribes it to Plato, that—"Every "man that opines, muſt opine ſomething: the ſubject of "opinion therefore is not nothing." But the faireſt way to Lord Monboddo is to give you the whole paſſage.

"It was not therefore without reaſon that Plato ſaid "that the ſubject of opinion was neither the το ὄν, or the "thing itſelf, nor was it the το μη ὄν, or nothing; but "ſomething betwixt theſe two. This may *appear* at *firſt* "ſight a little myſterious, and difficult to be underſtood; "but, like other things of that kind in Plato, when "*examined to the bottom*, it has a *very clear* meaning, and

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* "As the old Hermit of Prague, that never ſaw pen and ink, very "wittily ſaid to a niece of king Gorboduc,—*That that is, is: So I being* "*Maſter Parſon, am Maſter Parſon. For what is that, but that? And is,* "*but is?*"

Twelfth Night, Act IV. Scene 3.

John Lily's Sir Tophas *monboddizes* in the ſame manner.

"Sir Tophas. Doeſt thou not know what a poet is?

"Epiton. No.

"Sir Tophas. Why foole, a poet is as much as one ſhould ſay—a poet."

Endimion, Act I. Scene 3.

" *explains* the nature of opinion *very well* *: FOR, as he " ſays, Every man that opines, muſt opine ſomething; " the ſubject of opinion therefore is not nothing. At the " ſame time it is not the thing itſelf, but ſomething be- " twixt the two †." His Lordſhip, you ſee, has explained it

* Lucinde. Qu'eſt ce que c'eſt que ce galimatias?
Frontin. Ce galimatias! Vous n'y comprenez donc rien?
Lucinde. Non, en verité.
Frontin. Ma foi, ni moi non plus: je vais pourtant vous l'expliquer ſi vous voulez.
Lucinde. Comment m' expliquer ce que tu ne comprends pas?
Frontin. Oh! Dame, J'ai fait mes études, moi.
L'amant de lui-meme. Rouſſeau, Scene xiii.

† Origin and Progreſs of Language, Vol. I. p. 100. " Il poſſede " l'antiquité, comme on le peut voir par les belles remarques qu'il a faites. " Sans lui nous ne ſçaurions pas que dans la ville d'Athenes les enfans " pleuroient quand on leur donnoit le fouet.—Nous devons cette decouverte " à ſa profonde erudition."

But his lordſhip's philoſophical writings are full of information, explanations and obſervations of equal importance. Vol. I. p. 136, he informs us, that—Porphyry, *the greateſt philoſopher as well as beſt writer of his age*, " relates that crows and magpies and parrots were taught in his time not " only to imitate human ſpeech, but to attend to what was told them and " to remember it; and many of them, ſays he, have learned to inform " againſt thoſe whom they ſaw doing any miſchief in the houſe. And he " himſelf tamed a partridge that he found ſomewhere about Carthage to " ſuch a degree, that it not only played and fondled with him, but anſwered " him when he ſpoke to it in a voice different from that in which the " partridges call one another: but was ſo well bred, that it never made

it very clearly; and no doubt muſt have ſweated much to get thus to the bottom.

But Mr. Harris has the advantage of a Simile over this gentleman: and though Similies appear with moſt beauty

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" this noiſe but when it was ſpoken to. And he maintains, that all animals " who have ſenſe and memory are capable of reaſon: and this is not only " his opinion, but that of the Pythagoreans, *the greateſt philoſophers in* " *my opinion that ever exiſted*, next to the maſters of their maſter, I mean " the Egyptian prieſts. And beſides the Pythagoreans, Plato, Ariſtotle, " Empedocles, and Democritus, were of the ſame opinion. *One thing* " *cannot be denied*, that their natures may be very much improved by uſe " and inſtruction, by which they may be made to do things that are really " wonderful and far exceeding their natural power of inſtinct."—So far we " are obliged to *the greateſt of all philoſophers that ever exiſted.* And thus far the judgment of the extract can alone be called in queſtion. Now for the farther confirmation of this doctrine by their illuſtrious diſciple.— " There is a man in England at preſent, who has practiſed more upon them " and with greater ſucceſs than any body living:"—(I ſuſpect his lordſhip means the owner of the learned Pig)—" and he ſays, *as I am informed*,"— (Ay, Right, my lord, Be cautious how you take an aſſertion ſo important as this, upon your own authority! Well, He ſays? What?)—" That, *if* " *they lived long enough*, and pains *ſufficient* were taken upon them,"— (Well, what then?)—" *it is impoſſible to ſay to what lengths ſome of them* " *might be carried.*"

Now if this, and ſuch ſtuff as this, be Philoſophy; and that too, of the greateſt philoſophers that ever exiſted; I do moſt humbly intreat your lordſhip, if you ſtill continue obſtinate to diſcard Mr. Locke, that I may have my *Tom Thumb* again. For this philoſophy gives to my mind as much diſguſt, though not ſo much indignation, as your friend and admirer Lord Mansfield's LAW.

and propriety in works of imagination, they are frequently found moſt uſeful to the authors of philoſophical treatiſes: and have often helped them out at many a dead lift, by giving them an appearance of ſaying ſomething, when indeed they had nothing to ſay: For Similies are in truth the bladders upon which they float; and the Grammarian ſinks at once if he attempts to ſwim without them.

As a proof of which, let us only examine the preſent inſtance; and, diſmiſſing the *Zoophytes*, ſee what intelligence we can draw from Mr. Harris concerning the nature of *Conjunctions*.

Firſt he defines a *Word* to be a "*ſound ſignificant* *." Then he defines *Conjunctions* to be words (i. e. *ſounds ſignificant*) "*devoid of ſignification*."—Afterwards he allows that they have—"*a kind of ſignification*."

But this kind of ſignification is—"*obſcure*," (i. e. a ſignification unknown): ſomething I ſuppoſe (as Chillingworth couples them) like a *ſecret Tradition*, or a *ſilent Thunder*: for it amounts to the ſame thing as a *ſignification* which does *not ſignify*: an obſcure or unknown ſignification

* And (page 329) he defines a word to be "a voice articulate, ſignificant by compact."

being no ſignification at all. But, not contented with theſe inconſiſtencies, which to a leſs learned man would ſeem ſufficient of all conſcience, Mr. Harris goes farther, and adds, that they are a—" *kind of middle beings*"—(he muſt mean between ſignification and no ſignification)—" *ſharing the Attributes of both*"—(i. e. of ſignification and no ſignification) and—" *conduce to link them both*"—(i. e. ſignification and no ſignification) " *together.*"

It would have helped us a little, if Mr. Harris had here told us what that *middle ſtate* is, between ſignification and no ſignification *! What are the *attributes* of no ſignification! And how ſignification and no ſignification can be *linked* together!

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* If common reaſon alone was not ſufficient to keep Mr. Harris and Lord Monboddo from this middle ſtate between the το ον and the το μη ον, and between ſignification and no ſignification; they ſhould at leaſt have liſtened to what they are better acquainted with, *Authority*.

" Οσα δε των εναντιων τοιαυτα εστιν, ωστε εν οις πεφυκε γινεσθαι, η ων κατηγορεισθαι, " αναγκαιον αυτων θατερον υπαρχειν;—τουτων δεξιν εστιν ανα μεσον." Ariſtot. Categ.

" Inter affirmationem & negationem nullum medium exiſtit." J. C. Scaliger, Lib. 5. C. cxiv.

Now

Now all this may, for aught I know, be " read and " admired as long as there is any taſte for *fine writing* in " Britain *." But with ſuch unlearned and vulgar philoſophers

* " The truly philoſophical language of my worthy and learned friend " Mr. Harris, the author of Hermes, a work that will be read and admired " as long as there is any taſte for philoſophy and fine writing in Britain."

Orig. and Prog. of Language, Vol. i. *p.* 8.

" But I can hardly have the ſame indulgence for the philoſopher, eſpecially " one who *pretended*, like Mr. Locke, to be ſo attentive an obſerver of " what paſſed in his own mind, and has written a whole book upon the " ſubject.—If Mr. Locke would have taken the trouble to ſtudy what had " been diſcovered in this matter by the antients, and had not reſolved to " have the merit of inventing himſelf a whole ſyſtem of philoſophy, he " would have known that every material object is compoſed of *matter* and " *form*."

Orig. and Prog. of Lang. Vol. i. *p.* 38.

" Mr. Locke wrote at a time when the old philoſophy, I mean the " ſcholaſtic philoſophy, was generally run down and deſpiſed, but no other " come in its place. In that ſituation, being naturally an acute man, and " not a bad writer, it was no wonder that his Eſſay met with great applauſe, " and was thought to contain wonderful diſcoveries. And I muſt allow " that I think it was difficult for any man, without the aſſiſtance of books, " or of the converſation of men more learned than himſelf, to go further " in the philoſophy of mind than he has done. But now that Mr. Harris " has opened to us the treaſures of Greek philoſophy, to conſider Mr. " Locke ſtill as a ſtandard book of philoſophy, would be, to uſe an ancient " compariſon, continuing to feed on *acorns* after *corn* was diſcovered." Page 53.

" It

ſophers as Mr. Locke and his diſciples, who ſeek not *Taſte* and *elegance*, but truth and common ſenſe in philoſophical ſubjects, I believe it will never paſs as a "*perfect Example* "*of Analyſis*;" nor bear away the palm for "*acuteneſs of* "*inveſtigation and perſpicuity of explication.*" For, ſeparated from the *Fine Writing*, (which however I can no where find in the book) thus is the *Conjunction* explained by Mr. Harris.—A ſound ſignificant devoid of ſignification,

Having at the ſame time a kind of *obſcure* ſignification;

And yet having neither ſignification nor no ſignification;

But a *middle ſomething* between ſignification and no ſignification,

Sharing the attributes both of ſignification and no ſignification;

And linking ſignification and no ſignification together.

"It was the misfortune of us in the weſtern parts of Europe, that after "we had learned Greek, and got ſome taſte of the Greek philoſophy, we "immediately ſet up as maſters ourſelves, and would needs be inventors in "philoſophy, inſtead of humble ſcholars of the ancient maſters. In this "way Deſcartes philoſophized in France, Mr. Hobbes and Mr. Locke in "England, and many ſince their time of leſs note. I would fain hope, if "the indolence and diſſipation that prevail ſo generally in this age would "allow me to think ſo well of it, that Mr. Harris would put a ſtop to this "method of philoſophiſing without the aſſiſtance of the ancients, and re-"vive the genuine Greek philoſophy among us." *Id. p.* 54.

If

If others, of a more elegant Taſte for *Fine Writing*, are able to receive either pleaſure or inſtruction from ſuch *truly philoſophical language* *, I ſhall neither diſpute with them nor envy them: But can only deplore the dullneſs of my own apprehenſion, who, notwithſtanding the great authors quoted in Mr. Harris's treatiſe, and the great authors who recommend it, cannot help conſidering this "perfect "example of analyſis," as—An improved compilation of almoſt all the errors which Grammarians have been accumulating from the time of Ariſtotle down to our preſent days, of technical and learned affectation †.

* "Clarus ob obſcuram linguam magis inter inanes
"Quamde graveis inter Grajos, qui vera requirunt.
"Omnia enim ſtolidi magis admirantur amantque
"Inverſis quæ ſub verbis latitantia cernunt:
"Veraque conſtituunt, quæ belle tangere poſſunt
"Aures, & lepido quæ ſunt fucata ſonore."

LUCRETIUS, *Lib.* 1. 640.

† I muſt however do Mr. Harris and Dr. Lowth the juſtice to acknowledge, that the Hermes of the former has been received with univerſal approbation both at home and abroad; and has been quoted as undeniable authority on the ſubject by the learned of all countries. For which however I can eaſily account; not by ſuppoſing that its doctrine gave any more ſatisfaction to their minds who quoted it than to mine; but becauſe, as Judges ſhelter their knavery by *precedents*, ſo do ſcholars their ignorance by *authority*: and when they cannot reaſon, it is ſafer and leſs diſgraceful to repeat that nonſenſe at ſecond hand, which they would be aſhamed to give originally as their own.

B.

I am afraid, my good friend, you ſtill carry with you your old humour in politics, though your ſubject is now different. You ſpeak too ſharply for Philoſophy. Come, Confeſs the truth. Are not you againſt *Authority*, becauſe Authority is againſt you? And does not your ſpleen to Mr. Harris ariſe principally from his having taken care to fortify his opinions in a manner in which, from your ſingularity, you cannot?

H.

I hope you know my diſpoſition better. And I am perſuaded that I owe your long and ſteady friendſhip to me, to the conviction which an early experience in private life afforded you, that—Neminem libenter nominem, niſi ut laudem; ſed nec peccata reprehenderem, niſi ut aliis prodeſſem.—Indeed you have borne your teſtimony for me in very trying ſituations, where few beſides yourſelf would have ventured ſo much honeſty. At the ſame time, I confeſs, I ſhould diſdain to handle any uſeful truth daintily, as if I feared leſt it ſhould ſting me; and to employ a philoſophical inquiry as a vehicle for intereſted or cowardly adulation.

I proteſt to you, my notions of Language were formed before I could account etymologically for any one of the words in queſtion, and before I was in the leaſt acquainted with the opinions of others. I addreſſed myſelf to an inquiry into their opinions with all the diffidence of conſcious ignorance; and, ſo far from ſpurning authority, was diſpoſed to admit of half an argument from a great name. So that it is not my fault, if I am forced to carry inſtead of following the lanthorn: but at all events it is better than walking in total darkneſs.

And yet, though I believe I differ from all the accounts which have hitherto been given of Language, I am not ſo much without authority as you may imagine. Mr. Harris himſelf and all the Grammarians whom he has, and whom (though uſing their words) he has not quoted, are my authorities. Their own doubts, their difficulties, their diſſatisfaction, their contradictions, their obſcurity on all theſe points are my authorities againſt them *: for their

* "Profecto in Grammaticorum prope omnium commentis, quæ αγροικοι "immenſium extollunt, pene ἀδην ὑγιες: cum paginæ ſingulæ ſæpe plures "contineant errores, quam Sicinius ille Dentatus vulnera toto habuit "corpore."

G. J. Vossii Aristarchus, Lib. iii. Cap. 2.

LXXIV. "Capienda etiam ſunt ſigna ex incrementis et progreſſibus philo-"ſophiarum et ſcientiarum. Quæ enim in natura fundata ſunt, creſcunt

ſyſtem and their difficulties vaniſh together. Indeed unleſs, with Mr. Harris, I had been repeating what others have written, it is impoſſible I ſhould quote any direct authorities for my own manner of explanation. But let us hear Wilkins, whoſe induſtry deſerved to have been

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" et augentur: quæ autem in opinione, variantur; non augentur. Itaque " ſi iſtæ doctrinæ plane, inſtar plantæ, a ſtirpibus ſuis revulſæ non eſſent, " ſed utero naturæ adhærerent, atque ab eadem alerentur, id minime " eventurum fuiſſet, quod per annos bis mille jam fieri videmus: nempe, ut " ſcientiæ ſuis hæreant veſtigiis, et in eodem fere ſtatu maneant, neque " augmentum aliquod memorabile ſumpſerint."

LXXV. " Etiam aliud ſignum capiendum eſt (ſi modo *ſigni* appellatio " huic competat; cum potius *teſtimonium* ſit, atque adeo teſtimoniorum " omnium validiſſimum) hoc eſt, propria confeſſio auctorum, quos homines " nunc ſequuntur. Nam et illi, qui tanta fiducia de rebus pronunciant, " tamen per intervalla cum ad ſe redeunt, ad querimonias de *naturæ ſubti-* " *litate, rerum obſcuritate,* humani ingenii infirmitate ſe convertunt. Hoc " vero ſi ſimpliciter fieret, alios fortaſſe qui ſunt timidiores ab ulteriori " inquiſitione deterrere, alios vero qui ſunt ingenio alacriori et magis " fidenti ad ulteriorem progreſſum acuere et incitare poſſit. Verum non " ſatis illis eſt de ſe confiteri, ſed quicquid ſibi ipſis aut magiſtris ſuis in- " cognitum aut intactum fuerit, id extra terminos poſſibilis ponunt: et " tanquam ex arte, cognitu aut factu impoſſibile pronunciant: et tanquam " ex arte, cognita aut factu impoſſibile pronunciaret: Summa ſuperbia et " invidia ſuorum inventorum infirmitatem, in naturæ ipſius calumniam et " aliorum omnium deſperationem vertentes. Hinc ſchola Academiæ novæ, " quæ *Acatalepſiam* ex profeſſo tenuit, et homines ad ſempiternas tenebras " damnavit."

NOVUM ORGANUM.

better employed, and his perſeverance better rewarded with diſcovery; let us hear what he ſays.

—" According to the true philoſophy of ſpeech, I can-
" not conceive this kind of words" (he ſpeaks of Adverbs and Conjunctions) " to be properly a diſtinct part of
" ſpeech, as they are commonly called. But until they
" can be diſtributed into their proper places, I have ſo far
" complied with the Grammars of inſtituted languages, as
" to place them here together."—And again,

" For the accurate effecting of this [i. e. a *real charac-*
" *ter*] it would be neceſſary that the theory itſelf [i. e. *of*
" *language*] upon which ſuch a deſign were to be founded,
" ſhould be exactly ſuited to the nature of things. But
" upon ſuppoſal that this theory [viz. *of language*] is de-
" fective, either as to the fulneſs or the order of it; this
" muſt needs add much perplexity to any ſuch attempt,
" and render it imperfect. And that this is the caſe with
" that common theory already received, need not much
" be doubted."

It appears evidently therefore that Wilkins (to whom Mr. Locke was much indebted) was well convinced that all the accounts hitherto given of Language were erroneous.

And

And in fact, the languages which are commonly uſed throughout the world, are much more ſimple and eaſy, convenient and philoſophical than Wilkins's ſcheme for a *real character*; or than any other ſcheme that has been at any other time imagined or propoſed for the purpoſe.

Mr. Locke's diſſatisfaction with all the accounts which he had ſeen, is too well known to need repetition.

Sanctius reſcued QUOD particularly from the number of theſe myſterious Conjunctions, though he left UT amongſt them.

And Servius, Scioppius, G. J. Voſſius, Perizonius, and others, have explained and diſplaced many other ſuppoſed Adverbs and Conjunctions.

Skinner (though I knew it not previouſly) had accounted for IF before me, and in the ſame manner; which, though ſo palpable, *Lye* confirms and compliments. Even S. Johnſon, though miſtakenly, has attempted AND; and would find no difficulty with THEREFORE.

In ſhort, there is not ſuch a thing as a *Conjunction* in *Any* Language, which may not, by a ſkilful Herald, be traced

traced home to its own family and origin; without having recourſe to contradiction and myſtery with Mr. Harris: or, with Mr. Locke, cleaving open the head of man, to give it ſuch a birth as Minerva's from the brain of Jupiter.

B.

Call you this authority in your favour? When the full ſtream and current ſets the other way, and only ſome little brook or rivulet runs with you? You know very well that all the authorities which you have alleged, except Wilkins, are upon the whole againſt you. For though they have explained the meaning, and traced the derivation of many Adverbs and Conjunctions; yet (except Sanctius in the particular inſtance of QUOD,—whoſe conjunctive uſe in Latin he too ſtrenuouſly denies) they all acknowledge them ſtill to be *Adverbs* or *Conjunctions*. It is true, they diſtinguiſh them by the title of *reperta* or *uſurpata:* But they at the ſame time acknowledge (indeed the very diſtinction itſelf is an acknowledgment) that there are others which are *real, primigenia, nativa, pura.*

H.

True. Becauſe there are ſome, of whoſe origin they were totally ignorant. But has any Philoſopher or Grammarian ever yet told us what a *real, original, native, pure* Adverb

Adverb or Conjunction is? Or which of theſe Conjunctions of Sentences are ſo? Whenever that is done, in *any* language, I may venture to promiſe you that I will ſhew thoſe likewiſe to be *repertas* and *uſurpatas*, as well as the reſt. And till then I ſhall take no more trouble about them. I ſhall only add, that though *Abbreviation and corruption are always buſieſt with the words which are moſt frequently in uſe*; yet the *words moſt frequently uſed are leaſt liable to be totally laid aſide.* And therefore they are often retained,—(I mean that branch of them which is moſt frequently uſed)—when moſt of the other words—(and even the other branches of theſe retained words)—are, by various changes and accidents, quite loſt to a Language. HENCE the difficulty of accounting for them. And HENCE (becauſe only one branch of each of theſe *declinable* words is retained in a language) ariſes the notion of their being *indeclinable*; and a ſeparate ſort of words, or Part of Speech by themſelves. But that they are not *indeclinable*, is ſufficiently evident by what I have already ſaid. For Lip, An, &c. certainly could not be called *indeclinable*, when all the other branches of thoſe *Verbs*, of which they are the regular Imperatives, were likewiſe in uſe. And that the words IF, AN, &c. (which ſtill retain their original ſignification, and are uſed in the very ſame manner and for the ſame purpoſe as formerly) ſhould now be called *indeclinable*,

proceeds

proceeds merely from the ignorance of thoſe who could not account for them; and, who therefore, with Mr. Harris, were driven to ſay that they have neither *meaning* nor *inflection:* whilſt notwithſtanding they were ſtill forced to acknowledge (either directly, or by giving them different titles of *conditional*, *adverſative*, &c.) that they have a "*kind of obſcure meaning* *."

How much more candid and ingenuous would it have been, to have owned fairly that they did not underſtand the nature of theſe *Conjunctions*; and, inſtead of wrapping it up in myſtery, to have exhorted and encouraged others to a farther ſearch.

B.

You are not the firſt perſon who has been miſled by a fanciful etymology. Take heed that your derivations be not of the ſame ridiculous caſt with theirs who deduced

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* "Et quelle idée eſt excitée dans l'eſprit en entendant prononcer les "particules ET, AUSSI? On voit bien que ces mots ſignifient une eſpece de "connexion; mais quelque peine qu'on ſe donnât à decrire cette connexion, "on ſe ſerviroit d'autant d'autres mots, dont la ſignification ſeroit auſſi "difficile à expliquer: et voulant expliquer la ſignification de la particule "ET, je me ſervirois pluſieurs fois de cette même particule."

Lettres à une Princeſſe d'Allemagne, by Euler, Letter 121.

Conſtantinople from *Conſtantine the noble*,—*Breeches* from *bear-riches*,—*Donna* from *Dono*,—*Honour* from *Hon* and *Aurum*,—and *King Pepin* from ὅσπερ *.

H. If

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* " Then this Conſtantyne removed the emperyall ſee unto his cytye of " *Conſtantyne the noble:* and there for the more partye kepte his emperyall " honoure; and other emperours in lyke wyſe after hym. By reaſon " whereof the emperours were longe after called emperours of *Conſtantyne* " *noble.*"

Fabian's Chronicle, Chap. LXIX.

" *Hed.* But why *Breeches* now?
" Pha. Breeches, quaſi *bear-riches*; when a gallant bears all his riches in " his breeches."

B. Johnſon. Cynthia's Revels, Act 4. Sce. 3.

" Placano i *Doni* il ciel; placan l'inferno.
" E pur non ſon le *Donne*
" Men avare che il cielo,
" Piu crude che l'inferno.
" Il *Don*, credimi, il *Dono*
" Gran miniſtro d' amore, anzi tiranno.
" Egli è, che a ſuo voler impetra e ſpetra.
" Non ſai tu cio ch' Elpino,
" Il ſaggio Elpino dicea?
" Che fin colà nella primiera etade,
" Quand' anco ſemplicetti
" Non ſapean favellare
" Che d' un linguaggio ſol la lingua e 'l core,
" Allor le amanti *Donne* altra canzona
" Non s' udivan cantar che—*Dona, Dona.*

H.

If I have been miſled, it moſt certainly is not by Etymology: of which I confeſs myſelf to have been ſhamefully ignorant at the time when theſe my notions of language were firſt formed. Though even that previous ignorance is *now* a circumſtance which confirms me much in my opinion concerning theſe Conjunctions: For I knew not even the *character* of the language from which my particular proofs of the *Engliſh* conjunctions were to be drawn. And (notwithſtanding Lord Monboddo's diſcouraging Sneer *,) it was general reaſoning *à priori*, that led me

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" Quindi l' *enne* addoppiando
" Perchè non baſta *un Don*,—DONNA fu detta."

Guidobaldo de' Bonarelli.

" On connoit le jeu de mots d' *Owen*, aſſez mauvais, mais qui renferme
" un grand ſens.
" Divitias et opes, HON. lingua hebræa vocavit:
" Gallica gens, AURUM-OR; indeque venit HONOR."

Mirabeau. Eſſai ſur le Deſpotiſme.

" Ὅπερ—ἤπερ—ὅπερ—Diaper—Napkin—Nipkin—
" Pipkin—Pippin-king—King Pepin."

I forget my merry author of this etymology; but it is altogether as plauſible as even *Menage*'s derivation of CHEZ from *Apud*.

* " Now as I am not able from Theory merely, and *à priori*, to form
" the idea of a perfect language, I have been obliged to ſeek for it in the
" ſtudy of the Greek.—What men of *ſuperior Genius* may do in ſuch ſpecu-
" lations, I cannot tell; but I know well that *ordinary* men, without the
" ſtudy

me to the particular inſtances; not particular inſtances to the general reaſoning. This Etymology, againſt whoſe faſcination you would have me guard myſelf, did not occur to me till many years after my ſyſtem was ſettled: and it occurred to me ſuddenly, in this manner;—" If my rea-" ſoning concerning theſe conjunctions is well founded,

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" ſtudy of ſome model of the kind, would be as unable to conceive the " idea of a perfect language, as to form a high taſte in other arts, ſuch as " ſculpture and painting, without having ſeen the beſt works of thoſe kinds " that are to be found.—It would be doing injuſtice to *thoſe ſuperior minds* " *who have in themſelves the ſtandard of perfection in all the Arts*, to judge " of them by myſelf; but I am confident that *my idea* of perfection in " language would have been ridiculouſly imperfect, if I had known no other " language than the modern languages of Europe."

Origin and Progreſs of Language. Vol. II. Page 183.

Read this, *Mr. Burgeſs*, and then complain of illiberality to Lord Monboddo: who places himſelf *anſatus in Cathedra*, and thus treats all other men in advance. Whoever, after his lordſhip, ſhall dare to reaſon on this ſubject *à priori*, muſt aſſume then, it ſeems,—to have in his own ſuperior mind the ſtandard of perfection in *All* the Arts!—Do you, Mr. Burgeſs, acquieſce to this condition? If it were poſſible (which I am very far from believing) that the ſame ſentiments ſhould pervade any conſiderable part of the very learned and reſpectable body to which you belong; I ſhould be ſorrowfully compelled to join in the exclamation,—O! aurita Arcadiæ pecora! qui, *Romæ*, hujus cuculi vocem veluti luſciniolæ melos, in aures admittere ſuſtinetis! And perhaps Mr. Burgeſs himſelf may have reaſon hereafter to regret, that (with all his real or pretended admiration of Lord Monboddo's writings) he neglected to avail himſelf of the only uſeful leſſon to be drawn from them: viz. To be at leaſt as well bred as *Porphyry's partridge*; and to have forborne his noiſe, until he was himſelf ſpoken to.

" there muſt then be in the original language from which " the Engliſh (and ſo of all other languages) is derived, " literally *ſuch* and *ſuch* words bearing preciſely *ſuch* and " *ſuch* ſignifications."—I was the more pleaſed with this ſuggeſtion, becauſe I was entirely ignorant even of the Anglo-ſaxon and Gothic characters: and the experiment preſented to me a mean, either of diſabuſing myſelf from error (which I greatly feared;) or of obtaining a confirmation ſufficiently ſtrong to encourage me to believe (what every man knowing any thing of human nature will always be very backward in believing of himſelf) that I had really made a diſcovery. For, if upon trial I ſhould find in an unknown language preciſely thoſe very words both in ſound, and ſignification, and application, which in my perfect ignorance I had foretold; what muſt I conclude, but either that ſome Dæmon had maliciouſly inſpired me with the ſpirit of true prophecy in order the more deeply to deceive me; or that my reaſoning on the nature of language was not fantaſtical. The event was beyond my expectation: for I inſtantly found upon trial, all my predictions verified. This has made me preſumptuous enough to aſſert it univerſally. Beſides that I have ſince traced theſe ſuppoſed unmeaning, indeclinable conjunctions with the ſame ſucceſs in many other languages beſides the Engliſh. And becauſe I know that the generality of minds receive

conviction

conviction more eaſily from a number of particular inſtances, than from the ſurer but more abſtracted arguments of general proof; if a multiplicity of uncommon avocations and engagements (ariſing from a very peculiar ſituation) had not prevented me, I ſhould long before this have found time enough from my other purſuits and from my enjoyments (amongſt which idleneſs is not the ſmalleſt) to have ſhewn clearly and ſatisfactorily, the origin and preciſe meaning of each of theſe pretended unmeaning, indeclinable Conjunctions, at leaſt in all the dead and living languages of Europe.

B.

Men talk very ſafely of what they *may do*, and what they *might have done*. But, though preſent profeſſions uſually outweigh paſt proofs with the people, they have never yet paſſed current with philoſophers. If therefore you would bring me over to your opinion, and embolden me to quit the beaten path with you, you muſt go much beyond the example of Henry Stephens, which was conſidered by Mer. Caſaubon as the ne plus ultra on this ſubject *, and muſt do what Wilkins required, before he would

* " Henricus Stephanus (author immortalis operis, quod Theſaurus " linguæ Græcæ indigitavit) ita omnes orationis particulas (*quarum quanto* " *in*

would venture to differ from the Grammars of inſtituted languages: that is, you muſt diſtribute all our *Engliſh* Conjunctions at leaſt into their proper places. And if it ſhould ſeem unreaſonable in me thus to impoſe upon you a taſk which—" no man, however learned or ſagacious has yet " been able to perform *;"—you muſt thank yourſelf for it, and the peremptory roundneſs of your aſſertion. Beſides, I do really think that after you have profeſſed ſo much of all the languages of Europe, I may fairly expect you to perform a little in your own.

" *in omni lingua difficilior, tanto utilior obſervatio*) omnes idiotiſmos excuſſit, " eruit, explicavit, ſimilia cum ſimilibus comparavit, ut exemplum quidem " in hoc genere aliis ad imitandum reliquerit abſolutiſſimum; ſed quod " pauci ſint aſſecuturi." Mer. Caſ. de lingua Saxonica.

* " The Particles are, among all nations, applied with ſo great latitude, " that they are not eaſily reducible under any regular ſcheme of explication: " this difficulty is not leſs, nor perhaps greater, in Engliſh than in other " languages. I have laboured them with diligence, I hope with ſucceſs: " ſuch at leaſt as can be expected in a taſk, which no man, however learned " or ſagacious, has yet been able to perform."

Preface to S. Johnſon's Dictionary.

H.

If it muſt be ſo, thus then: I ſay that

If	Are the Imperatives	Lıꝑ	of their reſpective Verbs.	Lıꝑan	To Give.
An		Ān		Ānan	To Grant.
Unleſs		Onleꝛ		Onleꝛan	To Diſmiſs.
Eke		Ȩac		Ȩacan	To Add.
Yet		Lȩt		Lȩtan	To Get.
Still		Stell		Stellan	To Put.
Elſe		Ālеꝛ		Ālеꝛan	To Diſmiſs.
Tho'		Đaꝑ		Đaꝑıan	To Allow.
or		or		or	
Though		Đaꝑıȝ		Đaꝑıȝan	
Bŭt		Bot		Botan	To Boot.
Būt		Be-utan		Beon-utan	To Be-out.
Without		Ꝟẏṅð-utan		Ꝟẏṅðan-utan	To Be-out.
And		Ān-aþ		Ānan-aþ	*Dare congeriem.*

Lest is the paſt participle Leꝛeþ of Leꝛan, To Diſmiſs.

Since { Sıððan, Sẏne, Seanþ-eꝛ, Sıððe, or Sın-eꝛ } is the participle of Seon, To See.

That is the Article or Pronoun Đat.

Theſe,

Theſe, I apprehend, are the only Conjunctions in our language which can cauſe any difficulty; and it would be impertinent in me to explain ſuch as—BE SO (*a*). BE IT. ALBEIT (*b*). ALBEIT SO (*c*). SET (*d*). NOTWITHSTANDING.

(*a*) " Set forth (quod ſhe) and tell me how.
Shew me thy ſekcnes euery dele.
Madame, that can I do wele:
BE ſo my lyfe therto woll laſte."
Gower. Lib. 1. Fol. 8. Pag. 2. Col. 1.

" For theſe craftes (as I finde)
A man maie do by waie of kinde:
BE ſo it be to good entent."
Gower. Lib. 5. Fol. 134. Pag. 2. Col. 1.

" For ſuche men that ben vilayns
The lawe in ſuche a wiſe ordeineth,
That what man to the lawe pleyneth,
BE ſo the judge ſtande upright,
He ſhall be ſerued of his right."
Gower. Lib. 7. Fol. 159. Pag. 1. Col. 1.

" The maſt to brake, the ſayle to roofe,
The ſhip upon the wawes droofe,
Till that thei ſee the londes coſte.
Tho made a vowe the leſte and moſte
BE ſo thei mighten come alonde."
Gower. Lib. 8. Fol. 177. Pag. 1. Col. 2.

(*b*) " Saturne anon, to ſtynten ſtryfe and drede
AL BE IT that it be agayne his kynde
Of all this ſtrife he can remedy fynde."
Chaucer. Knyghtes Tale. Fol. 8. Pag. 2. Col. 1.

ING. NEVERTHELESS. SAVE *that* (*e*). SAVING *that*. EXCEPT

" The quhilk Juno nowthir lang dayis nor ȝeris,
Nor nane diuyne ſacrifice may appeis;
Sche reſtis neuir, nor may ſche leif at eis,
ALBEIT the power and charge of Jupiter
Reſiſtis ſche wat, and fatis war hir contrare."
Douglas. 5th Booke. Pag. 154.

" Freynd ſerly not, na cauſe is to compleyne,
ALBEIT thy wit grete god may not atteyne."
Douglas. Prol. to 10th Booke. Pag. 309.

(*e*) " Another remedy is that a man eſchewe the companye of hem by whiche he douteth to be tempted: for ALBEIT ſo that the dede is wythſtonde, yet is there greate temptacyon."
Chaucer. Perſons Tale. Fol. 115. Pag. 2. Col. 2.

" AL BE IT ſo that of your pride and high preſumpcion and folye, ye haue " miſborne you, yet for as mikell as I ſe and beholde your greate humilyte, " it conſtrayneth me to do you grace and mercy."
Tale of Chaucer. Fol. 83. Pag. 1. Col. 1.

(*d*) " Bot ſen I am compellid the to tranſlait,
And not onlie of my curage, God wate,
Durſt I interpriſe ſic outragious folie,
Quhare I offend, the leſſe repreſe ſerf I,
And that ȝe knaw at quhais inſtance I tuke
For to tranſlate this maiſt excellent buke,
I mene Virgillis volum maiſt excellent,
SET this my werk full febill be of rent."
Douglas. Preface. Page 4.

" Sic pleſand wordes carpand, he has forth brocht,
SETT his mynd troublit mony greuous thocht."
Douglas. 1ſt Booke. Pag. 19.

EXCEPT *that*. EXCEPTING *that*. BATING *that*. IF CASE (*f*).

IN

" Betwix gude hope and drede in doute they ſtude,
Quhither thay war lewand, or tholit extreme dede al,
Thay anſuerit not, SET thay oft plène and cal."
Douglas. 1ſt Booke. Pag. 19.

" And SET it be not louable nor ſemely thocht
To punys ane woman, but ſchamefull hir to ſla,
Na victory, but lak following alſa,
ȝit netheles I aucht louit to be,
Vengeaunce to take on hir deſeruis to de."
Douglas. 2d. Booke. Pag. 58.

" Virgill is full of ſentence ouer all quhare,
His hie knawlege he ſchawis, that euery ſorte
Of his clauſis comprehend ſic ſentence,
Thare bene thereof, SET thou think this but ſporte,
Made grete ragmentis of hie intelligence."
Douglas. Prol. to 6th Booke. Pag. 158.

" To name the god, that war ane manifeſt lee,
Is but ane god, makar of euery thing:
SET thou to Vulcane haue ful grete reſembling."
Douglas. Prol. to 6th Booke. Pag. 161.

" Thare ſuld na knicht rede but ane knichtly tale.
Quhat forcis him the buſſart on the brere?
SET wele him ſemes the falcone heroner."
Douglas. Prol. to 9th Booke. Pag. 271.

" Turnus, behald on cais reuoluit the day,
And of his fre wyl ſendis the perſay
Sic auantage and oportunite,
And SET thou wald haif aſkit it, quod ſche,

IN CASE (*g*). PUT CASE (*h*). SET CASE (*i*). I POSE (*k*).
BECAUSE.

There was neuer ane of al the goddis ding,
Quhilk durſt have the promittit ſic ane thing."
Douglas. 9th Booke. Pag. 273.

" SET our nature God has to him unyte,
His godhede incommyxt remanis perfite."
Douglas. Prol. to 10th Booke. Pag. 308.

" Angellis, ſcheiphardis, and kingis thy godhede kend,
SET thou in crib betuix twa beiſtis was laid."
Douglas. Prol. to 10th Booke. Pag. 310.

" Drances, forſoith, quod he, euer has thou bene
Large and to mekil of ſpeche, as weil is ſene,
Bot not with wourdis ſuld the court be fyllyt,
SET thou be grete tharin, and ful euill wyllit."
Douglas. 11th Booke. Pag. 376.

" *I put the cais* SET the Etholianis
Liſt not to cum in our help nor ſupple;
Zit than the bald Meſſapus wele wylle."
Douglas. 11th Booke. Pag. 378.

" With ſtout curage agane him wend I will,
Thocht he in proues pas the grete Achill,
Or SET *in cais* ſic armour he weris as he,
Wrocht be the handis of God Vulcanus ſle."
Douglas. 11th Booke. Pag. 378.

" Bot Juno tho doun from the hicht, I wys,
Of the mountane that Albane clepyt is
Now in our dayis (SET then this hillis down
Had nouther name, honour, nor renowne)
Scho did behald amyd the feildis plane."
Douglas. 12th Booke. Pag. 411.

BECAUSE. TO WIT. FORESEEING *that* (*l.*) FORESEEN *that.*

" For SET we preis us faſt to ſpeike out braid,
Ne voce, nor wourdis followis nocht is ſaid."
Douglas. 12th Booke. Pag. 446.

" And SET that empty be my brane and dull,
I haue tranſlatit ane volume wounderfull."
Douglas. 13th Booke. Pag. 483.

" Fra tyme I thareto ſet my pen to wryte,
It was compilyt in auchtene monethis ſpace:
SET I feil ſyith ſic twa monethis in fere
Wrate neuir ane wourd, nor micht the volume ſtere."
Douglas. Pag. 484.

(*e*) " SAUFE onely that I crie and bidde,
I am in triſteſſe all amidde."
Gower. Lib. 4. Fol. 82. Pag. 2. Col. 1.

" Almoſte ryght in the ſame wiſe the phiſiciens anſwerd,
SAUE that they ſayden a fewe wordes more."
Tale of Chaucer. Fol. 74. Pag. 1. Col. 2.

" Tyl ſhe gan aſken him howe Hector ferde
That was the townes wal, and Grekes yerde.
Ful wel I thanke it God, ſayde Pandarus,
SAUE in his arme he hath a lytle wounde."
Chaucer. 2d Booke of Troylus. Fol. 164. Pag. 1. Col. 1.

" Behynd thame for uptaking quhare it lay
Mony bricht armoure rychely dycht thay left,
SAUF that Eurialus with him turſit away
The riall trapouris, and mychty patrellis gay."
Douglas. 9th Booke. Pag. 288.

" Bot

that. PROVIDED *that.* BEING *that.* &c. Which are evident at firſt ſight.

B. Well

" Bot al this time I bid na mare, I wys,
SAIF that this wenſche, this vengeabil peſt or traik,
Be bet doun dede by my wound and ſcharp ſtraik."

Douglas. 11th booke. Pag. 393.

" All the air a ſolemn ſtillneſs holds;
SAVE that from yonder ivy-mantled bower
The moping owl does to the moon complain."

Gray's Elegy.

(*f*) " I do not like theſe paper-ſquibs, good maſter, they may undo " your ſtore—I mean of credit, and fire your arſenall; IF CASE you do not " in time make good thoſe outer works, your pockets."

B. Johnſon. Staple of News, Act. 1. Sc. 3.

Chaucer alſo uſes IF CACE.

(*g*) " The dignite of king John wold have diſtroyed al Englande, " therfore mokel wiſedome and goodnes both, nedeth in a perſon, the " malyce in dignite ſlyly to bridell, and with a good byt of areſt to with- " draw, IN CASE it wold praunce otherwiſe than it ſhuld."

Chaucer. Teſtament of Loue. 2d boke. Fol. 317. P. 2. Col. 1.

" Forſoith, IN CAIS the auenture of battal
Had bene doutſum: wald God it war aſſale."

Douglas. 4th booke. Pag. 121.

(*b*) " And

B.

Well. Whether you are right or wrong in your conjectures concerning Conjunctions, I acknowledge that this is

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(*b*) " And PUT THE CAIS that I may not optene
From Latyne land thaim to expell all clene,
ȝit at leiſt thare may fall ſtop or delay
In ſa grete materis for ane ȝere or tway."

Douglas. 7th Booke. Page 217.

PUT CASE, though now out of faſhion, was frequently uſed by Chillingworth and other good authors.

" PUT THE CASE the Pope, for a reward of your ſervice done him in " writing this book, had given you the honour and means of a cardinal, " would you not have profeſſed, that you have not merited ſuch a reward."

Chillingworth. Chap. 4. Pag. 211. § 36.

(*i*) " He is worthy to loſe his priuylege, that miſuſeth the might and " power that is giuen hym. And I SETTE CASE ye might enioyne hem " that payne by right and lawe, whiche I trowe ye may not do: I ſaye ye " might not put it to execution."

Tale of Chaucer. Fol. 82. Pag. 2. Col. 2.

" Yet SETTE I CASE ye haue lycence for to venge you, I ſaye that there " ben full many thinges that ſhall reſtrayne you of vengeaunce takyng."

Ibid. Fol. 79. Pag. 2. Col. 1.

(*k*) " Auauntour

is coming to the point: and is fairer than ſhuffling them over unnoticed, as the greater part of grammarians have

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(*k*) " Auauntour and a lyer, al is one
As thus. I POSE a woman graunt me
Her loue, and ſayth that other wol ſhe none
And I am ſworne to holden it ſecre
And after I tel it two or thre
I wys I am auauntour at the leeſt
And lyer eke, for I breke my beheeſt."

Chaucer, 3d boke of Troylus, Fol. 174, Pag. 1. Col. 2.

" Sone after this, ſhe to him gan rowne
And aſked him if Troylus were there
He ſwore her nay, for he was out of towne
And ſayd, Nece: I POSE that he were there
You durſt neuer haue the more feere."

Chaucer, 3d booke of Troylus, Fol. 175, Page 2. Col. 1.

(*l*) " It may be ordered that ii or iii of our owne ſhippes do ſee the " ſayde Frenche ſoldiers wafted to the coaſt of France; FORSEING that our " ſayd ſhippes entre no hauen there."

Queen Elizabeth to Sir W. Cecil and Dr. Wotton.
Lodge's Illuſtrations, Vol. I. Pag. 339.

(*m*) " Whan he made any ordinary judges, advocates or proctoures, he " cauſed them to be openly named, requirynge the people and gyvynge " them courage, if there were cauſe to accuſe them, to prove the cryme " by open wytneſſe: FORESENE if they dyd not ſufficiently prove it, and " that it ſemed to be maliciouſe detraction, the accuſour ſhulde forthwith " be beheaded."

Sir T. Elliott. Image of Governaunce, Chap. 17.

done;

done; or than repeating after others, that they are not themſelves any parts of language, but only ſuch *acceſſaries* as *ſalt* is to meat, or *water* to bread; or that they are the mere *edging* or *ſauce* of language; or that they are like the *handles* to cups, or *plumes* to helmets, or *binding* to books, or *harneſs* for horſes; or that they are *pegs* and *nails*, and *nerves* and *joints*, and *ligaments* and *glue*, and *pitch* and *lime*, and *mortar*, and ſo forth *. In which kind

* " Pour quoy eſt-ce que Platon dit, que l'oraiſon eſt temperée de *noms* " & de *verbes?*—Mais adviſons que nous ne prenions autrement les paroles " de Platon que comme il les a dittes: car il a dit que l'oraiſon eſtoit tem- " perée *De* ces deux parties, non *Par* ces deux parties; que nous ne " façions la faulte que feroit celuy qui calomnieroit un autre pour avoir dit, " que un oignement ſeroit compoſé de cire & de galbanum, alleguant " qu'il auroit obmis à dire le feu & le vaſe, ſans leſquels on ne ſçauroit " meſler leſdites drogues: auſſi ſemblablement ſi nous le reprenions pour " autant qu'il auroit obmis à dire les conjonctions, les prepoſitions, & " autres telles parties. Car le parler & l'oraiſon n'eſt compoſé *De* ces " parties là, mais *Par* icelles, & non ſans elles. Car comme celuy qui " prononceroit *battre*, ou *eſtre battu*; ou d'ailleurs *Socrates* & *Pythagoras*, " encore donneroit-il aucunement à entendre & à penſer quelque choſe: " mais celuy qui profereroit *Car* ou *De* ſimplement & ſeulement, on ne " pourroit imaginer qu'il entendiſt aucune choſe ny aucun corps, ains s'il " n'y a quelques autres paroles qui ſoient proferées quant & quant, elles " reſſembleront à des ſons & des bruits vains ſans aucune ſignification; " d'autant que ny à par elles ny avec d'autres ſemblables, elles ne peuvent " rien ſignifier. Mais à fin que nous conjoignons ou meſlions & aſſem- " blions tout en un, nous y adjouſtons des prepoſitions, conjonctions, & " articles,

kind of pretty ſimilies Philoſophers and Grammarians ſeem to have vied with one another; and have often endeavoured to

" articles, voulans enfaire un corps de tout.—Comment donc pourra dire " quelqu'un, ces parties-là ne ſervent-elles de rien à l'oraiſon? Quant à " moy, je tiens qu'elles y ſervent autant comme le *Sel* à la viande, & l'*eau* " à faire le Pain. Evenus ſouloit dire que le *Feu* eſtoit la meilleure *Saulſe* " du Monde; auſſi ſont ces Parties l'aſſaiſonnement de noſtre langage, ne " plus ne moins que le feu & le Sel des breuvages & viandes, dont nous " ne nous ſçaurions paſſer; excepté que nóſtre parler n'en a pas toujours " neceſſairement à faire: comme l'on peut dire du langage des Romains, " duquel aujourd'huy tout le monde preſque uſe; car il a oſté preſque " toutes les prepoſitions excepté bien peu; & quant aux articles que l'on " appelle, il n'en reçoit pas un tout ſeul, ains uſe de noms ſans *bordure*, " par maniere de dire; & ne s'en fault pas eſmerveiller, attendu qu' " Homere, à peu de noms prepoſe des articles, comme ſi c'etoient *anſes* " à des vaſes qui en euſſent beſoign, ou des *pennaches* ſur des morions.— " Or que les Dialecticiens aient plus beſoign de conjonctions, que nuls " autres hommes de lettres, pour la liaiſon & tiſſure de leurs prepoſitions, " ou les disjonctions d'icelles, ne plus ne moins que les cochers ont beſoign " d' *attelages* pour atteler de front leur chevaux; ou comme Ulyſſes " avoit beſoign d'*ozier* en la caverne de Cyclops pour lier ſes moutons; " cela n'argue ni ne preuve pas que la conjonction ſoit autrement " partie d'oraiſon, mais bien un outil propre à conjoindre ſelon qu'elle " en porte nom, & a contenir & aſſembler non pas toutes choſes, " ains ſeulement celles qui ne ſont pas ſimplement dites: ſi l'on ne " vouloit dire que la *Chorde* ou *courroye* dont une balle ſeroit liée fuſt " partie de la balle; ou la *colle* d'un papier ou d'un livre qui eſt collé; " & les données & diſtributions des deniers partie du gouvernement: " comme Demades diſoit que les deniers que l'on diſtribuoit manuellement " par teſte à chaſque citoyen d'Athenes, pour veoir les jeux, eſtoient la " colle du gouvernement de l'eſtat populaire. Et quelle eſt la conjonction

to amuſe their readers and cover their own ignorance, by very learnedly diſputing the propriety of the ſimilie, inſtead of explaining the nature of the Conjunction.

But, pray, have you any authority for the derivation of theſe words? Are not all former etymologiſts againſt you?

H.

Except in IF, and BUT (in one of its meanings) I believe they are all againſt me. But I am perſuaded that all future etymologiſts, and perhaps ſome philoſophers, will acknowledge their obligation to me. For theſe troubleſome conjunctions, which have hitherto cauſed them ſo much miſtaken and unſatisfactory labour, ſhall ſave them

---

" qui façe de pluſieurs propoſitions une, en les couſant & liant enſemble,
" comme le marbre fait le fer quand on le fond avec lui par le feu; mais
" pour cela le marbre n'eſt pas pourtant, ny ne l'appelle lon pas partie de
" fer; combien que ces choſes-là qui entrent en une compoſition & qui
" ſont fondues avec les drogues que l'on meſle, ont accouſtumé de faire
" & de ſouffrir ne ſçay quoi de commun, compoſé de tous les ingrediens.—
" Quant aux prepoſitions on les peult accomparer aux *pennaches* ou autres
" Ornemens que lon met au deſſus les habillemens de Teſtes, ou bien aux
" *baſes* & *ſoubaſſement* que lon met au deſſoubs des Statues; pour ce
" qu'elles ne ſont pas tant parties d'oraiſon, comme alentour des parties."

PLUTARCH, *Platonic Queſtions*.—9th. *Amyot*.

many

many an error and many a weary ſtep in future. They ſhall no more expoſe themſelves by unnatural forced conceits to derive the Engliſh and all other languages from the Greek, or the Hebrew; or ſome imaginary primæval tongue. The Particles of every language ſhall teach them whither to direct and where to ſtop their inquiries: for wherever the evident meaning and origin of the Particles of any language can be found, *there* is the certain ſource of the whole.

B.

Without a moment's reflection, every one muſt perceive that this aſſertion is too general and comprehenſive. The mixture which is found in all cultivated languages; the perpetual acceſſion of new words from affectation as well as from improvement, and the introduction of new Arts and Habits, eſpecially in learned nations; and from other circumſtances; forbid the deduction of the *whole* of a language from any one ſingle ſource.

H.

Moſt certainly. And therefore when I ſay the *whole*, I muſt beg to be underſtood with thoſe exceptions. And, that I may not ſeem to contradict myſelf when we ſhall hereafter come to treat of them, I beg you likewiſe to re-

member, that I by no means include in my aſſertion, the *Abbreviations* of language: for they are always *improvements* ſuperadded by language in its progreſs; and are often borrowed from ſome other more cultivated languages. Whereas the original Mother-tongue is always rude and tedious, without thoſe advantages of *Abbreviation*. And were he once more in being, I ſhould not at all doubt of being able to convince even Junius himſelf (who with many others could ſo far miſtake the courſe and progreſs of ſpeech, as to derive an uncultivated from a cultivated language) that, inſtead of referring the Anglo-ſaxon to his favourite Greek as its original, he muſt ſeek out (and I ſuppoſe he would eaſily find) a Parent for the latter.

But, I beg pardon, this is rather digreſſing from my purpoſe. I have nothing to do with the learning of mere curioſity *: nor am any farther concerned with Etymology, than as it may ſerve to get rid of the falſe philoſophy received concerning language and the human underſtanding. If you pleaſe, therefore, I will return to the Con-

* " Il y a un point, paſſé lequel les recherches ne ſont plus que pour la " curioſité. Ces verités ingenieuſes et inutiles reſſemblent à des étoiles " qui, placées trop loin de nous, ne nous donnent point de clarté."

Voltaire, Sur la Societé royale et ſur les Academies.

junctions

junctions I have derived; and, if you think it worth the while, we will examine the conjectures of other perſons concerning them; and ſee whether I have not ſomething better than the authorities you aſk after in my favour.

B.

I ſhould be glad you would do ſo.

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ, &c.

CHAP. VIII.

ETYMOLOGY OF THE ENGLISH CONJUNCTIONS.

I F.

H.

IF and AN may be uſed mutually and indifferently to ſupply each other's place.

Beſides having Skinner's authority for IF, I ſuppoſe that the meaning and derivation of this *principal* ſupporter of the *Tripod of Truth* *, are ſo very clear, ſimple and univer-

* See Plutarch Περι του ΕΙ του εν Δελφοις,

Εν δε Διαλεκτικη δη τι μεγιστην εχει δυναμιν ὁ συναπτικος ἑτοσι συνδεσμος, ὰτε δη το λογικωταιον σχηματιζων αξιωμα.—Το γαρ τεκνικον και λογικον, ὡσπερ ειρηται, γνωσις ακολυθιας, την δε προσληψιν ἡ αισθησις τω λογω διδωσιν. ὁθεν ει και αισχρον ειπειν, εκ απορεψομαι τελο ειναι τον της αληθειας τριποδα τον λογον, ὁν την τε λεγοντος ὡρος το προηγυμενον ακολυθιαν θεμενος, ειτα προσλαβων την ὑπαρξιν, επαγει το συμπερασμα της αποδειξεως. Τον εν Πυθιον ει δη μυσικη τι ηδεται, και κυκνων φωναις και κιθαρας ψοφοις, τι θαυμαστον εστι Διαλεκτικης φιλια τελο ασπαζεσθαι τε λογε το μερος και αγαπαν, ὡ μαλιστα και πλειστω προσχρωμενος ὁρα τες φιλοσοφους.

ſally

ſally allowed, as to need no farther diſcourſe about them.

Skinner ſays—" IF (in agro Linc. *Gif*) ab AS. Ƿiꝑ. *Si.* " Hoc a verbo Ƿiꝑan, *dare*, q. d. *Dato.*"

Lye, in his edition of Junius, ſays—" Haud inſcitè " Skinnerus, qui deduxit ab A. s Ƿiꝑan, *dare*, q. d. *Dato.*"

GIF is to be found not only, as Skinner ſays, in Lincolnſhire, but in all our old writers. G. Douglas almoſt always uſes *Gif:* once or twice only he has uſed *If*; once he uſes GEWE, and once GIFFIS, and ſometimes IN CASE and IN CAIS for GIF.

" GIF luf be vertew, than is it leful thing;
" GIF it be vice, it is ȝour undoing."

Douglas. Prol. to 4th boke. Pag. 95.

" Thocht ſum wald ſwere, that I the text haue waryit,
" Or that I haue this volume quite myſcaryit,
" Or threpe planelie, I come neuer nere hand it,
" Or that the werk is werſt that euer I fand it,
" Or ȝit GEWE Virgil ſtude wele before,
" As now war tyme to ſchift the werſt ouer ſkore."

Douglas Preface, Pag. 11.

" Be

" Be not ouer ſtudyous to ſpy ane mote in myn ɛ,
" That in ȝour awin ane ferrye bot can not ſe,
" And do to me, as ȝe wald be done to;
" Now hark ſchirris, thare is na mare ado:
" Quha liſt attend, GYFFIS audience and draw nere."

Douglas Preface, Pag. 12.

Chaucer commonly uſes IF; but ſometimes YEUE, YEF and YF.

" Lo here the letters ſelid of thys thyng
" That I mote beare in all the haſte I may;
" YEUE ye woll ought unto your ſonne the kyng,
" I am your ſeruaunt bothe nyght and day."

Chaucer. Man of Lawes tale. Fol. 22. *Pag.* 1. *Col.* 2.

" And therfore he of full auiſement
" Nolde neuer write in non of his ſermons
" Of ſuche unkynde abhominacions
" Ne I ne wol non reherce, YEF that I may."

Chaucer. Man of Lawes prologue. Fol. 18. *Pag.* 2. *Col.* 1.

" She was ſo charytable and ſo pytous
" She wolde wepe YF that ſhe ſawe a mous
" Caught in a trappe, if it were deed or bledde."

Prol. to Canterbury tales. Prioreſſe.

And it is to be obſerved that in Chaucer and in other old writers, the verb to GIVE ſuffers the ſame variations in the manner of writing and pronouncing it, whether uſed

conjunctively or otherwiſe: as does alſo the *Noun* derived from it.

" And after on the daunce went
" Largeſſe, that ſet al her entent
" For to ben honorable and free,
" Of Alexanders kynne was ſhe,
" Her moſt joye was ywis
" Whan that ſhe YAFE, and ſayd: Haue this.
" Not Auarice the foule caytyſe
" Was halfe to grype ſo ententyſe
" As Largeſſe is to YEUE and ſpende,
" And god alway ynowe her ſende,
" So that the more ſhe YAUE awaye
" The more ywis ſhe had alwaye:
" Great loos hath Largeſſe, and great priſe,
" For both wyſe folke and unwyſe
" Were wholy to her bandon brought
" So wel with YEFTES hath ſhe wrought."

Chaucer. Romaunt of the Roſe. Fol. 125, *P.* 2. *C.* 1.

" A wyſe is goddes YEFTE verely
" Al other maner YEFTES hardely
" As londes, rentes, paſture, or commune
" Or mouables, all ben YEFTES of fortune
" That paſſen, as a ſhadowe on a wall
" But dred nat, YF playnly ſpeke I ſhall
" A wyſe wol laſte and in thyn houſe endure
" Wel lenger than the lyſt parauenture."

Chaucer. Marchauntes tale. Fol. 28. *Pag.* 2. *Col.* 2.

" FORGIFF me, Virgill, GIF I thee offend."

Douglas. Preface. Pag. 11.

" GIF us thy anſueir, quharon we ſal depend."

Douglas, 3d booke, Pag. 70.

" And ſuffir Tyrianis, and all Liby land
" Be GIF in dowry to thy ſon in hand."

Douglas, 4th booke, Pag. 103.

" In the mene tyme, of the nycht wache the cure
" We GIF Meſſapus."

Douglas, 9th booke, Pag. 280.

In Henry the VIIth's will, dated 1509, you will alſo find YEVE uſed where we now employ GIVE: and in the time of Queen Elizabeth it was written in the ſame manner.

" YEOVEN under our ſignet."

Lodge's Illuſtrations. The Queen to Sir W. Cecil and Dr. Wotton, Vol. 1. *Pag.* 343.

" YEVEN under our ſeale of our order, the firſt day of April 1566, the " eight year of our reign."

Lodge's Illuſtrations. Quene Elizabeth to the Erle of Sherowſbury, Vol. 1. *Pag.* 362.

GIN * is often uſed in our Northern counties and by the Scotch, as we uſe IF or AN: which they do with equal

* Ray ſays—" *Gin, Gif,* in the old Saxon is *Gif*; from whence the word " *If* is made per aphæreſin literæ G. *Gif,* from the verb *Gifan,* dare; " and is as much as *Dato.*"

propriety

propriety and as little corruption: for GIN is no other than the participle *Given*, *Gi'en*, *Gi'n*. (As they alſo uſe *Gie* for *Give*, and *Gien* for *Given*, when they are not uſed *conjunctively*.) And *hoc dato* is of equal conjunctive value in a ſentence with *Da hoc*.

" Then *wi'* his ſpear he turn'd hir owre,
" O GIN hir face was wan!
" He turn'd her owre and owre again,
" O GIN hir ſkin was whyte."

Percy's Reliques, Vol. i. *Edom o'Gordon*.

Even our Londoners often pronounce *Give* and *Given* in the ſame manner: As

" *Gi'* me your hand."
" I have *Gin* it him well."

So Wycherly, Love in a Wood, Act V. " If my " daughter there ſhould have done ſo, I wou'd not have *gi'n* her a groat."

A N.

I do not know that AN has been attempted by any one, except S. Johnſon: and, from the judicious diſtinction he has made between Junius and Skinner *, I am perſuaded that

* " Junius appears to have excelled in extent of learning, and Skinner " in rectitude of underſtanding. Junius was accurately ſkilled in all the " northern

that he will be the firſt perſon to relinquiſh his own conjecture *: eſpecially when he notices his own ſelf-contradiction: for after having (under the article AN) told us that "AN is a contraction of *And if*;" and given the following inſtance,

——"Well I know
"The clerk will ne'er wear hair on's face that had it.
——"He will AN'IF he live to be a man."

He very truly (under the article AND) ſays—"In *And if*, the *And* is *redundant*; and is omitted by all later writers. As

——"I pray thee, Launce,
"AN'IF thou ſeeſt my boy, bid him make haſte."

"northern languages; Skinner probably examined the antient and remoter "dialects only by occaſional inſpection into dictionaries: But the learning "of Junius is often of no other uſe than to ſhew him a track by which he "may deviate from his purpoſe; to which Skinner always preſſes forward "by the ſhorteſt way. Skinner is often ignorant, but never ridiculous: "Junius is always full of knowledge; but his variety diſtracts his judgment, "and his learning is very frequently diſgraced by his abſurdities."

Preface to Dictionary.

* Immediately after the publication of my letter to Mr. Dunning, I was informed by Mr. S. (an intimate friend of Dr. Johnſon) that I was not miſtaken in this opinion; Dr. Johnſon having declared, that if he lived to give a new edition of his Dictionary, he ſhould certainly adopt my derivations.

The author of "*Criticiſms on the Diverſions of Purley*," who publiſhes under the feigned name of CASSANDER, (I ſuppoſe, becauſe he was born in the iſland of *Cadſan*, in Dutch Flanders) and who is a Teacher and Preacher in the City of Norwich, thus elegantly amuſes his readers. Pages 36, 37, 38.

"I have known a public ſpeaker who would now and "then take a ſurvey of his audience, and call out (if he "eſpied any drooping noddles or falling jaws)—*Brethren*, "*I will tell you a ſtory.*—As I think this an excellent "method of rouſing the attention of a reader or hearer, "for ever inclined to grow drowſy when the ſubject is ſo, "I ſhall not ſcruple to make uſe of it upon this occaſion.

"It is well known that the Boors in Frieſland, one of "the United Provinces, have ſo far retained ancient "cuſtoms, as to be, in dreſs, language, and manners, "exactly the ſame people which they were five hundred "years ago; a circumſtance that induced Junius the ſon "to pay them a viſit, and to paſs a few months among "them. In a tour I made to that country ſome years "ago, I was at a gentleman's houſe, from which I made "frequent excurſions into the inner part of the province. "In one of theſe I was obliged to take the firſt ſheltering

"place

" place in my way, being overtaken by a violent ſhower.
" It was a farm houſe, where I ſaw ſeveral children: and
" *I ſhall never forget* the ſpeech which one of them, an
" overgrown babe, made to his mother. He was ſtanding
" at her breaſt; and after he had done with one, I heard
" him ſay to her,—*Trientjen, yan my t'oor.*—i. e. Kate,
" give me t'other.—*I little thought at the time,* I ſhould
" have ſo good an opportunity of making uſe of the ſtory
" as I have at preſent."

This ſtory of the babe, he ſays, is certainly in my favour. I think it is deciſively.

But the Critic proceeds—" But we ſhould not fancy
" that words exiſt, or muſt have exiſted, becauſe, having
" adopted a certain method of finding out origins, we can-
" not poſſibly do without them. I have been looking out
" with ſome anxiety for the Anglo-Saxon verb Ānan, but
" but can get very little information about it. I find, in-
" deed, in King Alfred's Will the following article:—
" Æpiɼc ic an Eaƀpaɼƀe minum cl̃ɼa ɼuna.—Firſt I give to
" Edward my eldeſt ſon.—And from the expreſſion ic
" Ān, it ſhould ſeem as if there really exiſted ſuch verb
" in the Anglo-Saxon as Ānan. But as this is the only
" ſign of life it has given, as one may ſay, for theſe

" thouſand years, I am inclined to look upon that ſign as " being rather equivocal, and ſuſpect that the true reading " of the Will is, not ic an, but ic un, from unnan " cedere, concedere; this laſt verb being common in the " Anglo-Saxon, and nothing more eaſy than to miſtake " an u for an a, in that language, as well as in Engliſh. " However, as I have not ſeen hitherto any manu- " ſcript, on whoſe authority I can ground the juſtneſs of " my conjecture, I do not give it you as any thing certain; " and if you perſiſt in giving the preference to the old " reading, the ſtory of the babe is certainly in your " favour; for there is as little difference between An and " and yan, as between un and An. With me it will re- " main a matter of doubt, whether there ever exiſted ſuch " a verb as Anan, the ſame in ſignification and yet dif- " ferent in origin, with Gipan. It is by no means pro- " bable, that a people, who had hardly a conveyance for " one idea in a thouſand, ſhould have procured two ſuch " noble conveyances for one ſingle idea. This is a piece " of luxury, which even the moſt civilized nation ſeldom " allow themſelves *."

* Reprehenſor audaculus verborum—qui perpauca eademque a vulgo protrita legerat, habebatque nonnullas diſciplinæ grammaticæ inauditiunculas, partim rudes inchoataſque, partim non probas; eaſque quaſi pulverem ob oculos, quum adortus quemque fuerat, adſpergebat;—neque rationem verbum hoc, inquit, neque auctoritatem habet.

To

To this I anſwer, that Ānan, Ānnan, and Unnan, are all one and the ſame word differently ſpelled (as almoſt all the Anglo-Saxon and old Engliſh words are) becauſe differently pronounced.

But "he has been looking for Ānan, he ſays, with "ſome anxiety, and can get very little information about "it." If he looks ſo careleſsly when he is anxious, we may pretty well gueſs with how much accuracy he looks upon other occaſions. I will relieve his anxiety. I know he has Lye's collection of Anglo-Saxon words before him; (for he quotes it in his 66th page) let him put on his ſpectacles and open the book: he will there find Ānan, and Ānnan, with references to places where they are uſed. And if, after that, he ſhould ſtill continue anxious, I will furniſh him with more.

"Nothing, he ſays, is more eaſy than to miſtake an u "for an a, in that language, as well as in the Engliſh."— It is not ſo eaſy to miſtake the Anglo-Saxon character U for Ā, or u for a; as it is to miſtake the *written* Engliſh character u for *a*.

It is not true that any people are now, or ever were in the condition he repreſents the Anglo-Saxons; viz. of having

having " hardly a conveyance for one idea in a thouſand;" unleſs he means to include in his expreſſion, of *one idea*, each man's particular perception. No. Cheer up, *Caſſander:* your lot is not peculiar to yourſelf: for the people who have the pooreſt and ſcantieſt language, have yet always many more words than ideas. And I leave the reader to judge whether to have two words for one idea, be " a piece of luxury which even the moſt civilized na- " tion ſeldom allows itſelf."

UNLESS.

Skinner ſays—" *Unleſs* niſi, præter, preterquam, q. d. " *One-leſs*, uno dempto ſeu excepto: vel potius ab Onleꝑan, " dimittere, liberare, q. d. *Hoc dimiſſo.*"

It is extraordinary, after his judicious derivation of IF, that Skinner ſhould have been at a loſs about that of UNLESS; eſpecially as he had it in a manner before him: For Onleꝑ, *dimitte*, was ſurely more obvious and immediate than Onleꝑeð, *dimiſſo*.—As for, *One-leſs*, i. e. *Uno dempto* ſeu *excepto*, it is too poor to deſerve notice.

So low down as in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, this conjunction was ſometimes written *Oneles* and *Oneleſſe*. And this way of ſpelling it, which ſhould rather have directed

Skinnner to its true etymology, might perhaps contribute to miſlead him to the childiſh conjecture of *One leſs, Uno dempto.*—But in other places it is written purely ONLES: and ſometimes ONLESSE.

Thus, in the Trial of Sir John Oldcaſtle, An. 1413, "It was not poſſible for them to make whole Chriſtes cote "without ſeme, ONLESSE certeyn great men were brought "out of the way."

So Thomas Lupſet, in the early part of Henry the 8th's reign;

"But alway, ſiſter, remembre that charitie is not per-"fect ONLES that it be burninge."

Treatiſe of Charitie, pag. 8.

"This peticion cannot take effect ONLES man be made "like an aungel." *Ibid. pag.* 66.

"Fayth cannot be perfect, ONLES there be good workes."

A compendious Treatiſe teachynge the Waye of diynge well. pag. 160.

"The more ſhamfully that men for the moſt parte feare "to die, the greater profe there is, that ſuch extreme

" poyntes of feare againſt all ſhame ſhuld not in ſo many " dayly appere, whan death approcheth, ONLES bi natur " ſome juſt feare were of the ſame." *Ibid. pag.* 166.

In other places Lupſet ſpells it ONELES and ONLESSE.

So, in " The Image of Governance" by Sir T. Elliott, 1541, " Men do feare to approche unto their ſoverayne " Lorde, ONELES they be called."

" This noble empire is lyke to falle into extreme ruyne " and perpetuall infamye, ONELESSE your moſte excellent " wyſedomes wyll dilygently and conſtantly prepare your- " ſelfes to the certayne remedy."

So in—" A neceſſary doctrine and erudition for any " chriſten man, ſet furthe by the Kynges majeſtie of " Englande." 1543.

" ONLES ye beleve, ye ſhall not underſtande."

" No man ſhall be crowned, ONLES he lawfully fight."

" Neyther is it poſſible for any man, ONELESSE this " holy ſpirite ſhall firſt illumine his hart."

" True honour ſhall be gyven to none, ONELES he be " worthy."

" Who can have true penance, ONLES he beleve ſted- " faſtly that God is."

" Who ſo ever doth forſake his lawful wyfe, ONELES it " be for adultery, commytteth adulterye in ſo doynge."

" They be bound ſo to do, ONLES they ſe reaſonable " cauſe to the contrary."

" The ſoule waxeth feble, ONLESSE the ſame be cheriſhed."

" In vayne, ONLESSE there were ſome facultie."

" It cannot begynne, ONELESSE by the grace of God."

So in the " Supplication to King Henry VIII." by Barnes.

" I ſhall come to the councell when ſoever I bee called, " ONLES I be lawfully let."

So in the " Declaration againſt Joye" by Gardiner, Biſhop of Wincheſter.

" No,

" No man commeth to me, ONLESSE my father draweth " hym."

" Can any man further replye to this carpenter, ONLES " a man wolde ſaye, that the carpenter was alſo after the " thefe hymſelfe."

" For ye fondely *improve* * a concluſion which myght " ſtande and be true, with your fonde paradox of only " fayth

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* To *improve* (i. e. to cenſure, to impeach, to blame, to reprove) A word perpetually uſed by the authors about Shakeſpeare's time, and eſpecially in religious controverſy.—" Whereas he hath ſpoken it by his " own mouth, that it is not good for man to be alone, they have *im-* " *proved* that doctrine and taughte the contrarye."—*The Actes of Engliſh Votaries by Ihon Bale. Dedicated to Edward the 6th.* 1550.

" A wonderful thyng, that this ſhoulde be cryed lawful in their cathedrall " church with ryngyng, ſyngynge, and ſenſynge, and in their yelde halle " condemned for felony and treaſon. Ther did they worſhyp it in their " ſcarlet gownes with cappe in hande, and here they *improved* it with ſcornes " and with mockes, grennyng upon her lyke termagauntes in a playe."
Actes of Engliſh Votaries.

The word is taken by us from the French, who uſed it and ſtill continue to uſe it in the ſame meaning.—" Elles croient que le corps et le ſang ſont " vraiment diſtribués à ceux qui mangent; et *improuvent* ceux qui en- " ſeignent le contraire." *Boſſuet des variat des Egliſes. Prot.*

" Ils ſont indignes de jamais comprendre ces ſortes de beautés, et ſont " condamnez au malheur de les *improuver*, et d' étre *improuvez* auſſi des " gens d' eſprit." *Lettres de Buſſy Rabutin. Tom.* 4. *pag.* 278.

" fayth juſtifieth, ONLESSE in teaching ye wyl ſo handel " the matter, as, &c.

" We cannot love god, ONLES he prepareth our harte " and geve us that grace; no more can we beleve god, " ONLESSE he giveth us the gift of belefe."

" In every kynde the female is commonly barren, " ONLESSE it conceyveth of the male; ſo is concupyſcence " barren and voyde of ſynne, ONLESSE it conceyve of " man the agreymente of his free wyll."

" La bourgeoiſie de Geneve a droit de faire des repreſentations dans " toutes les occaſions où elle croit les loix léſées, et où elle *improuve* la con- " duite de ſes magiſtrats." *Rouſſeau. Vol. 2. pag. 440.*

" Je ne pouvois en effet me diſſimuler qu' en *improuvant* les travaux " qu' on venoit de faire; ceux qui les avoient ordonnés en rejetteroient le " blame ſur les deux architectes."

Memoires du Baron de Tott. Tom. 2. pag. 123.

" Arrêtons-nous ſur les inculpations faites à Roland dans cette acte " d' accuſation, qui fera la honte du ſiecle et du peuple qui a pu, ou l' ap- " prouver, ou ne pas hautement l' *improuver*." *Obſervations par Amar.*

The expreſſion in Hamlet (Act 1. Sce. 1.) —" Of *unimproved* mettle " hot and full."—ought not to have given Shakeſpeare's commentators any trouble: for *unimproved* means *unimpeached*; though Warburton thinks it means " *unrefined:*" Edwards, " *unproved;*" and Johnſon (with the approbation of Malone) " *not regulated nor guided by knowledge or experience:*" and in his Dictionary he explains it to be " *not taught, not meliorated by in-* " *ſtruction.*"

" We

" We may not properly ſaye we apprehend juſtification " by fayth, ONLESSE we wolde call the promiſſe of God, &c."

" Such other peviſshe wordes as men be encombred to " heare, ONLES they wolde make Goddes worde the matter " of the Devylles ſtrife."

" Who can wake out of ſynne, WITHOUT god call him; " and ONLESSE god hath given eares to heare this voyce of " god. How is any man beyng lame with ſynne, able to " take up his couche and walke, ONLESSE god ſayeth, &c."

So in the—" Anſweare to Fekenham touchinge the othe " of the ſupremacy," by Horne, Biſhop of Wincheſter.

" I coulde not chooſe, ONELES I woulde ſhawe myſelfe " overmuch unkinde unto my native countrey, but take " penne in hande and ſhape him a ful and plaine anſweare, " without any curioſitie."

" The election of the pope made by the clergie and " people in thoſe daies, was but a vaine thing, ONLES the " emperour or his lieutenant had confirmed the ſame."

" The pope would not conſecrate the elect biſhop, " ONLES he had firſt licence therto of the emperour."

" No

" No prince, no not the emperour himſelfe ſhould be " preſent in the councell with the cleargie, ONLES it were " when the principall pointes of faith were treated of."

" He ſweareth the Romaines that they ſhall never after " be preſent at the election of any pope, ONLES they be " compelled thereunto by the emperour."

" Who maketh no mencion of any prieſt there preſent, " as you untruely report, ONLES ye will thinke he meant " the order, whan he named the faction of the Phariſees."

" So that none ſhould be conſecrate, ONLESSE he were " commended and inveſtured biſhop of the kinge."

" And further to commaunde the newe electe pope to " forſake that dignitie unlawfully come by, ONLESSE they " woulde make a reaſonable ſatisfaction.

" That the pope mighte ſende into his dominions no " legate, ONLESSE the kinge ſhoulde ſende for him."

" What man, ONLESSE he be not well in his wittes, " will ſay that, &c."

" To

" To exerciſe this kinde of juriſdiction, neither kinges " nor civill magiſtrates may take uppon him, ONLESSE he " be lawfully called."

" That from hencefoorth none ſhoulde be pope, " ONELESSE he were created by the conſent of the em- " perour."

" Ye cannot finde ſo muche as the bare title of one of them, ONELESSE it be of a biſhoppe."

So in the—" Whetſtone of Witte," by Robert Recorde, 1557.

" I ſee moare menne to acknowledge the benefite of " nomber, then I can eſpie willyng to ſtudie to attaine the " benefites of it. Many praiſe it, but fewe dooe greatly " practiſe it; ONLESSE it bee for the vulgare practice con- " cernyng Merchaundes trade."

" Yet is it not accepted as a like flatte, ONLES it be re- " ferred to ſome other ſquare nomber."

I believe that William Tyndall, our immortal and match- leſs tranſlator of the bible, was one of the firſt who wrote

this word with an u; and, by the importance and merit of his works, gave courſe to this corruption in the language *.

" The ſcripture was geven, that we may applye the " medicine of the ſcripture, every man to his own ſores, " UNLESSE then we entend to be idle diſputers and braulers " about vaine wordes, ever gnawyng upon the bitter barke " without, and never attayning unto the ſweete pith " within, &c." Prol. before the 5 B. of Moſes.

" My thoughts have no veines, and yet UNLES they be " let blood, I ſhall periſh."

Endimion. By John Lilly. Act 1. *Sce.* 1.

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* Shakeſpeare, in Othello, Act II. Sce. 13. writes,

——————" What's the matter,
" That you *Unlace* your reputation thus
" And ſpend your rich opinion for the name
" Of a night brawler ?"

In a note on this paſſage S. Johnſon ſays—" Slacken or looſen. Put in " danger of dropping; or, perhaps, ſtrip of its ornaments." And in his Dictionary, he ſays,—" To make looſe; to put in danger of being loſt.— " Not in uſe." But he gives no reaſon whatever for this interpretation. I believe that *Unlace* in this paſſage means—" You UNLESS or ONLES your " reputation," from the ſame verb Onleȝan.

" His

" His frendes thought his learning theire ſufficient " (UNLES he ſhould proceed Doctor and profeſſe ſome one " ſtudie or ſcience.")

Lord Burley's Life in Peck's Deſiderata curioſa, Vol. 1. *pag.* 4.

" No man's cattell ſhall be queſtioned as the companies, " UNLES ſuch as have been entruſted with them or have " diſpoſed of them without order."

Articles ſigned and ſealed by the Commiſſioners of the Councill of State for the Commonwealth of England the twelveth day of March. 1651.

I do not know that Onleſ is employed *conjunctively* by the Angloſaxon writers, as we uſe *Unleſs*; (though I have no doubt that it was ſo uſed in diſcourſe); but inſtead of it, they frequently employ nymðe or nemðe: (which is evidently the Imperative nym or nem, of nyman or neman, to which is ſubjoined ðe, i. e. *That* *.) And nymðe—*Take away that*,—may very well ſupply the place of—Onleſ (ðe expreſſed or underſtood)—*Diſmiſs that.*

* It is too ſingular to be left unnoticed, that the ancient Romans uſed *Nemut*, inſtead of *Niſi*. For which Feſtus cites Cato *de poteſtate Trib.* but the paſſage is loſt.

LES, the Imperative of Leſan (which has the ſame meaning as Onleſan) is likewiſe uſed ſometimes by old writers inſtead of UNLESS.

" And thus I am conſtrenit, als nere as I may,
" To hald his verſe, and go nane uthir way;
" LES ſum hiſtorie, ſubtell worde, or ryme,
" Cauſis me mak degreſſioun ſum tyme."

G. DOUGLAS. *Preface.*

——————— " Gif he
" Commyttis any treſſoun, ſuld he not de;
" LES than his prince of grete humanite
" Perdoun his fault for his long trew ſervice."

G. D. *Prol.* to 10th Book.

" Sterff the behuffis, LES than thou war unkynd
" As for to leif thy brothir deſolate."

G. D. *Ænead.* 10th book.

In the ſame manner it is uſed throughout Ben. Johnſon.

" LESS learn'd Trebatius Cenſure diſagree."

Poetaſter.

" Firſt hear me—Not a ſyllable, LESS you take."

Alchymiſt, Act III. Scene 5.

" There for ever to remain
" LESS they could the knot unſtrain."

Maſque.

" To tell you true, 'tis too good for you,
" LESS you had grace to follow it."

Barthol. Fair.

" But

" But will not bide there, LESS yourſelf do bring him."
Sad Shepherd *.
" You

* It is this ſame Imperative LES, placed at the end of nouns and coaleſcing with them, which has given to our language ſuch adjectives as *hopeleſs*, *reſtleſs*, *deathleſs*, *motionleſs*, &c. i. e. *Diſmiſs* hope, reſt, death, motion, &c.

The two following lines of Chaucer in the Reve's Tale, in Wyllyam Thynne's edition,

And when the horſe was *loſe*, he gan to gon
" Towarde the fen, there wylde mares rynne."

are thus printed in Mr. Tyrwhit's edition,

" And whan the hors was *laus*, he gan to gon
" Toward the fen, ther wilde mares renne."

I am to ſuppoſe that Mr. Tyrwhit is juſtified for this reading by *ſome* manuſcript; and that it was not altered by himſelf merely for the ſake of introducing " *Laus*, *Iſland.* and the *Conſuetud. de Beverley*," into his Gloſſary.

" LAUS (ſays Mr. Tyrwhit) adj. Sax. *Looſe*. 4062. *Laus*, *Iſland.* Solutus.
" This is the true original of that termination of adjectives ſo frequent in
" our language, in *les* or *leſs*. Conſuetud. Beverley. MS. Harl. 560.—
" Hujus ſacrilegii emenda non erat determinata, ſed dicebatur ab anglis
" *Botalaus*. i. e. ſine emenda.—So Chaucer uſes *Boteles*, and other words
" of the ſame form; as *Detteles*, *Drinkeles*, *Gilteles*, &c."

I think, however, there will be very little doubt concerning this derivation; when it is obſerved that we ſay indifferently either *ſleep-leſs*, or *without-ſleep*; &c. i. e. *Diſmiſs* ſleep or Be-out ſleep, &c. And had not theſe words *les* and *without* been thus convertible, Shakeſpeare would have loſt a pun.—" Thrice have I ſent him (ſays Glendower) weather-beaten
" home, and *bootleſs* back." " Home *without boots* (replies Hotſpur);
" and

" You muſt no more aim at thoſe eaſie acceſſes,
" LESS you can do't in air."
Beaumont and Fletcher. Beggars Buſh, Act V. Sce. 2.

" and in foul weather too! How ſcapes he agues in the Devil's name?" So, for thoſe words where we have not by habit made the coaleſcence, as the Daniſh Folkelös and Hakelös, &c. we ſay in Engliſh *Without* people, *Without* a tail, &c. But any one may, if he pleaſes, add the termination *leſs* to any noun: and though it ſhould be unuſual, and heard for the firſt time, it will be perfectly underſtood. Between Wimborn-minſter and Cranbourn in Dorſetſhire, there is a wood called Harley: and the people in that country have a ſaying perfectly intelligible to every Engliſh ear.—" When Harley is *bare-leſs*, Cranbourn *whore-leſs* and Wimborn *poor-leſs*, " the world will be at an end." And it is obſervable that in all the northern languages, the termination of this adjective in each language varies juſt as the correſpondent verb, whoſe Imperative it is, varies in that language.

		Termination.		Infin. of the verb.
Goth.	—	ΛΛΠS	—	ΛΛΠSGΛΝ
A. S.	—	Leaſ	—	Leoſan
Dutch	—	Loos or Loſs	—	Löſſen
German	—	Los	—	Löſen
Daniſh	—	Lös	—	Löſer
Swediſh	—	Lŏs	—	Lŏſa

I muſt be permitted here to ſay, that I ſincerely lament the principle on which Mr. Tyrwhit proceeded in his edition of Chaucer's tales. Had he given invariably the text of that manuſcript which he judged to be the oldeſt, and thrown to the bottom the variorum readings with their authority; the obligation of his readers (at leaſt of ſuch as myſelf) would indeed have been very great to him: and his induſtry, care, and fidelity would then have been much more uſeful to inquirers, than any ſkill which he has ſhewn in etymology or the northern languages; were it even much greater than it appears to me to have been.

You will pleaſe to obſerve that all the languages which have a correſpondent conjunction to *Unleſs*, as well as the manner in which its place is ſupplied in the languages which have not a conjunction correſpondent to it; all ſtrongly juſtify my derivation. The Greek Ει μη. The Latin *Niſi*. The Italian *Se non*. The Spaniſh *Sino*. The French *Si non*. All mean *Be it not*. And in the ſame manner do we ſometimes ſupply its place in Engliſh either by *But*, *Without*, *Be it not*, *But if*, &c.

" Without profane tongues thou canſt never riſe,
" Nor be upholden, *Be it not* with lies."

M. Drayton. *Leg. of* R. D. *of Normandy.*

" That never was there garden of ſuch pryſe,
" But yf it were the very paradyſe."

Frankeleyn's *Tale.*

" That knighte he is a foul Paynim,
" And large of limb and bone;
" And *But if* heaven may be thy ſpeede,
" Thy life it is but gone."

Sir Cauline. Percy's *Reliques.*

Though it certainly is not worth the while, I am tempted here to obſerve the groſs miſtake Mr. Harris has made in the *Force* of this word; which he calls an " *Adequate Preventive.*"

His

His example is—"Troy will be taken, UNLESS the "Palladium be preſerved."—"That is (ſays Mr. Harris) "This alone is ſufficient to preſerve it."—According to the oracle, ſo indeed it might be; but the word UNLESS has no ſuch force.

Let us try another inſtance.

"England will be enſlaved UNLESS the Houſe of Com-"mons continues a part of the Legiſlature."

Now, I aſk, is this alone ſufficient to preſerve it? We who live in theſe times, know but too well that this very houſe may be made the inſtrument of a tyranny as odious and (*perhaps*) more laſting than that of the Stuarts. I am afraid Mr. Harris's *adequate Preventive* will not ſave us. For, though it is moſt cruel and unnatural; yet we know by woful experience that the Kid may be ſeethed in the mother's milk, which providence appointed for its nouriſhment; and the liberties of this country be deſtroyed by that very part of the Legiſlature, which was moſt eſpecially appointed for their ſecurity.

EKE.

E K E.

Junius ſays,—" *Eak*, etiam. Goth. ᚪᚾᚴ. A. S. Ɛac. " *Al.auch. D.og. B.ook.* Viderentur eſſe ex inverſo και; ſed " rectius petas ex proxime ſequenti ᚪᚾᚴᚪᚾ (Iſl. αυξα) " A. S. Ɛacan. Ɛcan. ican. *Al.* auchon. D.oge. B.oecken. " Ɛacan vero, vel auchon, ſunt ab αυξειν vel αεξειν, addere, " adjicere, augere."

Skinner ſays—" Eke. ab A. s. Ɛac. Ɛeac. *Belg. Oock. Teut. Auch. Fr. Th. Ouch. D.oc.* etiam."

Skinner then proceeds to the verb,

" *To Eke*, ab A. S. Ɛacan. Geican. Iecan. augere, adji- " cere. Fr. Jun. ſuo more, deflectit. a Gr. αυξειν. Mallem " ab Ɛac, iterum, quod vide: quod enim augetur, ſecun- " dum partes ſuas quaſi iteratur & de novo fit."

In this place Skinner does not ſeem to enjoy his uſual ſuperiority of judgment over Junius. And it is very ſtrange that he ſhould chuſe here to derive the verb Ɛacan from the conjunction Ɛac (that is, from its own Impera-

* An inſtance has been already given where IF is uſed as a prepoſition. In the following paſſage of Dryden, *Unleſs* is alſo uſed as a prepoſition;

" The commendation of Adverſaries is the greateſt triumph of a writer; " becauſe it never comes *Unleſs* extorted."

tive; rather than the conjunction (that is, the Imperative) from the verb. His judgment was more awake when he derived IF or GIF from Ƿiƿan, and not Ƿiƿan from Ƿiƿ; which yet, according to his preſent method, he ſhould have done.

Perhaps it may be worth remarking, as an additional proof of the nature of this conjunction; that in each language, where this imperative is uſed conjunctively, the Conjunction varies juſt as the verb does.

In Daniſh the Conjunction is *og*, and the verb *öger*.
In Swediſh the Conjunction is och, and the verb öka.
In Dutch the Conjunction is ook, from the verb oecken.
In German the Conjunction is auch, from the verb auchon.
In Gothic the Conjunction is ΑΝΚ, and the verb ΑΝΚΑΝ.
As in Engliſh the Conjunction is Eke or Eak, from the verb Ɛacan.

ƳET. STILL.

I put the conjunctions YET and STILL here together; becauſe (like If and An) they may be uſed mutually for each other without any alteration in the meaning of the ſentences; a circumſtance which (though not ſo obviouſly as in theſe inſtances) happens likewiſe to ſome other of the

the conjunctions; and which is not unworthy of consideration.

According to my derivation of them both, this mutual interchange will not seem at all extraordinary: for YET (which is nothing but the Imperative ȝet or ȝyt, of ȝetan or ȝytan, obtinere) and STILL (which is only the Imperative ſtell or ſteall, of ſtellan or ſteallian *, ponere) may very well ſupply each other's place, and be indifferently uſed for the ſame purpoſe.

ALGATE and even ALGATES, when uſed adverſatively by Chaucer, I ſuppoſe, though ſo ſpelled, to mean no other than *All-get*.

" For ALBEIT tarieng be noyful, ALGATE it is not to be " reproued in *yeuynge* of iugement, ne in vengeaunce " takyng."

Tale of Chaucer; Vol. 74, *Pag.* 2. *Col.* 1.

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* Though this verb is no longer current in Engliſh, except as a Conjunction, yet it keeps its ground in the collateral languages.

In German and Dutch it is	—		*Stellen*
In the Swediſh	—	—	*Ställa*
And in the Daniſh	—	—	*Stiller*.

" A great waue of the ſee cometh ſomtyme with ſo " great a vyolence, that it drowneth the ſhyppe: and the " ſame harme dothe ſometyme the ſmall dropes of water " that entreth through a lytell creueys, in to the tymbre " and in to the botome of the ſhyppe, *yf* men be ſo neg- " ligente that they diſcharge hem not by tymes. And " therfore all though there be a difference betwixt theſe " two cauſes of drowning, ALGATES the ſhyppe is " drowned."

The verb *to get* is ſometimes ſpelled by Chaucer *geate*.

But I will repeat to you the derivations which others have given, and leave you to chuſe between us.

Mer. Caſaubon ſays—" ETI, adhuc, Yet."

Junius ſays—" YET, adhuc. A. S. ȝyt. Cymrœis etwa, " etto, ſignificat, adhuc, etiam, iterum; ex ετι vel αυθις."

Skinner ſays—" YET, ab A. S. Ȝet, Ȝeta, adhuc. modo. " Teut. Jetzt, jam, mox."

Again he ſays—" STILL, aſſidue, indeſinenter, inceſſan- " ter. Neſcio an ab A. S. ȝtll, addito tantum ſibilo; vel a " noſtro,

" noſtro, & credo etiam, A. S. As, ut, ſicut; (licet apud " Somnerum non occurrat) & eodem Tıl, uſque. q. d. " uſque, eodem modo.

E L S E.

This word ELSE, formerly written *Alles*, *Alys*, *Alyſe*, *Elles*, *Ellus*, *Ellis*, *Ells*, *Els*, and now *Elſe*; is, as I have ſaid, no other than Ælꝛ or Ælẏꝛ, the Imperative of Æleꝛan or Ælẏꝛan, dimittere.

Mr. Wharton, in his Hiſtory of Engliſh Poetry, Vol. i. page 193 (without any authority, and in ſpite of the context, which evidently demands *Elſe*, and will not admit of *Alſo*) has explained ALLES in the following paſſage by *Alſo*.

" The Soudan ther he ſatte in halle;
" He ſent his meſſagers faſte with alle,
" To hire fader the Kyng.
" And ſayde, how ſo hit ever bi falle,
" That mayde he wolde clothe in palle
" And ſpouſen hire with his ryng.
" And ALLES I ſwere withouten fayle
" I chull hire winnen in pleye battayle
" With mony an heih lordyng."

The meaning of which is evidently,—" Give me your " daughter, ELSE I will take her by force."

It

It would have been nonſenſe to ſay,—" Give me your " daughter, ALSO I will take her by force."

" To haſten loue is thynge in veine,
" Whan that fortune is there ageine.
" To take where a man hath leue
" Good is: and ELLES he mote leue."

Gowar. lib. 2. *Fol.* 57. *pag.* 1. *col.* 1.

" Withouten noyſe or clatteryng of belles
" Te deum was our ſonge, and nothyng ELLES."

Chaucer. Sompners tale. Fol. 43. *pag.* 1. *col.* 1.

" Eſchame ȝoung virgins, and fair damycellis,
" Furth of wedlok for to diſteyne ȝour kellis;
" Traiſt not all talis that wantoun wowaris tellis,
" ȝou to defloure purpoſyng, and not ELLIS."

Douglas. Prol. to 4th boke. Pag. 97.

" And, bycauſe the derthe of things be ſuche as the " ſoldyors be not able to lyue of theyr accuſtomed wages, " which is, by the day, ſix pence the foteman, and nine " pence th' horſman; therfor we beſeche your lordſhips " to be meanes to the Queene's majeſtie, that order may " be taken, eyther for th' encreace of theyr wages by the " day, the foteman to eightpence, and th' horſman to " twelve pence, or ELLS to allow that at the pay daiſe " they may, by their capteins or otherwiſe, haue ſome re- " warde to counteruaill the like ſomme."

The Council in the North to the Privy Council. 4th of Sept. 1557. *Lodge's Illuſtrations.*

N. B.

N. B. " Wheat at this time was ſold for four Marks " per Quarter. Within one month after the harveſt the " price fell to *five ſhillings*."

" And eury man for his partie
" A kyngdome hath to iuſtifie,
" That is to ſein his owne dome.
" If he miſrule that kyngdome,
" He leſeth him ſelfe, that is more,
" Than if he loſte ſhip and ore,
" And all the worldes good with alle.
" For what man that in ſpeciall
" Hath not him ſelfe, he hath not ELS,
" No more the perles than the ſhels,
" All is to him of o value."

Gower. lib. 8. *Fol.* 185. *pag.* 2. *col.* 2.

" Nede has no pere,
" Him behoueth ſerue himſelfe that has no ſwayn,
" Or ELS he is a ſole, as clerkes ſayn.

Chaucer. Reues tale. Fol. 16. *pag.* 1. *col.* 2.

Junius ſays—" *Elſe*, aliter, alias, alioqui. A. S. *Elles. Al. Alles.* D. *Ellers*."

Skinner ſays—" *Elſe*, ab A. S. Ellęr, alias, alioquin. " Minſhew & Dr. Tho. Hickes putant eſſe contractum a " Lat. *alias*, vel. Gr. Αλλως, nec ſine veriſimilitudine."

S. Johnſon ſays—" *Elſe*, Pronoun, (Ellep, Saxon) *other*, " *one beſides*. It is applied both to perſons and things."

He ſays again—" *Elſe*, Adverb. 1. Otherwiſe. 2. Be- " ſides; except that mentioned."

THOUGH.

THO' THOUGH, THAH * (or, as our country-folks more purely pronounce it, THAF, THAUF and THOF) is the Imperative Ðaþ or Ðaþiȝ of the verb Ðaþian or Ðaþiȝan; to allow, permit, grant, yield, aſſent: And Ðaþiȝ becomes *Thah*, *Though*, *Thoug* (and *Thoch*, as G. Douglas and other Scotch authors write it) by a tranſition of the ſame ſort, and at leaſt as eaſy, as that of *Hawk* from Þaþuc. And it

* See a ballad written about the year 1264, in the reign of Henry the third;

" Richard THAH thou be ever trichard,
" Trichten ſhalt thou never more."
Percy's Reliques, Vol. ii. p. 2.

See alſo another ballad written in the year 1307, on the death of Edward the firſt.

" THAH mi tonge were mad of ſtel,
" Ant min herte yzote of bras,
" The godneſs myht y never telle
" That with kyng Edward was."
Percy's Reliques, Vol. ii. p. 10.

is

is remarkable, that as there were originally two ways of writing the verb, either with the guttural ȝ (Þaþȝan) or without it (Þaþan): ſo there ſtill continues the ſame difference in writing and pronouncing the remaining imperative of this ſame verb, with the guttural ȝ (*Though*), or without it (*Tho'*). In Engliſh, the difference is only in the characters; but the Scotch retain in their pronunciation, the guttural termination.

In the earlier Anglo-Saxon the verb is written ȝeðaþȝan. In a charter of William the conqueror it is written—ic nelle ȝeðaþan. And in a charter of Henry the firſt it is alſo written—ic nelle ȝeðaþan. But a charter of Henry the ſecond has it—ic nelle ȝeðauan.

See the preface to Hickes's Theſaurus, pag. 15, 16.

So that we thus have a ſort of proof, at what time the ȝ was dropped from the pronunciation of ðaþan; (namely, about the reign of Henry the ſecond) and in what manner THAFIG became THAF, and THAF became THAU or THO'.

I reckon it not a ſmall confirmation of this etymology, that our antient writers often uſed *All be. All be it. All had. All ſhould. All were. All give. How be it. Set. Suppoſe.* &c. inſtead of *Although.*

" But AL BE that he was a philoſophre
" Yet had he but lytel golde in cofre."

Chaucer. Prol. to Canterb. tales.

" Ye wote your ſelfe, ſhe may not wedde two
" At ones, though ye fyghten euer mo
" But one of you, ALL BE him lothe or leſe
" He mote go pype in an yue leſe."

Knyghtes tale. Fol. 5. *pag.* 2. *col.* 2.

" ALBEIT originally the King's Bench be reſtrained by " this Act to hold plea of any real action, yet by a mean " it may; as when removed thither, &c." *Lord Coke.*

" —I ſhal *yeuen* her ſufficient anſwere
" And all women after for her ſake
" That though they ben in any gylte itake
" With face bolde, they ſhullen hem ſelue excuſe
" And bere hem doun, that wold hem accuſe
" For lacke of anſwere, non of hem ſhull dyen
" ALL HAD he ſey a thyng with both his eyen
" Yet ſhuld we women ſo viſage it hardely
" And wepe and ſwere and chyde ſubtelly
" That ye ſhal ben as leude as gees."

Chaucer. Marchauntes tale. Fol. 33. *pag.* 1. *col.* 2.

" But rede that boweth down for euery blaſte
" Ful lyghtly ceſſe wynde, it wol aryſe
" But ſo nyl not an oke, whan it is caſte
" It nedeth me nought longe the forvyſe
" Men ſhal reioyſen of a great empriſe
" Atcheued wel, and ſtant withouten dout
" AL HAUE men ben the lenger there about."

2d boke of Troylus. Fol. 170. *pag.* 2. *col.* 1.

" For I wol ſpeke, and tel it the
AL SHULDE I dye."

Romaunt of the Roſe. Fol. 152. *Pag.* 2. *Col.* 1.

" And I ſo loued him for his obeyſaunce
And for the trouthe that I demed in his hert
That if ſo were, that any thyng him ſmert
AL WERE it neuer ſo lyte, and I it wyſt
Methought I felt deth at my hert twiſt."

Squiers Tale. Fol. 27. *Pag.* 2. *Col.* 1.

" ALLGYF England and Fraunce were thorow ſaught."

Skelton.

" The Moor, HOWBEIT that I endure him not,
Is of a conſtant, loving, noble nature."

Othello. Act 2. *Sce.* 1.

" No wonder was, SUPPOSE in mynde that he
Toke her ſygure ſo ſoone, and Lo now why
The ydol of a thyng in caſe may be
So depe enprynted in the fantaſy
That it deludeth the wyttes outwardly."

Complaynt of Creſeyde. Fol. 204. *Pag.* 1. *Col.* 2.

" In ſere placis throw the ciete with thys
The murmour rais ay mare and mare, I wys,
And clearar wax the rumour, and the dyn,
So that, SUPPOIS * Anchiſes my faderis In
With treis about ſtude ſecrete by the way,
So buſtuous grew the noyis and furious fray
And ratling of thare armoure on the ſtrete,
Affrayit I gliſnit of ſlepe, and ſterte on fete."

Douglas. Boke 2. *Pag.* 49.

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* ——— QUANQUAM ſecreta parentis
Anchiſæ domus.———

" Eurill (as ſaid is) has this iouell hint,
About his ſydis it braſin, or he ſtynt;
Bot all for nocht, SUPPOIS the gold dyd glete."
Douglas. Boke 9. Pag. 289.

" That ſche might haue the copies of the pretendit " writingis giuen in, quhilkis they haue diuerſe tymes " requirit of the Quene's maieſtie and hir counſel, SUPPOIS " thay haue not as ȝit obtenit the ſamin."
Mary Queen of Scots.

N. B. In the year 1788 I ſaw the ſame uſe of SUPPOSE for THOUGH, in a letter written by a Scotch officer at Guernſey, to my moſt lamented and dear friend the late Lieutenant General James Murray. The letter in other reſpects was in very good and common Engliſh.

" I feel exceedingly for Lord W. M. SUPPOSE I have " not the honour of being perſonally acquainted with him."

I believe that the uſe of this word SUPPOSE for THOUGH is ſtill common in Scotland.

The German uſes *Doch*; the Dutch *Doch* and *Dog*; the Daniſh *Dog* and *Endog*; and the Swediſh *Dock*; as we uſe *Though*: all from the ſame root. The Daniſh employs *Skiönt* and *Endſkiöndt*; and the Swediſh Änſkönt, for *Though*: from

from the Daniſh verb Skiönner; and the Swediſh verb Skiönja, both of which mean, to *perceive, diſcern, imagine, conceive, ſuppoſe, underſtand.*

As the Latin *ſi* (*if*) means *Be it:* and *Niſi* and *ſine* (*unleſs* and *without*) mean *Be not:* ſo *Etſi* (*although*) means *And be it* *. The other Latin Conjunctions which are uſed for *Although*, (as, *Quam-vis, Licet, Quantum vis, Quamlibet*) are ſo uncorrupted as to need no explanation.

Skinner barely ſays—" THOUGH, ab AS Ðeah. Belg. " Ðoch. Belg. & Teut. Ðoch. etſi, quamvis †."

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* It may not be quite needleſs to obſerve, that our conjunctions IF and THOUGH may very frequently ſupply each other's place, as—" THOUGH an " hoſt of men riſe up againſt me, yet ſhall not my heart be afraid;" or, " IF an hoſt of men, &c." So—" THOUGH all men ſhould forſake you, " yet will not I;" or, " IF all men ſhould forſake you, &c."

† Though this word is called a conjunction of ſentences, it is conſtantly uſed (eſpecially by children and in low diſcourſe) not only at the beginning, and between, but at the end of ſentences.

" *Pro.* Why do you maintain your poet's quarrel ſo with velvet and good " clothes? We have ſeen him in indifferent good clothes e're now himſelf.

" *Boy.* And may again. But his clothes ſhall never be the beſt thing " about him, THOUGH. He will have ſomewhat beſide, either of humane " letters or ſevere honeſty, ſhall ſpeak him a man, though he went naked."

BUT.

It was this word, BUT, which Mr. Locke had chiefly in view, when he ſpoke of Conjunctions as marking ſome "Stands, Turns, Limitations, and Exceptions of the mind." And it was the corrupt uſe of this *One* word (BUT) in modern Engliſh, for *Two* words (BOT and BUT) originally (in the Anglo-ſaxon) very different in ſignification, though (by repeated abbreviation and corruption) approaching in ſound, which chiefly miſled him.

"BUT (ſays Mr. Locke) is a Particle, none more familiar "in our language; and he that ſays it is a *diſcretive* Con-"junction, and that it anſwers SED in Latin, or MAIS in "French *, thinks he has ſufficiently explained it. But "it ſeems to me to intimate ſeveral Relations the mind "gives to the ſeveral propoſitions or parts of them, which "it joins by this monoſyllable.

"Firſt,——BUT *to ſay no more:*

"Here it intimates a ſtop of the mind, in the courſe it "was going, before it came to the end of it.

* It does not anſwer to *Sed* in Latin, or *Mais* in French; except only where it is uſed for *But*. Nor will any *one* word in *any* Language anſwer to our Engliſh BUT: becauſe a ſimilar corruption in the ſame inſtance has not happened in any other language.

"Secondly,

" Secondly,——*I ſaw* BUT *two Plants.*

" Here it ſhews, that the mind limits the ſenſe to what " is expreſſed, with a negation of all other.

" Thirdly,——*You pray*; BUT *it is not that God would* " *bring you to the true religion:*

" Fourthly,——BUT *that he would confirm you in your* " *own.*

" The firſt of theſe BUTS intimates a ſuppoſition in the " mind of ſomething otherwiſe than it ſhould be: the " latter ſhews that the mind makes a direct oppoſition be- " tween that and what goes before it.

Fifthly,—*All animals have ſenſe,* BUT *a dog is an animal.*

" Here it ſignifies little more, but that the latter pro- " poſition is joined to the former, as the Minor of a " Syllogiſm.

" To theſe, I doubt not, might be added a great many " other ſignifications of this particle, *if it were my buſineſs* " *to examine it in its full latitude,* and conſider it in all the " places

" places it is to be found; which if one ſhould do, I " doubt whether in all thoſe manners it is made uſe of, it " would deſerve the title of DISCRETIVE which Gramma- " rians give to it.

" But *I intend not* * *here a full explication of this ſort* " *of ſigns.* The inſtances I have given in this one, may " give occaſion to reflect upon their uſe and force in lan- " guage, and lead us into the contemplation of *ſeveral* " *actions of our minds* in diſcourſing, which it has *found a* " *way* to intimate to others by *theſe Particles*, ſome whereof " conſtantly, and others in certain conſtructions, have the " ſenſe of a whole ſentence contained in them."

Now all theſe difficulties are very eaſily to be removed without any effort of the underſtanding: and for that very reaſon I do not much wonder that Mr. Locke miſſed the explanation: for he dug too deep for it. But that the Etymologiſts (who only juſt turn up the ſurface) ſhould

* " Eſſentiam finemque conjunctionum ſatis aptè explicatum puto: nunc " earum originem materiamque videamus. Neque vero *Sigillatim* per- " currere omnes *in Animo eſt.*" J. C. SCALIGER.

The conſtant excuſe of them all, whether Grammatiſts, Grammarians or Philoſophers; though they dare not hazard the aſſertion, yet they would all have us underſtand that they can do it; but *non in animo eſt.* And it has never been done.

miſs it, does indeed aſtoniſh me. It ſeems to me impoſſible, that any man who reads only the moſt common of our old Engliſh authors ſhould fail to obſerve it.

Gawin Douglas, notwithſtanding he frequently confounds the two words, and uſes them often improperly, does yet (without being himſelf aware of the diſtinction, and from the mere force of cuſtomary ſpeech) abound with ſo many inſtances, and ſo contraſted, as to awaken, one ſhould think, the moſt inattentive reader.

" Bot thy werke ſhall endure in laude and glorie,
But ſpot or falt condigne eterne memorie."

Preface. pag. 3.

" *Thoch* Wylliame Caxtoune had no compatioun
Of Virgill in that buk he preyt in prois,
Clepand it Virgill in Eneados,
Quhilk that he ſayis of Frenſche he did tranſlait,
It has nathing ado therwith, God wate,
Nor na mare like than the Deuil and ſanct Auſtin.
Haue he na thank tharfore, BOT lois his pyne;
So ſchamefully the ſtorie did peruerte,
I reid his werk with harmes at my hert,
That ſic ane buk, BUT ſentence or ingyne,
Suld be intitulit eftir the poete diuine."

Preface. pag. 5.

" I ſchrink not anys correkkit for to be,
With ony wycht groundit on charite,
And glaidlie wald I baith inquire and lere,
And to ilk cunnand wicht la to myne ere;

Bot laith me war, BUT uther offences or cryme,
Ane rural body ſuld intertrik my ryme."

Preface. pag. 11.

" Bot gif this ilk ſtatew ſtandis here wrocht,
War with ȝour handis into the ciete brocht,
Than ſchew he that the peopil of Aſia
But ony obſtakill in fell battel ſuld ga."

Booke 2. *pag.* 45.

" This chance is not BUT goddis willis went,
Nor it is not leful thyng, quod ſche,
Fra hyne Creuſa thou turs away wyth the,
Nor the hie governoure of the heuin aboue is
Will ſuffer it ſo to be, BOT the behuffis
From hens to wend full fer into exile,
And ouer the braid ſey ſayl furth mony a myle,
Or thou cum to the land Hiſperia,
Quhare with ſoft courſis Tybris of Lydia
Rynnis throw the riche feildis of pepill ſtout;
Thare is gret ſubſtance ordanit the BUT dout.

Booke 2. *pag.* 64.

" Vpoun ſic wiſe vncertanlie we went
Thre dayes wilfum throw the myſty ſtreme,
And als mony nychtes BUT ſterneys leme,
That quhidder was day or nycht vneth wiſt we.
Bot at the laſt on the ferd day we ſe
On fer the land appere, and hillis ryſe
The ſmoky vapoure up caſting on thare gyſe.
Doun fallis ſalis, the aris ſone we ſpan
But mare abaid."

Booke 3. *pag.* 74.

—— " Bot

—— " Bot gif the faits, BUT pleid,
At my pleſure ſuffer it me life to leid,
At my fre wil my workis to modify.

Booke 4. pag. 111.

" Bot ſen Apollo clepit Gryneus
Grete Italie to ſeik commandis us,
To Italie eik oraclis of Licia
Admoniſt us BUT mare delay to ga
Thare is my luſt now and delyte at hand."

Booke 4. pag. 111.

" Thou wyth thyr harmes ouerchargit me alſo,
Quhen I fell fyrſt into this rage, quod ſche,
Bot ſo to do my teris conſtrenyt the.
Was it not lefull, allace, BUT cumpany,
To me BUT cryme allane in chalmer to ly?"

Booke 4. pag. 119.

" Ane great eddir ſlidand can furth thraw,
Eneas of the ſycht abaſit ſum deile,
Bot ſche at the laſt with lang fard fare and wele
Crepis amang the veſchell and coupis all,
The drink, and eik the offerandis grete and ſmall,
Snokis and likis, ſyne ful the altaris left,
And BUT mare harme in the graif enterit eft."

Booke 5. pag. 130.

" Thare hartis on flocht, ſmytin with ſhame ſum dele,
Bot glaid and ioly in hope for to do wele,
Raſis in thare breiſtis deſyre of hie renowne:
Syne BUT delay at the firſt trumpis ſoune
From thare marchis attanis furth thay ſprent."

Booke 5. pag. 132.

" Ane uthir mache to him was ſocht and ſperit;
Bot thare was nane of all the rout that ſterit,
Na durſt preſume mete that man on the land,
With mais or burdoun, to debate hand for hand.
Ioly and glaid therof baith all and ſum,
Into bargane wenyng for to ouercum,
Before Eneas feite ſtude, BUT delay."

Booke 5. *pag.* 140.

" The tothir anſwerd, Nowthir for drede nor boiſt,
The luf of wourſchip nor honoure went away is
Bot certanly the daſit blude now on dayis
Waxis dolf and dull throw myne unweildy age,
The cald body has mynyſt my curage:
Bot war I now as umquhile it has bene
ȝing as ȝone wantoun woiſtare ſo ſtrang thay wene,
ȝe had I now ſic ȝoutheid, traiſtis me,
But ony price I ſuld all reddy be:
Na luſty bul me till induce ſuld nede,
For nouthir I ſuld haue crauit wage nor mede.
Quhen this was ſaid he has BUT mare abade
Tua kempis burdouns brocht, and before thaym laid."

Booke 5. *pag.* 140.

" And fyrſt to hym ran Aceſtes the kyng,
And for compaſſioun has uphynt in feild
His freynd Entellus unto him euin eild.
Bot nowthir aſtoniſt nor abaſit hereon,
Mare egirly the vailȝeant campion
Agane to bargane went als hate as fyre:
And ardently with furie and mekle boiſt
Gan dares cache, and driue ouer al the coiſt:
Now with the richt hand, now with the left hand he
Doublis dyntis, and BUT abade lete fle;

The

The prince Eneas than ſeand this dout,
No langar ſuffir wald ſic wraith procede,
Nor feirs Entellus mude thu⸗ rage and ſprede,
Bot of the bargane maid end, but delay."

Booke 5. pag. 143.

" In nowmer war they BUT ane few menge,
Bot thay war quyk, and valgeant in melle."

Booke 5. pag. 153.

" Blyn not, blyn not, thou grete Troian Enee,
Of thy bedis nor prayeris, quod ſche:
For BOT thou do, thir grete durris, BUT dred,
And griſlie gettis ſall neuer warp on bred."

Booke 6. pag. 164.

" On ſiclike wiſe as thare thay did with me,
Grete goddis mot the Grekis recompens,
Gif I may thig ane uengeance BUT offens.
Bot ſay me this agane, freind, all togidder,
Quhat auenture has brocht the leuand hidder?"

Booke 6. pag. 182.

" How grete apperance is in him, BUT dout,
Tyll be of proues and ane vailgeant knycht:
Bot ane blak ſop of myſt als dirk as nycht
Wyth drery ſchaddow bylappis his hede."

Booke 6. pag. 197.

" Nor myſknaw not the condiciouns of us
Latyne pepyll and folkis of Saturnus,
Unconſtrenyt, not be law bound thertyll,
Bot be our inclinacioun and fre wyll
Iuſte and equale, and BUT offenſis ay,
And reulit eftir the auld goddis way."

Booke 7. pag. 212.

" BOT

" Bot ſen that Virgil ſtandis BUT compare."

Prol. to Booke 9. *pag.* 272.

" Quhidder gif the goddis, or ſum ſpretis ſilly
Mouis in our myndis this ardent thochtful fire,
Or gif that euery mannis ſchrewit deſyre
Be as his god and genius in that place,
I wat neuer how it ſtandis, BOT this lang ſpace
My mynd mouis to me, here as I ſtand,
Batel or ſum grete thyng to tak on hand:
I knaw not to quhat purpois it is dreſt,
Bot be na way may I tak eis nor reſt.
Behaldis thou not ſo furelie BUT affray
Vone Rutulianis haldis thaym glaid and gay."

Booke 9. *pag.* 281.

" His feris lukis about on euery ſide,
To ſe quharfra the groundin dart did glide.
Bot lo, as thay thus wounderit in effray,
This iſk Niſus, wourthin proude and gay,
And baldare of his chance ſa with him gone,
Ane uthir takill aſſayit he anone:
And with ane found ſmate Tagus BUT remede."

Booke 9. *pag.* 291.

" Agane Eneas can Tarquitus dres,
And to recounter Enee inflamyt in tene,
Keſt hym ſelf in; BOT the tothir BUT fere
Bure at hym mychtely wyth ane lang ſpere."

Booke 10. *pag.* 337.

" Sic wourdis vane and unſemelie of ſound
Furth warpis wyde this Liger fulichelie:
Bot the Troiane baroun unabaſitlie
Na wourdis preiſis to render him agane;
Bot at his ſa let fle ane dart or flane,

That

That hit Lucagus quhilk fra he felt the dynt,
The ſchaft hinging in to his ſchield, BUT ſtynt
Bad driue his hors and chare al fordwert ſtreicht."

Booke 10. *pag.* 338.

" BOT quhat awalis bargane or ſtrang melle,
Syne ȝeild the to thy fa, BUT ony why."

Prol. to Booke 11. *pag.* 356.

" Than of his ſpeich ſo wounderit war thay
Kepit thare ſilence, and wiſt not what to ſay,
BOT athir towart uthir turnis BUT mare,
And can behald his fallow in ane ſtare."

Booke 11. *pag.* 364.

" ——— Lat neuir demyt be
The buſtuouſnes of ony man dant the,
BOT that thy dochter, O thou fader gude,
Unto ȝone wourthy prince of gentill blude
Be geuin to be thy ſon in law, I wys,
As he that wourthy ſic ane wedlok is;
And knyt up pece BUT mare diſſeuerance,
With all eternall band of alliaunce."

Booke 11. *pag.* 374.

" Turnus and thy cheif ciete haue I ſaue,
Sa lang as that the fatis ſufferit me,
And quhil werde ſiſteris ſa tholit to be:
BOT now I ſe that ȝoung man haiſt BUT fale
To mache in feild wyth fatis inequale."

Booke 12. *pag.* 412.

" On euery ſyde he has caſſin his E;
And at the laſt behaldis the ciete,
Saikles of batal, fre of all ſic ſtryffe,
BUT pane or trauel, at quiet man and wyffe.

Than of ane greter bargane in his entent
All ſuddanly the fygure dyd emprent.
And on ane litill mote aſcendit in hye,
Quhare ſone forgadderit all the Troyane army,
And thyck about hym flokkand can BUT baid,
BUT nowthir ſcheild nor wappinnis doun thay laid."
Booke 12. *pag.* 430.

——— " Ha! How,
Sa grete ane ſtorme or ſpate of felloun ire,
Under thy breiſt thou rollis hait as fyre?
BOT wirk as I the byd, and do away
That wraith conſauit BUT ony caus, I pray."
Booke 12. *pag.* 442.

The Gloſſariſt of Douglas contents himſelf with explaining BOT by BUT.

The Gloſſariſt to Urry's Edition of Chaucer ſays,— " BOT for BUT is a form of ſpeech *frequently* uſed in " Chaucer to denote the greater certainty of a thing."— This is a moſt inexcuſable aſſertion: for I believe the place cited in the Gloſſary is the only inſtance (in this edition of Chaucer) where BOT is uſed; and there is not the ſmalleſt ſhadow of reaſon for forming even a conjecture in favour of this unſatisfactory aſſertion: unſatisfactory, even if the fact had been ſo; becauſe it contains no explanation: for why ſhould BOT denote greater certainty?

And

And here it may be proper to obſerve, that Gawin Douglaſs's language (where BOT is very frequently found) though written about a century after, muſt yet be eſteemed more ancient than Chaucer's: even as at this day the preſent Engliſh ſpeech in Scotland is, in many reſpects, more ancient than that ſpoken in England ſo far back as the reign of Queen Elizabeth *. So Mer. Caſaubon (de vet. ling. Ang.) ſays of his time—" Scotica lingua Anglicâ " hodiernâ purior."—Where by *purior*, he means nearer to the Anglo-Saxon.

So G. Hickes, in his Anglo-Saxon Grammar, (Chap. 3.) ſays—" Scoti in multis *Saxonizantes*."

But, to return to Mr. Locke, whom (as B. Johnſon ſays of Shakeſpeare) " I reverence on this ſide of idolatry;" in the *five* inſtances which he has given for *five* different meanings of the word BUT, there are indeed only two different meanings †: nor could he, as he imagined he could, have added

* This will not ſeem at all extraordinary, if you reaſon directly contrary to Lord Monboddo on this ſubject; by doing which you will generally be right, as well in this as in almoſt every thing elſe which he has advanced.

† " You muſt anſwer, that ſhe was brought very near the fire, and as " good as thrown in; or elſe that ſhe was provoked to it by a divine inſpi- " ration. BUT, BUT that another divine inſpiration moved the beholders

added any other ſignifications of this particle, but what are to be found in BOT and BUT as I have explained them *.

BUT, in the *firſt*, *third*, *fourth*, and *fifth* inſtances, is corruptly put for BOT, the imperative of Botan:

In the *ſecond* inſtance only it is put for Bute, or Butan, or Be-utan †.

In

" to believe that ſhe did therein a noble act, this act of her's might have " been calumniated, &c."

DONNE's Βιαθανατος, *Part* II. *Diſtinct.* 5. *Sect.* 8.

In the above paſſage, which is exceedingly aukward, BUT is uſed in both it's meanings cloſe to each other: and the impropriety of the corruption appears therefore in it's moſt offenſive point of view. A careful author would avoid this, by placing theſe two BUTS at a diſtance from each other in the ſentence, or by changing one of them for ſome other equivalent word. Whereas had the corruption not taken place, he might without any inelegance (in this reſpect) have kept the conſtruction of the ſentence as it now ſtands: for nothing would have offended us, had it run thus—" BOT, " *butan* that another divine inſpiration moved the beholders, &c."

* S. Johnſon, in his Dictionary, has numbered up *eighteen* different ſignifications (as he imagines) of BUT: which however are all reducible to BOT and *Be-utan*.

† " I ſaw BUT two plants."

Not or *Ne* is here left out and underſtood, which uſed formerly to be inſerted, as it frequently is ſtill.

So

In the *firſt* inſtance,—" *To ſay no more,*" is a mere parentheſis: and Mr. Locke has unwarily attributed to

BUT,

So Chaucer,

" Tel forth your tale, ſpareth for no man,
And teche us yong men of your practike.
Gladly (quod ſhe) if it may you lyke.
But that I pray to all this company,
If that I ſpeke after my fantaſy,
As taketh not a grefe of that I ſay,
For myn entent is NOT BUT to play."

Wife of Bathes Prologue.

" I ne uſurpe not to haue founden this werke of my labour or of myne " engyn, I NAM BUT a leude compylatour of the laboure of olde aſtro- " logiens, and haue it tranſlated in myn englyſshe."

Introduction to Concluſyons of the Aſtrolabye.

" Forſake I wol at home myn herytage
And as I ſayd, ben of your courte a page
If that ye voucheſafe that in this place
Ye graunte me to haue ſuche a grace
That I may haue NAT BUT my meate and drinke
And for my ſuſtynaunce yet wol I ſwynke."

" Yet were it better I were your wyfe
Sithe ye ben as gentyl borne as I
And haue a realme NAT BUT faſte by."

Ariadne. Fol. 217. *pag.* 1. *col.* 1. *and* 2.

We ſhould now ſay—*my intent is* BUT *to play.*—*I am* BUT *a compiler*, &c.

This omiſſion of the negation before BUT, though now very common, is one of the moſt blameable and corrupt abbreviations of conſtruction which is uſed in our language; and could never have obtained, but through the

BUT, the meaning contained in the parentheſis: for ſuppoſe the inſtance had been this,—" BUT *to proceed.*"—Or this,—" BUT, *to go fairly through this matter.*"—Or this,—" BUT, *not to ſtop.*"

Does

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utter ignorance of the meaning of the word BUT. " There is not (ſays " Chillingworth) ſo much ſtrength required in the edifice as in the foun- " dation: and if BUT wiſe men have the ordering of the building, they " will make it much a ſurer thing, that the foundation ſhall not fail the " building, than that the building ſhall not fall from the foundation. And " though the building be to be of brick or ſtone, and perhaps of wood; " yet it may be poſſibly they will have a rock for their foundation; whoſe " ſtability is a much more indubitable thing, than the adherence of the " ſtructure to it."

It ſhould be written—" If *none* but wiſe men."—But the error in the conſtruction of this ſentence, will not excuſe the preſent miniſter, if he neglects the matter of it. The bleſſings or execrations of all poſterity for ever upon the name of PITT, (*pledged as he is*) will depend intirely upon his conduct in this particular.

The reader of this edition is requeſted to obſerve, that the above note is not inſerted après coûp; *but was publiſhed in the firſt edition of this volume in* 1786: *when I was in poſſeſſion of the following ſolemn, public engagement from Mr. Pitt, made to the Weſtminſter* DELEGATES *in* 1782.

" Sir,

" I am extremely ſorry that I was not at home, when you and the other " gentlemen from the Weſtminſter Committee did me the honor to call. " May I beg the favor of you to expreſs that I am truly happy to find that " the motion of Tueſday laſt, has the approbation of ſuch zealous friends " to the public, and to aſſure the Committee that my exertions ſhall never

" be

Does BUT in any of theſe inſtances, intimate a ſtop of the mind in the courſe it was going? The truth is, that BUT itſelf is the fartheſt of any word in the language from "*intimating a ſtop.*" On the contrary it always

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" be wanting in ſupport of a meaſure, which I agree with them in thinking
" eſſentially neceſſary to the independence of Parliament, and to the liberty
" of the people.

" I have the honor to be,
" with great reſpect and eſteem,
" Sir, your moſt obedient and
" moſt humble Servant

" Lincoln's-Inn,
" May 10. " W. PITT."

Although I had long known the old deteſtable maxim of political adventurers, (for Philip was no other;—" To amuſe boys with playthings and men with " oaths"—*yet, I am not aſhamed to confeſs, I,* at that time, *placed the firmeſt reliance on his engagement: and in conſequence of my full faith and truſt, gave to him and to his adminiſtration, moſt eſpecially when it tottered and ſeemed overthrown (at the time of the Regency Bill in* 1788) *a ſupport ſo zealous and effectual, as to draw repeatedly from himſelf and his friends the warmeſt acknowledgments.*

This letter was produced by me upon my trial at the Old Bailey in the year 1794: *when fidelity to the ſentiments it contains, was ſeriouſly and unblushingly imputed to me as High Treaſon. The original of this letter Mr. Pitt, upon his oath, to my aſtoniſhment acknowledged to be in his own handwriting; although every trace of* DELEGATION *was totally effaced from his memory.*

intimates

intimates ſomething MORE *, ſomething to follow: (as indeed it does in this very inſtance of Mr. Locke's; though we

* In the French, Italian, Spaniſh, Portugueſe, Dutch, and ſeveral other dead and living languages, the very word more is uſed for this conjunction BUT.

The French anciently uſed MAIS, not only as they now do for the conjunction MAIS; but alſo as they now uſe *plus* or *d'avantage*.—

Y puis je *Mais?*
Je n'en puis *Mais*,

are ſtill in uſe among the vulgar people; in both which expreſſions it means *more*. So Henry Eſtiene uſes it;

" Sont ſi bien accouſtumez à ceſte ſyncope, ou plutoſt apocope, qu'ils " en font quelquesfois autant aux diſſyllabes, qui n'en peuvent *mais*."
H. E. *de la precellence du langage Francois*, p. 18.

" *Mais* vient de *magis* (j'entens *mais* pour *d'avantage*.") Id. p. 131.

" Helas! il n'en pouvoit MAIS, le pauvre prince, ni mort, ny vivant."
Brantome.

" Enfin aprés cent tours aiant de la maniere
Sur ce qui n'en peut MAIS dechargé ſa colere."
Moliere. Ecole des Femmes. A. 4. *Sce.* 6.

In the ſame manner the Italians;

" Io t' ho atato, quanto ho potuto: sì ch' io non ſo, ch' io mi ti poſſa " piu atare: E però qui non ha MA che uno compenſo. Comincia a " piangere, e io piangeroe con teco inſieme."
Cento Novelle. Nov. 35.

" Fue

we know not what that ſomething is, becauſe the ſentence is not compleated.) And therefore whenever any one in diſcourſe finiſhes his words with BUT, the queſtion always follows—BUT *what?*

So that Shakeſpeare ſpeaks moſt truly as well as poetically, when he gives an account of BUT, very different from this of Mr. Locke.

" *Meſſ.* Madam, he's well.
" *Cleo.* Well ſaid.
" *Meſſ.* And friends with Cæſar.
" *Cleo.* Thou art an honeſt man.
" *Meſſ.* Cæſar and he are greater friends than ever.
" *Cleo.* Make thee a fortune from me.
" *Meſſ.* BUT—YET—Madam,—
" *Cleo.* I do not like BUT—YET.—It does allay
" The good precedent. Fie upon BUT,—YET.—
" BUT—YET—is as a Jaylour, to bring forth
" Some monſtrous malefactor."

Anthony and Cleopatra, Act II. Sc. 5.

" Fue un ſignore, ch' avea uno giullare in ſua corte, e queſto giullare " l' adorava ſicome un ſuo Iddio. Un altro giullare vedendo queſto, ſi " gliene diſſe male, e diſſe: Or cui chiami tu Iddio? Elli non é MA che " uno." *Cento Novelle. Nov.* 18.

In the ſame manner alſo the Spaniſh language employs MAS both for *But* and *More.*

" Es la verdad la que *Mas* importa à los principes, y la que menos ſe " halla en los palacios." *Saavedra. Corona Gothica.*

" Obra de *Mas* novedad, y *Mas* eſtudio." Id.

Where you may obſerve that YET (tho' uſed elegantly here, to mark more ſtrongly the heſitation of the ſpeaker) is merely ſuperfluous to the ſenſe; as it is always when uſed after BOT: for either BOT or YET alone has the very ſame effect, and will always be found (eſpecially BOT) to *allay* equally the *Good* or the *Bad* * *precedent*; by ſomething MORE † that follows. For Boran means—to BOOT,

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* "*Speed.* Item, She hath more hairs than wit, and more faults than "hairs; BUT more wealth than faults.

"*Laun.* Stop there. She was mine, and not mine, twice or thrice in "that article. Rehearſe that once more.

"*Speed.* Item, ſhe hath more hair than wit.

"*Laun.* What's next?

"*Speed.* And more faults than hairs.

"*Laun.* That's monſtrous! O that that were out!

"*Speed.* BUT more wealth than faults.

"*Laun.* Why that word makes the faults gracious."

Here the word BUT allays the *bad* precedent; for which, without any ſhifting of its own intrinſic ſignification, it is as well qualified as to allay the *Good.*

† So Taſſo,——

——"Am. Oh, che mi dici?
"Silvia m'attende, ignuda, e ſola? *Tir.* Sola,
"Se non quanto v'è Dafue, ch' è per noi.
"*Am.* Ignuda ella m'aſpetta? *Tir.* Ignuda: MA—
"Am. Oimè, *che* MA? Tu taci tu m' uccidi."

Aminta, Att. II. Sc. 3.

BOOT *, i. e. to ſuperadd †, to ſupply, to ſubſtitute, to atone for, to compenſate with, to remedy with, to make amends with, to add ſomething MORE in order to make up a deficiency in ſomething elſe.

So likewiſe in the *third* and *fourth* inſtances (taken from Chillingworth) ‡. Mr. Locke has attributed to BUT a meaning

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Where the difference of the conſtruction in the Engliſh and the Italian is worth obſerving; and the reaſon evident, why in the queſtion conſequent to the conjunction, *what* is placed *after* the one, but *before* the other.

Boot what?		What *more?*
i. e.		i. e.
But what?		Che *ma?*

* S. Johnſon, and others, have miſtaken the expreſſion—*To Boot*—(which ſtill remains in our language) for a ſubſtantive; which is indeed the Infinitive of the ſame verb, of which the conjunction is the Imperative. As the Dutch alſo ſtill retain *Boeten* in their language, with the ſame meaning.

† "Perhaps it may be thought improper for me to addreſs you on this "ſubject. BUT a moment, my Lords, and it will evidently appear, that "you are equally blameable for an omiſſion of duty here alſo."

This may be ſuppoſed an abbreviation of conſtruction, for "BUT indulge "me with a moment, my Lords, and it will, &c." but there is no occaſion for ſuch a ſuppoſition.

‡ Knott had ſaid,—"How can it be in us a fundamental error to ſay, "the Scripture alone is not judge of controverſies, SEEING (notwithſtand-

meaning which can only be collected from the words which follow it.

But Mr. Locke ſays,—" IF it were his buſineſs to " examine it (BUT) in its full latitude."—And that he " *intends not here* a full explication of this ſort of ſigns."—And yet he adds, that—" the inſtances he has given in " this one (BUT) may lead us into the contemplation of " ſeveral *actions of our minds* in diſcourſing, which it has

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" ing this our belief) we uſe for interpreting of Scripture all the means " which they preſcribe; as *Prayer*, conferring of Places, conſulting the " originals, &c."

To which Chillingworth replies,

" You pray, BUT it is not that God would bring you to the true reli- " gion, BUT that he would confirm you in your own. You conſer places, " BUT it is, that you may confirm or colour over with plauſible diſguiſes " your erroneous doctrines; not that you may judge of them and forſake " them, if there be reaſon for it. You conſult the originals, BUT you re- " gard them not when they make againſt your doctrine or tranſlation."

In all theſe places, BUT (i. e. BOT, or, as we now pronounce the verb, BOOT) only directs ſomething to be added or ſupplied, in order to make up ſome deficiency in Knott's expreſſions of " *Prayer*, conferring of places, " &c." And ſo far indeed as an omiſſion of ſomething is improper, BUT (by ordering it's inſertion) may be ſaid " to intimate a ſuppoſition in the " mind of the ſpeaker, of ſomething otherwiſe than it ſhould be." But that intimation is only, as you ſee, by conſequence; and not by the in- trinſic ſignification of the word BUT.

" *found*

" *found a way* to intimate to others by theſe particles." And theſe, it muſt be remembered, are *Actions*, or as he before termed them THOUGHTS of our minds, for which he has ſaid, we have " either *none or very deficient names*."

Now if it had been ſo, (which in truth it is not) it was ſurely for that reaſon, moſt eſpecially the buſineſs of an Eſſay on human *underſtanding*, to examine theſe Signs in their *full latitude:* and to give a *full explication* of them. Inſtead of which, neither *Here*, nor *elſewhere*, has Mr. Locke given *Any* explication whatever.

Though I have ſaid much, I ſhall alſo omit much which might be added in ſupport of this double etymology of BUT: nor ſhould I have dwelt ſo long upon it, but in compliment to Mr. Locke; whoſe opinions in any matter are not ſlightly to be rejected, nor can they be modeſtly controverted without very ſtrong arguments.

None of the etymologiſts have been aware of this corrupt uſe of *one* word for *two* *.

Minſhew,

* Nor have etymologiſts been any more aware of the meaning or true derivation of the words correſponding with BUT in other languages. Voſſius derives the Latin conjunction AT from ἀτας; and AST from AT, " inſerto s."

Minſhew, keeping only one half of our modern BUT in contemplation, has ſought for its derivation in the Latin imperative *Puta.*

(But how or why s happens to be inſerted, he does not ſay.) Now to what purpoſe is ſuch ſort of etymology? Suppoſe it was derived from this doubtful word ατας; what intelligence does this give us? Why not as well ſtop at the Latin word AT, as at the Greek word ατας? Is it not ſuch ſort of trifling etymology (for I will not give even that name to what is ſaid by Scaliger and Nunneſius concerning SED) which has brought all etymological inquiry into diſgrace?

Voſſius is indeed a great authority; but, when he has nothing to juſtify an uſeleſs conjecture but a ſimilarity of ſound, we ought not to be afraid of oppoſing an appearance of Reaſon to him.

It is contrary to the cuſtomary progreſs of corruption in words to derive AST from AT. Words do not gain but loſe letters in their progreſs; nor has unaccountable accident any ſhare in their corruption; there is always a good reaſon to be given for every change they receive: and, by a good reaſon, I do not mean thoſe cabaliſtical words Metatheſis, Epentheſis, &c. by which Etymologiſts work ſuch miracles; but at leaſt a probable or anatomical reaſon for thoſe not arbitrary operations.

Adſit, Adſt, Aſt, At.—This conjecture is not a little ſtrengthened both by the antient method of writing this conjunction, and by the reaſon which Scaliger gives for it.—" AT fuit AD; *acceſſionem* enim dicit."

De C. L. L. cap. CLXXIII.

I am not at all afraid of being ridiculed for the above derivation, by any one who will give himſelf the trouble to trace the words (correſponding with BUT) of any language to their ſource: though they ſhould not all be quite ſo obvious as the French *Mais,* the Italian *Ma,* the Spaniſh *Mas,* or the Dutch *Maar.*

Junius confines his explanation to the other half; which he calls its " *primariam ſignificationem.*"

And Skinner willing to embrace them both, found no better method to reconcile two *contradictory* meanings, than to ſay hardily that the tranſition from one * to the other † was—" LEVI FLEXU !"

Junius ſays—" BUT, Chaucero T. C. V. 194. bis poſitum " pro *fine.* Primus locus eſt in ſummo columnæ;—BUT " *temperaunce in tene.*"—Alter eſt in columnæ medio;

—" His golden carte with fiery bemes bright
" Four yoked ſtedes, full different of hew
" BUT baite or tiring through the ſpheres drew."

" ubi, tamen perperam, primo BOUT pro BUT repoſueram: " quod iterum delevi, cum (ſub finem ejuſdem poematis) " incidiſſem in hunc locum;

" BUT mete or drinke ſhe dreſſed her to lie
" In a darke corner of the hous alone."

" Atque adeo exinde quoque obſervare cœpi frequen- " tiſſimam eſſe hanc particulæ acceptionem. In Æneide

* Id eſt, a direction to leave out ſomething.

† Id eſt, a direction to ſuperadd ſomething.

" quoque

" quoque Scoticâ paſſim occurrunt."—" BUT *ſpot or falt.*" " 3. 58.—" BUT *ony indigence.*" 4. 20.—" BUT *ſentence* " *or ingyne.*" 5. 41.—" *Principal poet* BUT *pere.*" 9. 19.— " Atque ita porro. BUT videtur dictum quaſi *Be-ut*, pro " quo Angli dicunt WITHOUT: unde quoque, hujus deri- " vationis intuitu, præſens hujus Particulæ acceptio vide- " bitur oſtendere hanc eſſe *primarium ejus ſignificationem.*"

The extreme careleſſneſs and ignorance of Junius, in this article is wonderful and beneath a comment.

Skinner ſays,—" BUT, ut ubi dicimus—" *None* BUT " *be*;—ab A. S. Butɛ, Butan, *præter*, *niſi*, *ſine*; Hinc, " LEVI FLEXU, poſtea cœpit, loco antiqui Anglo-ſaxonici " AC, *Sed*, deſignare. Butɛ autem & Butan tandem de- " flecti poſſunt à Præp. Be, *circa*; vel Beon, *eſſe*, et utɛ " vel utan, *foris.*"

Mr. Tyrwhit in his Gloſſary ſays—" BUT. prep. *Sax.* " *Without.* Gloſſ. Ur.—I cannot ſay that I have myſelf " obſerved this prepoſition in Chaucer, but I may have " overlooked it. The Saxons uſed it very frequently; " and how long the Scottiſh writers have laid it aſide I " am doubtful. It occurs repeatedly in Bp. Douglas."

Knowing

Knowing that no Engliſhman had yet laid this *prepoſition* aſide, I was curious to ſee how many ſentences Mr. Tyrwhit himſelf had written without the uſe of this prepoſition; and I confeſs I was a little diſappointed in not meeting with it till the fourth page of his preface: where he ſays —"Paſſages which have nothing to recommend them to "credit, BUT the ſingle circumſtance of having been often "repeated."

So in Chaucer throughout—"Hys ſtudy was BUT lytel "on the Byble." But Mr. Tyrwhit was not aware that, in all ſuch inſtances, BUT is as much a *prepoſition*, as any in the language.

WITHOUT.

BUT (as diſtinguiſhed from *Bot*) and WITHOUT have both exactly the ſame meaning, that is, in modern Engliſh, neither more nor leſs than—*Be-out*.

And they were both originally uſed indifferently either as *Conjunctions* or *Prepoſitions*. But later writers having adopted the falſe notions and diſtinctions of language maintained by the Greek and Latin Grammarians, have ſucceſſively endeavoured to make the Engliſh Language conform more and more to the ſame rules. Accordingly

WITHOUT, in approved modern ſpeech *, is now intirely confined to the Office of a *Prepoſition*; and BUT is generally though not always uſed as a *Conjunction*. In the ſame manner as *Niſi* and *Sine* in Latin are diſtributed; which do both likewiſe mean exactly the ſame, with no other difference than that, in the former the *negation precedes*, and in the other it *follows* the verb.

Skinner only ſays,—" WITHOUT, ab A. S. wiðutan, " *Extra.*"

S. Johnſon makes it a Prepoſition, an Adverb, and a Conjunction; and under the head of a Conjunction, ſays, " WITHOUT, Conjunct. Unleſs; if not; Except—*Not in* " *uſe.*"

Its true derivation and meaning are the ſame as thoſe of BUT (from Butan.)

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* It is however uſed as a *Conjunction* by Lord Mansfield in Horne's Trial, page 56.

" It cannot be read, WITHOUT the Attorney General conſents to it."

And yet, if this reverend Earl's authority may be ſafely quoted for any thing, it muſt be for *Words*. It is ſo unſound in matter of law, that it is frequently rejected even by himſelf.

It is nothing but the Imperative þýþðucan, from the Anglo-ſaxon and Gothic verb þeoþðan, ΘΛΙΚΩΛΝ; which in the Anglo-ſaxon and Engliſh languages is yoked and incorporated with the Verb Beon eſſe. And this will account to Mr. Tyrwhit for the remark which he has made, viz. that—" *By* and *With* are often ſynonymous *."

In modern Engliſh we have retained only a ſmall portion of it; but our old Engliſh authors had not loſt the uſe of any part of this verb þeoþðan, and frequently employed it, inſtead of BE, in every part of the conjugation.

" But I a draught haue of that welle,
" In whiche my deth is and my lyfe;
" My ioye is tourned in to ſtrife,
" That ſobre ſhall I neuer WORTHE."

Gower. Lib. 5. *Fol.* 128. *Pag.* 2. *Col.* 2.

" Wo WORTHE the fayre gemme vertueſſe
" Wo WORTH that herbe alſo that doth no bote
" Wo WORTH the beaute that is routhleſſe
" Wo WORTH that wight trede eche under fote."

Chaucer. Troylus. Boke 3. *Fol.* 165. *Pag.* 1. *Col.* 1.

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* " *Without* and *Within.* Butan and Binnan: originally, I ſuppoſe, Bi " utan and Bi innan. *By* and *With* are often ſynonymous." Gloſſary.

" The broche of Thebes was of ſuche kynde
" So ful of rubies and of ſtones of Inde
" That euery wight that ſette on it an eye
" He wende anone to WORTHE out of his mynde."
Complaynt of Mars. Fol. 343. *Pag.* 2. *Col.* 2.

" In eais thay bark I compt it neuer ane myte,
" Quha can not hald thare pece ar fre to flite,
" Chide quhill thare hedis riffe, and hals WORTHE hace."
Douglas. Prol. to Booke 3. *Pag.* 66.

" Thay WOURTH affrayit of that ſuddane ſycht."
Douglas. Booke 8. *Pag.* 244.

" Wo WORTH euer falſe enuie."
Gower. Lib. 8. *Fol.* 181. *Pag.* 1. *Col.* 2.

" Wo WORTH all flowe."
Gower. Lib. 8. *Fol.* 188. *Pag.* 2. *Col.* 1.

" Sir Thopas wold out ryde
" He WORTH upon his ſtede gray
" And in his honde a launce gay
" A long ſwerde by his ſyde."
Chaucer. Ryme of Syr Thopas. Fol. 172. *Pag.* 2. *Col.* 1.

" O mother myn, that cleaped were Argyue
" Wo WORTH that day, that thou me bare on lyue."
Troylus. Boke 3. *Fol.* 186. *Pag.* 2. *Col.* 1.

" Than in my mynd of mony thing is I muſit,
" And to the goddes of vildernes, as is uſit,
" Quilk Hamadriades hait, I wourſchip maid,
" Beſeiking this auiſioun WORTH happy,
" And the orakil proſperite ſuld ſignify."
Douglas. Booke 3. *Pag.* 68.

" Pallas

" Pallas aſtoniſt of ſo hie ane name
" As Dardanus, abaſit WORTH for ſchame."
Douglas. Booke 8. *Pag.* 244.

" His hals WORTH dry of blude."
Douglas. Booke 8. *Pag.* 250.

" The large ground WORTH griſly unto ſe."
Douglas. Booke 11. *Pag.* 385.

" In leſuris and on leyis litill lammes
" Full tait and trig ſocht bletand to thare dammes,
" Tydy ky lowis velis, by thaym rynnis,
" And ſnod and ſlekit WORTH thir beiſtis ſkinnis."
Douglas. Prol. to Booke 12. *Pag.* 402.

" Quhat wenys thou, freynd, thy craw be WORTHIN quhite."
Douglas. Prol. to Booke 3. *Pag.* 66.

" And quhen thay bene aſſemblit all in fere,
" Than glaid ſcho WOURTHIS."
Douglas. Booke 13. *Pag.* 458.

" Euer as the batel WORTHIS mare cruel,
" Be effuſion of blude and dyntis fel."
Douglas. Booke 7. *Pag.* 237.

" Wod wroith he WORTHIS for diſdene and diſpite."
Douglas. Booke 12. *Pag.* 423.

AND.

M. Caſaubon ſuppoſes AND to be derived from the Greek ἐπὶτα, poſtea.

Skinner ſays—" Neſcio an a Lat. *Addere* q. d. *Add*; " interjectâ per Epentheſin N, ut in *Render* a reddendo."

Lye ſuppoſes it to be derived from the Greek ἔτι, adhuc, præterea, etiam, quinetiam, inſuper.

I have already given the derivation which, I believe, will alone ſtand examination.

I ſhall only remark here, how eaſily men take upon truſt, how willingly they are ſatisfied with, and how confidently they repeat after others, falſe explanations of what they do not underſtand.—Conjunctions, it ſeems, are to have their denomination and definition from the uſe to which they are applied: *per accidens*, *eſſentiam*. Prepoſitions connect words; but—" the Conjunction connects or " joins together ſentences; ſo as out of two to make one " ſentence. Thus—" *You and I and Peter, rode to* " *London* *," is one ſentence made up of three, &c."

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* " *Petrus et Paulus diſputant*: id eſt, *Petrus diſputat et Paulus diſputat*." Sanctii Minerva, Lib. 1. cap. XVIII.

So again, Lib. 3. cap. XIV. " *Cicero & filius valent*. Figura Syllepſis " eſt: ut, *valet Cicero, & valet filius*." Which Perizonius ſufficiently confutes, by theſe inſtances—" Emi librum X drachmis & IV obolis." " Saulus & Paulus ſunt iidem."

Well!

Well! So far matters ſeem to go on very ſmoothly. It is,

"*You rode, I rode, Peter rode.*"

But let us now change the inſtance, and try ſome others, which are full as common, though not altogether ſo convenient.

Two AND *two are four.*
AB *and* BC *and* CA *form a Triangle.*
John AND *Jane are a handſome couple.*

Does AB form a triangle, BC form a triangle? &c.—Is John a couple? Is Jane a couple?—Are two four?

If the definition of a Conjunction is adhered to, I am afraid that AND, in ſuch inſtances, will appear to be no more a Conjunction, (that is a connecter of ſentences) than *Though* in the inſtance I have given under that word: or than *But*, in Mr. Locke's *ſecond* inſtance: or than *Elſe*, when called by S. Johnſon a *Pronoun*; or than *Since*, when uſed for *Sithence* or for *Syne*. In ſhort, I am afraid that the Grammarians will ſcarcely have an entire Conjunction left: for I apprehend that there is not one of thoſe words which they call Conjunctions, which is not ſometimes uſed (and that very properly) without connecting ſentences.

LEST.

LEST.

Junius only ſays—" LEST, *leaſt*, minimus. v. *little*." Under *Leaſt*, he ſays—" LEAST, *leſt*, minimus. Con-" tractum eſt ex ελαχιϛος. v. *little*, parvus." And under *little*, to which he refers us, there is nothing to the purpoſe.

Skinner ſays—" LEST, ab A. S. Lær, *minus*, q. d. *quo* " *minus hoc fiat*."

S. Johnſon ſays,—" LEST, Conj. (from the Adjective *Leaſt*) *That not*."

This laſt deduction is a curious one indeed; and it would puzzle as ſagacious a reaſoner as S. Johnſon to ſupply the middle ſteps to his concluſion from *Leaſt* (which always however means *ſome*) to " *That not*" (which means none at all.) It ſeems as if, when he wrote this, he had already in his mind a preſſentiment of ſome future occaſion in which ſuch reaſoning would be convenient. As thus,—" The Mother Country, the Seat of Government, " muſt neceſſarily enjoy the greateſt ſhare of dignity, " power, rights, and privileges: an united or aſſociated " Kingdom muſt have in ſome degree a ſmaller ſhare; and " their

" their Colonies the *leaſt* ſhare;"—That is, (according to S. Johnſon *) *None of any kind.*

It has been propoſed by no ſmall authority (Wallis followed by Lowth) to alter the ſpelling of LEST to *Leaſt*; and vice verſa. " Multi," ſays Wallis, " pro *Leſt* ſcribunt " *Leaſt* (ut diſtinguatur a Conjunctione *Leſt, ne, ut non:*)

* Johnſon's merit ought not to be denied to him; but his Dictionary is the moſt imperfect and faulty, and the leaſt valuable of any of his productions; and that ſhare of merit which it poſſeſſes, makes it by ſo much the more hurtful. I rejoice however, that though the leaſt valuable, he found it the moſt profitable: for I could never read his preface without ſhedding a tear. And yet it muſt be confeſſed, that his *Grammar* and *Hiſtory* and Dictionary of what *he calls* the Engliſh language, are in all reſpects (except the bulk of the latter) moſt truly contemptible performances; and a reproach to the learning and induſtry of a nation, which could receive them with the ſlighteſt approbation.

Nearly one third of this Dictionary is as much the language of the Hottentots as of the Engliſh; and it would be no difficult matter ſo to tranſlate any one of the plaineſt and moſt popular numbers of the *Spectator* into the language of that Dictionary, that no mere Engliſhman, though well read in his own language, would be able to comprehend one ſentence of it.

It appears to be a work of labour, and yet is in truth one of the moſt idle performances ever offered to the public: compiled by an author who poſſeſſed not one ſingle requiſite for the undertaking, and (being a publication of a ſet of bookſellers) owing its ſucceſs to that very circumſtance which alone muſt make it impoſſible that it ſhould deſerve ſucceſs.

" Verum omnino contra analogiam Grammaticæ. Mallem " ego Adjectivum *leſt*, Conjunctionem *leaſt* ſcribere."

" The ſuperlative *Leaſt*," ſays Lowth, " ought rather " to be written without the A; as Dr. Wallis has long ago " obſerved. The Conjunction of the ſame ſound might " be written with the A, for diſtinction."

S. Johnſon judiciouſly diſſents from this propoſal, but for no other reaſon, but becauſe he thinks " the profit is " not worth the change."

Now though they all concur in the ſame Etymology, I will venture to affirm that LEST, for *Leſed* (as *bleſt* for *bleſſed*, &c.) is nothing elſe but the participle paſt of Leþan, dimittere; and, with the article *That* (either expreſſed or underſtood) means no more than *hoc dimiſſo* or *quo dimiſſo* *.

* As LES the Imperative of Leþan is ſometimes uſed for UNLESS, as has been already ſhewn under the article *Unleſs:* ſo is the ſame imperative LES ſometimes uſed inſtead of the participle LEST.

" I knew it was paſt four houris of day,
" And thocht I wald na langare ly in May;
" Les Phœbus ſuld me loſingere attaynt."

G. Douglas, Prol. to the 12th book of Eneados.

And, if this explanation and etymology of LEST is right, (of which I have not the ſmalleſt doubt) it furniſhes one caution more to learned Critics, not to innovate raſhly: *Leſt*, whilſt they attempt to amend a language, as they imagine, in one trifling reſpect, they mar it in others of more importance; and by their corrupt alterations and amendments, confirm error; and make the truth more difficult to be diſcovered by thoſe who come after.

Mr. Locke ſays, and it is agreed on all ſides, that— "it is in the right uſe of theſe" (*Particles*) "that more "particularly conſiſts the clearneſs and beauty of a good "ſtyle:" and that, "theſe words, which are *not truly by "themſelves the names of any ideas*, are of conſtant and in- "diſpenſible uſe in language; and do much contribute to "men's well expreſſing themſelves."

Now this, I am perſuaded, would never have been ſaid, had theſe Particles been underſtood; for it proceeds from nothing but the difficulty of giving any rule or direction concerning their uſe; and that difficulty ariſes from a miſtaken ſuppoſition that they are not "*by themſelves the names "of any ideas*:" and in that caſe indeed I do not ſee how any rational rules concerning their uſe could poſſibly be given. But I flatter myſelf that henceforward, the true

force and nature of theſe words being clearly underſtood, the proper uſe of them will be ſo evident, that any rule concerning their uſe will be totally unneceſſary: as it would be thought abſurd to inform any one that when he means to direct *an addition*, he ſhould not uſe a word which directs *to take away*.

I am induced to mention this in this place, from the very improper manner in which LEST (more than any other conjunction) is often uſed by our beſt authors: thoſe who are moſt converſant with the learned languages being moſt likely to make the miſtake.—" *You make uſe of ſuch in-*
" *direct and crooked arts as theſe to blaſt my reputation, and*
" *to poſſeſs men's minds with diſaffection to my perſon*; LEST
" *peradventure, they might with ſome indifference hear reaſon*
" *from me.*" CHILLINGWORTH's Preface to the Author of Charity maintained, &c.

Here LEST is well uſed—" *You make uſe of theſe arts:*"
—Why? the reaſon follows,—Lereb that i. e. *Hoc dimiſſo*
—" *men might hear reaſon from me.*"——Therefore,—
" *you uſe theſe arts.*"

Inſtances of the improper uſe of LEST may be found in almoſt every author that ever wrote in our language;

becauſe none of them have been aware of the true meaning of the word; and have been miſled by ſuppoſing it to be perfectly correſpondent to ſome conjunctions in other languages; which it is not.

Thus King Henry the Eighth, in *A neceſſary Doctrine*, &c. *ſixte petition*, ſays,—" *If we ſuffer the fyrſte ſuggeſtion unto* " *ſynne to tarry any whyle in our hartes, it is great peryll* " LEST *that conſent and dede wyll folowe ſhortly after.*"

Thus *Aſcham*, in his *Scholemaſter*, ſays,—" *If a yong* " *jentleman will venture himſelfe into the companie of ruffians,* " *it is over great a jeopardie,* LEST *their facions, maners,* " *thoughts, taulke, and dedes will verie ſone be over like.*"

Any tolerable judge of Engliſh will immediately perceive ſomething aukward and improper in theſe ſentences; though he cannot tell why. Yet the reaſon will be very plain to him, when he knows the meaning of theſe unmeaning particles (as they have been called:) for he will then ſee at once that LEST has no buſineſs in the ſentences; there being nothing *dimiſſo*, in conſequence of which ſomething elſe would follow: and that, if he would employ LEST, the ſentences muſt be arranged otherwiſe.

As,—" *We muſt take heed that the firſt ſuggeſtion unto ſin,* " *tarry not any while in our hearts,* LEST *that,* &c."

" *A young gentleman ſhould be careful not to venture* " *himſelf,* &c. LEST, &c."

" Il eſt bon quelquefois (ſays Leibnitz) d'avoir la com-" plaiſance d'examiner certaines objections: car, outre " que cela peut ſervir à tirer les gens de leur erreur, il " peut arriver que nous en profitions nous-mêmes. Car " les paralogiſmes ſpecieux renferment ſouvent quelque " ouverture utile, et donnent lieu à reſoudre quelques dif-" ficultés conſiderables. C'eſt pourquoi j'ai toujours aimé " des objections ingenieuſes contre mes propres ſentiments, " et je ne les ai jamais examinées ſans fruit *."

I ſhall, in this inſtance, be more complaiſant than Leibnitz; and will deſcend to examine objections which are neither ſpecious nor ingenious: and the rather, becauſe (before their publication) the ſubſtance of the *Criticiſms on the Diverſions of Purley* was, with ſingular induſtry and a characteriſtical affectation, goſſiped by the preſent precious Secretary at War, in Payne the bookſeller's ſhop; the

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* *Eſſais de Theodicée. Diſcours de la conformité de la foi avec la raiſon.*

cannibal commencing with this modeſt obſervation, that—"I had found a mare's neſt *."

I ſhall examine them in this place, becauſe one fourth part of theſe criticiſms (20 pages out of 79) is employed in objections to the derivation of UNLESS, ELSE, and LEST: which have all three one meaning (viz. of *Separation*) and are all, as I contend, portions of the ſame verb Leſan. i. e. of On-leſan, Ā-leſan, Leſan.

My Norwich critics (for I ſhall couple them) blame me,

1. For the obſcurity of my *Title-page*. Page 2. †

2. For

* This malignant and falſe obſervation was heard with an appearance of ſatisfaction which prudence dictated to the hearer; and communicated with that diſguſt which a liberal royaliſt always feels at Renegado illiberality.—"No, (ſaid my antipolitical communicating friend) "I will never deſcend "with him beneath even a Japaneſe: and I remember what Voltaire re-"marks of that country;—Le Japon était partagé en pluſieurs ſectes, "quoique ſous un roi Pontife. Mais toutes les ſectes ſe reuniſſaient dans "les mêmes principes de Morales. Ceux qui croiaient la metempſycoſe, "et ceux qui n'y croiairent pas, s' abſtenaient, et s' abſtiennent encore "aujourdhui, *de manger la chair des animaux qui rendent ſervice à l' homme.*"

† Vix plane a me impetrare poſſum, quin exemplum ſequar *Petri Franciſci Giambullarii* qui librum ſuum de linguæ Florentinæ origine ſcriptum, a *Johannis Baptiſtæ Gellii*, viri ſibi amicitia et ſtudiis conjunctiſſimè, cognomine,

2. For the matter of my *Introduction.* Page 3.

3. For the place of my *Advertiſement.* Page 21.

4. For a very ſtrong propenſion towards inaccuracy. Page 2.

5. For having "introduced one of the champions for "intolerance," by quoting a Roman catholic biſhop. P. 4.

6. For the imperfection of my Anglo-ſaxon alphabet. Page 22.

7. And finally, For my politics. Page 32. *

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cognomine, quem in ſcribendo ſocium et conſiliarium habuit, Il Gello nuncupari voluit. Perinde quidem et mihi THWAITESII nomine librum noſtrum inſcribendo, ſi per modeſtiam ejus liceret, nobis faciendum eſſet.

G. Hickes.

* Mr. Secretary and his ſecretary will not be ſurpriſed that their diſapprobation does not move me; when they conſider that, as far as corrupt and unbridled power has been able to enforce the decree, I have, on account of theſe politics, been, for the laſt thirty years, robbed of the fair uſe of life, *interdictus aqua et igni:* and, by what I can prognoſticate, I ſuppoſe I am ſtill to lay down my life for them. I might have quitted them, as Mr. Secretary has done, and have received the reward of my treachery. But my politics will never be changed, nor be kept back on any occaſion: and whilſt I have my life, it will neither be embittered by any regret for the paſt, nor fear for the future.

All

All theſe I willingly abandon to their mercy and diſcretion; although they have not ſhewn any ſymptoms of either.

But I ſhould be ſorry if any of my readers were haſtily miſled by them to believe,

1ſt. That "Grammar was one of the *Firſt* arts which "probably engaged the attention of the curious." Pag. 4.

For the contrary is not a matter of conjecture, but of hiſtorical fact: and whoever pleaſes may know at what preciſe period Grammar, as an art, had its commencement in every nation of Europe.

Or 2dly. That "The deſire which ariſes in the mind, "*next* to that of communicating thought, is certainly to "uſe ſuch ſigns as will convey the meaning clearly and "preciſely." Pag. 19.

For a deſire of *communicating thought*, and a deſire of *conveying our meaning* clearly and preciſely (though expreſſed by different words) are not two deſires, but one deſire: for *as far as* our meaning is not conveyed clearly and preciſely, it is not conveyed at all; *ſo far* there is no communication of thought.

Or

Or 3dly. That "This deſire of conveying our meaning clearly and preciſely naturally leads to the uſe of abbreviations: and that abbreviations ſeem to bear a much ſtronger affinity to the deſire of perſpicuity than to that of diſpatch." Pag. 20.

For, to ſatisfy himſelf that the deſire of clearneſs and perſpicuity does not lead to the uſe of abbreviations, (which are ſubſtitutes) any perſon needs only to conſult the legal inſtruments of any civilized nation in the world: for, in theſe inſtruments, perſpicuity or clearneſs is the only object. Now theſe legal inſtruments have always been, and always muſt be, remarkably more tedious and prolix than any other writings, in which the ſame clearneſs and preciſion are not equally important. For abbreviations open a door for doubt; and, by the uſe of them, what we gain in time we loſe in preciſion and certainty. In common diſcourſe we ſave time by uſing the ſhort ſubſtitutes HE and SHE and THEY and IT; and (with a little care on one ſide and attention on the other) they anſwer our purpoſe very well; or, if a miſtake happens, it is eaſily ſet right. But this ſubſtitution will not be riſqued in a legal inſtrument; and the drawer thinks himſelf compelled, for the ſake of certainty to ſay—HE (the ſaid John A.) to HIM (the ſaid Thomas B.) for THEM (the ſaid William C. and Anne

Anne D.) as often as thoſe perſons are mentioned *. And for the ſame reaſon he is compelled to employ many other prolixities of the ſame kind.

Or 4thly. That " A deſire of variety gave birth to " Pronouns in language, which otherwiſe would not have " appeared in it." Pag. 20.

For Pronouns prevent variety.

Or 5thly. That " Articles and Pronouns are neither " Nouns nor Verbs." Page 26.

For I hope hereafter to ſatisfy the reader that they are nothing elſe, and *can be* nothing elſe.

Or 6thly. That Johnſon conſidered Skinner as ſo ignorant that his authority ought not to be regarded. Pag. 39 †.

* Abbreviations and ſubſtitutes undoubtedly cannot ſafely be truſted in legal inſtruments. But it is an unneceſſary prolixity and great abſurdity which at preſent prevails, to retain the ſubſtitute in theſe writings at the ſame time with the principal, for which alone the ſubſtitute is ever inſerted and for which it is merely a proxy. HE, SHE, THEY, IT, WHO, WHICH, &c. ſhould have no place in theſe inſtruments, but be altogether baniſhed from them. And I know a Solicitor of eminence who, at my ſuggeſtion, near twenty years ago, did baniſh them.

† " Skinner, indeed, tranſlates Onleȝan, or rather Aleȝan, to *Diſmiſs*. " But Skinner is often ignorant, ſays Dr. Johnſon."

For Johnſon ſpeaks of him as one whom "he ought "not to mention but with the reverence due to his in- "ſtructor and benefactor," and to whom he was chiefly indebted for his northern etymologies *.

Or 7thly. That I have myſelf repreſented Junius as a "very careleſs and ignorant" writer. Pag. 51 †.

For (under the article AN) I have noticed "the judicious "diſtinction which Johnſon has made between Junius and "Skinner." And when I had occaſion (under the article BUT) to ſay that he was careleſs and ignorant concerning that particular word, I mentioned it as "*wonderful.*" But thus theſe critics meanly attempt to miſlead their readers: catching at the word *ignorant* (which when applied to a perſon in a particular inſtance, means only that he *did not*

* "For the Teutonic etymologies I am commonly indebted to Junius "and Skinner, the only names which I have forborn to quote when I copied "their books: not that I might appropriate their labours or uſurp their "honours, but that I might ſpare a perpetual repetition by one general "acknowledgment. Theſe I ought not to mention but with the reverence "due to inſtructors and benefactors." Johnſon's Preface.

† "You have here, however, the authority of Junius, who puts down "theſe verbs as being the origin; but, I have yours to ſay, that he was "ſometimes very careleſs and ignorant." Page 51 of the Criticiſms.

know

know that particular thing) in order fraudulently to faſten an imputation of *general ignorance*.

Or 8thly. That thoſe who have ſpelled LESS with a ſingle s, were not "civilized people *." i. e. (I ſuppoſe) not capable of the accuſtomed relations of peace and amity.

Or 9thly. That "The blemiſhes of Johnſon's Dicti-"onary are not of the kind, *quas incuria fudit*, but the "reſult of too much nicety and exactneſs." Pag. 46.— But of this in another place: for it is of more conſequence than any thing which relates to theſe Norwich Critics.

Or, 10thly. That it requires much practice in the Anglo-Saxon or old Engliſh writers, and much attention to the circumſtance, to obſerve "the various ſpellings of one "and the ſame word in the language †."

For not only are almoſt all the words ſpelled differently by different authors; but even by the ſame author, in the

* "The orthography of this word, I preſume to ſay, is LESS. And it "ſhould ſeem as if civilized people had no other way of ſpelling it." P. 40.

† "My taſte for the Anglo-ſaxon has never induced me to attend to the "various ſpellings of one and the ſame word in the language." Page 51 of the Criticiſms.

ſame book, in the ſame page, and frequently in the ſame line.

Or, 11thly. That I "deſire to paſs my ſentiments "upon others, as articles of faith." Pag. 76 *.

My critics commence with a ſolemn proteſtation, that they "aim at nothing but a fair repreſentation of the "truth." Pag. v.

Yet twice in the 7th page, and twice in the 8th page, and again in the 25th page of the *Criticiſms*, they pretend to quote my words; and falſely, to ſerve their own purpoſe, inſert a word of their own. My words are—"Ab-"breviations *employed* for the ſake of diſpatch." They, five times repeatedly, aſſert that my words are—"words "*neceſſary* for diſpatch."

* This groundleſs apprehenſion is not unnatural in *one* of my critics. He ſtartles at his own expreſſion—an article of faith. But fear not me, Caſſander. I pay the ſame regard to a ſickly conſcience that I do to a ſickly appetite: and I have known thoſe who, like ſome honeſt ſectaries, have fainted at the ſmell of roaſt beef. No, I ſhall never wiſh to impoſe articles of faith on others, though I am not ſcared at their impoſition upon me. I am a willing conformiſt to all that is not fatal. I would ſurely reject poiſon, i. e. power in the prieſthood, and deſpotiſm any where; but otherwiſe I am not dainty: and can feed heartily upon any wholeſome food, both in the church and out of it; although it might happen to be coarſe and not overpleaſing to my palate.

In

In their 8th page they twice aſſert that I " rank *Articles*, " *Prepoſitions*, and *Conjunctions*, under the title of *Abbre-* " *viations*: and in their 11th page they aſſert, that I have " made " Abbreviations the principal object of the work" I have publiſhed, i. e. of the firſt edition of this volume.

I hope I have there ſpoken with ſufficient clearneſs to make it impoſſible for any attentive reader to fall into ſuch an error; or to ſuppoſe that I have hitherto ſpoken one word about thoſe *Abbreviations* which compoſe my ſecond claſs. It is evident however that my Critics made no ſuch miſtake, but falſified the matter wilfully: for, in their 35th page, they contradict their own previous ſtatement, and acknowledge the fact.—" Conjunctions in your ſyſtem " (ſay they) are not ſeparate parts of ſpeech, but words " belonging to the ſpecies either of Nouns or Verbs."

I hardly think it neceſſary to inform the reader, that I have hitherto ſpoken little of the *Noun*, nothing of the *Verb*, and nothing of the *Abbreviations*; but have chiefly employed myſelf to get rid of the falſe doctrine concerning Conjunctions, Prepoſitions and Adverbs. The method I have taken may perhaps be injudicious: indeed I have been told ſo: I may perhaps have begun at the wrong end: but I did it not wantonly or careleſsly, but after the moſt ma-

ture reflexion, and with the view of leſſening the difficulties and ſparing the labour of thoſe who may chuſe to proceed with me in this enquiry. Perhaps when we come to the cloſe of it, my readers will feel with me (they will hardly feel ſo forcibly as I do) the juſtneſs of the following reflexion of Mr. Necker—" Je reviens à mon triſte travail. " On aura peine, je le crains, à ſe former une idée de ſon " étendue; car, *en reſultat, tout devient ſimple:* et l' un des " premiers effets de la methode, c'eſt de cacher les difficultés vaincues: auſſi dans les plus grandes choſes comme " dans les plus petites, tous ceux qui jouiſſent de l' ordre, " n'en connoiſſent pas le merite *."

In their 13th page, they ſay, that " It is evident from " my words, that, in my opinion, Mr. Locke was no better " than in a miſt when he wrote his famous Eſſay."

In their 19th page, they repreſent me (who have denied any abſtract or complex ideas) as affirming—" that, in " my opinion, it is the term that gives birth to the abſtract idea."

Becauſe I have, in the 255th page of my firſt edition, obſerved that " it is contrary to the *cuſtomary* progreſs of

* Nouveaux Ecclairciſſemens ſur le comte rendu.

" corruption

" corruption in words to gain letters;" and in the 131ſt page, that " Letters, like ſoldiers, are very apt to deſert " and drop off in a long march:"—They twice, in their 41ſt page, repreſent me as denying the poſſibility that any word ſhould ever gain a letter *, or be written by any ſucceeding author with more letters than by his predeceſſor.

Becauſe I have, in the 218th page of my firſt edition, given the correſponding *Terminations* in the other northern languages; which terminations I ſuppoſe likewiſe, as well as LESS (which is not a modern Engliſh imperative) to have been originally the imperatives of their verbs; They, in their 44th page, and again in their 46th page, charge me with " contending" that LOOS (ſo written) is the *preſent modern* imperative in Dutch.

In their 55th page, though I call Douglas (in the very place alluded to by them) " one of the moſt common of " our old Engliſh authors;" they would make their readers believe that I produce him " as an Anglo-Saxon writer."

In the concluſion of their *Criticiſms* they ſay—" Pro- " feſſor Schultens was the *firſt* philologiſt who *ſuſpected*

* I had given inſtances in *Unles*, *Whiles*, *Amiddes*, *Amonges*, which afterwards became *Unleſs*, *Whilſt*, *Amidſt*, *Amongſt*.

" Prepoſitions, Conjunctions, Particles in general to be no " more than Nouns or *Verbs*, and *refuſed* therefore to " make ſeparate claſſes of them, among thoſe that com- " prehend the Parts of Speech. But he confined himſelf " in the application of this *Truth* to the learned *Languages*. " You are the firſt who *applied it* to thoſe which are called " modern."

Theſe are the gentlemen who commence with a ſolemn proteſtation, that they " aim at nothing but a fair repre- " ſentation of the truth." And yet, in the above extract, there is not a ſingle propoſition that does not convey more than one wilful falſhood.

I will here inſert the whole which Schultens has ſaid upon the ſubject.

" SECTIO V.

" Lxv. Partes orationis Hebræis eædem quæ Græcis, " Latinis, omnibus populis. Ad tres claſſes concinne ſatis " omnes illæ partes revocari ſolent, Verbum, Nomen, " *Particulam*. Ab Arabibus diſtinctionem hanc hauſere " primi grammatici Hebræorum. In *Gjarumia* habes, " Partes orationis tres ſunt, Nomen, et Verbum, et Par- " ticula, quæ venit in ſignificationem. Apud Rabbinos

" ſimiliter

" ſimiliter Nomen, Actio, id eſt Verbum, et Vox, ſive " Particula. Veteres Stoici quatuor claſſes fecere. Alii " plures, alii pauciores adhuc, ſolo nomine et verbo con- " tenti. Optima diviſio Theodectis, et Ariſtotelis, apud " Dion. Halic. in ονοματα, ρηματα, συνδεσμους. Eam laudat unice " Quintil. Nomina, Verba, et Convinctiones, reddens: ut " nomina exhibeant *materiam*, verba *vim* ſermonis, in " convictionibus autem *complexus* eorum indicetur. Con- " ſulendus de hiſce *G. J. Voſs.* qui dubium cenſet utrum " Orientales hac in re imitati ſint Græcos, an Græci potius " ſecuti ſint exemplum Orientalium. Mihi Arabes ex Ari- " ſtotele hauſiſſe, planiſſume liquet."

The above is a mere tranſcript from Voſſius, to whom Schultens very fairly refers us *. He then proceeds to apply

* " De numero partium orationis diu eſt, quod tribus grammaticæ " controverſantur. Antiquiſſima eorum eſt opinio, qui tres faciunt claſſes. " Eſtque hæc Arabum quoque ſententia, quibus hæ claſſes vocantur No- " men, Verbum et Particula. Hebræi quoque (qui cum Arabes gram- " maticam ſcribere deſinerent, artem eam *Demum* ſcribere cæperunt; quod " ante annos contigit circiter quadringentos) Hebræi, inquam, hac in re " ſecuti ſunt magiſtros ſuos Arabes. Imo vero trium claſſium numerum " aliæ etiam Orientis linguæ retinent. Dubium, utrum ea in re Orientales " imitati ſint antiquos Græcorum: an hi potius ſecuti ſint Orientalium " exemplum. Utut eſt, etiam veteres Græcos tres tantum partes agnoviſſe, " non ſolum autor eſt Dionyſius: ſed etiam Quinctilianus teſtatur, ubi

apply this doctrine in the Hebrew language alone.—— " Idem dixerim de methodo grammaticam texendi ſecun- " dum has orationis partes. Arabes et Judæi a verbo in- " cipere ſolent, quod tanquam radix ſit, unde Nomina et " Particulæ *propagentur*.

" Verba nempe tanquam radices ſunt unde nomina *pro-* " *pagantur*, variis formis, et terminationibus: itemque " Particulæ; ſub quibus Pronomina, Adverbia, Præpoſi- " tiones, Conjunctiones, et Interjectiones continentur. Et " harum denſa illa ſylva a Nominibus ferme *ſuccrevit*, " quin ad claſſem nominum *maximam partem* referenda."

" hanc Ariſtotelis ipſius, ac Theodectis ſententiam fuiſſe docet. Idemque " de veteribus Græcis teſtatur Rabbinus iſte qui, &c.

" Atque ex Arabibus grammaticis eandem ſequitur *Giarumiæ* auctor " Muhamed Sanhagius. Poſtea autem antiquiſſimi Stoicorum quatuor " claſſes fecerunt. Imo nec defuere, qui alias afferendo diviſiones ampliorem " facerent numerum Partium orationis. Quorum omnium autor nobis " Dionyſius Halicarnaſſenſis. Addam et inſignem locum Quinctiliani,— " Veteres, quorum fuerunt Ariſtoteles quoque, atque Theodectes, verba " modo et nomina et convinctiones tradiderunt. Videlicet, quod in verbis " *vim* ſermonis, in nominibus *materiam*, in convinctionibus autem *com-* " *plexum* eorum eſſe judicaverunt.—Sed ut omnis hæc diſputatio melius in- " telligatur, non abs re erit, ſi quæ a Dionyſio, et Priſciano ſcribuntur " accuratius expendamus. Duæ ſunt principes partes, Nomen et Verbum: " de quibus ſolis iccirco Ariſtoteles agit, libro Περι ερμηνειας."

G. J. Voſſius de arte gram. lib. 3. cap. 1.

SECTIO

" SECTIO VI.

" XCI. A nomine pergimus ad Particulas. Eas recte " dividunt in ſeparatas et inſeparabiles. Minus commoda " diſtinctis cl. Altingii inter particulas declinabiles et inde- " clinabiles. Ad priores refert pronomina. Ad poſteriores " Adverbia, Præpoſitiones, conjunctiones, et interjectiones: " Atqui et pronomina quædam non declinantur, et *bona* " *pars* adverbiorum, ac præpoſitionum, patitur declina- " tionem, quippe quæ *maximam partem* ſunt *Nomina*, vel " *Subſtantiva*, vel Adjectiva. Hoc ſi perſpexiſſent primi " grammatici, multo felicius naturam, vim, mutationem, " et conſtructionem particularum expedire valuiſſent."

" XCVI. Particulas reliquas, ſub quibus adverbia, præ- " poſitiones, conjunctiones, et interjectiones comprenſæ, " minus rite indeclinabiles vocari, quod re vera declinentur, " *præſertim* adverbia et præpoſitiones; utpote veri nominis " *ſubſtantiva* vel *adjectiva*, *maximam partem*. Rectius in " ſeparatas et inſeparabiles dirimuntur. Separatarum claſſes " diſtinctius ſubnotabo: atque ſub ſingulis ſpecimina quæ- " dam exhibebo.—Sic reliqua ſunt *originis* vel *ſubſtantiva* " vel *adjectiva*. Horum enucleatio *ampliora exigit ſpatia*. " *Nonnulla* infra *tangentur*.

" Apud Latinos quoque Conjunctiones *multæ* a *Nomi-*
" *nibus oriundæ*, ut *Verum. Vero. verum enimvero. que-*
" *madmodum. quamquam.* Additum et Verbum in *quam-*
" *libet. quolibet. quovis.* Merum verbum eſt Licet, &c.
" De adverbiis et præpoſitionibus idem ſubmonitum velim."

Thus it appears that Schultens, without reaſoning at all upon the ſubject, took the old diviſion of language exactly as he found it; and, with his predeceſſors on the Oriental tongues, conſidered and ranked the *Particles* as a diſtinct part of ſpeech. But he condemns the ſubdiviſion of particles into *declinable* and *indeclinable*, and propoſes to divide them into *ſeparate* and *inſeparable*.

In my opinion neither of theſe diſtributions is blameable in the grammar of a particular language, whoſe object is only to aſſiſt a learner of that language: but the one ſubdiviſion is juſt as *unphiloſophical* as the other. If the Particles are all merely Nouns or Verbs, they are equally ſo whether uſed ſeparately or not. The term *inſeparable*, inſtead of *not ſeparated*, is likewiſe juſtifiable in Schultens, who confined himſelf to a dead language; and who did not intend to conſider the nature of general ſpeech: for, in a dead language, authority is every thing; and thoſe words which cannot be found to have been uſed ſeparately

by

But my critics, who ſay that Schultens *ſuſpected*, in five lines farther impudently convert this *ſuſpicion* into a *Truth*, which they repreſent him as having demonſtrated or at leaſt aſſerted: and with equal effrontery they tell us, he applied it to the dead *languages*; and that I *applied* his *Truth* to thoſe which are called modern.

It is however of little conſequence to the reader from what quarter he may receive a diſcovered truth; or (if it be a diſcovery) whoſe name it may bear; nor do I feel the ſmalleſt anxiety on the ſubject. But bear with my infirmity, reader, if it be an infirmity.—The enemies of the *eſtabliſhed* civil liberties of my country have hunted me through life, without a ſingle perſonal charge againſt me through the whole courſe of my life; but barely becauſe I early deſcried their conſpiracy, and foreſaw and foretold the coming ſtorm, and have to the utmoſt of my power *legally* reſiſted their corrupt, tyrannical and fatal innovations and uſurpations: They have deſtroyed my fortunes: They have illegally barred and interdicted my uſefulneſs to myſelf, my family, my friends, and my country: They have tortured my body *: They have aimed at my life and honour:

* The antient legal and mild impriſonment of this country (mild both in manner and duration, compared to what we now ſee) was always held to be *Torture*

honour :—Can you wonder that, whilſt one of theſe critics takes a cowardly advantage (where I could make no defence) to brand me as an *acquitted Felon*; I am unwilling (where I can make a defence) that he ſhould, in conjunction with his anonymous aſſociate, exhibit me as a convicted plagiary and impoſtor? But no more of theſe cowardly aſſaſſins. I conſign them to the laſting contempt they have well earned, and which no future *Title* will ever be able to obliterate from the name of *Windham.*

It may however be uſeful to examine the objections to my explanation of UNLESS, ELSE, and LEST; which are to be found in pages 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 51, 52, 53, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, of the Criticiſms on the Diverſions of Purley.

Four inſtances are produced, and only four, in which it is contended that my ſolution cannot be admitted.

Torture and even *civil death.* What would our old, honeſt, uncorrupted lawyers and judges (to whom and to the law of the land the word CLOSE was in abhorrence) what would they have ſaid to *ſeven months* of CLOSE cuſtody, ſuch as I have lately ſuffered, without a charge, without a legal authority (for their own monſtrous law, which arbitrarily ſuſpended the Habeas Corpus, did not authorize CLOSE cuſtody) and without even the moſt flimſy pretence of any occaſion for it?

"I have already obſerved" (ſay the Critics, page 53.) "that it [Aleſan] is not ſuſceptible of the ſignification "you have all along affixed to it as its primary one; but "let us ſuppoſe it to ſignify *Diſmiſs*, and nothing beſides; "we ſhall find many phraſes in which ELSE will hardly "bear to be reſolved into *Hoc diſmiſſo* *: witneſs the fol-"lowing, *Nothing elſe. How elſe. What elſe. Where elſe.*"

To have a proof of the ſolidity or futility of this objection, we muſt have compleat ſentences.

EXAMPLE I. *Nothing* ELSE.

You ſhall have a fool's cap for your pains; and *Nothing* ELSE.

RESOLUTION.

You ſhall have a fool's cap for your pains; and *Nothing* BUT a fool's cap.

i. e. BUT for *Be-out*.

You ſhall have a fool's cap for your pains; and *Nothing* EXCEPT a fool's cap.

* I have ſaid that ELSE is the Imperative of Aleſan, and means *Dimitte*, but they give what they pleaſe as my words.

You ſhall have a fool's cap for your pains; and, IF NOT a fool's cap, *Nothing*.

You ſhall have a fool's cap for your pains; and, DISMISS the fool's cap, *Nothing*.

EXAMPLE 2. *How* ELSE.

If a nation's liberties cannot be ſecured by a fair repreſentation of the people; *How* ELSE can they be ſecured?

RESOLUTION.

If a nation's liberties cannot be ſecured by a fair repreſentation of the people; WITHOUT it, *How* can they be ſecured? i. e. WITHOUT for *Be-out*.

If a nation's liberties cannot be ſecured by a fair repreſentation of the people; EXCEPT by a fair repreſentation of the people, *How* can they be ſecured?

If a nation's liberties cannot be ſecured by a fair repreſentation of the people; DISMISS it, (i. e. a fair repreſentation of the people) *How* can they be ſecured?

EXAMPLE 3. *What* ELSE.

You have ſhewn impotence and malice enough; *What* ELSE have you ſhewn?

RESOLUTION.

You have ſhewn impotence and malice enough; *What* have you ſhewn BUT impotence and malice? Or, *What* BUT them have you ſhewn?

You have ſhewn impotence and malice enough; EXCEPT them (i. e. impotence and malice) *What* have you ſhewn?

You have ſhewn impotence and malice enough; DISMISS them, *What* have you ſhewn?

EXAMPLE 4. *Where* ELSE.

Honour ſhould reſide in the breaſt of a king; although it might not be found any *Where* ELSE.

RESOLUTION.

Honour ſhould reſide in the breaſt of a king; although, EXCEPT in the breaſt of a king, it might not be found any *where*.

Honour ſhould reſide in the breaſt of a king; although, DISMISS (i. e. *Leave out*, *Take away*, &c.) the breaſt of a king, it might not be found any *where*.

Having thus, as I truſt, ſatisfactorily reſolved the only inſtances they have produced as irreconcileable with my etymology; I will proceed to conſider their other objections.

I.

They ſay—"The Latin, the Italian, the French, make "uſe here [that is, where the Engliſh uſe UNLESS] of the "word *Except*." Pag. 38.

The Latin commonly employs *Ni ſi*. i. e. *Ne ſit*, the negative preceding the verb: the Italian, *ſe non*, and the French, *ſi ne*. i. e. *Sit non*, *Sit ne*, the negative following the verb: Inſtances have been already given of the ſame conjunctive uſe of *Be not*, or *Be it not* in Engliſh. The Italians ſometimes uſe *In fuori*, *Senza che*; and, if they pleaſe, the participle *Eccetto*: the French alſo ſometimes uſe *Si non que*, *Si ce n'eſt que*, *A moins que*, *A moins de*; and, if they pleaſe, the imperative *Exceptez*, or the participle *Excepté*. And any word or words directing SEPARATION (and none other) in our own, or in any other language, will always be equivalent to UNLESS. And, inſtead

ſtead of being an objection, I think this circumſtance ſtrongly enforces my etymology.

II.

" If there be ſuch a verb [as Onleȝan] in the Anglo-
" ſaxon, it muſt be the ſame as Onleȝon, a compound of
" On and Leȝan." Pag. 39.

Why it ſhould be doubted that there is any ſuch verb as Onleȝan in the Anglo-ſaxon, I cannot imagine; but if any one, beſide my critics, ſhould entertain ſuch a doubt, it may eaſily be removed by opening Lye's Anglo-ſaxon dictionary; where both Onleȝan and Onlyȝan will be found, with various references to the places where they are uſed. But that Onleȝon ſhould be preferred by the critics to Onleȝan, is truly extraordinary; An being the common termination of the Anglo-ſaxon Infinitives.

III.

" Leȝan in the Anglo-ſaxon does not ſignify to *Diſmiſs*.
" Leȝan in its primary ſignification, means to *unbind*; in
" its ſecondary, to *redeem*, to *unload*, to *ſet at liberty*.
" Solvere, redimere, liberare, ſays the dictionary. In the
" firſt ſenſe it anſwers to the Engliſh, to *Looſen*, i. e. to
" *make looſe*." Pag. 39.

" It is poſſible that LES ſhould be the Imperative of " Leſan; but LESS can have no pretenſions to it." Pag. 40.

" No ſooner has the imperative of the Anglo-ſaxon verb " Leſan ſhewn itſelf with you in one form, than it ap- " pears in another. In the very next article to that we " are upon here, you ſuppoſe it to be, not LES but LEAS. " But it will be ſaid, how can Leaſ be the imperative of " Leſan?—Certain it is, that the verb Leſan is here all " of a ſudden transformed into Leoſan, in conſequence of " which its alliance with the affix Leaſ becomes unqueſtion- " able. But Leoſan ſignifies *perdere*, and is the ſame verb " with the Engliſh to *Loſe*." Pag. 41.

If the reader will caſt his eye over the following column, he will find that no transformation has been ſuddenly made by me; and that the alteration of a letter in the ſpelling of LES, LESS and LEAS, will be no reaſonable objection to the etymology.

ᚪᚪᚿᛊᚷᚪᚿ. M. Goth. Imperat. ᚪᚪᚿᛊ.
Loſigan
Loſian
Loeſian
Leoſian.

Leoſan.

Leoꝛan - - - - Imperat. Læꝛ.
Leꝛan - - - - Imperat. Leꝛ, Leꝛꝛ, Leꝛꝛe.
Liꝛan
Lÿꝛan
Ā-leꝛan - - - Imperat. Āleꝛ.
Ā-liꝛan
A-lÿꝛan
ꝓop-leoꝛan
ꝓop-lÿꝛan
On-leꝛan - - - Imperat. Onleꝛ.
On-lÿꝛan.

Under all theſe ſhapes this word appears in the Anglo-ſaxon language: for I take them all to be one and the ſame verb, differently pronounced, and therefore differently ſpelled. And from this Gothic and Anglo-ſaxon verb, I imagine, proceed not only the conjunctions, as they are called, UNLESS, ELSE, and LEST, and the privative termination LESS, together with LESS the adjective, as it is called, and the comparative LESS, and the ſuperlative LEAST; but alſo

To *Loſe* - - - *Loſt*. A *Loſs*.
To *Looſe* - - - *Looſe*.
To *Un-looſe*
To *Looſen*

To

To *Un-looſen*
To *Leſſen*
To *Leaſe* - - - A *Leaſe*
To *Re-leaſe* - - A *Releaſe*, A *Leaſe* and *Releaſe*.
To go a *Leaſing* *.

And however this word (for they are all one) may be now differently ſpelled, and differently uſed and applied in modern Engliſh; the reader will eaſily perceive that SEPARATION is always invariably ſignified in every uſe and application of it †.

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* *Leaſing*, i. e. *Looſing*, i. e. picking up that which is *Looſe* (i. e. *Looſed*) ſeparate (i. e. *ſeparated*) or detached (*detaché*) from the ſheaf (*a*).

† ——— Clavumque affixus et hærens
Nuſquam *A-mittebat*. *Æneis. Lib.* 5.

He never *ſent from* his hand. He never *parted* with. He never *miſſed* his hold. He never *let go* his hold. He never *loſt* his hold. He never *looſed* his hold. He never *let go*.

(*a*) SHEAF (A. S. ſceaf. Dutch Schoof) which we call a ſubſtantive, is no other than the paſt participle ſceaf (or ſceafod) from the verb ſcufan; which paſt participle in modern Engliſh we write *ſhove* (or *ſhoved*). *Sheaf* means, that which is *ſhov'd* together. N. B. The paſt participle in the Anglo-ſaxon is uſually formed by adding od (which we now write ed) to the præterperfect; but the præterperfect itſelf is often uſed (both in Anglo-ſaxon and in Engliſh) for the paſt participle, without the termination od or *ed*. Now the præterperfect of ſcufan is ſceaf.

SHAFT (A. S. ſceaft) which ſeems to us ſo different a word from *Sheaf*, is yet no other than the ſame paſt participle ſceafod, ſceafd, ſceaft. *Shaft* means that which is *ſhov'd*.

I will

I will give a few inſtances, out of very many, to ſhew how variouſly our old Engliſh writers ſpelled and uſed this ſame word.

" Pardoun and life to thir teris gif we,
(Quod Priamus) and mercy grantis fre.
And firſt of all the mannakillis and hard bandis
Chargeit he Lous of this ilk mannis handis.
——— Bot than the tothir wicht,
Full weil inſtrukkit of Grekis art and ſlicht,
LOUSIT and laitlye fred of all his bandis,
Unto the ſternis heuit up his handis."

Douglas. Booke 2. *Pag.* 43.

" Bewalit thair feris LOSIT on the flude."

Booke 1. *Pag.* 19.

" That we thy blud, thy kinrent, and ofspring
Has LOSIT oure ſchippis."

Booke 1. *Pag.* 20.

" The grete LOIS of Anchiſes regreting ſare,
And altogidir gan to wepe and rare."

Booke 5. *Pag.* 148.

" For neuir ſyne with ene ſaw I her eft,
Nor neuer abak, fra ſche was LOIST or reft,
Blent I agane."

Booke 2. *Pag.* 63.

" His nauy LOIST reparellit I but fale,
And his feris fred from the deith alhale."

Booke 4. *Pag.* 112.

" Bewaland

" Bewaland gretelye in his mynde penſife,
For that his freynd was fall, and LOIST his life."

Booke 5. *Pag.* 157.

" Deſiſt, Drances, be not abaſit, I pray,
For thou ſall neuer LEIS, ſchortlie I the ſay,
Be my wappin nor this rycht hand of myne
Sic any peuiſhe and cative ſaule as thine."

Booke 11. *Pag.* 377.

" But yet LESSE thou do worſe, take a wyſe
Bet is to wedde, than brenne in worſe wyſe."

Dreame of Chaucer. Fol. 259. *Pag.* 2. *Col.* 2.

" And on his way than is he forthe yfare
In hope to ben LESSED of his care."

Chaucer. Frankeleyns Tale. Fol. 54. *Pag.* 1. *Col.* 1.

" Now let us ſtynt of Troylus a ſtounde
That fareth lyke a man, that hurt is ſore
And is ſom dele of akyng of his wounde
YLESSED well, but heled no dele more."

Troylus. Boke 1. *Fol.* 163. *Pag.* 1. *Col.* 1.

" And gladly LESE his owne right,
To make an other LESE his."

Gower. Lib. 2. *Fol.* 28. *Pag.* 2. *Col.* 2.

" Lo wherof ſorcerie ſerueth.
Through ſorcerie his loue he cheſe
Through ſorcerie his life he LESE."

Lib. 5. *Fol.* 137. *Pag.* 1. *Col.* 1.

" For unto loues werke on night
Hym lacketh both will and might.
No wondre is in luſtie place
Of loue though he LESE grace."

Lib. 7. *Fol.* 143. *Pag.* 1. *Col.* 2.

" It fit a man by wey of kynde
To loue, but it is not kinde,
A man for loue his wit to LESE."

Lib. 7. *Fol.* 167. *Pag.* 1. *Col.* 2.

" Wyne maketh a man to LESE wretchedly
His mynde, and his lymmes euery chone."

Chaucer. Sompners Tale. Fol. 44. *Pag.* 1. *Col.* 1.

" There may nothing, ſo God my ſoule ſaue,
Lykyng to you, that may diſpleſe me
Ne I deſire nothyng for to haue
Ne dred for to LESE, ſaue onely ye."

Clerke of Oxenfordes Tale. Fol. 48. *Pag.* 1. *Col.* 1.

" Him neded none helpe, if he ne had no money that " he myght LESE."

Boecius. Boke 3. *Fol.* 233. *Pag.* 1. *Col.* 1.

" Al ſhulde I dye, I wol her herte ſeche
I ſhal no more LESEN but my ſpeche."

Troylus. Boke 5. *Fol.* 194. *Pag.* 2. *Col.* 2.

" If it ſo be that thou art myghtye ouer thy ſelfe, that " is to ſayne, by tranquyllyte of thy ſoule, than haſte thou " thynge in thy power, that thou noldeſt neuer LESEN."

Boecius. Boke 2. *Fol.* 227. *Pag.* 2. *Col.* 2.

" The maiſter LESETH his tyme to lere
Whan the diſciple wol not here."

Romaunt of the Roſe. Fol. 130. *Page* 1. *Col.* 2.

" Ha, how grete harme, and ſkaith for euermare
That child has caucht, throw LESING of his moder."

Douglas. Booke 3. *Pag.* 79.

IV.

IV.

" Skinner, Minſhew and Johnſon agree in deriving it " [ELSE] from the Greek αλλως or the Latin *alias*. There " is indeed as much reaſon to ſuppoſe that the Greeks and " Latins borrowed the word from the Germans, as that " theſe borrowed it from them.—AL and EL may be ſaid " to convey the *ſame idea* as the Greek αλλως and the Latin " *alias*; and, if ſo, why ſhould we have recourſe to the " verb Ālefan to find their origin?" Pag. 52.

This is truly curious: ELSE from αλλως or *alias*; although there is as much reaſon to ſuppoſe that the Greeks and Latins borrowed the word from the Germans, as that theſe borrowed it from them.

But AL and EL convey the *ſame idea* as αλλως and *alias*: —What is that idea? This is a queſtion which my critics never aſk themſelves; and yet it is the only rational object of etymology. Theſe gentlemen ſeem to think that *tranſlation* is *explanation*. Nor have they ever yet ventured to aſk themſelves, what they mean; when they ſay that any word *comes* from, is *derived* from, *produced* from, *originates* from, or *gives birth* to, any other word. Their ignorance and idleneſs make them contented with this vague and miſapplied metaphorical language: and if we ſhould beg

them to conſider that words have no *loco-motive* faculty, that they do not *flow* like rivers, nor *vegetate* like plants, nor *ſpiculate* like ſalts, nor are *generated* like animals; they would ſay, we quibbled with them; and might perhaps in their fury be tempted to exert againſt us "a *vigour* "*beyond the law.*" And yet, untill they can get rid of theſe metaphors from their *minds*, they will not themſelves be fit for etymology, nor furniſh any etymology fit for reaſonable men.

V.

"As there is an equivalent in the French of the word "UNLESS, very much reſembling it in turn, it is ſome-"what extraordinary that it ſhould never have occurred to "you, that poſſibly the one is a tranſlation, or at leaſt an "imitation of the other. This equivalent is À moins que. "What word more likely to have *given birth* to UNLESS; "if we may ſuppoſe the latter to be a compound of ON "and LESS." Pag. 39.

"You add in a note"—"It is the ſame imperative LES, "placed at the end of nouns and coaleſcing with them, "which has given to our language ſuch adjectives as "Hopeleſs, Reſtleſs, &c."—"Theſe words have been "all along conſidered as compounds of *Hope*, *Reſt*, &c.

" and the adjective Leſs, Anglo-ſaxon Leaſ, and Dutch " Loos: and this explanation is ſo *natural*, ſo clear and " ſatisfactory, that it is inconceivable how a man, who " has any notion of neatneſs and conſiſtency in etymo- " logical diſquiſitions, could ever think of their being " compounds of a noun, and the imperative of the verb " Leſan. LEAS and Loos are ſtill extant, this in the " Dutch, and that in the Anglo-ſaxon language: and both " *anſwer* to the Latin *ſolutus* in this phraſe *ſolutus cura*.

—" Multa adjectiva formantur ex ſubſtantivis addendo " *affixum negativum* Leaſ vel Leaſe. Hinc apud nos " *careleſſe*, &c. Sciendum vero eſt Leaſ Anglo-ſaxonicum " deduci a M. Gothico *Laus*, quod ſignificat *liber*, ſolutus, " *vacuus*, et in compoſitione *privationem* vel *defectum* de- " notat. Hickes. A. S. Gram. Pag. 42.

" Dr. Johnſon gives us, in his dictionary, the following " *deduction* of the word LEST;—" LEST, conjunction from " the adjective LEAST, *That not*." Pag. 70. " Your im- " provement upon Dr. Johnſon is, *Lezed* * *that*, i. e. *Hoc* " *Dimiſſo*.

* " *Lezed*."—They miſrepreſent my words juſt as it ſuits their purpoſe. I have ſaid LESED, not LEZED. They have not introduced the z here by accident; for the change is important to the etymology. We could never arrive

" *Dimiſſo.* Is it not aſtoniſhing that a man ſhould plume " himſelf on having ſubſtituted this ſtrange and far-fetched " manner of ſpeaking, for the eaſy and *natural* explana- " tion which precedes?" Pag. 71.

" LEST, in the ſenſe of *That not*, or the *Ne* emphati- " cum of the Latin, is generally written in the ancient " language thus, LÆST. And as Læſ is uſed alſo in the " Anglo-ſaxon for the comparative of lytel, parvus, it is " evident that þ læſ anſwers to the modern THE, or THAT " LESS. þ Læſt, to THAT LEAST, ſupple, OF ALL " THINGS." Pag. 72.

I may anſwer them in the language of Shakeſpeare,

> ——" merely ye are death's fools;
> For him ye labour by your flight to ſhun,
> And yet run toward him ſtill."

They contend that the conjunction UNLESS, and the privative termination LESS, come from the adjective LESS; and the conjunction LEST, from the ſuperlative LEAST. Well: And what *is* the adjective LESS? What *is* the com-

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arrive at LEST from LEZED: for (when the vowel between them is removed) z muſt be followed by D in pronunciation, as s by T.—Take the word *Greaſed* for an inſtance: if you remove the vowel, you muſt either pronounce it *Greaz'd*, or *Greas't*.

parative

parative LESS? and what *is* the ſuperlative LEAST? I ſay, *What are* they? for that is the rational etymological queſtion; and not, whence do they *come*.—It is with words as with men: Call this Squire, my Lord; then he will be comparative: Call him by the new-fangled title of Marquis, or call him Duke; then he will be ſuperlative: And yet whoſoever ſhall truſt him, or have to do with him, will find to their coſt that it is the ſame individual Squire Windham ſtill. So neither is the ſubſtance or meaning or real import or value of any word altered by its grammatical claſs and denomination.

The adjective *Leſs* and the comparative *Leſs* * are the imperative of Leran; and the ſuperlative *Leaſt* is the paſt participle.

The idle objections of theſe critics have brought me to mention this etymology out of its due courſe: and I do not intend to purſue its conſequences in this place. But the reader will ſee at once the force of this adjective, as uſed by our anceſtors, when, inſtead of *nineteen* and *eighteen*,

* Parvum—Comparative Minus. Little or Small—Comparative Leſs.

The reader will not be ſurpriſed at the irregularity (as it is called) of the above compariſons, when he conſiders the real meaning and import of *Minus* and *Leſs*.

they ſaid, An læf tpentig—Tpa læf tpentig. i. e. Twenty, *Diſmiſs* (or *Take away*) one. Twenty, *Diſmiſs* (or *Take away*) two. We alſo ſay,—" He demanded twenty: I gave him two *Leſs*." i. e. I gave him twenty, *Diſmiſs* two. The ſame method of *reſolution* takes place, when we ſpeak of any other quantity beſides bare numbers: nor can any inſtance of the uſe of *Leſs* or *Leaſt* be found in the language, where the ſignification of *Diſmiſſing*, *ſeparating*, or *Taking away*, is not conveyed.

VI.

" LEST for LESED, ſay you, as BLEST for BLESSED.—
" This is the whole of what you tender for our deference
" to your opinion: and ſmall as the conſideration is, it is
" made up of bad coin. LESAN and BLESSIAN cannot,
" whatever you may think of the matter, be coupled to-
" gether, as belonging to one and the ſame order of verbs;
" the one has a ſingle, the other a double conſonant before
" the termination of the infinitive mood: that forms a
" long, this a ſhort ſyllable in the participle paſſive; and
" conſequently, though the latter will bear the contraction,
" it does not follow that the former will bear it likewiſe.
" And thus much for the bad coin with which you at-
" tempt to put us off." Pag. 68.

The

The change of the terminating D to T in the paſt participles (or in any other words) does not depend either upon ſingle or double conſonants, or upon the length or ſhortneſs of the ſyllables; but ſingly upon the *ſound* of the conſonant which precedes it. There is an anatomical reaſon and neceſſity for it, which I have explained in pages 130 and 402 of the firſt edition of this volume. But, without the reaſon, and without the explanation, the facts are ſo notorious and ſo conſtantly in repetition, that they had only to open their eyes or their ears to avoid ſo palpable an abſurdity as this rule about double conſonants and long ſyllables, which they have, for the firſt time, conjured up. What then; Should I not ſpeak common Engliſh, if I ſhould ſay to Mr. Windham,

" Thou haſt *Fac't* many things;
" Face not me."

" You have *Fleec't* the people, and *Splic't* a rope for your " own neck."

Here are no double conſonants; and there are long ſyllables. But, if they will not believe their eyes and their ears, let them try their own organs of ſpeech; and they will find, that without a vowel between S and D (or an interval equal to the time of a vowel) they cannot follow

the ſound s with the audible ſound ᴅ; and that, if they will *terminate* with ᴅ, they muſt change the preceding s to a z. All this would be equally true of the *ſound*, even if the ſpelling had always continued with a ᴅ, and that no writer had ever conformed his orthography to the pronunciation *. But we have very numerous written authorities to dumbfound theſe critics †. I ſhall give them but two; believing they are two more than they wiſh to ſee.

" None other wiſe negligent
Than I you ſaie, haue I not bee.
In good ſeith ſonne wel me quemeth,
That thou thy ſelfe haſt thus acquite
Toward this, in whiche no wight
Abide maie, for in an houre
He LEST all that he maie laboure
The longe yere."

Gower. de Conf. Aman. Fol. 68. *Pag.* 1. *Col.* 2.

" In the towne of Stafforde was, (William of Cantorbury " ſaith, Ihon Capgraue confirminge the fame) a luſtye " minion, a trulle for the nonce, a pece for a prince, with

* Ða halgan ꝑaule ꝑꝓam ðam benðum ðæꝛ lichoman onlÿꝛðe. *Bed.* 3. 8. Onlÿꝛðe inſtead of onlÿꝛeð; the e being removed from between the ꝛ and ð, this word muſt be pronounced onlÿꝛꝛe.—" D literam ratio poſcit, aures " magis audiunt s."

† Satis hoc potuit admonendi gratia dixiſſe, præter agreſtes quoſdam et indomitos certatores, qui niſi auctoritatibus adhibitis non comprimuntur.

" whome

" whome by report, the kinge at times was very familiare.
" Betwixte this wanton damſel or primeroſe pearleſſe and
" Becket the chancellor, wente ſtore of preſentes, and of
" loue tokens plenty, and alſo the louers met at times, for
" when he reſorted thidre, at no place would he be hoſted
" and lodged, but wher as ſhe held reſidence. In the
" dedde tyme of the night (the ſtorye ſaithe) was it her
" generall cuſtome, to come alone to his bedchambre with
" a candle in her hand, to toy and trifle with him. Men
" are not ſo foliſh, but they can wel conceiue, what
" chaſtity was obſerued in thoſe prety, nice, and wanton
" metinges. But they ſay, he ſore amended whan he was
" once conſecrated archbiſhop of Cantorbury, and LEAST *
" well his accuſtomed enbracinges after the rules of loue,
" and became in life relygious, that afore in loue was
" lecherous."

Iohn Bale. Actes of Engliſh Votaries.
Dedicated to kyng Edwarde the ſyxte. 1550.

SINCE.

SINCE is a very corrupt abbreviation; confounding together different words and different combinations of words:

* He *diſpoſſed.* He *put away.* He *relinquiſhed.*

and is therefore in modern Engliſh improperly made (like BUT) to ſerve purpoſes which no one word in any other language can anſwer; becauſe the ſame accidental corruptions, ariſing from ſimilarity of ſound, have not happened in the correſpondent words of any other language.

Where we now employ SINCE was formerly (according to its reſpective ſignification) uſed,

Sometimes,

1. Seoððan, Sioððan, Seððan, Siððan, Siððen, Sithen, Sithence, Sithens, Sithnes, Sithns:

Sometimes,

2. Syne, Sine, Sene, Sen, Syn, Sin:

Sometimes,

3. Seand, Seeing, Seeing that, Seeing as, Sens, Senſe, Sence.

Sometimes,

4. Siððe, Sið, Sithe, Sith, Seen that, Seen as, Sens, Senſe, Sence.

Accordingly SINCE in modern Engliſh, is uſed four ways. Two, as a prepoſition; connecting (or rather

affecting) words: and Two, as a Conjunction; *affecting* ſentences *.

When uſed as a prepoſition, it has always the ſignification either of the paſt participle *Seen* joined to *thence*, (that is, *ſeen and thenceforward:*)—or elſe it has the ſignification of the paſt Participle *ſeen* only.

When uſed as a Conjunction, it has ſometimes the ſignification of the preſent participle *Seeing*, or *Seeing that*; and ſometimes the ſignification of the paſt participle *Seen*, or *Seen that*.

As a Prepoſition,

1. SINCE (for Sibban, Sithence, or Seen *and thenceforward*) as,

"*Such a ſyſtem of Government, as the preſent, has not* "*been ventured on by any King* SINCE *the expulſion of* "*James the Second.*"

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* It is likewiſe uſed adverbially: as when we ſay—It is a year SINCE: i. e. a year SEEN.

In French—*une année paſſée.*
In Italian—*un anno fa:* i. e. *fatto.*

2. SINCE

2. SINCE (for Syne, Sene, or Seen) as,

" *Did George the Third reign before or* SINCE *that* " *example?*"

As a Conjunction,

3. SINCE (for Seand, Seeing, Seeing as, or Seeing that:) as,

" *If I ſhould labour for any other ſatisfaction, but that* " *of my own mind, it would be an Effect of phrenzy in me,* " *not of hope;* SINCE *it is not Truth, but Opinion that can* " *travel the world without a paſſport.*"

4. SINCE (for Sidde, Sith, Seen as, or Seen that); as,

" SINCE *Death in the end takes from all, whatſoever* " *Fortune or Force takes from any one; it were a fooliſh* " *madneſs in the ſhipwreck of worldly things, where all* " *ſinks but the ſorrow, to ſave that* *."

Junius ſays,—" SINCE *that Time,* exinde. Contractum " eſt ex Angl. *Sith thence,* q. d. ſerò poſt: ut *Sith* illud

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* *Vû*, the French paſt participle of *Voir*, to *See*, is uſed in the ſame conjunctive manner in that language.

" Dis nous pourquoi Dieu l' a permis,
Veu qu'il paroit de ſes amis?"

" originem

" originem traxerit ex illo ſeiþn, Serò; Quod habet Arg. " Cod."

Skinner ſays,—" SINCE, a Teut. Sint Belg. Sind. " Poſt, Poſtea, Poſtquam. Doct. Th. H. putat deflexum " à noſtro *Sithence*. Non abſurdum etiam eſſet declinare " à Lat. *Exhinc*, E & H abjectis, & X facillimâ mutatione " in S tranſeunte." Again he ſays,—" SITH ab A. S. " Siððan, Syððan. Belg. Sedt, Sint. Poſt, Poſt illa, Poſtea."

After the explanation I have given, I ſuppoſe it unneceſſary to point out the particular errors of the above derivations.

Sithence and *Sith*, though now obſolete, continued in good uſe down even to the time of the Stuarts.

Hooker in his writings uſes *Sithence*, *Sith*, *Seeing*, and *Since*. The two former he always properly diſtinguiſhes; uſing *Sithence* for the true import of the Anglo-Saxon Siððan, and *Sith* for the true import of the Anglo-Saxon Siððe. Which is the more extraordinary, becauſe authors of the firſt credit had very long before Hooker's time confounded them together; and thereby led the way for the

preſent indiſcriminate and corrupt uſe of SINCE in all the four caſes mentioned.

Seeing Hooker uſes ſometimes, perhaps, (for it will admit a doubt *) improperly. And SINCE (according to the corrupt cuſtom which has now univerſally prevailed in the language) he uſes indifferently either for *Sithence*, *Seen*, *Seeing*, or *Sith*.

THAT.

There is ſomething ſo very ſingular in the uſe of this Conjunction, as it is called, that one ſhould think it would alone, if attended to, have been ſufficient to lead the Grammarians to a knowledge of moſt of the other conjunctions, as well as of itſelf. The uſe I mean is, that the conjunction THAT generally makes a part of, and keeps

* Such is the doubtful uſe of it by Shakeſpear in the following paſſage:

" Of all the wonders that I yet have heard,
It ſeems to me moſt ſtrange that men ſhould fear;
SEEING that death, a neceſſary end,
Will come when it will come."

For it may either be reſolved thus;—It ſeems ſtrange that men, SEEING that death will come when it will come, ſhould fear;

Or—Strange that men ſhould fear; it being SEEN that death will come when it will come.

company

company with moſt of the other conjunctions.—*If that, An that, Unleſs that, Though that, But that, Without that, Leſt that, Since that, Save that, Except that,* &c. is the conſtruction of moſt of the ſentences where any of thoſe conjunctions are uſed.

Is it not an obvious queſtion then, to aſk, why this conjunction alone ſhould be ſo peculiarly diſtinguiſhed from all the reſt of the ſame family? And why this alone ſhould be able to connect itſelf with, and indeed be uſually neceſſary to almoſt all the others? So neceſſary, that even when it is compounded with another conjunction, and drawn into it ſo as to become one word, (as it is with *ſith* and *ſince*) we are ſtill forced to employ again this neceſſary index, in order to precede, and ſo point out the ſentence which is to be affected by the other Conjunction?

B.

Ðe, in the Anglo-Saxon, meaning THAT, I can eaſily perceive that SITH (which is no other than the Anglo-Saxon Siððe) includes THAT. But when SINCE is (as you here conſider it) a corruption for *Seeing-as* and *Seen-as*; how does it then include THAT?—In ſhort what is AS? For I can gather no more from the Etymologiſts concern-

ing it, than that it is derived either from ὡς or from ALS*: But ſtill this explains nothing: for what ὡς is, or ALS, remains likewiſe a ſecret.

H.

The truth is that AS is alſo an article; and (however and whenever uſed in Engliſh) means the ſame as *It*, or *That*, or *Which*. In the German, where it ſtill *evidently* retains its original ſignification and uſe, (as ſo † alſo does) it is written—*Es*.

It

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* Junius ſays,—" As, *ut*, *ſicut*, Græcis eſt ὡς." Skinner, whom S. Johnſon follows, ſays—" AS a Teut. *Als*, ſicut; eliſo ſcil. propter eupho-" niam intermedio L."

† The German ſo and the Engliſh ſo (though in one language it is called an *Adverb* or *Conjunction*; and in the other. an *Article* or *Pronoun*) are yet both of them derived from the Gothic article SA, SR. And have in *both* languages retained the original meaning, viz. *It*, or *That*.

Mr. Tyrwhit indeed (not perceiving that *Al-es* and *Al-ſo* are different compounds) in a note on the Canterbury Tales, V. 7327. ſays—" Our " AS is the ſame with *Als*. Teut. and Sax. It is only a further corruption " of *Alſo*." But the *etymological* opinions of Mr. Tyrwhit (who derives *For the Nones* from *Pro nunc*) merit not the ſmalleſt attention.

Dr. Lowth, amongſt *ſome* falſe Engliſh which he has recommended, and *much* good Engliſh which he has reprobated, ſays—" So—AS, was uſed by " the

It does not come from *Als*; any more than *Though*, and *Be-it*, and *If* (or *Gif*), &c. come from *Although*, and *Albeit*, and

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" the writers of the laſt century, to expreſs a conſequence, inſtead of so— " THAT. Swift, I believe, is the laſt of our good writers who has fre- " quently uſed this manner of expreſſion. It ſeems *improper*, and is *de-* " *ſervedly* grown obſolete."

But Dr. Lowth, when he undertook to write his *Introduction*, with the beſt intention in the world, moſt aſſuredly ſinned againſt his better judgment. For he begins moſt judiciouſly, thus,—" Univerſal Grammar " explains the principles which are common to *All* languages. The " Grammar of any particular language *applies* thoſe common principles to " that particular language." And yet, with this clear truth before his eyes, he boldly proceeds to give a *particular* grammar; without being himſelf poſſeſſed of one ſingle principle of *Univerſal* Grammar. Again, he ſays,— " The connective parts of ſentences are the moſt important of all, and re- " quire the greateſt care and attention: for it is by theſe chiefly that the " train of thought, the courſe of reaſoning, and the whole progreſs of the " mind, in continued diſcourſe of all kinds, is laid open; and on the right " uſe of theſe, the perſpicuity, that is the firſt and greateſt beauty of ſtyle, " principally depends. Relatives and Conjunctions are the inſtruments of " connection in diſcourſe: it may be of uſe to point out ſome of the moſt " common inaccuracies that writers are apt to fall into with reſpect to them; " and a few examples of faults may perhaps be more inſtructive, than any " rules of propriety that can be given."

And again,—" I have been the more particular in noting the proper uſes " of theſe conjunctions, becauſe they occur very frequently; and, as it " was obſerved before of connective words in general, are of great im- " portance with reſpect to the clearneſs and beauty of ſtyle. I may add " too, becauſe miſtakes in the uſe of them are very common."

and *Algif*, &c.—For *Als*, in our old Engliſh is a contraction of *Al*, and *es* or *as*: and this *Al* (which in compariſons uſed to be very properly employed before the firſt *es* or *as*, but was not employed before the ſecond) we now, in modern Engliſh, ſuppreſs: As we have alſo done in numberleſs other inſtances; where *All* (though not improper) is not neceſſary.

Thus,

" She glides away under the foamy ſeas
" As ſwift AS Darts or feather'd arrows fly."

That is,

" She glides away (with) THAT ſwiftneſs, (with) WHICH feather'd
" arrows fly."

After which he proceeds to his examples of the proper and improper uſe of theſe connectives:—without having the moſt diſtant notion of the *meaning* of the words whoſe *employment* he undertakes to ſettle. The conſequence was unavoidable: that, (having no *reaſonable* rule to go by, and no apparent *ſignification* to direct him) he was compelled to truſt to his own *fanciful* taſte (*as in the beſt it is*), and the uncertain authority of others: and has conſequently approved and condemned without truth or reaſon. " Pour-
" quoi (ſays Girard) apres tant de ſiecles & tant d'ouvrages, les gens de
" Lettres ont-ils encore des idées ſi informes & des expreſſions ſi confuſes
" ſur ce qu'ils font profeſſion d'etudier & de traiter? Ou s'ils ne veulent
" pas prendre la peine d'approfondir la matiere, comment oſent-ils en
" donner des leçons au public? C'eſt ce que je ne conçois pas."

When

When in old Engliſh it is written,

" Sche———————
" Glidis away under the ſomy Seis
" Als ſwift as Ganze or fedderit arrow fleis."

Douglas. Booke 10. *Pag.* 323.

Then it means,

" With ALL THAT ſwiftneſs *with* WHICH, &c."

After what I have ſaid, you will ſee plainly why ſo many of the conjunctions may be uſed almoſt indifferently (or with a very little turn of expreſſion) for each other. And without my entering into the particular minutiæ in the uſe of each, you will eaſily account for the ſlight differences in the turn of expreſſion, ariſing from different cuſtomary abbreviations of *conſtruction*.

I will only give you one inſtance, and leave it with you for your entertainment: from which you will draw a variety of arguments and concluſions.

" And ſoft he ſighed, LEST men might him hear.
And ſoft he ſigh'd, THAT men might NOT him hear.
And ſoft he ſighed, ELSE men might him hear.
UNLESS he ſighed ſoft, men might him hear.
BUT that he ſighed ſoft, men might him hear.
WITHOUT he ſighed ſoft, men might him hear.
SAVE that he ſighed ſoft, men might him hear.
EXCEPT he ſighed ſoft, men might him hear.

OUTCEPT

OUTCEPT he ſighed ſoft, men might him hear.
OUT-TAKE he ſighed ſoft, men might him hear.
IF that he ſigh'd NOT ſoft, men might him hear.
And AN he ſigh'd NOT ſoft, men might him hear.
SET that he ſigh'd NOT ſoft, men might him hear.
PUT CASE he ſigh'd NOT ſoft, men might him hear.
BE IT he ſigh'd NOT ſoft, men might him hear.

B.

According to your account then, Lord Monboddo is extremely unfortunate in the particular care he has taken to make an exception from the general rule he lays down, of the Verbs being the *Parent* word of all language, and to caution the *candid* reader from imputing to him an opinion that the *conjunctions* were intended by him to be included in his rule, or have any connexion whatever with *Verbs* *.

H. In

* "This ſo copious derivation from the verb in Greek, naturally leads "one to ſuſpect that it is the *Parent* word of the whole language: and "indeed I believe that to be the fact: for I do not know that it can be "certainly ſhewn that there is any word that is undoubtedly a primitive, "which is not a *verb*; I mean a *verb* in the ſtricter ſenſe and common "acceptation of the word. By this the candid reader will not underſtand "that I mean to ſay that *prepoſitions*, *conjunctions*, and ſuch like words, "which are rather the *Pegs* and *Nails* that faſten the ſeveral parts of the "language together than the language itſelf, are derived from verbs or are "derivatives of any kind." Vol. II. Part 2. B. 1. Ch. 15.

Court

H.

In my opinion he is not leſs unfortunate in his *rule* than in his *exception*. They are both equally unfounded: and yet as well founded, as almoſt every other poſition which he has laid down in his two firſt volumes. The whole of which is perfectly worthy of that profound politician and philoſopher, who eſteems that to be the moſt perfect form, and as he calls it—"*the laſt ſtage of civil ſociety* *," where government leaves nothing to the free-will of individuals; but interferes with the domeſtic private lives of the citizens,

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Court de Gebelin is as poſitive in the contrary opinion,—"Il a fallu ne-
"ceſſairement," (ſays he) "que tous les autres mots vinſſent des noms.
"Il n'eſt aucun mot, de quelqu' eſpece que ce ſoit, & dans quelque langue
"que ce ſoit, qui ne deſcende d'un nom."—Hiſt. de la Parole, page 180.

* "But the *private* lives of the ſubjects under thoſe governments are
"left as much to the free will of each individual, and as little ſubjected to
"rule, as in the American Governments above mentioned: and every man
"in ſuch a ſtate may with impunity educate his children in the worſt
"manner poſſible; and may abuſe his own perſon and fortune as much as
"he pleaſes; provided he does no injury to his neighbours, nor attempts
"any thing againſt the ſtate. The *laſt* ſtage of civil ſociety, in which the
"progreſſion ends, is that moſt perfect form of polity which, to all the
"advantages of the Governments laſt mentioned, joins the care of the
"education of the youth, and of the private lives of the citizens; neither
"of which is left to the will and pleaſure of each individual; but both are
"regulated by PUBLIC WISDOM."—Vol. I. page 243.

and

and the education of their children! Such would in truth be the *laſt* ſtage of civil ſociety, in the ſenſe of the lady in the comedy; whoſe lover having offered—" to give " her the *laſt* proof of love and marry her."—She aptly replied, " The *laſt* indeed; for there's an end of loving."

B.

But what ſay you to the bitter irony with which Mr. Harris treats the moderns in the concluding note to his doctrine of Conjunctions? Where he ſays,—" It is ſome- " what ſurpriſing that the politeſt and moſt elegant of the " Attic writers, and Plato above all the reſt, ſhould have " their works filled with *Particles* of all kinds and with " *Conjunctions* in particular; while in the modern polite " works, as well of ourſelves as of our neighbours, ſcarce " ſuch a word as a *Particle* or *Conjunction* is to be found. " Is it that where there is connection in the meaning, " there muſt be words had to connect; but that where " the connection is little or none, ſuch connectives are of " little uſe? That houſes of cards without *cement* may " well anſwer their end; but not thoſe houſes where one " would chuſe to dwell? Is this the cauſe? Or have we " attained an elegance to the antients unknown?

" *Venimus ad ſummam fortunæ*, &c."

What will you ſay to Lord Monboddo, who holds the ſame opinion with Mr. Harris *?

II.

I ſay that a little more reflection and a great deal leſs reading, a little more attention to common ſenſe †, and leſs blind prejudice for his Greek commentators, would have made Mr. Harris a much better Grammarian, if not perhaps a Philoſopher.—What a ſtrange language is this to come from a man, who at the ſame time ſuppoſes theſe *Particles* and *Conjunctions* to be words *without meaning!* It ſhould ſeem, by this inſolent pleaſantry, that Mr. Harris reckons it the perfection of compoſition and diſcourſe to

* " This abundance of Conjunctions and Particles," (ſays he, Vol. II. page 179) " is, in my opinion, one of the greateſt beauties of the Greek " language, &c. For I am ſo far from thinking that that disjointed com- " poſition and ſhort cut of ſtyle, which is ſo much in faſhion at preſent, " and of which Tacitus among the ancients is the great model, is a beauty: " that I am of opinion it is the affectation of a deformity; nor is there, in " my apprehenſion, any thing that more disfigures a ſtyle, or makes it " more offenſive *to a man of true Taſte and Judgement in writing*, &c."

" I ſhall only add at preſent, that one of the greateſt difficulties of com- " poſing in Engliſh appears to me to be the *want* of ſuch connecting par- " ticles as the Greeks have, &c."

† The author would by no means be underſtood to allude to the COMMON SENSE of Doctors Oſwald, Reid, and Beattie; which appears to him to be ſh enonſenſe.

uſe a great many words *without meaning!*—If ſo, perhaps Maſter Slender's language would meet with this learned Gentleman's approbation.

" I keep *but* three men *and* a boy *yet*, *till* my mother " be dead; *but what though yet* I live a poor gentleman " born."

Now here is *cement* enough in proportion to the building. It is plain, however, that Shakeſpeare (a much better philoſopher by the bye than moſt of thoſe who have written philoſophical Treatiſes) was of a different opinion in this matter from Mr. Harris. He thought the beſt way to make his Zany talk unconnectedly and nonſenſically was to give him a quantity of theſe elegant words *without meaning* which are ſuch favourites with Mr. Harris and Lord Monboddo.

B.

This may be raillery perhaps, but I am ſure it is neither reaſoning nor authority. This inſtance does not affect Mr. Harris: for *All cement* is no more fit to make a firm building than no cement at all. Slender's diſcourſe might have been made equally as unconnected without any particles, as with ſo many particles together. It is the proper mix-

ture

ture of particles and other words which Mr. Harris would recommend; and he only cenſures the moderns for being too ſparing of Particles.

H.

Reaſoning! It diſdains to be employed about ſuch conceited nonſenſe, ſuch affected airs of ſuperiority and pretended *elegance*. Eſpecially when the whole foundation is falſe: for there are not any uſeful connectives in the Greek, which are not to be found in modern languages. But for his opinion concerning their employment, you ſhall have *authority*, if you pleaſe; Mr. Harris's favourite authority: an Antient, a Greek, and one too writing profeſſedly on Plato's opinions, and in defence of Plato; and which if Mr. Harris had not forgotten, I am perſuaded, he would not have contradicted.

Plutarch ſays—" Il n'y a ny Beſte, ny inſtrument, ny " armeure, ny autre choſe quelle qu'elle ſoit au monde, " qui par ablation ou privation d'une ſiene propre partie, " ſoit plus belle, plus active, ne plus doulce que paravant " elle n'eſtoit; là où l'oraiſon bien ſouvent, en eſtans les " *conjonctions toutes oſtées*, a une force & efficace plus " affectueuſe, plus active, & plus eſmouvante. C'eſt pour- " quoy ceulx qui eſcrivent des figures de Retorique louent

" & priſent grandement celle qu'ils appellent deliée; là " où ceulx qui ſont trop religieux & qui s' aſſubjettiſſent " trop aux regles de la grammaire, ſans ozer oſter une " ſeule conjonction de la commune façon de parler, en " ſont à bon droit blaſmez & repris; comme faiſans un " ſtile enervé, ſans aucune pointe d'affection, & qui laſſe " & donne peine à ouir," &c. *

I will give you another authority, which perhaps Mr. Harris may value more, becauſe I value it much leſs.

" Il n'y a rien encore qui donne plus de mouvement au " diſcours que d'en *ôter les liaiſons*. En effet, un diſcours " que rien ne lie & n'embaraſſe, marche & coule de ſoy- " même, & il s'en faut peu qu'il n'aille quelquefois plus " vite que la penſée même de l'orateur." Longinus then " gives three examples, from Xenophon, Homer, and De- " moſthenes; and concludes—" En egalant & applaniſſant " toutes choſes par le moyen de *liaiſons*, vous verrez que " d'un pathetique fort & violent vous tomberez dans une " petite affeterie de langage qui n'aura ni pointe ni eguil- " lon; & que toute la force de votre diſcours s'eteindra " auſſi-toſt d'elle-meſme. Et comme il eſt certain, que ſi

* Platonic Queſtions. Amyot's Tranſlation.

" on

" on lioit le corps d'un homme qui court, on lui feroit " perdre toute ſa force; de même ſi vous allez embarraſſer " une paſſion de ces *liaiſons* & de ces *particules inutiles*, " elle les ſouffre avec peine; vous lui otez la liberté de ſa " courſe, & cette impetuoſité qui la faiſoit marcher avec " la meſme violence qu' un trait lancé par une machine *."

Take one more authority, better than either of the foregoing on this ſubject.

" Partes orationis ſimiles nexu indigent, ut inter ſe " uniantur; & iſte vocatur *Conjunctio*, quæ definitur *vocula* " *indeclinabilis quæ partes orationis colligit.* Alii eam ſub- " intelligi malint, alii expreſsè & moleſtè repetunt: illud, " qui attentiores ſunt rebus; hoc, qui rigoroſius loquuntur. " Omittere ferè omnes conjunctiones Hiſpanorum aut " vitium aut character eſt. Plurimæ deſiderantur in Lu- " cano, plurimæ in Seneca, multæ in aliis authoribus. " Multas omitto; &, ſi meum genium ſequerer, ferè " omnes. Qui rem intelligit & argumentum penetrat, " percipit ſibi ipſis cohærere ſententias, nec egere parti- " culis ut connectantur: quod, ſi interſerantur voculæ

* Boileau's Tranſlation.

" connexivæ, ſcopæ diſſolutæ illæ ſunt; nec additis &
" multiplicatis conjunctionibus cohærere poterunt. Hinc
" patet quid debuiſſet reſponderi Caligulæ, Senecæ calamum
" vilipendenti. *Suetonius: Lenius comptiuſque ſcribendi*
" *genus adeò contempſit, ut Senecam, tum maxime placentem,*
" *commiſſiones meras componere,* & ARENAM SINE CALCE,
" *diceret.*"—" Caligulæ hoc judicium eſt, inquit Lipſius
" in judicio de Seneca; nempe illius qui cogitavit etiam
" de Homeri carminibus abolendis, itemque Virgilii & Titi
" Livii ſcriptis ex omnibus bibliothecis amovendis. Reſpon-
" deo igitur meum Senecam *non vulgo nec plebi ſcripſiſſe,*
" *nec omni viro docto, ſed illi qui attentè eum legeret. Et*
" *addo, ubi Lector mente Senecam ſequitur, ſenſum adſequi:*
" *nec inter ſententias, ſuo ſe prementes & conſolidantes*
" *pondere, conjunctionem majorem requiri.*"

CARAMUEL, cxlii.

And I hope theſe *authorities* (for I will offer no *argument* to a writer of his caſt) will ſatisfy the " *true taſte* " *and judgment in writing*" of Lord Monboddo; who with equal affectation and vanity has followed Mr. Harris in this particular: and who, though incapable of writing a ſentence of common Engliſh (*defuerunt enim illi & uſus pro duce & ratio pro ſuaſore*) ſincerely deplores the *decreaſe of*

*learning in England**; whilſt he really imagines that there is ſomething captivating in his own ſtyle, and has gratefully informed us to whoſe aſſiſtance we owe the obligation.

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* See Mr. Boſwell's Tour to the Hebrides, p. 473.

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ, &c.

CHAP. IX.

OF PREPOSITIONS.

B.

WELL, Sir, what you have hitherto ſaid of the Conjunctions will deſerve to be well conſidered. But we have not yet entirely done with them: for, you know, the Prepoſitions were originally, and for a long time, claſſed with the Conjunctions: and when firſt ſeparated from them, were only diſtinguiſhed by the name of *Prepoſitive Conjunctions* *.

H. Very

* The philoſophers of Hungary, Turkey and Georgia at leaſt were in no danger of falling into this abſurdity: for Dr. Jault, in his preface to (what is very improperly, though commonly, called) Menage's Dictionary, tells us—" Par le fréquent commerce que j'ai eu avec eux [*les Hongrois*] " pendant pluſieurs années, ayant tâché de pénétrer à fonds ce que ce " pouvoit être que cet idiôme ſi différent de tous les autres d' Europe, je " les ai convaincus qu'ils etoient Scythes d' origine, ou du moins que leur " langue étoit une des branches de la Scythique; puiſqu' à l' égard de " l'inflexion

H.

Very true, Sir. And theſe *Prepoſitive* conjunctions, once ſeparated from the others, ſoon gave birth to another ſubdiviſion *; and Grammarians were not aſhamed to have a claſs of *Poſtpoſitive Prepoſitives*.—" Dantur etiam *Poſt-*
" *poſitiones* (ſays Caramuel); quæ *Præpoſitiones poſtpoſitivæ*
" ſolent dici, nullâ vocabulorum repugnantiâ: vocantur
" enim *Præpoſitiones*, quia ſenſu ſaltem præponuntur; &
" *Poſtpoſitivæ*, quia vocaliter poſtponi debent."

B.

But as Mr. Harris ſtill ranks them with *Connectives*, this, I think, will be the proper place for their inveſtigation. And as the title of *Prepoſitive* or *Prepoſition* " *only expreſſes*
" *their place and not their character*; *their Definition*, *he*
" *ſays*, *will diſtinguiſh them from the former Connectives*." He therefore proceeds to give a *compleat* definition of them, viz.

" l' inflexion elle avoit rapport à celle des Turcs, qui conſtamment paſſoient
" pour Scythes, étant originaire du Turqueſtan, et de la Tranſoxiane; et
" qu' outre cela les PRÉPOSITIONS de ces deux langues, auſſi bien que de la
" Georgienne, ſe mettoient toujours *apres leur regime*, contre l' ordre de la
" nature et la ſignification de leur nom."

* Buonmattei has ſtill a farther ſubdiviſion; and has made a ſeparate part of ſpeech of the *Segnacaſi*.

—" *A Prepoſition is a part of ſpeech, devoid itſelf of* " *ſignification*; *but ſo formed as to unite two words that are* " *ſignificant, and that refuſe to coaleſce or unite of them-* " *ſelves.*"—Now I am curious to know, whether you will agree with Mr. Harris in his definition of this part of Speech; or whether you are determined to differ from him on every point.

H.

Till he agrees with himſelf, I think you ſhould not diſapprove of my differing from him; becauſe for this at leaſt I have his own reſpectable authority. Having defined a word to be a " *Sound ſignificant*;" he now defines a Prepoſition to be a word " *devoid of ſignification.*" And a few pages after, he ſays, " *Prepoſitions commonly transfuſe* " *ſomething of their own meaning into the word with which* " *they are compounded.*"

Now, if I agree with him that words are ſounds *ſignificant*; how can I agree that there are ſorts of words *devoid of ſignification?* And if I could ſuppoſe that Prepoſitions are *devoid of ſignification*; how could I afterwards allow that they transfuſe ſomething of *their own meaning?*

B.

This is the ſame objection repeated, which you made before to his definition of the *firſt* ſort of Connectives. But is it not otherwiſe a compleat definition?

H.

Mr. Harris no doubt intended it as ſuch: for, in a note on this paſſage, he endeavours to juſtify his doctrine by a citation from Apollonius *; which he calls "rather a de-"ſcriptive ſketch than a complete definition." But what he gives us in the place of it, as *compleat*, is neither definition nor even deſcription. It contains a *Negation* and an *Accident*; and nothing more. It tells us what the Preposition *is not*; and the *purpoſe* for which he ſuppoſes it to be *employed*. It might ſerve as well for a definition of the *Eaſt India Company*, as of a Prepoſition: for of that we may truly ſay—"It is not itſelf any part of the

* "Je n' entends pas trop bien le Grec, dit le Geant.
"Ni moi non plus, dit la Mite philoſophique.
"Pourquoi donc, reprit le Sirien, citez-vous un certain Ariſtote en "Grec?
"C'eſt, repliqua le Savant, qu'il faut bien citer ce qu'on ne comprend "point du tout, dans la langue qu'on entend le moins."
Voltaire. Micromeogas.

" Government, but ſo formed as to unite thoſe who would " not have coaleſced of themſelves *."—Poor Scaliger (who well knew what a definition ſhould be) from his own melancholy experience exclaimed—" *Nihil infelicius gram-* " *matico definitore !*" Mr. Harris's logical ignorance moſt happily deprived him of a ſenſe of his misfortunes. And ſo little, good man, did he dream of the danger of his ſituation; that whilſt all others were acknowledging their ſucceſsleſs though indefatigable labours, and lamenting their inſuperable difficulties, he prefaces his doctrine of *Connectives* with this ſingularly confident introduction;—" What remains of our work is a matter of leſs difficulty; " it being the ſame here as in ſome hiſtorical picture:

* Let the reader who has any ſenſe of juſtice, or who feels any anxiety for the welfare of his country, look back and re-conſider the corrupt uſe which one Coalition would have made of this company in the year 1783, and the corrupt uſe which another Coalition has made of it ſince. Let him then recall to his mind the parallel hiſtory of the Company of St. George, at the cloſe of the flouriſhing days of the Republic of Genoa; and, in ſpite of all outward appearances, he will eaſily be able to foretell the ſpeedy fate of this pilfered and annihilated body. Without any external ſhock, the ſure cauſe of its rapid deſtruction is in its preſent deſpotic and corrupt conſtitution: to the formation of which (and to no ſuppoſed delinquency nor perſonal enmity) that much injured man, Mr. Haſtings, was made the victim by all the corrupt parties in the kingdom.

" when

" when the principal figures are once formed, it is an *eaſy* " *labour* to deſign the reſt *."

B.

However contradictory and irregular all this may appear to you, Mr. Harris has advanced nothing more than what the moſt approved Greek and Latin Grammarians have de-

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* Such is the language, and ſuch are the definitions of him who, in this very chapter of the prepoſitions, has modeſtly given us the following note. —" And here I cannot but obſerve, that he who pretends to diſcuſs the " ſentiments of any one of theſe philoſophers, or even to cite and tranſlate " him (except in trite and obvious ſentences) without accurately knowing " the Greek tongue in general; the nice differences of many words appa- " rently ſynonymous; the peculiar ſtyle of the author whom he preſumes " to handle; the new coined words, and new ſignifications given to old " words uſed by ſuch author and his ſect; the whole philoſophy of ſuch " ſect, together with the connections and dependencies of its ſeveral parts, " whether *logical*, ethical or phyſical;—He, *I ſay*, that without this pre- " vious preparation, attempts *what I have ſaid*, will ſhoot in the dark; " will be liable to perpetual blunders; will explain and praiſe, and cenſure " merely by chance; and though he may poſſibly to *fools* appear as a wiſe " man, will certainly among the wiſe ever paſs for a *fool*. Such a man's " intellect comprehends antient philoſophy, as his eye comprehends a " diſtant proſpect. He may ſee, perhaps, enough to know mountains " from plains, and ſeas from woods; but for an accurate diſcernment of " particulars and their character, this, without farther helps, it is impoſſible " to attain."

livered down to him, and what modern Grammarians and Philoſophers have adopted *.

H. Yes.

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* " Præpoſitio ſeu adnomen, *per ſe non ſignificat*, niſi addatur nomi-
" nibus."——Campanella.

" Multas & varias hujus partis orationis definitiones invenio. Et præ
" cæteris arridet hæc.—Præpoſitio eſt vocula: modum quendam nominis
" *adſignificans*."———Caramuel.

" Ut omittam Particulas minores, cujuſmodi ſunt Præpoſitiones, Con-
" junctiones, Interjectiones, quæ *nullam habent cum nominibus affinitatem*."
J. C. Scaliger. de L. L. Cap. CXCII.

Even Hoogeveen who clearly ſaw—" Particulas in ſua *Infantia fuiſſe* vel verba vel nomina, vel ex nominibus formata adverbia;" yet gives the following account and *Definition* of them.

Primam, ut reliquarum, ita Græcæ quoque linguæ originem fuiſſe ſimpliciſſimam, ipſa natura ac ratio docent, primoſque ονομαθετας nomina, quibus res; et verba, quibus actiones exprimerent, *non vero Particulas inſtituiſſe*, probabile eſt. Certe, cum ex nominibus et verbis integra conſtet oratio, quorum hæc actiones et affectiones, illa perſonas agentes et patientes indicant; *Jure quæritur, an primæva lingua habuerit particulas.* Non utique neceſſariam, rem exprimendi, vim habere videntur, ſed *adſcititiam quandam*, et ſententias per nomina et verba expreſſas *variandi, ſtabiliendi, infirmandi, negandi, copulandi, disjungendi, imminuendi, affirmandi, limitandi*, multiſque modis afficiendi: *Ipſæ vero, quatenus particulæ, per ſe ſolæ ſpectatæ, nihil ſignificant.*—

Natura, inquam, ipſa docet, *Particulis antiquiora eſſe nomina et verba*, quia, obſervato rerum ordine, neceſſe eſt, res et actiones prius fuiſſe natas

et

H.

Yes. Yes. I know the errors are ancient enough, to have been long ago worn out and diſcarded. But I do not think that any excuſe for repeating them. For a much leſs degree of underſtanding is neceſſary to detect the erroneous principles of others, than to guard againſt thoſe which may be ſtarted for the firſt time by our own imagination. In theſe matters it ſhews leſs weakneſs of judgment, becauſe it is more eaſy, to deceive ourſelves, than to be deceived by others.

B.

You will do well, Sir, to be particularly mindful of what you ſaid laſt; and to place your ſtrongeſt guard there,

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et expreſſas, quam Particulas, quæ has vel conjungunt, vel disjungunt: priora ſunt jungenda jungentibus, firmanda firmantibus, limitanda limitantibus, et ſic deinceps. Neque mea hæc, neque nova eſt de particularum minus antiqua origine opinio: ſuffragantem habeo Plutarchum ad illam quæſtionem, quæ inter Platonicas poſtrema eſt.—" Cur Plato dixerit ora-" tionem ex nominibus et verbis miſceri". Ubi ait—" Probabile eſſe, " homines ab initio orationem diſtinguentium Particularum eguiſſe."—

" Dicamus ergo, *Particulam* eſſe voculam, ex nomine vel verbo *natam*, " quæ ſententiæ addita, aliquam ipſi paſſionem *affert*, et orationi *adminiculo* " eſt, et *officioſa miniſtra*. Miniſtram voco, quia, orationi non inſerta, ſed " per ſe poſita et ſolitaria, *nihil ſignificat*."

where

where it may be moſt wanted: for you ſeem ſufficiently determined not to be deceived by *others*. And with this caution, I ſhall be glad to hear your account of the Prepoſition. Perhaps I ſhall ſave time, at leaſt I ſhall ſooner ſatisfy myſelf, by aſking you a few queſtions.—Pray how many Prepoſitions are there?

H.

Taking the Philoſophy of language as it now ſtands, your queſtion is a very proper one. And yet you know, that Authors have never hitherto been agreed concerning their number. The ancient Greek Grammarians admitted only eighteen, (ſix monoſyllables and twelve diſſyllables). The ancient Latin Grammarians above fifty *. Though the moderns, Sanctius, Scioppius, Perizonius, Voſſius, and others, have endeavoured to leſſen the number without fixing it †.

Our countryman Wilkins thinks that thirty-ſix are ſufficient ‡.

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* Scotus determines them to be forty-nine.

† Sanctius ſays,—"Ex numero Præpoſitionum, quas Grammatici pertinaciter aſſerunt; aliquas ſuſtulimus."

‡ "There are thirty-ſix Prepoſitions which may, with much leſs equivocalneſs than is found in inſtituted languages, *ſuffice* to expreſs thoſe various reſpects which are to be ſignified by this kind of Particle."

Part 3. Chap. 3.

Girard

Girard ſays, that the French language has done the buſineſs effectually with thirty-two: and that he could not, with the utmoſt attention, diſcover any more *.

But the authors of the Encyclopedie [*Prepoſition*] though they alſo, as well as Girard, admit only *ſimple* Prepoſitions, have found in the ſame language, forty-eight.

And Buffier gives a liſt of ſeventy-five; and declares that there is a great number beſides, which he has not mentioned.

The greater part of authors have not ventured even to talk of any particular number: and of thoſe who have, (except in the Greek) no two authors have agreed in the

* "Quoique les rapports determinatifs qu'on peut mettre entre les choſes "ſoient variés & nombreux; le langage François a trouvé l'art d'en faire "enoncer la multitude & la diverſité des nuances, par un petit nombre de "mots: car l'examen du detail fait avec *toute l'attention dont je ſuis capable*, "ne m'en offre que trente deux de cette eſpéce.—Il m'a paru que les dic- "tionaires confondent quelquefois des Adverbes & même des Conjonctions "avec des Prepoſitions.—Je ne me ſuis jamais permis de ne rien avancer "ſans avoir fait un *examen profond & rigoreux*; me ſervant toujours de "l'analyſe & des regles de la plus exacte Logique pour reſoudre mes doutes, "& tacher de prendre la parti le plus vrai. *Je ne diſſimulerai pourtant pas, "que mes ſcrupules ont été frequents:* mais ma diſcuſſion a été attentive, & "mon travail opiniatre." Vrais Principes, Diſc. XI.

ſame language. Nor has any one author attributed the ſame number to any two different languages.

Now this diſcordance has by no means proceeded from any careleſſneſs or want of diligence in Grammatiſts or Lexicographers: but the truth is, that the fault lies with the Philoſophers: for though they have pretended to teach others, they have none of them known themſelves what the nature of a Prepoſition is. And how is it poſſible that Grammarians ſhould agree, what words ought or ought not to be referred to a claſs which was not itſelf aſcertained. Yet had any of the definitions or accounts yet given of the Prepoſition and of language been juſt, two conſequences would immediately have followed; viz. That all men would have certainly known the preciſe number of Prepoſitions; and (unleſs Things, or the operations of the human mind, were different in different ages and climates) their number in all languages muſt have been always the ſame.

B.

You mean then now at laſt, I ſuppoſe, to fix the number of real Prepoſitions in our own, and therefore in all other languages.

H. Very

H.

Very far from it. I mean on the contrary to account for their variety. And I will venture to lay it down as a rule, that, of different languages, the leaſt corrupt will have the feweſt Prepoſitions: and, in the ſame language, the beſt etymologiſts will acknowledge the feweſt. And (if you are not already aware of it) I hope the reaſon of the rule will appear in the ſequel.

There is not, for inſtance, (as far as I am aware) a prepoſition in any language, anſwering directly to the French prepoſition CHEZ *. Yet does it by no means follow, that the modern French do therefore employ any operation of the mind, or put their minds into any poſture different from their anceſtors or from other nations; but only that

* In the ſame manner *Temoin* and *Moyennant* are prepoſitions peculiar alſo to the French, but which require no explanation: becauſe the *Subſtantive* Temoin, and the *Participle* Moyennant, are not confined to their *prepoſitive* employment alone (or, as in the Latin it is termed, put *abſolutely*), but are uſed upon all other common occaſions where thoſe denominations are wanted; and their ſignification is therefore evident. MOIENING was antiently uſed in Engliſh.—" At whoſe inſtigacion and ſtiring I (Robert Copland) have me " applied, *Moiening* the helpe of God, to reduce and tranſlate it." (See *Ames's Hiſtory of Printing*; or ſee *Percy's Reliques*, Vol. II. p. 273.) Had the uſe of this word continued in our language, it would certainly have been ranked amongſt the prepoſitions; and we ſhould conſequently have been conſidered as exerting one *operation of the mind* more than we do at preſent.

there happens not to be in any other language a ſimilar corruption of ſome word correſponding preciſely with CHEZ. Which is merely a corruption of the Italian ſubſtantive CASA *: in the ſame manner as *Choſe* is from *Coſa*; or as *Cheval*,

* Though the bulk of the French language is manifeſtly a corrupt derivation from the Italian, yet, as Scaliger obſerved of the Romans—" Aliqui " autem, inter quos Varro, etiam malignè eruerunt omnia è Latinis, Græ- " ciſque ſuas origines invidere:" So have the French, in all former times, ſhewn a narrow jealouſy and envy towards Italy, its authors, and language: to which however they originally owe every thing valuable which they poſſeſs. From this ſpirit Henri Eſtiene, *De la precellence du langage François*, (a book of ill-founded vanity, blind prejudice and partiality) aſſerts that the Italians have taken—" la bande des mots qu'on appelle *indeclinables*; " comme ſont *Adverbes*, *Conjonctions*, & *autres particules*" from the French: and amongſt others he mentions, *ſe*, *ſe non*, *che*, *ma*, and *Senza*. But I ſhall hereafter have occaſion to ſhew clearly the injuſtice of Henry Eſtiene to the Italian language, when I come to compare the reſpective advantages and diſadvantages of the modern languages of Europe, and whence they flow. In the mean time it may not perhaps be improper to offer a general rule, by which (when applicable) all etymological diſputants ought to be determined, whether ſuch determination be favourable or adverſe to their national vanity and prejudice. Viz. That where different languages uſe the ſame or a ſimilar *particle*, that language ought to be conſidered as its legitimate parent, in which the true meaning of the word can be found, and where its uſe is as common and familiar as that of any other verbs and ſubſtantives.

A more modern author (and therefore leſs excuſable) Bergier, *Elèmens primitifs des langues*, having firſt abſurdly imagined what is contradicted by all experience, viz.—" A meſure que les langues ſe ſont eloignées de leur " ſource primitive, les mots ont reçu de nouveaux accroiſſements: plus elles

Cheval, chémiſe, chemin, chetif, chevreuil, cher, chenu, chien, toucher, &c. are corrupted from *Cavallo, camiſcia, camino, cattivo, cavriuolo, caro, canuto, cane, toccare*, &c.

If

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ont eté cultivées plus elles ſe ſont allongées. On ne leur a donné de l'agrément, de la cadence, de l' harmonie qu'aux depens de leur brieveté :"—Proceeds to this conſequence,—" Les Romains ne nous ont pas communi-" qué les termes ſimples, les liaiſons du diſcours : là plupart de ces termes " ſont *plus courts* en François qu'en Latin, & les Gaulois s'en ſervoient " avant que de connoitre l'Italie ou ſes habitants."—And then to ſhew more ſtrongly the ſpirit which animates him (a ſpirit unworthy of letters and hoſtile to the inveſtigation of truth) adds—" Sommes nous ſuffiſament in-" ſtruits, lorſque nous avons appris de nos Etymologiſtes, que tel mot " François eſt emprunté du Latin, tel autre du Grec, celui-ci de l'Eſpagnol, " celui-la du Teuton ou de l'Allemand ? Mais les Latins ou les Allemands " de qui l'ont ils reçu ? Ne ſemble-*t*-il pas que nos ayeux ne ſubſiſtoient " que des emprunts, tandiſque les autres peuples eſtoient riches de leur " propre fonds ? *Je ne puis ſouffrir qu'on nous envoie mendier ailleurs*, tan-" diſque nous l'avons chez nous."

Perhaps there was ſomething of this jealouſy in Menage, when (not being able to agree with Sylvius, that CHEZ ſhould be written *Sús* or *Sur*) he aſſerts that—" CHEZ vient de APUD d'ou les Italiens ont fait APO, & les " Eſpagnols CABE en prepoſant comme nous un c."

Mr. de Broſſes however, ſuperior to all little prejudices, ſays—" On voit " bien que CHEZ eſt une traduction de l' Italien CASA, & que quand on dit " CHEZ vous, c'eſt comme ſi l'on diſoit CASA VOI (MAISON de vous.) Et " encore ce dernier mot eſt plutot dans notre langue une *adverbe* qu'une " *particule* ; ainſi que beaucoup d'autres dont l'origine devient plus facile a " reconnoître. Mais quand ce ſont de *pures Particules*, il eſt mal aiſé de " retrouver la premiere cauſe de leur formation ; qui ſans doute a ſouvent

" été

If the ingenious Abbé Girard had known what CHEZ really was, he would not have ſaid (*vrais principes*, Diſc. 11.) " CHEZ a pour ſon partage particulier une idée d'habitation, " ſoit comme patrie, ſoit comme ſimple demeure domeſti- " que." But he would have ſaid CHEZ is merely a corruption of CASA, and has all the ſame meaning in French, which CASA has in Italian * : and that is ſomething more than *patrie* or *demeure domeſtique*; viz.—*Race*, *Family*, *Nation*, *Sect*, &c. [" Ancien patron de la CASE," ſays M. de Buſſy Rabutin in his Memoirs. Tom. 2. pag. 175.] Neither again would he have ſaid—" Il s'agit ici de la per-

" été arbitraire & precipitée : comme je l'ai remarqué en parlant de petites " expreſſions *conjonctives*, qui ne ſervent qu'a former la liaiſon du diſcours."
Formation mechanique des langues, Tom. II. Chap. 14. Art. 254.

The French Law Term *Chezé*, which has cauſed to that people ſo much litigation, and to their lawyers ſo much controverſy (and which ſome of their authors would have written *Cheſné*, becauſe they ſuppoſed the land to have been formerly meaſured with a *Chain*; and others would have written *choisé* parce-que l'ainé *choiſit*) is derived in like manner from CASA, and means no more than what we in Engliſh call the *Home-ſtead* or *Home-ſtall*, whoſe extent is, of courſe, variable; but ought in reaſon to go with the houſe.

If therefore the French Etymologiſts thus ſtumbled at CHEZÉ, it is no wonder they knew not what to make of CHEZ, whoſe corruption had proceeded one ſtep farther.

* S. Johnſon (who was converſant with no languages, but Engliſh, Latin, and Greek) under the word AT, ſays hardily, but not truly, that—" CHEZ " means ſometimes *application to*, or *dependance on*."

" miſſion que l'uſage a accordée à quelques prepoſitions " d'en regir d'autres en certaines occaſions : c'eſt, à dire, " de les ſouffrir dans les complemens dont elles indiquent " le rapport ; comme—*Je viens* DE CHEZ *vous*." He would have ſeen through this grammatical myſtery of one prepoſition's governing another ; and would have ſaid, that DE may be prefixed to the *Subſtantive* CHEZ (id eſt, CASA) in the ſame manner as to any other ſubſtantive. For,—" *Je* " *viens De* CHEZ *vous*," is no other than—*Je viens de* CASA *à vous :* or (omitting the *Segnacaſo* *) *de* CASA *vous* ; or, *de* CA *vous* †.

But

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* That this omiſſion of the *Segnacaſo* is not a ſtrained ſuppoſition of my own, we have the authority of Henri Eſtiene (*De la precell. du lang. Fran.* p. 178.)

" Qui la *maiſon ſon voiſin* ardoir voit,
" De la ſienne douter ſe doit.

" Et faut noter—*la maiſon ſon voiſin*—eſtre dict. à la façon ancienne ; au " lieu de dire—*la maiſon* DE *ſon voiſin*."

So the Diction. della Cruſca—" CASA. Nome dopo di cui vien laſciato " talvolta dagli autori per proprietà di linguagio, l'*Articolo* e il *ſegnacaſo*.

" *Sen' andarono a caſa i preſtatori*." BOCCAC.

† " Pourquoy ſi ſouvent de *Diſſylables* ſont ils (les Italiens) des *mono-* " *ſyllables* ; de CASA, CA, &c." H. ESTIENE. *De la precell.*

Dicton. della Cruſca.—" CA, accorciato da CASA."

So

But thus it is that when Grammar comes at length (for its application is always late) to be applied to a language; ſome long preceding corruption cauſes a difficulty: ignorance of the corruption gives riſe to ſome ingenious ſyſtem to account for theſe words which are conſidered as original and not corrupted. Succeeding ingenuity and heaps of miſplaced learning increaſe the difficulty, and make the error more obſtinate, if not incurable.

B.

Do you acknowledge the prepoſition to be an indeclinable word?

H.

No.

B.

Do you think it has a meaning of its own?

So Menage.—" Fermato l'uſo di queſto troncamento di CA per CASA, " familiare a noſtri antichi.—*Sarae ſimile all' uomo ſavio, il quale edifica la* CA " *ſua ſopra la pietra.* Vangel di San matteo volgare.—*Vinegia, ne' quali* " *paeſi ſi dice* CA *in vece di* CASA." Silvano Rozzi. Many other inſtances are alſo given from Dante, Boccacio. Giovan Villani. Franco Sachetti, &c.

H. Yes

H.

Yes moſt certainly. And indeed, if prepoſitions had no proper meaning of their own, why ſeveral unmeaning prepoſitions *; when one alone muſt have anſwered the purpoſe equally? The cypher, which has no value of itſelf, and only ſerves (if I may uſe the language of Grammarians) to *connote* and *conſignify*, and to change the value of the figures, is not ſeveral and various, but uniformly one and the ſame.

B.

I gueſſed as much whilſt you were talking of Conjunctions; and ſuppoſed that you intended to account for them both in the ſame manner †.

H. You

* Speaking of Prepoſitions, Cour de Gebelin ſays, Gram. Univerſ. page 238. "Mais comment des mots pareils qui ſemblent ne rien peindre, *ne* "*rien dire*, dont l'Origine eſt inconnue, & qui ne tiennent en apparence a "aucune famille, peuvent ils amener l'harmonie & la clarté dans les "tableaux de la parole & devenir ſi neceſſaires, que ſans eux le langage "n'offriroit que des peintures imparfaites? Comment ces mots peuvent ils "produire de ſi grands effets & repandre dans le diſcours tant de chaleur, "tant de fineſſe?"

† In a Letter to Mr. Dunning, publiſhed in the year 1778, I aſſerted in a note (page 23) that—"There is not, nor is it poſſible there ſhould be, "a word in any language, which has not a compleat meaning and ſignifi-

H.

You were not miſtaken, Sir. For though Voſſius and others have concurred with the cenſure which Priſcian paſſes on the Stoics for claſſing Prepoſitions and Conjunctions, &c. together under one head; yet in truth they are both to be accounted for in the ſame way.

" cation even when taken by itſelf. *Adjectives, Prepoſitions, Adverbs,* &c. " have all compleat, ſeparate meanings, not difficult to be diſcovered."

Having in that letter explained the *unmeaning* conjunctions, with which alone I had at that time any *perſonal* concern; and not foreſeeing that the *equally unmeaning* Prepoſitions were afterwards by a ſolemn deciſion (*but without explanation*) to be determined *more certain* than *certainty*; I was contented by that note to ſet other perſons who might be more capable and more at leiſure than myſelf, upon an enquiry into the ſubject: being very indifferent from whoſe hand the explanation might come to the public. I muſt acknowledge myſelf a little diſappointed, that in eight years time, no perſon whatever has purſued the inquiry; although the ſucceſs I had had with the Conjunctions might reaſonably have encouraged, as it much facilitated, the ſearch. But though all men (as far as I can learn) have admitted my particular proofs concerning the Conjunctions, none have been inclined (as I wiſhed they might be) to puſh the *principle* of my reaſoning farther, and apply it to the other *Particles*. The ingenious author of *Eſſays Hiſtorical and Moral*, publiſhed in 1785, ſays, (page 125)—" Poſſibly *Prepoſitions* were, " at firſt, ſhort interjectional words, ſuch as our carters and ſhepherds make " uſe of to their cattle, to denote the relations of place. Or perhaps a " more ſkilful Linguiſt and antiquarian may be able to trace them from " other words, as the Conjunctions have been traced by the author above " mentioned."—It is therefore manifeſt, that the *principle* of my reaſoning was either not ſufficiently opened by me, or has not taken ſufficient hold of the minds of others; and that it is neceſſary ſtill farther to apply it to the other *Particles*.

The

The Prepoſitions as well as the Conjunctions are to be found amongſt the other Parts of Speech. The ſame ſort of corruption, from the ſame cauſe, has diſguiſed both: and ignorance of their true origin has betrayed Grammarians and Philoſophers into the myſterious and contradictory language which they have held concerning them. And it is really entertaining, to obſerve the various ſhifts uſed by thoſe who were too ſharp-witted and too ingenuous to repeat the unſatisfactory accounts of theſe Prepoſitions, handed down by others; and yet not ingenuous enough to acknowledge their own total ignorance on the ſubject.

The Grammarian ſays, it is none of his buſineſs; but that it belongs to the philoſopher: and for that reaſon only he omits giving an account of them. Whilſt the Philoſopher avails himſelf of his dignity; and, when he meets with a ſtubborn difficulty which he cannot unravel, (*and only then*), diſdains to be employed about *Words*: although they are the neceſſary channel through which his moſt precious liquors muſt flow.

" Grammatico ſatis eſt, ſays Sanctius, ſi tres has partes " poſteriores (ſcil. *Adverbia*, *Præpoſitiones*, *Conjunctiones*, " vocet *Particulas indeclinabiles*; & functus erit officio " perfecti grammatici.—Significationes enumerare, magis

" Philoſophi eſt quam Grammatici: quia grammatici " munus non eſt, teſte Varrone, vocum ſignificationes in- " dagare, ſed earum uſum. *Propterea* nos in arte hæc " prætermiſſimus."

Mr. Locke complains of the neglect of others in this particular; denies it to be his buſineſs " to examine them " in their full latitude:" and declares that he " intends " not here, a full explication of them." Like Scaliger—*Non in animo eſt.*—And this ſerves him as an apology for not examining them at all in any latitude; and for giving no explication of them whatever in *any* place.

The Author of the Port Royal philoſophical grammar, ſaves himſelf by an *Almoſt*. " Ce ſont *preſque* les mêmes " rapports dans toutes les langues, qui ſont marqués par " les Prepoſitions." And therefore he will content himſelf to mention ſome of the *principal* French Prepoſitions, without obliging himſelf to fix their exact number. And as Sanctius had his reaſon for turning the buſineſs over to a philoſophical grammar, whilſt he was treating of a *particular* language: ſo this author, who was writing a *general* grammar, had his reaſon for leaving it to thoſe who wrote particular grammars.—" C'eſt pourquoi je me contenterai " de

" de rapporter ici les *principaux* de ceux qui ſont marqués " par les prepoſitions de la Langue Françoiſe; ſans " m'obliger à en faire un denombrement exact, comme il " ſeroit neceſſaire pour une Grammaire *particuliere*."

M. L'Abbé de Condillac's method is moſt conveniently cavalier, and perfectly adapted to a writer of his deſcription.—" Je me bornerai à vous en donner quelques " exemples: car *vous jugez bien*, Monſeigneur, que je *ne* " *me propoſe pas* d'analyſer les acceptions de toutes les pre- " poſitions." And again, concludes—" En voilà aſſez, " Monſeigneur *!"

Even the learned Preſident de Broſſes, in his excellent treatiſe De la formation mechanique des Langues, is compelled to evade the inquiry. " L'accroiſſement en tête " des mots y amene une quantité fort variée d'idées ac- " ceſſoires. C'eſt un effet commun des Prepoſitions; qui

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* In the ſame manner he ſkips over all ſorts of difficulty with the Conjunctions.

" Mais, Monſeigneur, il eſt *inutile* de faire l'enumeration de toutes les " conjonctions."—" Je ne crois pas, Monſeigneur, qu'il y ait *rien de plus* " *à remarquer* ſur les conjonctions."

Partie II. Chap. 23.

" pourroit

" pourroit fournir la matiere d'un chapitre tres-philoſo-
" phique ſur leurs cauſes, leurs racines, leur force, leur
" effet, leurs ſignifications, leur varietés. Je *ne ferai que*
" *toucher* cette matiere en fort peu de mots dans un
" exemple que je donnerai, & *ſeulement pour mettre ſur*
" *les voies.*"

Tom. II. Chap. 11. Art. 198.

The laborious and judicious R. Johnſon, includes in one page of his National Grammar all that he has to offer on the *Adverb*, *Conjunction*, and *Prepoſition:* and concludes with ſaying—" And here, if I would ſhew the reader the " defectiveneſs of this Grammar (Lilly's) in the account " it gives of the uſe of the Prepoſitions, it would make a " little volume.

" Sed nos immenſum ſpatio confecimus æquor,
" Et jam tempus Equum fumantia ſolvere colla *."

Our countryman Wilkins, who is fairer and more intelligent than any of them, does not deny that it falls pro-

* And in his *Noctes Nottinghamicæ* he ſays—" Præpoſitionum Con-
" ſtructio—

" We are come now to the moſt curious part of all grammar, and
" which, if it were truly ſtated, would at once inſtruct, and entertain the
" reader with a ſurprizing delight."
And there he leaves it.

perly

perly within his province; but ſaves himſelf by *ſelecting* ſuch as he conceives *ſufficient*. Speaking of Particles, he ſays, (Part 3. Chap. 2.)—" The words of this kind are " exceeding numerous and equivocal in all languages, and " add much to the difficulty of learning them. It being " a very hard matter to eſtabliſh the juſt number of ſuch " as in all kinds are neceſſary *, and to fix to them their " proper ſignifications: which yet *ought to be done in a* " *philoſophical grammar*. I ſhall in this Eſſay *ſelect* out of " inſtituted languages, ſuch of the ſeveral ſorts as I con- " ceive *ſufficient* for this purpoſe."

The learned Alexander Gil employs the denomination *Conſignificativa*; which is more comprehenſive than *Particle*, but not more explanatory.

" DE CONSIGNIFICATIVIS.

" Vox conſignificativa *Articulos* comprehendit, *Adverbia* " item, *Conjunctiones*, *Præpoſitiones*, *Interjectiones*. Et quia " in his invariabilibus *nihil difficultatis* eſt, præter ipſam

* No wonder that Wilkins found it ſo hard to fix the number which was neceſſary, ſince their number in every language depends merely upon how many of the moſt common words ſhall become obſolete or corrupted. This being mere matter of particular fact and of accident, can have no place in general or philoſophical grammar.

" vocum cognitionem, claſſes enim eædem ſunt, ut uſus " idem qui Latinæ, et aliis linguis, *ad Lexicographos* " harum rerum ſtudioſum lectorem ablegabo."

Logonomia Anglica. Pag. 67, 68.

Doctor Wallis, after Gil's example, ſays—" Adverbia " eandem ſortiuntur naturam apud nos quam apud Latinos, " aliaſque gentes. Conjunctiones item eundem habent " uſum quem apud Latinos, alioſque. Præpoſitiones " etiam eandem ſortiuntur naturam, quam aliis linguis. " Si quis tamen harum aliquot voces potius adverbia eſſe " dicat; aut etiam ex adverbiis aliquot ad conjunctionum " claſſem referre malit: non tanti eſt ut hac de re quis " contendat; cum, & apud Latinos, eadem non raro vox " nunc pro adverbio, nunc pro conjunctione cenſenda eſt. " Neque aliquod grave detrimentum pateremur, ſi tam ad- " verbia quam conjunctiones & interjectiones, ad eandem " claſſem redigerentur. *Eſt quidem nonnihil diſcriminis,* " *ſed leviuſculum.*" Cap. XIII.

Greenwood raſhly ventures a little farther than any other perſon; and upon Mr. Locke's authority, acknowledging it to be his duty to do what other grammarians had neglected, ſays—

" I am ſenſible that what I have here done"—(and he has done nothing)—" is ſlight and ſuperficial to what may " and ought to be done; but if this ſhall meet with any " encouragement, I may be excited to make farther im- " provements in theſe matters, by taking more pains to " obſerve nicely the ſeveral *poſtures of the mind* in diſ- " courſe *."

Now Greenwood's grammar did actually meet with very great and extraordinary encouragement; and went through ſeveral editions ſpeedily during the author's life; but he never fulfilled his promiſe: nor indeed is there any thing about him, to incline us to believe that he was a fit perſon for ſuch an undertaking.

But not to multiply quotations without end (in which you are much better verſed than I am) you know that all philoſophers, philologers and grammarians, who have owned a diſſatisfaction in the accounts already given of the Particles, have yet, for ſome ſhuffling reaſon or other, all

* In the ſame manner Greenwood ſlips the Conjunctions. " But this " ſhall ſuffice for the Conjunctions, ſince it would be too *tedious* to go " through all the diviſions of them; and *I may ſome other time* explain " them more largely and accurately."

deſired to be excuſed from giving a ſatisfactory account themſelves.

B.

But why not concur with M. M. de Port Royal, and the Preſident de Broſſes? They are free from the contradiction and inconſiſtency of Mr. Harris's account of the Prepoſitions. For they acknowledge them to have a ſignification. —" On a eu recours, ſay the former, dans toutes les " langues à une autre invention; qui a été d'*inventer de* " *petits mots* pour etre mis avant les noms; ce qui les a " fait appeller Prepoſitions."

And M. de Broſſes, with great ingenuouſneſs tells us, (Traité de la formation mechanique des langues, Tom. 2. Chap. XI. Art. 198.)—" Chacune des Prepoſitions a ſon " ſens propre, mais qu'on applique à beaucoup d'autres " ſens par extenſion & par approximation. Elles ſont des " formules abregées, dont l'uſage eſt le plus frappant & le " plus commode dans toutes les langues pour circonſtancier " les idées: elle ſont d'elles-mêmes Racines primitives; " mais *je n'ai pas trouvé qu'il fut poſſible d'aſſigner la cauſe* " *de leur origine:* tellement que j'en crois la formation " *purement arbitraire.* Je penſe de même des Particules, " des Articles, des Pronoms, des Relatifs, des Conjonctions;

" en

" fait connoitre la force & l'emploi. Ces petits ſignes de " liaſon ſont reſtés en grand nombre dans chaque langue, " où l'on peut les conſiderer comme ſons radicaux; & ils " y ont en effet leurs derivés."

And again (Art. 254.) " J'ai fait voir combien il etoit " difficile de trouver le premier germe radical des *Parti-* " *cules* conjonctives du diſcours. Leur examen m'a fait " pencher à croire qu'elles etoient pour la plupart *arbi-* " *traires*; & que le prompt & prodigieux beſoin qu'on en " a pour s'enoncer, ayant forcé les hommes de chaque " pays à prendre le premier monoſyllabe ou geſte vocal " indeterminé qui lui venoit à la bouche dans le beſoin " preſſant, l'uſage reiteré en avoit déterminé l'habitude " ſignificative. Il n'eſt guère plus aiſé d'aſſigner la pre- " miere origine de *Prepoſitions*, quoiqu'un peu plus com- " poſées que les ſimples particules conjonctives."

And again (Art. 274.) " On auroit à parler auſſi de la " cauſe des differentes terminaiſons dans les langues, de la " ſignification des prepoſitions, de leur varieté à cet egard: " car les mêmes ont pluſieurs ſens très-differents. C'eſt " une matiere extrememént vaſte & très-philoſophique."

H. Meſſieurs

H.

Meſſieurs de Port-Royal and M. de Broſſes deſerve for ever to be mentioned with reſpect and gratitude; but, upon this occaſion, I muſt anſwer them in the words of Mer. Caſaubon (*de lingua Hebraica*)—" Perſuadeant fortaſſe " illis; qui de verbis ſingulis, etiam vulgatiſſimis, à phi- " loſophis, priuſquam imponerentur, itum in conſilium " cedunt. Nos, qui de verborum origine longe aliter " opinamur, planè pro fabula habemus."

Language, it is true, is an Art, and a glorious one; whoſe influence extends over all the others, and in which finally all ſcience whatever muſt centre. But an art ſpringing from neceſſity, and originally invented by artleſs men; who did not ſit down like philoſophers to invent " *de petits mots pour etre mis avant les noms*;" nor yet did they take for this purpoſe " *des premiers ſons brefs &* " *vagues qui leur venoient à la bouche* *: but they took ſuch

* It will ſeem the more extraordinary that M. de Broſſes ſhould entertain this opinion of the *Particles*, when we remember what he truly ſays of *Proper names*.—" Tous les mots formant les noms propres ou appellatifs " des perſonnes, ont en quelque langage que ce ſoit, ainſi que les mots for- " mants les noms des choſes, une origine certaine, une ſignification deter- " minée, une etymologie veritable. Ils n'ont pas, plus que les autres mots, " été impoſés ſans cauſe, ni fabriqués au haſard, ſeulement pour produire " un.

ſuch and the ſame (whether great or ſmall, whether monoſyllable or polyſyllable, without diſtinction) as they employed upon other occaſions to mention the ſame *real objects*. For *Prepoſitions* alſo are the names of *real objects*. And theſe *petits mots*, happen in this caſe to be ſo, merely from their repeated corruption, owing to their frequent, long-continued, and perpetual uſe.

B.

You aſſert then that what we call *Prepoſitions*, and diſtinguiſh as a ſeparate part of ſpeech, are not a ſpecies of words eſſentially or in any manner different from the other parts: that they are not "*little words invented to* "*put before nouns, and to which all languages have had re-* "*courſe :*" but that they are in fact either Nouns or Verbs. And that (like the Conjunctions) Prepoſitions are only words which have been diſguiſed by corruption; and that Etymology will give us in all languages, what Philoſophy has attempted in vain. And yet I cannot but perceive that ſuch words as Prepoſitions, are abſolutely neceſſary to diſcourſe.

" un bruit vague. Cependant comme la plûpart de ces mots ne portent à " l'oreille de ceux qui les entendent aucune autre ſignification que de de- " ſigner les perſonnes nommées ; c'eſt ſur tout à leur égard que le vulgaire " eſt porté à croire qu'ils ſont denués de ſens & d'etymologie."

H.

I acknowledge them to be undoubtedly neceſſary. For, as the neceſſity of the *Article* (or of ſome equivalent invention) follows from the impoſſibility of having in language a diſtinct name or *particular term* for each particular individual *idea* *; ſo does the neceſſity of the *Prepoſition* (or of ſome equivalent invention) follow from the impoſſibility of having in language a diſtinct *complex term* for each different *collection of ideas* which we may have occaſion to put together in diſcourſe. The addition or ſubtraction of *any one* idea to or from a collection, makes it a different collection: and (if there were degrees of impoſſibility) it is ſtill more impoſſible to uſe in language a different and diſtinct *complex term* for each different and diſtinct *collection of ideas*, than it is to uſe a diſtinct *particular term* for each particular and individual idea. To ſupply, therefore, the place of the complex terms which are wanting in a language, is the Prepoſition employed. By whoſe aid *complex* terms are prevented from being infinite or too numerous, and are uſed only for thoſe collections of ideas which we have moſt frequently occaſion to mention in diſcourſe. And this end is obtained in the moſt ſimple manner in the world. For having occaſion in communication to mention a collection

* See before, Chap. V.

of

of ideas, for which there is no one ſingle *complex* term in the language, we either take that complex term which includes the greateſt number, though not *All*, of the ideas we would communicate; or elſe we take that complex term which includes *All*, and the feweſt ideas *more* than thoſe we would communicate: and then by the help of the Prepoſition, we either make up the deficiency in the one caſe, or retrench the ſuperfluity in the other.

For inſtance,

1. "*A Houſe* WITH *a Party-wall.*"
2. "*A Houſe* WITHOUT *a roof.*"

In the firſt inſtance, the complex term is deficient: The Prepoſition directs to add what is wanting. In the ſecond inſtance, the complex term is redundant: The Prepoſition directs to take away what is ſuperfluous.

Now conſidering it only in this, the moſt ſimple light, it is abſolutely neceſſary, in either caſe, that the Prepoſition itſelf ſhould have a meaning of its own: for how could we otherwiſe make known by it our intention, whether of adding to or retrenching from, the deficient or redundant complex term we have employed?

If to one of our modern grammarians, I ſhould ſay—"*A Houſe*, JOIN;"—He would aſk me—"JOIN *what?*"—But he would not contend that JOIN is an indeclinable word, and has no meaning of it own: becauſe he knows that it is the Imperative of the Verb, the other parts of which are ſtill in uſe; and its own meaning is clear to him, though the ſentence is not compleated. If, inſtead of JOIN, I ſhould ſay to him,—"*A Houſe* WITH;"—he would ſtill aſk the ſame queſtion, "WITH *what?*" But if I ſhould diſcourſe with him concerning the word WITH, he would tell me that it was a *Prepoſition*, an *indeclinable* word, and that it had no meaning of its own, but only a *connotation* or *conſignification*. And yet it would be evident by his queſtion, that he felt it had a meaning of its own; which is indeed the ſame as JOIN *. And the only difference

* WITH is alſo ſometimes the Imperative of þýþ̃an. *To be.* Mr. Tyrwhit, in his Gloſſary (*Art.* BUT) has obſerved truly, that—"BY and "WITH are often ſynonimous."—They are always ſo, when WITH is the "Imperative of þýþ̃an: for BY is the Imperative of Beon. *To be.*

He has alſo in his Gloſſary (*Art.* WITH) ſaid truly, that—"WITH "*meſchance.* WITH *miſaventure.* WITH *ſorwe.* 5316. 7797. 6916. 4410. "5890. 5922. are to be conſidered as parenthetical curſes."—For the literal meaning of thoſe phraſes, is (not *God yeve*, but)—BE *miſchance*, BE *miſadventure*, BE *ſorrow*, to him or them concerning whom theſe words are ſpoken. But Mr. Tyrwhit is miſtaken, when he ſuppoſes—"WITH *evil* "*preſe.* 5829. WITH *harde grace.* 7810. WITH *ſory grace.* 12810."—to

 have

ference between the two words WITH and JOIN, is, that the other parts of the verb ϒIΦΛN, piðan, *to join* (of which WITH is the imperative) have ceaſed to be employed in the language *. So that my inſtances ſtand thus,

1. *A Houſe*

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have the ſame meaning: for in thoſe three inſtances, WITH is the Imperative of ϒIΦΛN; nor is any parenthetical curſe or wiſh contained in either of thoſe inſtances.

As WITH means JOIN, ſo the correſondent French Prepoſition, AVEC, means—*And Have that*, or *Have that alſo*. And it was formerly written *Avecque*, i. e. *Avezque*. So Boileau, Satire 1.

" Quittons donc pour jamais une ville importune:
" Où l'honneur eſt en guerre AVECQUE la fortune."

And again, Satire 5.

" Mais qui m'aſſurera, qu'en ce longe cercle d'ans,
" A' leurs fameux epoux vos ayeules fidelles
" Aux douceurs des galands furent toujours rebelles?
" Et comment ſçavez-vous, ſi quelqu' audacieux
" N'a point interrompu le cours de vos ayeux?
" Et ſi leur ſang tout pur AVECQUE leur nobleſſe,
" Eſt paſſé juſqu' à vous de Lucrece en Lucrece."

* We ſtill retain in Engliſh ſpeech, though not often uſed in books, the ſubſtantives WITH or WITHE, WITHERS, and WITHER-BAND.

" Me thou ſhalt uſe in what thou wilt, and doe that with a ſlender twiſt,
" that none can doe with a tough WITH."

Euphues and his England. Pag. 136.

" They

1. *A Houſe* JOIN *a Party-wall.*
2. *A Houſe* BE-OUT *a roof.*

And indeed ſo far has always been plainly perceived, that WITH and WITHOUT are directly oppoſite and contradictory. Wilkins, without knowing what the words really were, has yet well expreſſed their meaning, where he ſays that WITH is a prepoſition—" relating to the notion of " *ſocial* or circumſtance of *ſociety affirmed*; and that WITH-" OUT is a prepoſition relating to the ſame notion of *ſocial*, " or circumſtance of *ſociety denied.*"

" They had arms under the ſtraw in the boat; and had cut the WITHES " that held the oars of the town-boats, to prevent any purſuit, if they " ſhould be forced to fly." *Ludlow's Memoirs.* Pag. 435.

And again, pag. 437. " One of the four watermen was the perſon who " cut the WITHES of all the town-boats, to prevent them from purſuing."

" This troubleſom rowing, though an ingenious invention of the Chineſes, " hath raiſed this proverb amongſt them, *that their boats are paper, and* " *their watermen iron*; becauſe they are made of very thin boards, like our " ſlit deal, which are not nailed, but faſtened together with WITHS, in the " Chineſe tongue called *rotang*; by which means the boats, though often " beaten by the ſtrong current againſt the rocks, ſplit not, but bend and " give way." *Hiſtory of China. By John Ogilby.* Vol. 2. pag. 609.

" The only furniture belonging to the houſes, appears to be an oblong " veſſel made of bark, by tying up the ends with a WITHE."
Captain Cook's deſcription of Botany Bay.

And it would puzzle the wiſeſt philoſopher to diſcover oppoſition and contradiction in two words, where neither of them had any ſignification.

B.

According then to your explanation, the Prepoſition WITHOUT, is the very ſame word, and has the very ſame meaning as the Conjunction WITHOUT. Does not this in ſome meaſure contradict what you before aſſerted, concerning the faithfulneſs of words to the ſtandard under which they were originally enliſted? For there does not appear in this caſe to be any melting down of two words into one, by ſuch a corruption as you before noticed in ſome of the Conjunctions. And yet here is one and the ſame word uſed both as a Conjunction and as a Prepoſition.

H.

There is nothing at all extraordinary, much leſs contradictory in this; that one and the ſame word ſhould be applied indifferently either to ſingle *words* or to *ſentences:* (for you muſt obſerve that the apparently *different application* conſtitutes the only difference between Conjunctions and Prepoſitions): For I may very well employ the ſame word of direction, whether it be to add a *word* or to add a *ſentence:* And again, one and the ſame word of direction will

will ſerve as well to take away a *word* as to take away a *ſentence*. No wonder therefore that our anceſtors (who were ignorant of the falſe diviſions and definitions of Grammar which we have ſince received) ſhould have uſed BUT indifferently to direct the omiſſion either of a *word*, or of a *ſentence:* and ſhould have uſed WITHOUT alſo indifferently for the omiſſion of a *ſentence* or of a *word*. But after our authors became more generally and better acquainted with the diviſions and definitions of the Greek and Latin Grammarians, they attempted by degrees to make our language alſo conform to thoſe definitions and diviſions. And after that it was, that BUT ceaſed to be commonly uſed as a *known* Prepoſition; and WITHOUT ceaſed to be *correctly* uſed as a Conjunction.

As the meaning of theſe two words BUT (I mean that part which is corrupted from Butan) and WITHOUT, is exactly the ſame, our authors would moſt likely have had ſome difficulty to agree amongſt themſelves, which ſhould be the Prepoſition and which the Conjunction; had it not been for the corruption of BOT, which becaming BUT, muſt neceſſarily decide the choice: for though WITHOUT could very well ſupply the place of the *Prepoſition* BUT, it could not ſupply the place of the Bot part of the *Conjunction* BUT: whereas BUT could entirely ſupply the place of

of the *Conjunction* WITHOUT. And this, I take it, is the reaſon why BUT has been retained as a Conjunction, and WITHOUT has been retained as a Prepoſition.

Not however that they have been able ſo to baniſh the old habit of our language, as that BUT ſhould always be uſed as a Conjunction, and WITHOUT always as a Prepoſition. (I mean that BUT ſhould always apparently be applied to *ſentences*, and WITHOUT always to *words*; for that, it muſt be remembered, is the only difference between Conjunctions and Prepoſitions): for BUT is ſtill uſed frequently as a *Prepoſition:* though Grammarians, forgetful or heedleſs of their own Definitions, are pleaſed to call it always a Conjunction;

As thus, "*All* BUT *one.*"

And, though it is not *now* an *approved* uſage, it is very frequent in common ſpeech to hear WITHOUT uſed as a conjunction; where, inſtead of WITHOUT, a correct modern ſpeaker would uſe UNLESS, or ſome other equivalent acknowledged conjunction: and that for no other reaſon, but becauſe it has pleaſed our Grammarians to exclude WITHOUT from the number of conjunctions.

B.

And is not that reaſon ſufficient, when the beſt writers have for a long time paſt conformed to this arrangement?

H.

Undoubtedly. Nor do I mean to cenſure thoſe who follow cuſtom for the propriety of a particular language: I do not even mean to condemn the cuſtom: for in this inſtance it is perfectly harmleſs. But I condemn the falſe philoſophy which cauſed it. I condemn thoſe who wilfully ſhut their eyes, and affect not to perceive the indifferent application of BUT, AND, SINCE, IF, ELSE, &c. both to *words* and to *ſentences*; and ſtill endeavour by their definitions to uphold a diſtinction which they know does not exiſt even in the practice of any language, and which they ought to know cannot exiſt in theory.

To the pedagogue indeed, who muſt not trouble children about the corruption of words, the diſtinction of prepoſitions and conjunctions may be uſeful enough (on account of the *caſes* which they govern when applied to *words*; and which they cannot govern when applied to *ſentences*); and for ſome ſuch reaſon perhaps, both this and many other diſtinctions were at firſt introduced. Nor would they have cauſed any miſchief or confuſion, if the *philoſopher*

had not adopted theſe diſtinctions; taken them for real differences in *nature*, or in the *operations of the human mind*; and then attempted to account for what he did not underſtand. And thus the *Grammatiſt* has miſled the Grammarian, and both of them the Philoſopher.

B.

" SANS eyes, SANS teeth, SANS taſte, SANS every thing."

This prepoſition too, which was formerly uſed inſtead of WITHOUT, you mean, I ſuppoſe, to account for in the ſame manner: It can be ſhewn, I ſuppoſe, to be the Imperative of ſome obſolete Saxon verb, having a ſimilar meaning.

H.

SANS, though ſometimes uſed inſtead of WITHOUT, is not an Engliſh but a French Prepoſition, and therefore to be derived from another ſource.

" Et je conſerverai, malgré votre menace,
" Une âme SANS-courroux, SANS crainte, et SANS audace."
Adelaïde.

Nor is it a *verb*, but a *ſubſtantive*: and it means ſimply *Abſence*. It is one proof, amongſt many others, that Plutarch's half-conjecture was not ill-founded. After all, he thinks it may be worth conſidering, whether the Prepoſitions

ſitions may not be perhaps little fragments of words, uſed in haſte and for diſpatch, inſtead of the whole words *. SANS is corrupted from the prepoſition *Senza* of the Italians (by old Italian authors written *Sanza* †) who frequently uſe it

* Ορα δε μη κομμασι και θραυσμασιν ονοματων εοικασιν, ωσπερ γραμματων σπαραγμασι και κεφαιαις οι σπευδοντες γραφουσι, &c.

Πλατωνικα Ζητηματα. θ.

† " Vai alla taverna, ripariti in *Caſa* femmine, et dove ſi giuoca ſpendi " SANZA modo." *Machiavelli. Clitia. Atto. 3. Sce. 4.*

" SENZA et SANZA (ſays Menage) Da *Abſentia*, per afereſi, lo cava il " Cittadini. Viene ſecondo me da *ſine* (come lo Spagniolo *Antes* da *Ante*) " *Sine. Sines. Senes.* (onde il Franceſe *Sens*, che ſi pronunzia *Sans*) *Senſe.* " *Senſa. Senza.* SANZA differ piu volentieri gli antichi."

Again Menage ſays, that SANS *deſſus deſſous*, ſhould be written SENS *deſſus deſſous* " comme on ecrit, *En tout Sens, dece Sens là*, &c. SENS, c'eſt à dire, *Face*, viſage, *ſituation*, poſture, &c.—Menage is ſurely wrong: for it means, *without top or bottom*, i. e. a ſituation of confuſion in which you cannot diſcern the top from the bottom; or ſay which is the top and which the bottom. We tranſlate it by a ſimilar expreſſion in Engliſh, *Upſide down*, by our old authors more properly written *Up ſo down.*

" But the other partie was ſo ſtronge,
That for the lawe of no ſtatute
There maie no right be execute:
And upon this diviſion
The londe was tourned UP SO DOWNE."
Gower. Lib. 2. Fol. 37. Pag. 1. Col. 2.

" Do lawe awaie, what is a kynge?
Where is the right of any thynge

it thus; SENZA *di te.* i. e. ASSENZA *di te.* The French (as we have ſeen in *Chez*) omit the *Segnacaſo*, and ſay SANS *toi.* And as from the Italian Aſſenza they have their *Abſence*; or, as they pronounce it, Abſance or Abſans; ſo have they their prepoſition SANS from SENZA or SANZA. But I perſuade myſelf that you can have no doubt of the meaning of this prepoſition SANS, when you find the ſignification of its *correſpondent* words equally clear in other languages.

The Greek prepoſition Χωρις, is the corrupted Imperative of Χωριζειν, to ſever, to disjoin, to ſeparate.

The German prepoſition SONDER, the imperative of *Sondern*, which has the ſame meaning as Χωριζειν.

The Dutch prepoſition ZONDER, the imperative of Zonderen, with the ſame meaning.

The Latin prepoſition SINE, i. e. *Sit ne. Be not.*

If that there be no lawe in londe?
This ought a kynge well underſtonde,
As he whiche is to lawe ſwore,
That if the lawe be forelore
Withouten execucion,
It maketh a londe turne UP SO DOWNE."

Gower. Lib. 7. *Fol.* 159. *Pag.* 1. *Col.* 1.

The Spaniſh *Sin*, from the Latin *Sine*.

The Italian *Fuori* The Spaniſh *Affuera* (as *Puerta from Porta*) The French *Hors* * (by their old authors written *Fors* †)	From the Latin *Foris* ‡.

* Menage, *Cambiamenti delle Lettere*, page 8, exemplifies Hors uſed by the French for *Foris*.

† " Toute la troupe étoit lors endormie,
Fors le galant qui trembloit pour ſa vie."
Contes de la Fontaine. Le Muletier.

" Elle étoit jeune et belle creature,
Plaiſoit beaucoup, Fors un point qui gâtoit
Toute l' affaire, et qui ſeul rebutoit
Les plus ardens; c'eſt qu'elle étoit avare."
Contes de la Fontaine. Le Galant Eſcroc.

Brantome, *Des Dames illuſtres*, cites an account of the funeral of Queen Anne of Bretagne—" Ne furent à l' offrande Fors Monſieur d'Angouleſme." And again—" La reyne fut en colore de ce que tout ce grand convoy " n' avoit paſsé outre, ainſi qu'elle attendoit, Fors Monſieur ſon fils, et " le roy de Navarre."

‡ The Greek Θυρα became the Doric Φορα and the Latin *Fora*, whence *Fores*, *Foris*, whence the Italian *Fuora*, *Fuore*, *Fuori*, and the French *Fors*; which, in the *prepoſitive* and *conjunctive* uſe of it, the French have latterly changed to *Hors*: but they have not ſo changed it when in compoſition. They ſay indeed *Fauxbourg* corruptly for *Forſbourg*, as it was anciently written by Froiſſart and others; [" La Bourg de Four n'eſtoit ancienne-" ment qu'un *Fauxbourg* qu'on appelloit en Savoyard *Bourg de Feur*, c'eſt

Whence *Hormis*, i. e. (*put out*) by the addition of the participle of *mettre*.

B.

If there were no other relations declared by the prepoſitions, beſides thoſe of *adding* or *taking away*, perhaps this explanation might convince me; but there are aſſuredly Prepoſitions employed for very different purpoſes. And inſtead of ſelecting ſuch inſtances as may happen to be ſuited particularly to your own hypotheſis, I ſhould have more ſatisfaction if you would exemplify in thoſe which Mr. Harris has employed to illuſtrate his hypotheſis.

"From theſe principles" (he ſays, Book II. Chap. 3.) "it follows, that when we form a ſentence, the ſubſtan-"tive without difficulty coincides with the verb, from the

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"à dire, *Bourg de Debors.*" Hiſtoire de la ville de Geneve par Jacob Spon; who gives us likewiſe from their Archives the tranſlation of it into *Burgi Foris*. For the ſame reaſon, I ſuppoſe a part of the town of Reading, in Berkſhire, is called The Forbery.] but in their compounds the French retain *For*:——"Corbleu, je luy paſſerois mon épée au travers du corps, "à elle et au galant, ſi elle avoit *Forfait* à ſon honneur."

George Dandin. Act 1. Sce. 4.

From the French we have many Engliſh words preceded by *For* with this meaning; as, *Forfeit*, *Foreclоſe*, &c. and we had anciently many more.

" natural coincidence of ſubſtance and energy.—*The Sun*
" *warmeth.*—So likewiſe the energy with the ſubject on
" which it operates.—*Warmeth the earth.*—So likewiſe
" both ſubſtance and energy with their proper attributes.
" —*The ſplendid ſun genially warmeth the fertile earth.*—
" But ſuppoſe we were deſirous to add other ſubſtantives;
" as for inſtance, *Air*, or *Beams*: How would theſe coin-
" cide, or under what character could they be introduced?
" Not as Nominatives or Accuſatives, for both thoſe places
" are already filled; the Nominative, by the ſubſtance
" *Sun*; the Accuſative by the ſubſtance *Earth*. Not as
" Attributes to theſe laſt, or to any other thing: for at-
" tributes by nature, they neither are nor can be made.
" Here then we perceive the riſe and uſe of *prepoſitions*.
" By theſe we connect thoſe ſubſtantives to ſentences,
" which at the time are unable to coaleſce of themſelves.
" Let us aſſume for inſtance a pair of theſe connectives,
" THRO' and WITH, and mark their effect upon the ſub-
" ſtances here mentioned. *The ſplendid ſun* WITH *his*
" *beams genially warmeth* THRO' *the air the fertile earth.*—
" The ſentence as before remains intire and one; the
" ſubſtantives required are both introduced; and not a
" word which was there before, is detruded from its
" proper place."

The

The firſt of this pair of his connectives (WITH) you have already explained, and I am willing to admit the explanation. It is,—*The ſplendid ſun* JOIN *his beams*—inſtead of one ſingle complex term including *Sun* and *beams*.

But of what *real object* is THROUGH the name?

H.

Of a very common one indeed *. For as the French peculiar prepoſition CHEZ is no other than the Italian ſubſtantive CASA or CA, ſo is the Engliſh Prepoſition THOROUGH †, *Thourough*, *Thorow*, *Through*, or *Thro'*, no other than the Gothic *ſubſtantive* ϑλΠΚϘ, or the Teutonic

* All *Particles* are in truth, in all languages, the ſigns of the moſt common and familiar ideas, and thoſe which we have moſt frequently occaſion to communicate: they had not otherwiſe become *Particles*. So very much miſtaken was Mr. Locke, when he ſuppoſed them to be the ſigns or marks of certain operations of the mind for which we had either *none or very deficient names*; that the *Particles* are always the words which were the moſt common and familiar in the language from which they came.

† S. Johnſon calls "*Thorough*,—the word *Through* extended into two "ſyllables."—What could poſſibly be expected from ſuch an Etymologiſt as this? He might, with as much veriſimilitude, ſay that ϑΛΙϢΛΛΛ was the word *Soul* extended into three ſyllables, or that Ελεημοσυνη was the word *Alms* extended into ſix.

ſubſtantive

ſubſtantive *Thuruh:* and, like them, means *Door, gate, paſſage.*

So that Mr. Harris's inſtance (tranſlated into modern Engliſh) ſtands thus,

" *The ſplendid ſun*—JOIN *his beams*—*genially warmeth* " —PASSAGE *the air*—(or, the air being the *paſſage* or *medium*) " *the fertile earth.*" And in the ſame manner may you tranſlate the prepoſition *Through* in every inſtance where *Thro'* is uſed in Engliſh, or its equivalent prepoſition is uſed in any other language*.

After having ſeen in what manner the ſubſtantive *Houſe* became a prepoſition in the French, you will not wonder to ſee *Door* become a prepoſition in the Engliſh: and though in the firſt inſtance it was more eaſy for you to perceive the nature of the French prepoſition *Chez*; becauſe, having no prepoſition correſponding to it in Engliſh, there was ſo much prejudice out of your way; yet I am perſuaded you will not charge this to me as a fantaſtical or far-fetched etymology, when I have placed before you, at

* So, I ſuppoſe, the Greek word Πορος has given the Latin and Italian prepoſition *Per*, the French *Par*, and the Spaniſh *Por*.

one

one view, the words employed to ſignify the ſame idea in thoſe languages to which our own has the neareſt affinity.

	Subſtantive.	*Prepoſition.*
Engliſh	Door *Thorruke* *	Thourough. Thorough. Thurgh. † Thorow. Through. Thro. ‡
Anglo-Sax.	Doꝛa. Duꝛu Duꝛe. Đuꝛe Đuꝛa §	Đuꝛuh. Đuꝛh. Đꝛuh. Đoꝛ

* " Than cometh ydelneſſe, that is the yate of all harmes. This ydle-" neſſe is the *Thorruke* of all wycked and vylayne thoughtes."

Chaucer. Perſons Tale. Fol. 111. pag. 1. col. 2.

† " So in an antient roll in verſe, exhibiting the deſcent of the family " of the lords of Clare in Suffolk, preſerved in the Auſtin Friary at Clare, " and written in the year 1356.

" ———So conioyned be
" Ulſtris armes and Gloceſtris *Thurgh* and *Thurgh*,
" As ſhewith our wyndowes in houſes thre."

Warton's Hiſt. of Engl. Poetry. Vol. I. pag. 302.

" Releued by thynfynyte grace and goodneſs of our ſaid lord *Thurgh* the " meane of the mediatrice of mercy."

The Dictes and Sayinges of the Philoſophers. 1477.

‡ The Greeks abbreviated in the ſame manner as the Engliſh: and as we uſe *Thro* for *Thorough*, ſo they uſed Θρα for Θυρα. Thus we find Ουρηθρα, the Urethra, or Urine paſſage, compounded of Ουρον and Θυρα, and by abbreviation Θρα.

§ Lif hiꝛan heoꝛa cyꝛicean maꝛe ðeaꝛf hæbben. healð hine mon on oðꝛum hûf. and ðat næbbe ðonne ma ðuꝛa ðonne ꝛeo cyꝛice.

Ælfꝛeðeꝛ æ.

Sub-

Subſtantive.		*Prepoſition.*
Goth.	ΔΛΠΚϘ. ΔΛΠΚ	ΦΛΙΚh
Dutch	Deure. Deur Door. Dore	Deur. Door.
German	Thure. Thur. Thor.	Durch
Teuton.	Thurah. Thur. Thor. Tura. Dura. Dure.	Thuruh. Thurah. Thur. Duruch. Duruc. Duruh. Durch. Durh.

Though it is not from Aſia or its confines, that we are to ſeek for the origin of this part of our language; yet is it worth noticing here, that the Greek (to which the Gothic has in many particulars a conſiderable reſemblance) employs the word Θυρα for *Door*. And both the Perſian (which in many particulars reſembles the Teutonic *) and

* " On n'eſt pas etonné de trouver du rapport entre l'*Anglois* & le " Perſan: car on ſçait que le fond de la langue Angloiſe eſt Saxon; & " qu'il y a une quantité d'exemples qui montre une affinité marquée entre " l'Allemand & le Perſan."

Form. mechan. des langues. Tom. II. Art. 166.

the Chaldean, uſe THRO for *Door*. You will obſerve, that the Teutonic uſes the ſame word *Thurah* both for the *ſubſtantive*, (*Door*) and for what is called the *Prepoſition* (*Thorough*). The Dutch, which has a ſtrong antipathy to our *Th*, uſes the very word *Door* for both. The Anglo-ſaxon, from which our language immediately deſcends, employs indifferently for *Door* either *Dure* or *Thure*. The modern German (directly contrary to the modern Engliſh) uſes the initial *Th* (*Thur*) for our *ſubſtantive* (*Door*) and the initial D (*Durch*) for our *prepoſition* (*Thorough*): and it is remarkable, that this ſame difference between the German and the Engliſh, prevails in almoſt all caſes, where the two languages employ a word of the ſame origin, having either of thoſe initials. Thus Diſtel und Dorn—in German are—*Thiſtles and Thorns* in Engliſh. So the Engliſh *Dear*, *Dollar*, *Deal*, are in German Theur, Thaler, Theil.

Minſhew and Junius both concur that *Door*, &c. are derived from the Greek Thura: Skinner ſays, *perhaps* they are all from the Greek Thura: and then without any reaſon (or rather as it appears to me againſt all reaſon) chuſes rather uſeleſly to derive the ſubſtantive *Door* from the Anglo-ſaxon prepoſition *Thor*, *Thrub*, *Thurh*. But I am perſuaded, that *Door* and *Thorough* have one and the ſame

preſident de Broſſes, and by all thoſe writers whom you moſt eſteem; and even by Wilkins (* 3) and Locke.

Now if theſe words have a meaning as you contend, and are conſtantly uſed according to their meaning, which you muſt allow, (becauſe you appeal to the uſe which is made of them as proof of the meaning which you attribute to them): how can they poſſibly be the names of *real and unchangeable objects*, as common nouns and verbs are? I am ſure you muſt ſee the neceſſity of reconciling theſe contradictory appearances.

H.

Moſt ſurely. And I think you will as readily acknowledge the neceſſity of firſt eſtabliſhing the facts, before you call upon me to reconcile them. Where is the Prepoſition to be found which is at any time uſed in contrary or even in different meanings?

(* 3) "Some of theſe prepoſitions are *abſolutely determined* either to *motion* or to *reſt*, or the *Terminus of Motion*. Others are relatively applicable to *both*. Concerning which this rule is to be obſerved: that thoſe which belong to motion cannot ſignify reſt; but thoſe which belong to reſt may ſignify motion in the *terminus*."

WILKINS. Part III. Chap. 3.

B.

Very many inſtances have been given; but none ſtronger than thoſe produced by Mr. Harris of the Prepoſition FROM; which he ſhews to be uſed to denote *three* very different relations, and the two laſt in abſolute contradiction to each other.

" FROM, he ſays, denotes the detached relation of Body; " as when we ſay—*Theſe Figs came* FROM *Turkey.*—So as " to *Motion* and *Reſt*, only with this difference, that *here* " the prepoſition *varies its character with the Verb.* Thus " if we ſay—*That lamp hangs* FROM *the cieling*—the pre- " poſition FROM aſſumes a character of *quieſcence.* But " if we ſay—*That lamp is falling* FROM *the cieling*,—the " prepoſition in ſuch caſe aſſumes a character of *Motion.*"

Now I ſhould be glad you would ſhew me what one Noun or Verb can be found of ſo verſatile a character as this prepoſition: what name of any one real object or ſign of one idea, or of one collection of ideas, can have been inſtituted to convey theſe different and oppoſite meanings?

H.

Truly, none that I know of. But I take the word FROM (*prepoſition*, if you chuſe to call it ſo)—to have as clear,

clear, as preciſe, and at all times as uniform and unequivocal a meaning, as any word in the language. FROM means merely BEGINNING, and nothing elſe. It is ſimply the Anglo-ſaxon and Gothic Noun Fրum, ᚠᚱᚢᛗ, *Beginning, Origin, Source, fountain, author* *. Now then, if you pleaſe, we will apply this meaning to Mr. Harris's formidable inſtances, and try whether we cannot make FROM ſpeak clearly for itſelf, without the aſſiſtance of the *interpreting* Verbs; who are ſuppoſed by Mr. Harris, to *vary its character* at will, and make the prepoſition appear as inconſiſtent and contradictory as himſelf.

Figs *came* FROM Turkey.
Lamp *falls* FROM Cieling.
Lamp *hangs* FROM Cieling.

Came is a complex term for one ſpecies of motion.

Falls is a complex term for another ſpecies of motion.

Hangs is a complex term for a ſpecies of attachment.

Have we occaſion to communicate or mention the COMMENCEMENT or BEGINNING of theſe motions and of this

* " Ne ꝑæbb ȝe ꝑe ðe on ꝑrumman ꝑoꝑhte. he ꝑoꝑhte pæpman anb " piꝑman." That is, Annon legiſtis, quod qui eos *in principio* creavit, creavit eos marem & fœminam. St. Matt. xix. 4.

attach-

attachment; and the *place* where theſe motions and this attachment commence or begin? It is impoſſible to have complex terms for each occaſion of this ſort. What more natural then, or more ſimple, than to add the ſigns of thoſe ideas, viz. the word BEGINNING (which will remain always the ſame) and the name of the *place* (which will perpetually vary)?

Thus,

" Figs came—BEGINNING Turkey.
" Lamp falls—BEGINNING Cieling.
" Lamp hangs—BEGINNING Cieling."

That is

Turkey the *Place* of BEGINNING to come.
Cieling the *Place* of BEGINNING to fall.
Cieling the *Place* of BEGINNING to hang.

B.

You have here ſhewn its meaning when it relates to *place*; but Wilkins tells us, that " FROM refers *primarily* to *place* and *ſituation*; and *ſecondarily* to *time*." So that you have yet given but half its meaning.

—" FROM morn till night th' eternal Larum rang."—

There is no *place* referred to in this line.

H. FROM

H.

FROM relates to every thing to which BEGINNING relates *, and to nothing elſe: and therefore is referable to *Time* as well as to *motion:* without which indeed there can be no *Time.*

---

* Is it unreaſonable to ſuppoſe that, if the meaning of this word FROM, and of its correſpondent prepoſitions in other languages, had been clearly underſtood; the Greek and Latin Churches would never have differed concerning the *Eternal Proceſſion* of the Holy Ghoſt FROM the Father, or FROM the Father and the Son. And that, if they had been determined to ſeparate, they would at leaſt have choſen ſome ſafer cauſe of ſchiſm?

" *Apelles.* I have now, Campaſpe, almoſt made an end.
" *Campaſpe.* You told me, Apelles, you would never end.
" *Ap.* Never end my love: for it ſhall be *Eternal.*
" *Cam.* That is, neither to have *Beginning* nor ending."

Campaſpe by *John Lilly.* Act 4. Sce. 4.

——" *Eternal* ſure, as without end
Without Beginning."——

Paradiſe Regained. Book 4. Line 391.

" To ſay that *Immenſity* does not ſignify boundleſs ſpace, and that *Eternity* " does not ſignify Duration or Time *without Beginning* and end; is, I " think, affirming that words have no meaning."

Dr. Sam. Clarke's fifth Reply to Leibnitz's fifth Paper. Sect. 104-106.

Is it preſumptuous to ſay, that the explanation of this ſingle prepoſition, would have decided the controverſy more effectually, than all the authorities and all the ſolid arguments produced by the wiſe and honeſt biſhop Procopowicz? And thus have withheld one handle at leaſt of reproach, from thoſe who aſſert—" Que l'on pourroit juſtement definir la theologie—L'art " de compoſer des chimeres en combinant enſemble des qualités impoſſibles " à concilier."—Syſteme de la Nature, Tom. II. p. 55.

" The

" The Larum rang BEGINNING Morning."

i. e. Morning being the *time* of its BEGINNING to ring.

B.

Still I have difficulty to truſt to this explanation. For Dr. S. Johnſon has numbered up *twenty* different meanings of this Prepoſition FROM. He ſays, it denotes,

" 1. *Privation.*
" 2. *Reception.*
" 3. *Deſcent* or *Birth.*
" 4. *Tranſmiſſion.*
" 5. *Abſtraction.*
" 6. *Succeſſion.*
" 7. *Emiſſion.*
" 8. *Progreſs from premiſſes to inferences.*
" 9. *Place* or *Perſon from whom a meſſage is brought.*
" 10. *Extraction.*
" 11. *Reaſon* or *Motive.*
" 12. *Ground* or *Cauſe.*
" 13. *Diſtance.*
" 14. *Separation* or *Receſſion.*
" 15. *Exemption* or *Deliverance.*
" 16. *Abſence.*
" 17. *Derivation.*

" 18. *Diſtance from the paſt.*
" 19. *Contrary to.*
" 20. *Removal.*"

To theſe he adds *twenty-two* other manners of uſing it. And he has accompanied each with inſtances ſufficiently numerous, as proofs *.

H.

And yet in all his inſtances (which, I believe, are above *ſeventy*) FROM continues to retain invariably one and the

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* Greenwood ſays—" FROM ſignifies *Motion* from a place; and then it " is put in oppoſition to TO.
" 2. It is uſed to denote the *Beginning of time.*
" 3. It denotes the *Original of Things.*
" 4. It denotes the *Order of a thing.*" (" And in theſe three laſt ſenſes " it is put before *Adverbs.*")
" 5. It ſignifies *Off.*"

The caprice of language is worth remarking in the words *Van* (the Dutch *From*) and *Rear*, both of which we have retained in Engliſh as *Subſtantives*, and therefore they are allowed with us to have a meaning. But being only employed as *Prepoſitions* by the Dutch, Italian and French; our philoſophers cannot be perſuaded to allow them any tranſmarine meaning.—*Animam mutant qui trans mare currunt.* And thus *Van* in Holland, *Von* in Germany, *Avanti* in Italy, and *Avant* and *Derriere* in France, are merely *des petits mots inventés pour etre mis* AVANT *les noms*, or, in the VAN of Nouns.

ſame

ſame ſingle meaning. Conſult them: and add to them as many more inſtances as you pleaſe; and yet (if I have explained myſelf as clearly as I ought, and as I think I have done) no farther aſſiſtance of mine will be neceſſary to enable you to extract the ſame meaning of the word FROM from all of them. And you will plainly perceive that the "*characters of quieſcence and of motion*," attributed by Mr. Harris to the word FROM, belong indeed to the words *Hang* and *Fall*, uſed in the different ſentences. And by the ſame manner of transferring to the *prepoſition* the meaning of ſome other word in the ſentence, have all Johnſon's and Greenwood's ſuppoſed different meanings ariſen.

B.

You obſerved, ſome time ſince, that the Prepoſitions WITH and WITHOUT were directly oppoſite and contradictory to each other. Now the ſame oppoſition is evident in ſome other of the prepoſitions: And this circumſtance, I ſhould imagine, muſt much facilitate and ſhorten the ſearch of the etymologiſt: For having once diſcovered the meaning of one of the adverſe parties, the meaning of the other, I ſuppoſe, muſt follow of courſe. Thus—Going TO a place;—is directly the contrary of—Going FROM a place.—If then you are right in your explanation of FROM; (and I will not deny that appearances are hitherto in your

favour); ſince FROM means *Commencement* or *Beginning*, TO muſt mean *End* or *Termination*. And indeed I perceive that, if we *produce* Mr. Harris's inſtances, and ſay,

"*Theſe figs came from Turkey* TO *England.*
"*The lamp falls from the cieling* TO *the ground.*
"*The lamp hangs from the cieling* TO *the floor*;"

as the word FROM denotes the *commencement* of the motion and hanging; ſo does the word TO denote their *termination:* and the places where they end or terminate, are reſpectively *England, Ground, Floor.*

And ſince we have as frequently occaſion to mention the *termination*, as we have to mention the *commencement* of motion or time; no doubt it was as likely that the word denoting *End* ſhould become a particle or prepoſition, as the word which ſignified *Beginning.* But in the uſe of theſe two words TO and FROM, I obſerve a remarkable difference. FROM ſeems to have *two* oppoſites; which ought therefore to mean the ſame thing: and, if meaning the ſame, to be uſed indifferently at pleaſure. We always uſe FROM (and *From* only) for the *beginning* either of *time* or *motion:* but for the *termination*, we apply ſometimes TO and ſometimes TILL: TO, indifferently either to *place*

or *time*; but TILL to *time* only and never to *place*. Thus, we may ſay,

> " *From morn* TO *night th' eternal larum rang.*"
> or, *From morn* TILL *night*, &c.

But we cannot ſay,—*From Turkey* TILL *England.*

H.

The oppoſition of Prepoſitions, as far as it reaches, does undoubtedly aſſiſt us much in the diſcovery of the meaning of each oppoſite. And if, by the total or partial extinction of an original language, there was no root left in the ground for an etymologiſt to dig up, the philoſopher ought no doubt to be ſatisfied with reaſoning from the contrariety. But I fear much, that the inveterate prejudices which I have to encounter, and which for two thouſand years have univerſally paſſed for learning throughout the world, and for deep learning too, would not eaſily give way to any arguments of mine *à priori*. I am therefore compelled to reſort to etymology, and to bring forward the original word as well as its meaning. That ſame etymology will very eaſily account for the peculiarity you have noticed: and the difficulty ſolved, like other enemies ſubdued, will become an uſeful ally and additional ſtrength to the conqueror.

The

The oppoſition to the prepoſition FROM, reſides ſingly in the prepoſition TO. Which has not *perhaps* (for I am not clear that it has not) preciſely the ſignification of *End* or *Termination*, but of ſomething tantamount or equivalent. The prepoſition TO (in Dutch written TOE and TOT, a little nearer to the original) is the Gothic ſubſtantive ΤΛΝΙ or ΤΛΝΗΤS, i. e. *Act*, *Effect*, *Reſult*, *Conſummation*. Which Gothic ſubſtantive is indeed itſelf no other than the paſt participle ΤΛΝΙΔ or ΤΛΝΙΔS, of the verb ΤΛΝϚΛΝ * *agere*. And what is *done*, is *terminated*, *ended*, *finiſhed* †.

After this derivation, it will not appear in the leaſt myſterious or wonderful that we ſhould, in a peculiar manner, in Engliſh, prefix this ſame word TO to the infinitive of our verbs. For the verbs, in Engliſh, not being diſtinguiſhed, as in other languages, by a peculiar termination, and it being ſometimes impoſſible to diſtinguiſh them by their *place*, when the old termination of the

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* In the Teutonic, this verb is written *Tuan* or *Tuon*, whence the modern German *Thun*, and its prepoſition (varying like its verb) *Tu*.

In the Anglo-ſaxon the verb is Teoϛan, and prepoſition To.

† " Dativus cuicunque orationi adjungi poteſt, in qua acquiſitio vel " ademtio, commodum aut incommodum, aut FINIS, quem in ſcholis " Logici *Finem cui* dicunt, ſignificatur."

Scioppii Gram. Philoſoph. pag. xiii.

Anglo-

Anglo-Saxon verbs was dropped, this word TO (i. e. *Æt*) became neceſſary to be prefixed, in order to diſtinguiſh them from NOUNS, and to inveſt them with the *verbal* character: for there is no difference between the NOUN, *Love*, and the VERB, TO *Love*, but what muſt be comprized in the prefix TO.

The infinitive therefore, appears plainly to be what the Stoics called it, the very verb itſelf; pure and uncompounded with the various accidents of *mood*, of *number*, of *gender*, of *perſon*, and (in Engliſh) of *tenſe*; which accidents are, in ſome languages, joined to the verb by variety of *termination*; and in ſome, by an *additional word* ſignifying the *added circumſtance*. And if our *Engliſh* Grammarians and Philoſophers had truſted ſomething leſs to their reading and a little more to their own reflection, I cannot help thinking that the very awkwardneſs and imperfection of our own language, in this particular of the *infinitive*, would have been a great benefit to them in all their difficulties about the VERB: and would have led them to underſtand and explain that which the perfection of more artificial and improved languages contributed to conceal from others. For I reckon it a great advantage which an *Engliſh* philoſopher has over thoſe who are acquainted with ſuch languages only which do this buſineſs by *termination*.

For

For though I think I have good reaſons to believe, that all theſe *Terminations* may likewiſe be traced to their reſpective origin; and that, however *artificial* they may now appear to us, they were not originally the effect of premeditated and deliberate *art*, but ſeparate words by length of time corrupted and coaleſcing with the words of which they are now conſidered as the *Terminations*: Yet this was leſs likely to be ſuſpected by others. And if it had been ſuſpected, they would have had much farther to travel to their journey's end, and through a road much more embarraſſed; as the corruption in thoſe languages is of much longer ſtanding than in ours, and more complex.

And yet, by what fatality I know not, our Grammarians have not only ſlighted, but have even been afraid to touch this friendly clue: for of all the points which they endeavour to ſhuffle over, there is none in which they do it more groſsly than in this of the Infinitive.

Some are contented to call TO, a *mark* of the *infinitive* mood *. But *how*, or *why*, it is ſo, they are totally ſilent.

* Lowth (page 66) ſays—"The *Prepoſition* TO placed before the Verb "makes the *Infinitive Mood.*" Now this is manifeſtly not ſo: for TO placed before the *Verb loveth*, will not make the *Infinitive Mood.* He would have ſaid more truly, that TO placed before ſome *Nouns* makes *Verbs.* But of this I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak hereafter, when I come to treat of the *Verb.*

Others

Others call it a *Prepoſition.*

Others, a *Particle.*

Skinner calls it an *Equivocal Article* *.

And others † throw it into that common ſink and repoſitory of all heterogeneous unknown corruptions,—the *Adverb.*

And when they have thus given it a *name*, they hope you will be ſatisfied: at leaſt they truſt that they ſhall not be arraigned for this conduct; becauſe thoſe who ſhould arraign them, will need the ſame ſhift for themſelves.

There is one miſtake however, from which this Prefix TO ought to have reſcued them: they ſhould not have repeated the error, of inſiſting that the *Infinitive* was a

* "Melius infinitiva ſua Anglo-ſaxones per term. AN, quam nos hodie "*Æquivoco illo articulo*, TO præmiſſo, ſæpe etiam omiſſo, diſtinxerunt."
Canones Etymologici.

† S. Johnſon ſays—"To, *adverb* [ꝺo, Saxon; *Te*, Dutch.]" And then, according to his uſual method, (a very convenient one for making a bulky book without trouble) proceeds to give inſtances of its various ſignifications, viz. "1. A particle coming between two verbs, and noting the "ſecond as the object of the firſt. 2. It notes the *intention.* 3. After an "adjective it notes its *object.* 4. Noting *Futurity.*"

mere *Noun* * : ſince it was found neceſſary in Engliſh to add another word (viz.) TO, merely to diſtinguiſh the *Infinitive* from the *Noun*, after the *Infinitive* had loſt that diſtinguiſhing *Termination* which it had formerly.

B.

I do not mean haſtily and without farther conſideration abſolutely to diſſent from what you have ſaid, becauſe ſome

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* " The words *Actiones* and *Lectiones* (Wilkins ſays) are but the plural ' number of *Agere*, *Legere*." However it muſt be acknowledged, that Wilkins endeavours to ſave himſelf by calling the *Infinitive*, not a mere noun, but a *Participle Subſtantive*.—" That which is called the *Infinitive* " *Mode* ſhould, according to the true analogy of ſpeech, be ſtyled a *Parti-* " *ciple Subſtantive*. There hath been formerly much diſpute among ſome " learned men, *whither* the notion called the *Infinitive Mode* ought to be " reduced according to the philoſophy of ſpeech. Some would have it to " be the *prime* and *principal* verb; as ſignifying more directly the notion " of action: and then the other varieties of the verb, ſhould be but the " inflexions of this. Others queſtion whether the Infinitive Mode be a " verb or no, becauſe in the Greek it receives articles as a noun. Scaliger " concludes it to be a *verb*, but will not admit it to be a *Mode*. Voſſius " adds, that though it be not *Modus in Actu*, yet it is *Modus in Potentia*. " All which difficulties will be moſt clearly ſtated by aſſerting it to be a " *Subſtantive Participle*." Real Character, Part IV. Chap. 6.

Mr. Harris without any palliation, ſays,—" Theſe *Infinitives* go farther. " They not only lay aſide the character of *Attributives*, but they alſo aſſume " that of *Subſtantives*.". Hermes, Book I. Chap. 8.

part

part of it appears to me plauſible enough. And had you confined yourſelf only to the *Segnacaſo* or *Prepoſition*, I ſhould not ſuddenly have found much to offer in reply. But when inſtead of the *Segnacaſo* (as Buonmattei claſſes it), or the *Prepoſition* (as all others call it), or the *mark* of the *Infinitive* (as it is peculiarly uſed in Engliſh), you direct me to conſider it as the neceſſary and diſtinguiſhing *ſign* of the VERB, you do yourſelf throw difficulties in my way which it will be incumbent on you to remove. For it is impoſſible not to obſerve, that the *Infinitive* is not the only part of our Engliſh verbs, which does not differ from the noun: and it reſts upon you to explain why this neceſſary *ſign* of the *Verb* ſhould be prefixed only to the *Infinitive*, and not alſo to thoſe other parts of the verb in Engliſh which have no diſtinguiſhing *Termination*.

H.

The fact is undoubtedly as you have ſtated it. There are certainly other parts of the Engliſh verb, undiſtinguiſhed from the noun by termination; but this is to me rather a circumſtance of confirmation than an objection. For the truth is, that to them alſo (*and to thoſe parts only* which have not a diſtinguiſhing termination) as well as to the Infinitive, is this diſtinguiſhing *ſign* equally neceſſary, and equally *prefixed*. Do (the *auxiliary* verb as it has been

called *) is derived from the ſame root, and is indeed the ſame word as TO. The difference between a T and a D is ſo

* "The verb to DO (ſays Mr. Tyrwhit, Eſſay, Note 37) is conſidered "by Wallis and other later grammarians, as an *auxiliary* verb. It is ſo uſed, "though very *rarely*, by Chaucer. It muſt be confeſſed that the exact "power which DO, as an auxiliary, now has in our language, is not eaſy to "be defined, and ſtill leſs to be accounted for from *Analogy*."

In Chaucer's time the diſtinguiſhing terminations of the verb ſtill remained, although not conſtantly employed; and he availed himſelf of that ſituation of the language, either to uſe them or drop them, as beſt ſuited his purpoſe, and ſometimes he uſes both *termination* and *ſign*. Thus, in the Wife of Bathes Tale, he drops the *Infinitive termination*; and uſes TO.

"My liege lady: generally, quod he,
"Women deſyren TO *have* ſoveraynte
"As well over her huſbondes as her love."

And again a few lines after, he uſes the infinitive *termination*, excluding TO,

"In al the court nas there wife ne mayde
"Ne widow, that contraried that he ſaide,
"But ſaid, he was worthy HAN his lyfe."

So alſo,

"I trowe that if Envye iwys
"Knewe the beſt man that is
"On thys ſyde or beyonde the ſee
"Yet ſomwhat LACKEN him wold ſhe."

Romaunt of the Roſe.

The ſame may be ſhewn by innumerable other inſtances throughout Chaucer.

B. Johnſon, in his Grammar, ſays—"The *Perſons plural* keepe the "termination of the firſt perſon ſingular. In former times, till about the "reigne

ſo very ſmall, that an Etymologiſt knows by the *practice* of languages, and an Anatomiſt by the *reaſon* of that practice, that in the derivation of words it is ſcarce worth regarding *. And for the ſame reaſon that TO is put before the Infinitive, DO uſed formerly to be put before ſuch other parts of the VERB which likewiſe were not diſtinguiſhed from the noun by termination. As we ſtill ſay—*I* DO *love*, —inſtead of—*I love*. And *I* DOED or DID *love*—inſtead of *I loved*. But it is worth our while to obſerve, that if a diſtinguiſhing *termination* is uſed, then the diſtinguiſhing DO or DID *muſt* be omitted, the *Termination* fulfilling its office. And therefore we never find—"I DID *loved*;" or "He DOTH *loveth*." But "I DID *love*" "He DOTH *love*."

It is not indeed an approved practice at preſent, to uſe DO before thoſe parts of the *Verb*, they being now by cuſtom ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed by their *Place*: and therefore the redundancy is now avoided, and DO is conſidered, in that caſe, as unneceſſary and expletive.

" reigne of King Henry the Eighth, they were wont to be formed by " adding *en*. But now (whatſoever is the cauſe) it hath quite growne out " of uſe, and that other ſo generally prevailed that I dare not preſume to " ſet this afoot againe." This is the reaſon why Chaucer uſed both TO and DO more rarely than we uſe them at preſent.

* See the Note, page 93.

However it is ſtill uſed, and is the common practice, and ſhould be uſed, whenever the diſtinguiſhing *Place* is diſturbed by *Interrogation*, or by the *inſertion* of a *negation*, or of ſome other words between the nominative caſe and the verb. As,—

" He DOES not *love* the truth.
" DOES he *love* the truth?
" He DOES at the ſame time *love* the truth."

And if we chuſe to avoid the uſe of this *verbal Sign*, DO, we muſt ſupply its place by a diſtinguiſhing termination to the verb. As,—

He *loveth* not the truth.
Loveth he the truth?
He at the ſame time *loveth* the truth.

Or where the verb has not a diſtinguiſhing termination (as in plurals)—

They DO not *love* the truth.
Do they *love* the truth?
They DO at the ſame time *love* the truth.

Here, if we wiſh to avoid the *verbal ſign*, we muſt remove the negative, or other intervening word or words from

from between the nominative caſe and the verb; and ſo reſtore the diſtinguiſhing *Place*. As,—

" They *love* not the truth.
" *Love* they the truth?
" At the ſame time they *love* the truth *."

And thus we ſee that, though we cannot, as Mr. Tyrwhit truly ſays, account for the uſe of this *verbal ſign* from any *Analogy* to other languages, yet there is no caprice in theſe methods of employing TO and DO, ſo differently from the practice of other languages: but that they ariſe from the peculiar method which the Engliſh language has taken to arrive at the ſame neceſſary end, which other languages attain by diſtinguiſhing *Termination*.

B.

I obſerve, that Junius and Skinner and Johnſon, have not choſen to give the ſlighteſt hint concerning the derivation of TO. Minſhew diſtinguiſhes between the prepoſition TO, and the *ſign* of the Infinitive TO. Of the firſt

* It is not however uncommon to ſay—" *They*, at the ſame time, *love* " the truth." Where the intervening words (*at the ſame time*) are conſidered as merely parenthetical, and the mind of the ſpeaker ſtill preſerves the connexion of *place* between the nominative caſe and the verb.

he is ſilent, and of the latter he ſays—" TO, as *to make*, " *to walk*, *to do*, a Græco articulo τὸ; idem eſt ut το ποιειν, " το περιπατειν, το πρατ∫ειν." But Dr. Gregory Sharpe is perſuaded, that our language has taken it from the Hebrew. And Voſſius derives the correſpondent Latin Prepoſition AD from the ſame ſource.

H.

Yes. But our Gothic and Anglo-ſaxon anceſtors were nŏt altogether ſo fond of the Hebrew, nor quite ſo well acquainted with it, as Dr. Sharpe and Voſſius were. And if Boerhaave could not conſent, and Voltaire * thought it ridiculous, to ſeek a remedy in South America, for a diſeaſe which was prevalent in the North of Europe, how much more would they have reſiſted the etymology of this pretended Jewiſh Prepoſition! for my own part, I am perſuaded that the correſpondent Latin Prepoſition AD has a more natural origin, and a meaning ſimilar to that of TO.

* " La Quinquina, ſeul ſpecifique contre les fiévres intermittentes, placé " par la nature dans les montagnes du Pérou, tandis qu'elle a mis la fiévre " dans le reſte du monde." *Voltaire's Hiſt. generale.*

" Il meurit à Mocha dans le ſable Arabique
Ce caffé neceſſaire aux pays des frimats;
Il met la fiévre en nos climats,
Et le reméde en Amerique."

Voltaire's Lettre au roi de Pruſſe.

It

It is merely the paſt participle of *Agere* *. (Which paſt participle is likewiſe a Latin *Subſtantive.*)

agitum-actum

AGDum	— AGD	—	AD
or	— or	—	or
ACTum	— ACT	—	AT.

The moſt ſuperficial reader of Latin verſe knows, how eaſily the Romans dropped their final *um:* for their poets would never have taken that licence, had it not been previouſly juſtified by common pronunciation. And a little conſideration of the organs and practice of ſpeech, will convince him how eaſily *Agd* or *Act*, would become AD or AT †, as

* My much valued and valuable friend Dr. Warner, the very ingenious author of METRONARISTON, *or a new pleaſure recommended, in a diſſertation upon Greek and Latin proſody*; has remarked that—" C and G were by the " Romans always pronounced hard, i. e. as the Greek K and Γ, before " ALL vowels: which ſound of them it would have been well if we had " retained; for, had this been done, the inconvenience of many equivocal " ſounds, and much appearance of irregularity in the language would have " been avoided."—Perhaps it may ſeem ſuperfluous to cite any thing from a book which muſt aſſuredly be in every claſſical hand; but it is neceſſary for me here to remind the reader of this circumſtance; leſt, inſtead of *Aggere* and *Aggitum*, he ſhould pronounce theſe words *Adjere* and *Adjitum*, and be diſguſted with a derivation which might then ſeem forced and unnatural.

† If the reader keeps in mind the note to page 93, he will eaſily perceive how *actum* became the irregular participle of *agere*, inſtead of *agitum*

as indeed this prepoſition was indifferently written by the antients. By the moderns the *prepoſition* was written AD with the D only, in order to diſtinguiſh it from the other corrupt word called the *Conjunction*, AT; which for the ſame reaſon was written with the T only, though that likewiſe had antiently been written, as the *prepoſition*, either AD or AT *.

B.

You have not yet accounted for the different employment of TILL and TO.

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or *agtum*. For it depended entirely on the employment or omiſſion of the *compreſſion* there noticed. And it is obſervable, that in *all* languages (for the natural reaſon is the ſame) if two of the letters (coupled in that note) come together, in one of which the compreſſion ſhould be employed and in the other omitted, the ſpeaker for his own convenience will either employ the compreſſion in both, or omit it in both; and that without any regard to the written character. Thus (amongſt innumerable inſtances) an Engliſhman pronounces—*obzerve*—and a Frenchman—*opserver*. So we learn from Quinctillian (lib. 1. cap. 7.) that the Romans pronounced *optinuit*, though they wrote *obtinuit*.—"Cum dico *obtinuit*, ſecundam B literam ratio poſcit; aures magis audiunt P."—In the ſame manner a Roman would pronounce the word either—*agdum*, or *actum*, that he might not in two letters coming cloſe together, ſhift ſo inſtantly from the *employment* to the *omiſſion* of the compreſſion.

* "AD & at, non tantum ob ſignificationem, ſed & originem diverſam, "diverſimodè ſcribere *ſatius* eſt."

G. J. Voſſius, Etymol. Ling. Lat.

H. That

B.

You acknowledge then that the oppoſition of prepoſitions is uſeful, as far as it reaches. But, beſides their *oppoſition* and abſolute *contradiction*, I ſhould imagine that the marked and diſtinguiſhed manner alſo, in which different prepoſitions are ſometimes uſed in the ſame ſentence, muſt very much tend to facilitate the diſcovery of their diſtinct ſignifications.

" *Well! 'tis e'en ſo! I have got the London diſeaſe they* " *call Love. I am ſick* OF *my huſband, and* FOR *my* " *gallant**."

Love makes her ſick OF, and ſick FOR. Here OF and FOR ſeem almoſt placed in oppoſition; at leaſt their effects in the ſentence are moſt evidently different: for, by the help of theſe two Prepoſitions alone, and without the aſſiſtance of any other words, ſhe expreſſes the two contrary affections of *Loathing* and *Deſire*.

H.

No. Small aſſiſtance indeed, if any, can be derived from ſuch inſtances as this. I rather think they tend to

* Wycherley's Country Wife.

miſlead

miſlead than to direct an inquirer. Love was not here the only diſeaſe. This poor lady had a complication of diſtempers; ſhe had two diſorders; a ſickneſs OF Loathing —and a ſickneſs OF Deſire. She was ſick FOR Diſguſt, and ſick FOR Love.

Sick OF *diſguſt* FOR *her huſband.*
Sick OF *love* FOR *her gallant.*
Sick FOR *diſguſt* OF *her huſband.*
Sick FOR *love* OF *her gallant.*

Her diſguſt was the OFFSPRING of her huſband, *proceeded from* her huſband, was *begotten* upon her *by* her huſband. Her gallant was the *cauſe* of her love.

I think I have clearly expreſſed the meaning of her declaration. And I have been purpoſely tautologous, that by my indifferent application of the two words OF and FOR—both to her diſguſt and to her love, the ſmalleſt appearance of oppoſition between theſe prepoſitions might be done away. Indeed, the difference between them (*thus conſidered*) appears to be ſo ſmall, that the author, if it had pleaſed him, might have uſed OF, where he has put FOR. And that he might ſo have done, the following is a proof.

" *Marian.*

" *Marian. Come, Amie, you'll go with us.*"

" *Amie. I am not well.*"

" *Lionel. She's ſick* OF *the yong ſhep'ard that bekiſt* " *her* *."

In the ſame manner we may, with equal propriety, ſay— " *We are ſick* OF *hunger*,"—or, " *We are ſick* FOR *hunger*." And in both caſes we ſhall have expreſſed preciſely the ſame thing.

B.

'Tis certainly ſo in practice. But is that practice juſtifiable? For the words ſtill ſeem to me to have a very different import. Do you mean to ſay that the words OF and FOR are ſynonymous?

H.

Very far from it. I believe they differ as widely as CAUSE and CONSEQUENCE. I imagine the word FOR (whether denominated *Prepoſition*, *Conjunction*, or *Adverb*) to be a *Noun*, and to have always one and the ſame ſingle ſignification, viz. CAUSE, and nothing elſe. Though Greenwood attributes to it *eighteen*, and S. Johnſon *forty-*

* Sad Shepherd, Act I. Sc. 6.

ſix

ſix different meanings: for which Greenwood cites above *forty*, and Johnſon above *two hundred* inſtances. But, with a little attention to their inſtances, you will eaſily perceive, that they uſually attribute to the *Prepoſition* the meaning of ſome other words in the ſentence.

Junius (changing P into F, and by metatheſis of the letter R) derives FOR from the Greek ϖρο. Skinner from the Latin *Pro*. But I believe it to be no other than the Gothic ſubſtantive ᚦᚨᛁᚴᛁᚾᚨ, CAUSE.

I imagine alſo that OF (in the Gothic and Anglo-ſaxon ᚨᚦ and Āþ) is a fragment of the Gothic and Anglo-ſaxon ᚨᚦᚨᚴᚨ, poſteritas, &c. Āþoþa, proles, &c. *. That it is a noun ſubſtantive, and means always *conſequence*, *offspring*, *ſucceſſor*, *followʒer*, &c.

And I think it not unworthy of remark, that whilſt the old patronymical termination of our northern anceſtors

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* "OF. A, ab. abs. de AN. S. OÞ. D. aff. B. af. Goth. ᚨᚦ. Exprimunt "Gr. απο, ab. de: præſertim cum απο ante vocabulum ab adſpiratione in- "cipiens, fiat αφ." JUNIUS.

Minſhew and Skinner derive OF from the Latin AB, and that from the Greek απο.

was

was SON, the Sclavonic and Ruſſian patronymic was OF. Thus whom the Engliſh and Swedes named *Peterſon*, the Ruſſians called *Peterhof*. And as a polite foreign affectation afterwards induced ſome of our anceſtors to aſſume *Fils* or *Fitz* (i. e. *Fils* or *Filius*) inſtead of SON; ſo the Ruſſian affectation in more modern times changed OF to *Vitch* (i. e. *Fitz*, *Fils*, or *Filius*) and *Peterhof* became *Petrovitch* or *Petrowitz*.

So M. de Broſſes (Tom. 2. p. 295.) obſerves of the Romans—" Remarquons ſur les noms propres des familles " Romaines qu'il n'y en a *pas un ſeul* qui ne ſoit terminé " en *ius*; deſinence fort ſemblable à l' υιος des Grecs, c'eſt " à dire *filius* *."

B.

Stop, Stop, Sir. Not ſo haſty, I beſeech you. Let us leave the Swedes, and the Ruſſians, and the Greeks, and the Romans, out of the queſtion for the preſent; and con-

* " Et quamvis nunc dierum habeant quidem ad Anglorum imitationem, " familiarum nomina; ſunt tamen ea plerumque merè patronymica: ſunt " enim Price. Powel. Bowel. Bowen. Pugh. Parry. Penry. Prichard. " Probert. Proger. &c. nihil aliud quam *Ap.* Rhys. *Ap.* Howel. *Ap.* Owen. " *Ap.* Hugh. *Ap.* Harry. *Ap.* Henry. *Ap.* Richard. *Ap.* Robert. *Ap.* " Roger. &c. AP, hoc eſt MAB, filius." WALLIS, Preface.

fine yourſelf, if you pleaſe, as in the beginning you confined my enquiry, to the Engliſh only. Above *two hundred* inſtances, do you ſay, produced by Johnſon as proofs of at leaſt *forty-ſix* different meanings of this one prepoſition FOR, when Harris will not allow one ſingle meaning to all the prepoſitions in the world together! And is it poſſible that one and the ſame author, knowing this, ſhould in the ſame ſhort preface, and in the compaſs of a very few ſhort pages, acknowledge the former to be "*the per-*" *ſon beſt qualified to give a perfect Grammar* *," and yet compliment the grammar of the latter, as the ſtandard of accuracy, acuteneſs and perfection †!

H.

Oh, my dear Sir, the wiſe men of this world know full well that the family of the *Blandiſhes* ‡ are univerſal favourites. Good breeding and policy direct us to mention the living only with praiſe; and if we do at any time hazard a cenſure, to let it fall only on the dead.

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* See A Short Introduction to Engliſh Gram. *Preface*, p. 6.

† See id. p. 14.

‡ See the *Heireſs*. (One little morſel of falſe moral excepted) the moſt perfect and meritorious comedy, without exception, of any on our ſtage.

B.

Pray, which of thoſe qualities dictated that remark?

H.

Neither. But a quality which paſſes for brutality and ill-nature: and which, in ſpite of hard blows and heavy burdens, would make me rather chuſe in the ſcale of beings to exiſt a maſtiff or a mule, than a monkey or a lapdog. But why have you overlooked my civility to Mr. Harris? Do you not perceive that by contending for only one meaning to the word FOR, I am forty-five times more complaiſant to him than Johnſon is?

B.

He loves every thing that is Greek, and no doubt therefore will owe you many thanks for this *Greek* favour.—*Danaos dona ferentes.*—But confirm it, if you pleaſe; and (if you can) ſtrengthen your doubtful etymology (which I think wants ſtrengthening) by extracting your ſingle meaning of FOR from all Greenwood's and Johnſon's numerous inſtances.

H.

That would be a tedious taſk; and, I truſt, unneceſſary; and for that reaſon only I have not purſued the method

you now propoſe, with all the other particles which I have before explained. But as this manner of conſidering the prepoſitions, though many years familiar to me, is novel to you, I may perhaps ſuppoſe it to be eaſier and clearer than it may at firſt ſight appear to others. I will riſque therefore your impatience, whilſt I explain one ſingle inſtance under each ſeparate meaning attributed to FOR.

Greenwood ſays—" The Prepoſition FOR has a great " many ſignifications, and denotes chiefly for what *purpoſe*, " *end*, or *uſe*, or for whoſe *benefit* or *damage* any thing is " done; As—*Chriſt died* FOR *us*." [i. e. *Cauſe* us; or We being the *Cauſe* of his dying.]

" 1. FOR ſerves to denote the *End* or *Object* which one " propoſes in any action; As—*To fight* FOR *the public good*." [i. e. CAUSE the public good; or, The public good being the *Cauſe* of fighting.]

" 2. It ſerves to mark the *Motive*, the *Cauſe*, the *Subject* " of any action; As—*He does all things* FOR *the love of* " *virtue*." [i. e. The love of virtue being the *Cauſe*.]

" 3. It is uſed to mark the uſe for which a thing is " done; As—*Chelſey Hoſpital was built* FOR *diſabled*

" *ſoldiers.*" [i. e. Diſabled Soldiers being the *Cauſe* of its being built.]

" 4. It is uſed likewiſe to denote *Profit*, *Advantage*, *Intereſt*; As—*I write* FOR *your ſatisfaction.*" [i. e. Your ſatisfaction being the *cauſe* of my writing.]

" 5. It is uſed to denote for what a thing is *Proper*, or " not; As—*It is a good remedy* FOR *the Fever.*" In which laſt example *to cure* is to be underſtood. [i. e. Curing the Fever being the *Cauſe* that it is called a *good* remedy.]

" 6. This prepoſition is uſed to denote *Agreement* or " *Help*; As—*The Soldier fights* FOR *the King.*" [i. e. The King being the *Cauſe* of his fighting.]

" 7. It is uſed to denote the *Convenience* or *Inconveni-* " *ence* of a thing; As—*He is big enough* FOR *his age.*" [i. e. His age being the *Cauſe* that he is big ENOUGH; or that his ſize anſwers our expectation.]

" 8. It is uſed to denote *Exchange* or *Trucking*, *Recom-* " *pence*, *Retribution* or *Requital* and *Payment*; As—*He* " *rewarded him* FOR *his good ſervices.*" [i. e. His good ſervices being the *Cauſe* of reward.]

" Hither

" Hither we may likewiſe refer theſe phraſes, *Eye* FOR *Eye*," &c. [i. e. An eye (deſtroyed by malicious violence) being the *Cauſe* of an eye taken from the convict in puniſhment.]

" 9. It is uſed to denote *Inſtead of, in the Place of*; As—*I will grind* FOR *him*." [i. e. He being the *Cauſe* of my grinding.]

" Sometimes it ſerves to denote a *Miſtake*; As—" *He ſpeaks one word* FOR *another*." [i. e. Another word being the *Cauſe* of his ſpeaking that word which he ſpeaks.]

" 10. It is uſed to denote the *Diſtribution* of things by *Proportion* to ſeveral others; As—*He ſets down twelve Acres* FOR *every man*." [i. e. Every or each man being the *Cauſe* of his ſetting down *twelve* acres.]

" 11. It denotes the *Condition of Perſons, Things* and *Times*; As—*He was a learned man* FOR *thoſe times*." [i. e. The darkneſs or ignorance of thoſe times being the *Cauſe* why he may be conſidered as a *learned* man.]

" 12. It is likewiſe uſed to denote *in the quality of*; As " —*He ſuborned him* FOR *a witneſs*." [i. e. FOR that he might be a witneſs; or, FOR to be a witneſs.—That he might be a witneſs; or, to be a witneſs being the *Cauſe* of his ſuborning him.]

" It ſignifies likewiſe as much as *Becauſe of, By reaſon* " *of*; As—*To puniſh a man* FOR *his crimes*." [i. e. His crimes being the *Cauſe* of puniſhment.]

" It ſignifies *As*, or *To be*; As—*He was ſent* FOR *a* " *pledge*." [i. e. That he might be a pledge, or to be a pledge being the *Cauſe* of his being ſent.]

" *During*; to denote the *Future Time*; As—*He was* " *choſen* [to ſome office] FOR *life*." [i. e. To continue in that office FOR life; or, FOR the continuance of his life—The continuance of his life being the *Cauſe* of the continuance of his office.]

" *Concerning, About*; As—*As* FOR *me*." [The ſentence here is not compleat; but it ſhall be explained amongſt Johnſon's inſtances.]

" *Not-*

" *Notwithſtanding:* As, after having ſpoke of the faults " of a man, we add, FOR *all that, he is an honeſt man.*" [i. e. Though all that has been ſaid may be the *Cauſe* of thinking otherwiſe, yet he is an honeſt man.]

S. Johnſon ſays, " FOR, Prepoſition.

" 1. *Becauſe of—That which we.* FOR *our unworthineſs* " [i. e. our unworthineſs the *Cauſe*] *are afraid to crave,* " *our prayer is, that God* FOR *the worthineſs of his Son* " [i. e. the worthineſs of his Son being the *Cauſe*] " *would notwithſtanding vouchſafe to grant.*"

" 2. *With reſpect to, with regard to*; As

" *Lo, ſome are vellom, and the reſt as good*
" FOR *all his lordſhip knows, but they are wood.*"

[i. e. As far as all that his lordſhip knows is the *Cauſe* of their being denominated *good* or bad, the reſt are as good.]

" 3. In this ſenſe it has often *As* before it; As—*As* " FOR *Maramaldus the general, they had no juſt cauſe to* " *miſlike him, being an old captain of great experience.*" [i. e. As far as Maramaldus the general might be a *Cauſe* of their diſcontent, they had no *juſt* cauſe to miſlike him.]

" 4. In

" 4. In the *Character* of; As—

" *Say, is it fitting in this very field,*
" *This field, where from my youth I've been a carter,*
" *I in this field ſhould die* FOR *a deſerter.*"

[i. e. Being a Deſerter, being the *Cauſe* of my dying.]

" 5. *With reſemblance of*; As—

" *Forward he flew, and pitching on his head,*
" *He quiver'd with his feet, and lay* FOR *dead.*"

[i. e. As if Death, or his being dead, had been the *Cauſe* of his laying; or, He lay in that *manner*, in which death or being dead is the *Cauſe* that perſons ſo lay.]

" 6. *Conſidered as*; *in the place of*; As—

" *Read all the Prefaces of Dryden:*
" FOR *thoſe our critics much confide in:*
" *Though merely writ at firſt* FOR *filling,*
" *To raiſe the volume's price a ſhilling.*"

[i. e. Read, &c. the *Cauſe* why you ſhould read them, being, that our critics confide in them. Though to fill up and to raiſe the volume's price was the *Cauſe* that they were at firſt written.]

" 7. *In*

" 11. *In proportion to*; As—*As he could ſee clear*, FOR " *thoſe times, through ſuperſtition, ſo he would be blinded,* " *now and then, by human policy.*" [i. e. The darkneſs, or ignorance, or bigotry of thoſe times being the *Cauſe*, why even ſuch ſight, as he then had, may be called or reckoned clear.]

" 12. *With appropriation to*; As—*Shadow will ſerve* " FOR *ſummer. Prick him:* FOR *we have a number of* " *Shadows to fill up the Muſter-book.*" [i. e. Summer is the *Cauſe* why *Shadow* will *ſerve*, i. e. will do; or will be proper to be taken. Prick him: the *Cauſe* (why I will have him pricked, or ſet down) is, that we have many ſhadows to fill up the Muſter-book.]

" 13. After O, *an expreſſion of Deſire*; As—

" *O!* FOR *a Muſe of fire, that would aſcend*
" *The brighteſt heaven of invention.*"

[i. e. O! I wiſh FOR a Muſe of fire, &c. i. e. A Muſe of fire being the *Cauſe* of my wiſhing.]

" 14. *In account of*; *In ſolution of*; As—*Thus much* " FOR *the beginning and progreſs of the deluge.*" [i. e. The " beginning and progreſs of the deluge is the *Cauſe* of thus

" 17. Noting *Power* or *Poſſibility*; As—FOR *a holy perſon* " *to be humble*; FOR *one, whom all men eſteem a ſaint, to* " *fear leſt himſelf become a devil, is as hard as* FOR *a prince* " *to ſubmit himſelf to be guided by Tutors.*" [i. e. To be humble is hard or difficult *Becauſe*, or, the *Cauſe* being, he is a holy perſon: To fear leſt himſelf become a devil is difficult *Becauſe*, or, the *Cauſe* being, he is one whom all men *eſteem a ſaint:* To ſubmit himſelf to be guided by Tutors is difficult *Becauſe*, or, the *Cauſe* being, he is a *Prince.* And all theſe things are equally difficult.]

" 18. Noting *Dependence*; As—*The colours of outward* " *objects, brought into a darkened room, depend* FOR *their* " *viſibility upon the dimneſs of the light they are beheld by.*" [i. e. Depend upon the dimneſs of the light as the *Cauſe* of their viſibility.]

" 19. *In Prevention of, for Fear of*; As

" *Corn being had down, any way ye allow,*
" *Should wither as needeth* FOR *burning in Mow.*"

[i. e. Burning in Mow, the *Cauſe* why it needeth to wither.]

And,

" *And,* FOR *the time ſhall not ſeem tedious,*
" *I'll tell thee what befell me on a day* *."

[i. e. The *Cauſe* of my telling thee, is, that the time may not ſeem tedious.]

" 20. *In Remedy of*; As—*Sometimes hot, ſometimes cold* " *things are good for the tooth-ach.*" [i. e. Their curing the tooth-ach the *Cauſe* of their being called *good.*]

" 21. *In Exchange for*; As—*He made conſiderable* " *progreſs in the ſtudy of the law, before he quitted that* " *profeſſion* FOR *this of Poetry.*" [i. e. The profeſſion of Poetry, the *Cauſe* of his quitting the profeſſion of the law.]

" 22. *In the Place of, Inſtead of*; As—*To make him* " *copious is to alter his character; and to tranſlate him* " *line* FOR *line is impoſſible.*" [i. e. Line *Cauſe* of line, or, Each line of the original being the *Cauſe* of each line of the tranſlation.]

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* So Chaucer,

" This dronken myller hath ytolde us here
Howe that begyled was a carpentere
Perauenture in ſkorne, FOR I am one."

Reue's prol. Fol. 15. pag. 2. col. 1.

" FOR they ſeemed philoſophers, they weren purſued to the dethe and " ſlayne." *Boecius.* Boke 1. Fol. 221. pag. 1. col. 1.

" 23.

" 23. *In Supply of, to ſerve in the Place of*; As—
" *Moſt of our ingenious young men take up ſome cried-up*
" *Engliſh poet* FOR *their model.*" [i. e. To be their model the *Cauſe* of taking him.]

" 24. *Through a certain Duration*; As

" *Since hir'd* FOR *life thy ſervile muſe muſt ſing,*
" *Succeſſive conqueſts and a glorious king.*"

[i. e. The continuance of your life the *Cauſe* of the continuance of your hire.]

" 25. *In Search of, in Queſt of*; As—*Some of the*
" *philoſophers have run ſo far back* FOR *arguments of*
" *comfort againſt pain, as to doubt whether there were*
" *any ſuch thing.*" [i. e. Arguments of comfort againſt pain the *Cauſe* of running ſo far back.]

" 26. *According to*; As—*Chymiſts have not been able,*
" FOR *aught is vulgarly known, by fire alone to ſeparate*
" *true ſulphur from antimony.*" [i. e. Any thing which is vulgarly known, being the *Cauſe* of ability, or of their being ſuppoſed to be able.]

" 27. Noting a *State of Fitneſs or Readineſs*; As—
" *Nay if you be an Undertaker, I am* FOR *you.*" [i. e. I

am an Undertaker, an Adverſary, a Fighter, &c. FOR you; or, I will undertake you; i. e. You the *Cauſe* of my being an Undertaker, &c.]

" 28. *In Hope of, for the Sake of*, noting the *final Cauſe*; " As—*Scholars are frugal of their words, and not willing to* " *let any go* FOR *ornament, if they will not ſerve* FOR *uſe.*" [i. e. Ornament the *Cauſe*; Uſe the *Cauſe*.]

" 29. *Of Tendency to, Towards*; As—*It were more* FOR " *his honour to raiſe the ſiege, than to ſpend ſo many good* " *men in the winning of it by force.*" [i. e. His honour the *Cauſe* why it were more *expedient, fitting, proper*, &c. to raiſe the ſiege.]

" 30. *In Favour of, on the Part of, on the Side of*; As " —*It becomes me not to draw my pen in the defence of a* " *bad cauſe, when I have ſo often drawn it* FOR *a good one.*" [i. e. A good one being the *Cauſe* of drawing it.]

" 31. Noting *Accommodation*, or *Adaptation*: As— " *Perſia is commodiouſly ſituated* FOR *trade both by ſea and* " *land.*" [i. e. Trade the *Cauſe* of its being ſaid to be *commodiouſly* ſituated.]

" 32.

" 32. *With Intention of*; As—

" *And by that juſtice haſt remov'd the Cauſe*
" *Of thoſe rude tempeſts, which,* FOR *rapine ſent,*
" *Too oft alas involv'd the innocent.*"

[i. e. Rapine the *Cauſe* of their being ſent.]

" 33. *Becoming, Belonging to*; As—

" *It were not* FOR *your quiet, nor your good,*
" *Nor* FOR *my manhood, honeſty and wiſdom,*
" *To let you know my thoughts.*"

[i. e. Your quiet is a *Cauſe*, your good is a *Cauſe*, my manhood, my honeſty, my wiſdom, each is a *Cauſe*, why it is not *fit* or *proper* to let you know my thoughts.]

" 34. *Notwithſtanding*; As—*Probability ſuppoſes that a* " *thing may, or may not be ſo,* FOR *any thing that yet is* " *certainly determined on either ſide.*" [i. e. Any thing yet determined being the *Cauſe* of concluding.]

" 35. FOR ALL. *Notwithſtanding*; As—FOR ALL *his* " *exact plot, down was he caſt from all his greatneſs.*" [i. e. His exact plot being, all of it, a *Cauſe* to expect otherwiſe; yet he was caſt down.]

" 36.

" 36. *To the Uſe of, to be uſed in*; As—

" *The Oak* FOR *nothing ill*;
" *The Oſier good* FOR *twigs*; *the Poplar* FOR *the Mill.*"

[i. e. Not any thing the *Cauſe* why the oak ſhould be pronounced bad; Twigs the *Cauſe* why the oſier ſhould be called good; the Mill the *Cauſe* why the poplar ſhould be eſteemed uſeful.]

" 37. *In conſequence of;* As—FOR *love they force* " *through thickets of the wood.*" [i. e. Love the *Cauſe.*]

" 38. *In recompenſe of*; As—

" *Now* FOR *ſo many glorious actions done*
" FOR *peace at home, and* FOR *the public wealth,*
" *I mean to crown a bowl to Cæſar's health:*
" *Beſides in gratitude* FOR *ſuch high matters,*
" *Know I have vow'd two hundred Gladiators.*"

[i. e. I mean to crown a bowl to Cæſar's health, the *Cauſe* —ſo many glorious actions; the *Cauſe*—peace at home; the *Cauſe*—the public weal. Beſides, I have in gratitude vowed two hundred gladiators, ſuch high matters being the *Cauſe* of my gratitude.]

" 39. *In proportion to*; As—*He is not very tall, yet* " FOR *his years he's tall.*" [i. e. His years the *Cauſe* why he may be eſteemed tall.]

" 40. *By means of; by interpoſition of;* As—*Moral* " *conſiderations can no way move the ſenſible appetite, were* " *it not* FOR *the will.*" [i. e. Were not the will the *Cauſe*.]

" 41. *In regard of; in preſervation of;* As—*I cannot* " FOR *my life.*" [i. e. My life being the *Cauſe*; or, To ſave my life being the *Cauſe* why I ſhould do it: i. e. though my life were at ſtake.]

" 42. FOR *to:* As—*I come* FOR *to ſee you.*" [i. e. To ſee you being the *Cauſe* of my coming.]

——" *A large poſterity*
" *Up to your happy palaces may mount;*
" *Of bleſſed ſaints* FOR *to increaſe the count:*"

[i. e. To increaſe the number being the *Cauſe* of their mounting.]

FOR. *Conjunction* *; As—

" *Heav'n*

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* So the French correſpondent *Conjunction* CAR (by old French authors written *Quar*) is no other than *Quâ re*, or, *Que* (i. e. Kai) *eâ re.*

" Qu and c, (ſays Laurenbergius) communionem habuere apud antiquos, " ut *Arquus, oquulus*, pro arcus, oculus. Priſc. Viciſſim *antiquus, aequus*, " pro antiquus, equulus, antiqui libri. *Cum* & *quum, cui* & *qui*, Terentius " Andriâ:

" *Heav'n doth with us as we with torches deal,*
" *Not light them* FOR *themſelves:* FOR *if our virtues*
" *Did not go forth of us, 'twere all alike*
" *As if we had them not.*"

[i. e. Themſelves not being the *Cauſe* of lighting them. If our virtues did not go forth of us, 'twere all alike as if we had them not: That is the *Cauſe* why heaven doth deal with us, as we deal with torches.]

" Andriâ: *Qui mihi expurgandus eſt*, pro cui: annotat Donatus. *Querquera*
" *febris*, Lucilius: *Quercera*, Gellius lib. 20. *Cotidie*, non *Quotidie*, ſcri-
" bunt Quintil. & Victorinus. *Stercilinium*, pro ſterquilinio, habent libri
" veteres Catonis de R. R. & Terentius Phormione: *Inſece* & *Inſeque*.
" Ennius, Livius, Cato: ut diſputat Gellius lib. 18. cap. 19. *Hujuſce*, &
" *hujuſque*, promiſcue olim ſcribebant. Hinc *Fortuna hujuſce diei*, apud
" Plinium, lib. 34. &, *Fortuna hujuſque diei*, apud Ciceronem, lib. 2. de
" legibus. Et Victor de regionibus urbis: VICUS. HUJUSQUE. DIEI. FORT.
" ÆD. Lex vetus ædificii: DIES OPERIS K. NOVEMB. PRIMEIS DIES PEQVN.
" PARS DIMIDIA DABITUR VBI PRÆDIA SATIS SUBSIGNATA ERUNT. AL-
" TERA PARS DIMIDIA SOLVETUR OPERE PERFECTO PROBATO QUE."

Of which innumerable other inſtances might alſo be given. And the Latins in cutting off the E at the end of *Que*, only followed the example of the Greeks, who did the ſame by Και (as ſhould have been mentioned before in the note to page 92). Thus in Sappho's ode to Venus,

Ηρε ὁτ]ι δ' ην το πρεπονθα, κ' ὁτ]ι
Δευρο καλοιμι.
Κ' ὁτ]ι γ' εμω μαλις' εθελω γινεσθαι.

Αι δε μη φιλει ταχεως φιλησει
Κ' ὁτ]ι κελευης.

" 2. *Becauſe*; *on this account that*; As—*I doubt not* " *but great troops would be ready to run*; *yet* FOR *that the* " *worſt men are moſt ready to move, I would wiſh them* " *choſen by diſcretion of wiſe men.*" [i. e. The worſt men are the moſt ready to move. That is the *Cauſe* why I would wiſh *them* (not the worſt men, but the troops) choſen by diſcretion of wiſe men.

" 3. *For as much. In regard that*; *in conſideration of*; " As—FOR *as much as the thirſt is intolerable, the patient* " *may be indulged the free uſe of Spaw water.*" [i. e. As much as the thirſt is intolerable, is the *Cauſe* why the patient may be indulged.]

" 4. FOR WHY. *Becauſe*; *For this reaſon that*; As, " *Solyman had three hundred field pieces, that a Camel* " *might well carry one of them, being taken from the car-* " *riage*: FOR WHY, *Solyman purpoſing to draw the emperor* " *unto battle, had brought no greater pieces of battery with* " *him.*" [i. e. the *Cauſe*, that.]

B.

FOR, is not yet your own, however hard you have ſtruggled for it: for, beſides Greenwood and S. Johnſon, you have ſtill three others to contend with. Wilkins

aſſigns *two* meanings to FOR. He ſays, it denotes—" *the* " *efficient or final cauſe, and adjuvancy or agreement with.*"

Lowth aſſerts that—" FOR, *in its primary ſenſe, is* loco " alterius, *in the* ſtead *or* place *of another.*" And he therefore cenſures Swift for ſaying—" *Accuſed the miniſters* " FOR *betraying the Dutch.*" And Dryden for ſaying—" *You accuſe Ovid* FOR *luxuriancy of verſe.*" Where, inſtead of FOR, he ſays OF ſhould be written.

And Mr. Tyrwhit, in his Gloſſary, ſays—" FOR. *Prep.* " *Sax. ſometimes ſignifies* AGAINST." Of which he gives three inſtances.

" He didde next his white lere
" Of cloth of lake fin and clere
" A breche and eke a ſherte
" And next his ſhert an haketon
" And over that an habergeon
" FOR percing of his herte."

Mr. Tyrwhit ſays,—" AGAINST, or to prevent piercing."

" Therfore FOR ſtealyng of the roſe
" I rede her nat the yate uncloſe."

Mr. T. ſays—" *Againſt* ſtealing."

" Some ſhall ſow the ſacke
" FOR ſheding of the wheate."

Mr. T. ſays—" to prevent ſhedding."

H. As

H.

As Wilkins has produced no *inſtances*, he has given me nothing to take hold of. And let any ingenuity try whether it can, with any colour of plauſibility, apply Dr. Lowth's meaning of *loco alterius*, or any other *ſingle* meaning (except *Cauſe*) to the inſtances I have already explained. His corrections of Swift and of Dryden, are both miſplaced. For the meaning of theſe paſſages, is,—

" *Betraying the Dutch*
" *Luxuriancy of verſe* } CAUSE of the accuſation.

So alſo in Mr. Tyrwhit's inſtances, though their conſtruction is aukward and faulty, and now out of uſe, yet is the meaning of FOR equally conſpicuous. The *Cauſe* of putting on the Habergeon, of the advice not to open the gate, of ſowing the ſack—being reſpectively—that the heart might not be pierced, that the roſe might not be ſtolen, that the wheat might not be ſhed.

B.

I will trouble you with only one inſtance of my own. How do you account for this ſentence?—" *To the diſgrace* " *of common ſenſe and common honeſty, after a long debate* " *concerning the Rohillas, a new writ was moved* FOR FOR " *old Sarum: and every orator was tongue-tied. Although*

" *it is as much the duty of the Houſe of Commons to examine* " *the claim of repreſentation, as of the other houſe to examine* " *the claim of peerage.*" Is the repetition of FOR tautologous, or only aukward?

H.

Only aukward. For here are two *Cauſes* mentioned. The *Cauſe* of the writ, and the *Cauſe* of the motion. By a ſmall tranſpoſition of the words you may remove the aukwardneſs and perceive the ſignification of the phraſe. —" *A motion was made* FOR *a new writ* FOR *old Sarum.*" [i. e. A new writ—*Cauſe* of the motion. Old Sarum, or a vacancy at Old Sarum—*Cauſe* of the writ.] And you will perceive that FOR may be repeated in a ſentence as often as you mean to indicate a *Cauſe*; and never elſe. As, " *A motion was made* FOR *an order* FOR *a writ* FOR " *the election of a burgeſs* FOR *to ſerve in parliament* FOR " *the borough of Old Sarum.*"

1. An order—Cauſe of the motion.
2. A writ—Cauſe of the order.
3. Election of a burgeſs—Cauſe of the writ.
4. To ſerve in Parliament—Cauſe of the election.
5. Borough of Old Sarum—Cauſe of the ſervice in Parliament.

So

So in theſe lines of Butler,

" The Devil's maſter of that office
" Where it muſt paſs, if't be a drum;
" He'll ſign it with *Cler. Parl. Dom. Com.*
" To him apply yourſelves, and he
" Will ſoon diſpatch you FOR his fee."

i. e. his fee the CAUSE.

B.

But if the words FOR and OF differ ſo widely as you ſay; if the one means *Cauſe* and the other means *Conſequence*; by what etymological legerdemain will you be able to account for that indifferent uſe of them which you juſtified in the inſtances of

" *Sickneſs* OF hunger; and *Sickneſs* FOR hunger."
" *Sickneſs* OF love; and *Sickneſs* FOR love."

H.

Qualified as it is by you, it is fortunate for me that I ſhall not need to reſort to Etymology for the explanation. Between the reſpective terms

" *Sickneſs* —— *Hunger*,
" *Sickneſs* —— *Love*,"

it is certainly indifferent to the ſignification which of the two prepoſitions you may pleaſe to inſert between them, whether

whether OF or FOR: this being the only difference, that if you inſert OF, it is put in *appoſition* to *Sickneſs*; and *Sickneſs* is announced the *Conſequence*: if you inſert FOR, it is put in appoſition to *Hunger* or to *Love*; and *Hunger* or *Love* is announced the *Cauſe* *.

B.

I do not well underſtand how you employ the term *Appoſition*. Scaliger, under the head *Appoſitio*, (Cap. CLXXVII. de cauſis) ſays—"Cauſſa propter quam duo "*ſubſtantiva* non ponuntur ſine copula, è philoſophia "petenda eſt. Si aliqua ſubſtantia ejuſmodi eſt, ut ex ea "& alia, unum intelligi queat; earum duarum ſubſtan- "tiarum totidem notæ (id eſt *nomina*) in oratione ſine "conjunctione cohærere poterunt."

* The Dutch are ſuppoſed to uſe *Van* in two meanings; becauſe it ſupplies indifferently the places both of our OF and FROM. Notwithſtanding which *Van* has always one and the ſame ſingle meaning, viz. *Beginning*. And its uſe both for OF and FROM is to be explained by its different *appoſition*. When it ſupplies the place of FROM, *Van* is put in *appoſition* to the ſame term to which FROM is put in *appoſition*. But when it ſupplies the place of OF, it is *not* put in *appoſition* to the ſame term to which OF is put in *appoſition*, but to its *correlative*. And between two *correlative* terms, it is totally indifferent to the meaning which of the two correlations is expreſſed.

H.

What Scaliger ſays is very true. And this is the caſe with all thoſe *prepoſitions* (as they are called) which are really *ſubſtantives*. Each of theſe—ejuſmodi eſt, ut ex ea & *alia* (to which it is *prefixed*, *poſtfixed*, or by any manner *attached*) unum intelligi queat.

B.

If it be as you ſay, it may not perhaps be ſo impoſſible as Lord Monboddo imagines, to make a Grammar even for the moſt barbarous languages: and the Savages may poſſibly have as compleat a *ſyntax* as ourſelves. Have you conſidered what he ſays upon that ſubject, Vol. I. Book 3. of his Origin and Progreſs of Language *?

H. I

* "The laſt thing I propoſed to conſider was, the expreſſion of the "*relation* or *connexion* of things, and of the words expreſſing them: which "makes what we call *Syntax*, and is the principal part of the grammatical "art."

"Now let ever ſo many words be thrown together of the moſt clear and "determinate meaning, yet if they are not ſome way connected, they will "never make diſcourſe, nor form ſo much as a ſingle propoſition. This "connexion of the parts of ſpeech in languages of art is either by ſeparate "words, ſuch as prepoſitions and conjunctions, or by caſes, genders, and "numbers, in nouns, &c. But in leſs perfect languages the moſt of "them are denoted by ſeparate words.

"Now

H.

I could ſooner believe with Lord Monboddo, that there are men with tails like cats, as long as his lordſhip pleaſes *; and

" Now as every kind of relation is a *pure idea of intellect, which never* " *can be apprehended by ſenſe,* and as ſome of thoſe relations, particularly " ſuch of them as are expreſſed by caſes, are very abſtract and metaphy- " ſical, it is not to be expected that ſavages ſhould have any ſeparate and " diſtinct idea of thoſe relations. They will therefore not expreſs them " by ſeparate words, or by the variation of the ſame word, but will throw " them into the lump with the things themſelves. This will make their " ſyntax wretchedly imperfect.—There are only three barbarous languages, " ſo far as I know, of which we have any particular account publiſhed that " can be depended upon. The Huron, the Galibi, and the Caribbee; of " which we have Dictionaries and Grammars alſo, *ſo far as it is poſſible to* " *make a Grammar of them.* With reſpect to ſyntax, the Hurons appear " to have *none at all:* for they have not *prepoſitions* or *conjunctions.* They " have no genders, numbers, or caſes, for their nouns; nor moods for their " verbs. In ſhort they have not, ſo far as I can diſcover, any way of con- " necting together the words of their diſcourſe. Thoſe ſavages therefore, " though they have invented words, uſe them as our children do when they " begin to ſpeak, without connecting them together: from which we may " infer, that Syntax, which completes the work of language, comes laſt in " the order of invention, and perhaps is the moſt difficult part of language. " It would ſeem however, that perſons may make themſelves underſtood " without ſyntax. And there can be no doubt but that the *poſition* of the " word will commonly determine what other word in the ſentence it is " connected with."

* As his Lordſhip (Vol. I. page 238) ſeems to wiſh for farther authorities for human tails, eſpecially of any tolerable length, I can help him to a tail of a foot long, if that will be of any ſervice.

and conclude with him, from the authority of his *famiſhed* friend, that human fleſh (even to thoſe who are not *famiſhed*)

" Avant que d'avoir vû cette ile, j'avois ſouvent oüy dire qu'il y avoit " des hommes à longues queües comme les bêtes; mais je n'avois jamais " pu le croire, & je penſois la choſe ſi éloignée de nôtre nature, que j'y " eus encore de la peine, lorſque mes ſens m'ôterent tout lieu d'en douter, " par une avanture aſſez bizarre. Les habitans de FORMOSA etant accou- " tumez à nous voir, nous en uſions enſemble avec aſſez de confiance pour " ne rien craindre de part ni d'autre; ainſi quoy qu' étrangers nous nous " croyons en ſeureté, & marchions ſouvent ſans eſcorte, lorſque l'experi- " ence nous fit connoître que c'etoit trop nous hazarder. Un jour quel- " ques uns de nos gens ſe promenant enſemble, un de nos miniſtres, qui " etoit de la compagnie, s'en eloigna d'un jet de pierre pour quelques be- " ſoins naturels; les autres cependant marchoient toûjours fort attentifs à " un recit qu'on leur faiſoit; quand il fut fini ils ſe ſouvinrent que le mi- " niſtre ne revenoit point, ils l'attendirent quelque temps; apres quoy las " d'attendre, ils allerent vers le lieu ou ils crurent qu'il devoit être: Ils le " trouverent mais ſans vie, & le triſte état où il étoit fit bien connoitre qu'il " n'avoit pas langui long-temps. Pendant que les uns le gardoient, les " autres allerent de divers côtez pour decouvrir le meurtrier: ils n'allerent " pas loin ſans trouver un homme, qui ſe voyant ſerré par les notres, " ecumoit, hurloit, & faiſoit comprendre qu'il feroit repentir le premier " qui l'approcheroit. Ses manieres deſeſperées firent d'abord quelqu' im- " preſſion; mais enfin la frayeur ceda, on prit ce miſerable qui avoüa qu'il " avoit tué le miniſtre, mais on ne put ſçavoir pourquoy. Comme le " crime étoit atroce, & que l'impunité pouvoit avoir de facheuſes ſuites, " on le condamna à être brulé. Il fut attaché à un poteau où il demeura " quelques heures avant l'execution; ce fut alors que je vis ce que juſques- " là je n'avois pu croire; ſa queuë étoit longue de plus d'un pied toute " couverte d'un poil roux, & fort ſemblable à celle d'un bœuf. Quand il

famiſhed) is the ſweeteſt of all viands to the human taſte, than admit that "every kind of *relation* is a *pure idea* "of

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"vit que les ſpectateurs étoient ſurpris de voir en lui ce qu'ils n'avoit "point, il leur dit que ce defaut, ſi c'en etoit un, venoit du climat, puiſque "tous ceux de la partie meridionale de cette Ile dont il étoit, en avoient "comme lui."

Voyages de Jean Struys, An. 1650. Tom. I. Chap. x.

The meek, modeſt, ſincere, diſintereſted, and amiable Doctor Horſley, LORD biſhop of Rocheſter, could have furniſhed the *other Lord* with an authority for Tails nearer home, in his own metropolitan city:——"Ex "hujus modi vocibus, fuerunt improbi nonnulli, quibus viſa eſt occulta "voluntas regis eſſe, ut Thomas e medio tolleretur; qui propterea velut "hoſtis regis habitus, jam tum cæpit ſic vulgo negligi, contemni ac in "odio eſſe, ut cum veniſſet aliquando Strodum, qui vicus ſitus eſt ad "Medveiam flumen, quod flumen Roceſtriam alluit, ejus loci accolæ "cupidi bonum patrem ita deſpectum ignominia aliqua afficiendi, non du- "bitarint amputare caudam equi quem ille equitaret; ſeipſos perpetuo "probro obligantes: nam poſtea, nutu dei, ita accidit, ut omnes ex eo "hominum genere, qui id facinus feciſſent, nati ſint inſtar brutorum ani- "malium caudati."—As this change of ſhape may afford a good additional reaſon why ſuch fellows ſhould have "nothing to do with the laws, but "to obey them," the biſhop perhaps will adviſe to ſink what Polydore kindly adds in concluſion,—"Sed ea infamiæ nota jam pridem una cum "gente illa eorum hominum, qui peccarint, deleta eſt."

Polyd. Virg. Urb. Angl. Hiſt. Fol. 218.

"But who conſiders right will find indeed,
"'Tis *Holy Iſland* parts us, not the Tweed.
Nothing but *Clergy* could us two ſeclude;
No Scotch was ever like a Biſhop's feud.

All

" *of intellect*, which *never can be apprehended by ſenſe*;
" and that thoſe particularly which are expreſſed by caſes,
" are more abſtract and metaphyſical than the others."

But his lordſhip and his fautors will do well to contend ſtoutly and obſtinately for their doctrine of language, for

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All Litanys in this have wanted faith,
There's no—*Deliver us from a Biſhop's wrath.*
Never ſhall Calvin pardon'd be for ſales;
Never, for Burnet's ſake, the Lauderdales;
For Becket's ſake Kent always ſhall have tales."

The Loyal Scot. By A. Marvell.

" Iohan Capgrave and Alexander of Eſſeby ſayth, that for caſtynge of
" fyſhe tayles at thys Auguſtyne, Dorſett Shyre menne hadde tayles ever
" after. But Polydorus applieth it unto Kentiſh men at Stroud by
" Rocheſter, for cuttinge of Thomas Becket's horſes tail. Thus hath
" England in all other land a perpetuall infamy of tayles by theyr wrytten
" legendes of lyes, yet can they not well tell, where to beſtowe them
" truely." Pag. 37.

And again, pag. 98.—" The ſpirituall ſodomites in the legendes of their
" ſanctified ſorcerers have diffamed the Engliſh poſterity with tails, as I
" have ſhewed afore. That an Englyſhman now cannot travayle in an
" other land, by way of marchandyſe or any other honeſt occupyinge, but
" it is moſt contumelioufly thrown in his tethe, that al Engliſhmen have
" tailes. That uncomly note and report have the nation gotten, without
" recover, by theſe laiſy and idle lubbers the Monkes and the Prieſtes,
" which could find no matters to advance their canoniſed gains by, or their
" ſaintes as they call them, but manifeſt lies and knaveries."

Iohan Bale. Actes of Engliſh Votaries.

they are menaced with a greater danger than *they* will at firſt apprehend: for if they give up their doctrine of language, they will not be able to make even a battle for their Metaphyſics: the very term *Metaphyſic* being nonſenſe; and all the ſyſtems of it, and controverſies concerning it, that are or have been in the world, being founded on the groſſeſt ignorance of words and of the nature of ſpeech.

As far as relates to *Prepoſitions* and *Conjunctions*, on which (he ſays) *Syntax* depends, the *principal and moſt difficult part* (as he calls it) of the Grammatical art, and which (according to him) is the *laſt in order of invention*, and compleats the work of language: As far as relates to theſe prepoſitions and conjunctions, I hope it is by this time pretty evident that, inſtead of *invention*, the *claſſes* of them ſpring from *corruption*; and that, in this reſpect, the Savage languages are upon an equal footing with the languages (as they are called) of *art*, except that the former are leſs corrupted: and that ſavages have not only as *ſeparate and diſtinct ideas* of thoſe relations as we have, but that they have this advantage over us (an advantage in point of intelligibility, though it is a diſadvantage in point of brevity) that they alſo *expreſs* them ſeparately and diſtinctly. For our *Prepoſitions* and *Conjunctions*, like the language of the Savages, are merely—" ſo many words of the moſt clear

" and

" and determinate meaning thrown together," or, (as he afterwards ſtrangely expreſſes it)—" *thrown into the lump* " *with the things* themſelves *."

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* What Lord Monboddo has delivered concerning Syntax, he has taken, in his own clumſy way, from the following erroneous article of M. de Broſſes.—147. *Fabrique des Syntaxes barbares.*—" Dans ſon origine, elle " n'a d'abord eu qu'un amas confus de ſignes épars appliqués ſelon le " beſoin aux objets à meſure qu'on les découvroit. Peu à peu la néceſſité " de faire connoître les circonſtances des idées jointes aux circonſtances " des objets, & de les rendre dans l'ordre où l'eſprit les place, a, par une " logique naturelle, commencé de fixer la veritable ſignification des mots, " leur liaiſon, leur régime, leurs dérivations. Par l'uſage reçu & invétéré, " les tournures habituelles ſont devenues les préceptes de l'art bons ou " mauvais, c'eſt à dire bien ou mal faits ſelon le plus où le moins de logique " qui y à preſidé; & comme les peuples barbares n'en ont gueres, auſſi " leurs langues ſont elles ſouvent pauvres & mal conſtruites: mais à meſure " que le peuple ſe police, on voit mieux l'abus des uſages, & la ſyntaxe " s'épure par de meilleures habitudes qui deviennent de nouveaux preceptes. " Je n'en dis pas davantage ſur l'etabliſſement des ſyntaxes; & même ſi j'y " reviens dans la ſuite, ce ne ſera qu'en peu de mots. *C'eſt une matiere* " *immenſe* dans ſes details, qui demanderoit un livre entier pour la ſuivre " dans toutes les opérations mechaniques du concept, qui en général la " rendent néceſſaire en conſequence de la fabrique du ſens interieur, mais " tres arbitraire dans ſes petits details, par le nombre infini de routes longues " ou courtes, droites ou tortues, bonnes ou mauvaiſes, que l'on peut " prendre pour parvenir au même but. Au ſurplus toutes ces routes bien " ou mal faites ſervent egalement dans l'uſage lorſqu'elles ſont une fois " frayées & connues." This *matiere immenſe*, as M. de Broſſes imagines it, is in truth a very ſmall and ſimple buſineſs. The whole of cultivated languages, as well as of thoſe we call barbarous, is merely " *un amas de* " *ſignes epars appliqués ſelon le beſoin aux objets.*"

B. Well,

B.

Well, Sir, after this tedious inveſtigation of FOR, (one half of which I think might have been ſpared) let us now, if you pleaſe, pauſe for a moment, and conſider the ground which we have beaten. The Prepoſitions IF, UNLESS, BUT, WITHOUT, SINCE, you had before explained amongſt the *Conjunctions*. To theſe you have now added the prepoſitions WITH, SANS, THROUGH, FROM, TO, WHILE, TILL, OF and FOR. Though we have ſpent much time, we have made but little progreſs, compared with what ſtill remains to be done: at leaſt if our language is as fertile in prepoſitions as Buffier ſuppoſes the French to be.

H.

I rather think we have made great progreſs. And, if you have nothing to object to my derivations and explanations, I muſt conſider the battle as already won. For I am not here writing a dictionary (*which yet ought to be done, and of a very different kind indeed from any thing ever yet attempted any where*), but only laying a foundation for a new theory of language. However, though the remaining prepoſitions are numerous, the greater part require but little, and many of them no explanation.

By.

By (in the Anglo-ſaxon written Bi, Be, Biȝ) is the Imperative Býð, of the Anglo-ſaxon verb Beon, *to be*. And our anceſtors wrote it indifferently either be or by. "Damville "be right ought to have the leading of the army, but, "bycauſe thei be coſen germans to the Admirall, thei be "miſtruſted." 1568. *See Lodge's Illuſtrations.* Vol. 2. pag. 9. This prepoſition is frequently, but not always, uſed with an abbreviation of conſtruction. Subauditur, *inſtrument, cauſe, agent,* &c. Whence the meaning of the omitted word has often been improperly attributed to by. *With* (when it is the imperative of þýþðan) is uſed indifferently for *By* * (when it is the imperative of Beon)

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* In compound prepoſitions alſo, the Anglo-ſaxon uſes indifferently either wiþ or Be; as,

wiþ-æftan	Be-æftan
wiþ-foran	Be-foran
wiþ-geondan	Be-geondan
wiþ-innan	Be-innan
wiþ-neoðan	Be-neoðan
wiþ-ufan	Be-ufan
wiþ-utan	Be-utan
wiþ-hindan	Be-hindan

though the modern Engliſh has given the preference to *Be*: having retained only two of the above prepoſitions commencing with wiþ, and dropped only two commencing with *Be*.

and

and with the ſame *ſubauditur* and imputed meaning: As—" *He was ſlain* BY *a ſword*, or, *he was ſlain* WITH *a ſword.*" —" *Kenwalcus was warreyd* WITH *the King of Britons.*" Wallis, confounding together the imperative of wyſ̄an with the imperative of ϒIΦΛN, ſays—" WITH indicat " *inſtrumentum*, ut Latinorum ablativus inſtrumenti; atque " etiam *concomitantiam*, ut Latinorum *cum.*"

BY was alſo formerly uſed (and not improperly nor with a different meaning) where we now employ other prepoſitions, ſuch as *For*, *In*, *During*, *Through*. As;—

" Aboute the XVIII yere of the reygne of Jue dyed " the holy byſhop Aldelme. Of him it is written, that " when he was ſtyred by his goſtly enymy to the ſynne " of the fleſh, he to do the more torment to himſelfe " and of hys body, wolde holde within his bedde by hym " a fayre mayden BY ſo long a tyme as he myght ſay over " the hole ſauter." Fabian LXXVI.

" The which BY a longe time dwelled in warre." XLV.

" To whom the fader had BY hys lyfe commytted " him." LXXII.

" He made Clement BY his lyfe helper and ſucceſſour." LV.

" Whom Pepyn BY his lyfe hadde ordeyned ruler of " Guian." LXXXIII.

" Sleynge the people without mercy BY all the wayes " that they paſſyd." LXXVIII.

So alſo OF was formerly uſed, and with propriety, where we now employ BY with equal propriety.

" Theſe quenes were as two goddeſſes
Of arte magike ſorcereſſes
Thei couthe muche, he couthe more:
Thei ſhape and caſt ayenſt hym ſore,
And wrought many a ſubtile wile.
But yet thei might hym not begyle.
Such craſte thei had aboue kynde,
But that arte couth thei not fynde,
OF whiche Uliſſes was deceived."

Gower. Lib. 5. *Fol.* 135. *Pag.* 1. *Col.* 2.

BETWEEN. BETWIXT.

BETWEEN (formerly written *Twene*, *Atwene*, *Bytwene*) is a *dual* prepoſition, to which the Greek, Latin, Italian, French, &c. have no word correſpondent; and is almoſt peculiar to ourſelves, as ſome languages have a peculiar dual

dual number. It is the Anglo-ſaxon Imperative *Be*, and ꝑpezen or *twain*.

BETWIXT (by Chaucer written *Bytwyt* *) is the imperative *Be*, and the Gothic ᵀᵛᵚS, or *two*: and was written in the Anglo-ſaxon Beꝑpeohs, Beꝑpeox, Beꝑpux, Beꝑpyx, and Beꝑpyxꝛ.

BEFORE, BEHIND, BELOW, BESIDE, BESIDES.

Theſe Prepoſitions are merely the imperative BE, compounded with the nouns FORE, HIND, LOW, SIDE, which remaining ſtill in conſtant and common uſe in the language; as—The *fore part*, the *hind part*, a *low place*, the *ſide*,—require no explanation.

BENEATH.

BENEATH means the ſame as *Below*. It is the imperative *Be* compounded with the *noun*, *Neath*. Which word *Neath* (for any other uſe but this of the *prepoſition*) having ſlipped away from our language, would perhaps have given ſome trouble, had not the *nouns*, *Nether* and *Nethermoſt*

* "Thy wife and thou mote hange fer atwynne,
"For that *Bytwyt* you ſhall be no ſynne."

Miller's Tale.

(corrupted

(corrupted from Neoðemeſt, Niðemæſt) ſtill continued in common uſe *. The word *Nether* is indeed at preſent fallen into great contempt, and is rarely uſed but in ridicule and with ſcorn: and this may poſſibly have ariſen from its former application to the houſe of commons, anciently called (by Henry 8) "*The* NETHER *houſe of* "*parliament* †." That the word ſhould thus have fallen into diſgrace is nothing wonderful: for in truth this *Nether end* of our parliament has for a long time paſt been a mere ſham and mockery of repreſentation, but is now become

---

* "——— yet higher than their tops
The verd'rous wall of paradiſe up ſprung:
Which to our general Sire gave proſpect large
Into his NETHER empire neighb'ring round."
Par. Loſt. Book IV. Ver. 445.

———"among theſe the ſeat of men,
Earth with her NETHER ocean circumfus'd
Their pleaſant dwelling place."
P. L. Book VII. V. 624.

"In yonder NETHER world where ſhall I ſeek
His bright appearances, or foot-ſtep trace?"
P. L. Book XI. V. 328.

† "Which doctrine alſo the lordes bothe ſpirituall and temporall, with "the NETHER houſe of our parliament, have both ſene, and lyke very wel."
A neceſſary doctrine and erudition for any chriſten man. Set furthe by the Kynges maieſtie of Englande. 1543.

an

an impudent and barefaced uſurpation of the rights of the people.

NEATH, Neoðan, Neoðe, (in the Dutch *Neden*, in the Daniſh *Ned*, in the German *Niedere*, and in the Swediſh *Nedre* and *Neder*) is undoubtedly as much a ſubſtantive, and has the ſame meaning as the word NADIR; which Skinner (and after him S. Johnſon) ſays, we have from the Arabians. This etymology (as the word is now applied only to aſtronomy) I do not diſpute; but the word is much more ancient in the northern languages, than the introduction of that ſcience amongſt them. And therefore it was that the whole ſerpentine claſs was denominated ᚾᛅᚦᚱ in the Gothic, and Neþre in the Anglo-ſaxon.

If we ſay in the Engliſh,—"*From the* TOP *to the* "BOTTOM,"—the *nouns* are inſtantly acknowledged: and ſurely they are to the full as evident in the collateral Dutch, "*Van* BOVEN *tot* BENEDEN,—BENEDEN *ſtad*, &c."

UNDER.

UNDER (in the Dutch *Onder*) which ſeems by the ſound to have very little connexion with the word *Beneath*, is yet in fact almoſt the ſame, and may very well ſupply its place: for it is nothing but *On neder*, and is a Noun.

" Nor engine, nor device polemic,
Diſeaſe, nor Doctor epidemic,
Though ſtor'd with deletory med'cines
(Which whoſoever took is dead ſince)
E'er ſent ſo vaſt a colony
To both the UNDER worlds, as He."

Hudibras. Can. 2. V. 320.

BEYOND.

BEYOND (in the Anglo-ſaxon wiðgeondan, Bigeond, Begeond) means *be paſſed.* It is the imperative *Be*, compounded with the paſt participle geond, geoned, or gond, of the verb Gan, Gangan, or Gongan, to *go*, or to *paſs*. So that—" BEYOND *any place*," means—" *Be paſſed* that " place,"—or, *Be* that place *paſſed.*

WARD.

WARD, in the Anglo-ſaxon ward or weard, is the imperative of the verb wardian or weardian, *to look at*; or to *direct the view.* It is the ſame word as the French garder *: and ſo Chaucer uſes it, where it is not called a prepoſition.

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* " Literarum g et w frequentiſſima eſt commutatio, &c."
Wallis's Preface.
" Galli ſemper g utuntur pro Sax. p. id eſt, pro w."
Spelman Gloſs. (*Garantia*).

" Take REWARDE of [i. e. Pay *regard* to, or *Look again* " at] thyn owne valewe, that thou ne be to foule to thy " ſelfe."

Parſons Tale. Fol. 101. pag. 2. col. 2.

" And yet of Danger cometh no blame
" In REWARD [i. e. *in regard*] of my doughter ſhame."

Rom. of the Roſe. Fol. 135. pag. 2. col. 1.

" This ſhuld a rigtwiſe lord haue in his thougt
" And nat be like tirauntes of Lombardy
" That han no REWARDE [i. e. *regard*] but at tyranny."

Legende of good Women. Fol. 206. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Wherfore God him ſelf toke REWARD to the thynges, " and theron ſuche punyſhment let fal."

Teſtament of Loue. Boke 2. Fol. 322. p. 2. c. 1.

Our common Engliſh word To reward *, which uſually, by the help of other words in the ſentence, conveys *To recom-*

* Skinner ſays—" REWARD q. d. *Re Award* (i. e. *contra* ſeu *viciſſim* " aſſignare, ab A. S. peapd verſus, erga. V. AWARD." And under Award, he ſays—" AWARD, a part. initiali otioſa A, et A. S. peapd. verſus. erga. " q. d. erga talem (i. e.) tali addicere, aſſignare."

S. Johnſon ſays, " REWARD [*Re* and *Award*] to give in return. Skinner." Which is the more extraordinary becauſe under the article Award, Johnſon ſays, that it is " derived by Skinner, ſomewhat *improbably*, from peapd. Sax. *towards*."

recompence, *To benefit* in return for ſome good action done; yet ſometimes means very far from benefit: as thus,—"*Reward* them after their doings"—where it may convey the ſignification of puniſhment; for which its real import is equally well calculated: for it is no other than *Regarder*. i. e. *To look again*, i. e. To remember, to reconſider; the natural conſequence of which will be either benefit or the contrary, according to the action or conduct which we *review*.

In a figurative or ſecondary ſenſe only, *Garder* means to *protect*, to *keep*, to *watch*, to *ward*, or to *guard*. It is the ſame in Latin: *Tutus*, guarded, *looked* after, ſafe, is the paſt participle of *Tueor*. *Tuitus*. *Tutus*. So *Tutor*, he who *looks* after. So we ſay either,—*Guard* him well, or, *Look* well after him. In different places in England, the ſame agent is very properly called either a *Looker*, a *Warden*, a *Warder*, an *Overſeer*, a *Keeper*, a *Guard*, or a *Guardian*.

Accordingly this word WARD may with equal propriety be joined to the name of any perſon, place, or thing, *to* or *from* which our view or ſight may be directed.

I ſuppoſe AWARD to be *à garder*, i. e. a determination *à qui c'eſt à garder* the thing in diſpute; i. e. to *keep* it—not *cuſtodire*, as Spelman imagined; but to *have* or *hold* it in poſſeſſion: for *garder* in French is uſed both ways, as *keep* is in Engliſh, and in both properly.

"He

——— " and forth goth he
" To ſhyppe, and as a traytour ſtale away
" Whyle that this Ariadne a ſlepe lay
" And to his *countreywarde* he ſayleth blyue."
Ariadne. Fol. 217. pag. 2. col. 1.

" Be this the ſon went to, and we forwrocht
" Left deſolate, the wyndis calmit eik:
" We not bekend, quhat rycht coiſt mycht we ſeik,
" War warpit to *Seywart* by the *outwart* tyde."
Douglas. Booke 3. pag. 87.

" The mone in till ane wauerand carte of licht
" Held rolling throw the heuynnis MIDDILWARDE."
Douglas. Booke 10. pag. 322.

" The *Landwart* hynes than, bayth man and boy,
" For the ſoft ſeſſoun ouerflowis ful of ioy."
Douglas. Booke 13. pag. 472.

" Lo Troylus, right at the ſtretes ende
" Came ryding with his tenthe ſomme yfere
" Al ſoftely, and *thyderwarde* gan bende
" There as thy ſate, as was his way to wende
" To *Paleyswarde.*"
Chaucer. Troylus. Boke 2. Fol. 169. p. 2. c. 2.

" As ſhe wold haue gon the way forth right
" *Towarde* the garden, there as ſhe had hight
" And he was to the *Gardenwarde* alſo."
Frankeleyns Tale. Fol. 55. pag. 2. col. 1.

" And than he ſonge it wel and boldely
" Fro worde to worde according to the note
" Twiſe a day it paſſeth through his throte
" To *Stolewarde,* and *Homwarde* when he went."
Prioreſſes Tale. Fol. 71. pag. 2. col. 1.

" To *Mewarde* bare he right great hate."

Romaunt of the Roſe. Fol. 138. p. 1. c. 1.

" He hath ſuche heuyneſſe, and ſuch wrathe to *uswarde*, bycauſe of our " offence."

Tale of Chaucer. Fol. 82. pag. 1. col. 1.

" But one thing I wolde wel ye wiſt
" That neuer for no worldes good
" Myne hert unto *birwarde* ſtood,
" But onely right for pure loue."

Gower. Lib. 5. Fol. 97. pag. 2. col. 2.

" But be he ſquier, be he knight
" Whiche to my *Ladyewarde* purſueth,
" The more he leſeth of that he ſeweth,
" The more me thinketh that I wynne."

Gower. Lib. 2. Fol. 28. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Wheras the Poo, out of a wel ſmall
" Taketh his firſt ſpring and his ſours
" That *Eſtwarde* euer increſeth in his cours
" To *Emelleward*, to Ferare, and to Venyſe."

Chaucer. Clerke of Oxenf. Tale. Fol. 45. p. 1. c. 2.

" If we turned al our care to *Godward*, we ſhuld not " be deſtitute of ſuch things as neceſſarili this preſente " lyfe nedeth."

Tho. Lupſet. Of diynge well. pag. 203.

" It is hard for a man in a welthy ſtate to kepe his " mind in a due order to *Godward*."

Ibid. pag. 205.

" The

" The which is with nothing more hurted and hyn-
" dered in his way to *Gracewarde* than with the brekinge
" of loue and charitie."

Lupſet. Exhortacion to yonge Men.

So we may bid the hearer *look at* or *regard* either the *End* or *Beginning* of any *action* or *motion* or *time*. Hence the compound prepoſitions TOWARD and FROMWARD, and Adverbs of this termination without number: in all of which, WARD is always the imperative of the verb, and always retains one ſingle meaning; viz. *Regard, Look at, See, Direct your view.*

Minſhew, Junius, and Skinner, though they are very clear that WARD and GARDER are, on all other occaſions, the ſame word; (and ſo in *Warden* and *Guardian*, &c.) yet concur that WARD the *Affix* or *poſtpoſitive prepoſition*, is the Latin *Verſus*: Skinner, with ſome degree however of doubt, ſaying—" A. S. autem Weapb, ſi a Lat. *Vertere*
" deflecterem, quid ſceleris eſſet?"—Surely none. It would only be an error to be corrected.

The French prepoſition *Vers*, from the Italian *Verſo*, from the Latin *Verſus* (which in thoſe languages ſupply the place of the Engliſh WARD, as *Adverſus* alſo does of

To-ward) do all indeed derive from the Latin verb *vertere*, to *turn*; of which thoſe prepoſitions are the paſt participle, and mean *turned*. And when it is conſidered that in order to *direct our view* to any place named, we muſt *turn* to it; it will not ſeem extraordinary, that the ſame purpoſe ſhould in different languages be indifferently obtained by words of ſuch different meanings, as *to look at*, or, *to turn to*.

ATHWART.

ATHWART (i. e. *Athweort*, or *Athweoried*) *wreſted, twiſted, curved*, is the Paſt participle of Þpeoꝑan, to *wreſt*, to *twiſt*; *flexuoſum, ſinuoſum, curvum* reddere; from the Gothic verb ᚦᚢᛉᚹᛖᚴᚷᚪᚾ. Whence alſo the Anglo-ſaxon Þpeoꝑ. Þpeoꝑh. the German *Zwerch*. *Zwar*. the Dutch *Dwars*. *Swërven*. the Daniſh *Tverer*. *Tvert*. *Tver*. the Swediſh *Twert*. and *Swarfwa*. and the Engliſh *Thwart*, *Swerve* and *Veer* *.

AMONG, AMONGST, YMELL.

Minſhew ſays—" ex Belg. *Gemengt*, i. e. *mixtus*."

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* Junius derives *Swerve* from the Hebrew. And all our Etymologiſts *Veer* from the French *Virer*.

Skinner

Skinner ſays—" ab A. s. Gemang, hoc a verbo Gemengan*."
Junius ſays—" Manifeſte eſt ex A. s. Mængan, Mengian,
" miſcere."

Here all our Etymologiſts are *right* in the meaning of the word, and *therefore concur* in their etymology. Mr. Tyrwhitt alone ſeems to have no notion of the word. For he ſays—" *I ſuſpect* the Saxon Gemang had originally " a termination in *an*." But Mr. Tyrwhitt muſt not be reckoned amongſt Etymologiſts.

EMONGE †, AMONGE ‡, AMONGES, AMONGEST §, AMONGST

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* In the Dutch *Mingen, Mengen, Immengen.*
German *Mengen.*
Daniſh *Mænger.*
Swediſh *Menga.*

† " The kynge with all his hole entent
" Then at laſte hem axeth this,
" What kynge men tellen that heis
" EMONGE the folke touchinge his name,
" Or it be price, or it be blame."
Gower. Lib. 7. Fol. 165. pag. 1. col. 2.

‡ " And tho ſhe toke hir childe in honde
" And yafe it ſouke; and euer AMONGE
" She wepte, and otherwhile *ſonge*
" To rocke with her childe aſlepe."
Gower. Lib. 2. Fol. 33. pag. 2. col. 1.

§ " I ſtonde as one AMONGEST all
" Whiche am oute of hir grace *fall.*"
Gower. Lib. 8. Fol. 187. pag. 2. col. 1.

AMONG,

AMONG, is the paſt participle Ge-mænczeð, Ge-menczeð, (or, as the Dutch write it, *Gemengd*, Gemengt; and the old Engliſh authors, Meynt *,) of the Anglo-ſaxon verb Gemænczan, Gemenczan, and the Gothic verb ᚷᚨᛗᚨᛁᚾᚷᚨᚾ. Or rather, it is the præterperfect Gemanz, Gemonz, Gemunz, or Amang, Among, Amung, (of the ſame verb Mænzan, Menzan) uſed as a participle, without the participial termination ob, að, or eb: and it means purely and ſingly *Mixed, Mingled.* It is uſual with the Anglo-ſaxons (and they ſeem to be fond of it) to prefix eſpecially to their paſt participles Á, Æ, Be, þoꝛ, Ge.

Chaucer uſes this participle AMONGES in a manner which, I ſuppoſe, muſt exclude all doubt upon the ſubject; and where it cannot be called a prepoſition.

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* "Warme milke ſhe put alſo therto
"With hony MEYNT, and in ſucke wiſe
"She gan to make hir ſacrifice."
Gower. Lib. 5. Fol. 105. pag. 2. col. 1.
"That men in eueryche myght ſe
"Bothe great anoye, and eke ſwetneſſe
"And ioye MEYNT with bytterneſſe
"Nowe were they eaſy, nowe were they wood."
Chaucer. Rom. of the Roſe. Fol. 130. pag. 1. col. 1.
"For euer of loue the ſickeneſſe
"Is MEYNT with ſwete and bitterneſſe."
Rom. of the Roſe. Fol. 130. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Yf thou caſteſt thy ſeedes in the feldes, thou ſhuldeſt
" haue in mynde that the yeres bene AMONGES, other-
" whyle plentuous, and otherwhyle bareyn."

Seconde Boke of Boecius. Fol. 225. pag. 2. col. 2.

This manner of uſing the præterperfect as a participle, without the participial termination *ed* or *en*, is ſtill very common in Engliſh; and was much more uſual formerly *. In the ſimilar verbs, To ſink Ge-ſencan, To drink Ge-ðrencan, To ſtink Ge-ſtencan, To hang ðenzan, To ſpring Á-ſpringan, To ſwing Spenzan, To ring Rinzan, To ſhrink Á-ſcrincan, To ſting Stingan, and in very many others, the ſame word is ſtill uſed by us, both as præterperfect and participle; *Sunk*, *Drunk*, *Stunk*, *Hung*, *Sprung*, *Swung*, *Rung*, *Shrunk*, *Stung*. All theſe were formerly written with an o (as *Among* ſtill continues to be) *Sonk*, *Dronk* (or *A-dronk*) *Stonk*, *Hong* (or *A-hong*) *Sprong* (or *Y-ſprong*) *Swong*, *Rong*, *Shronk*, *Stong*. But the o having been pro-

* Doctor Lowth is of a different opinion. He ſays—" This abuſe has " been long growing upon us, and is continually making further incroach-" ments," &c. But Doctor Lowth was not much acquainted with our old-Engliſh authors, and ſtill leſs with the Anglo-ſaxon. It is not an abuſe, but coæval with the language, and analogous to the other parts of it: but it muſt needs have been highly diſguſting to Doctor Lowth, who was excellently converſant with the learned languages, and took them for his model.

nounced as an u, the literal character has been changed by the moderns in conformity with the ſound. And though *Among* (by being ranked amongſt prepoſitions, and being unſuſpected of being a participle like the others) has eſcaped the change, and continues ſtill to be written with an o, it is always ſounded like an u; *Amung*, *Amunkſt*.

In the Reve's tale, Chaucer uſes the Prepoſition YMELL inſtead of *among*.

" Herdeſt thou ever ſlike a ſong er now?
" Lo whilke a complin is YMELL hem alle."

But this will give us no trouble, but afford a freſh confirmation to our doctrine: for the Danes uſe *Mellem*, *Imellem*, and *Iblandt*, for this prepoſition *Among*, from their verbs *Megler*, *Melerer*, (in the French *Meſler* or *Méler*) and *Iblander*, to *mix*, to *blend*; and the Swedes *Ibland*, from their verb *Blanda*, to *blend*.

YMELL means *y-medled*, i. e. *mixed*, *mingled*. A *medley* is ſtill our common word for a *mixture*. *Ymeddled*, *ymelled*, and *ymell* by the omiſſion of the participial termination, than which nothing is more common in all our old Engliſh writers.

" He drinketh the bitter with the ſwete,
" He MEDLETH ſorowe with likynge
" And liueth ſo, as who ſaieth, diynge."

Gower. Lib. 1. Fol. 17. pag. 1. col. 2.

" O mighty lorde, toward my vice
" Thy mercy MEDLE with juſtice."

Lib. 1. Fol. 24. pag. 2. col. 2.

" But for all that a man maie finde
" Nowe in this tyme of thilke rage
" Full great diſeaſe in mareiage,
" Whan venim MEDLETH with the ſugre,
" And mariage is made for lucre."

Lib. 5. Fol. 99. pag. 1. col. 1.

" Thus MEDLETH ſhe with ioye wo,
" And with her ſorowe myrth alſo."

Lib. 5. Fol. 116. pag. 1. col. 1.

" Whan wordes MEDLEN with the ſonge,
" It doth plefance well the more,"

Lib. 7. Fol. 150. pag. 1. col. 2.

" A kinge whiche hath the charge on honde
" The common people to gouerne
" If that he wil, he maie well lerne.
" Is none ſo good to the pleſance
" Of God, as is good gouernance.
" And euery gouernance is due
" To pitee, thus I maie argue,
" That pitee is the foundemente
" Of euery kynges regimente.
" If it be MEDLED with Juſtice,
" Thei two remeuen all vice,
" And ben of vertue moſt vailable
" To make a kinges roylme ſtable."

Lib. 7. Fol. 166. pag. 2. col. 1.

" But

" Bothe whiche hath his luſt aſſiſed
" With MEDLID loue and tyrannie."
Lib. 7. Fol. 170. pag. 2. col. 1.

" And MEDLETH ſorowe with his ſonge."
Lib. 8. Fol. 182. pag. 2. col. 2.

" We haunten no tauernes, ne hobelen abouten,
" Att markets and miracles we MEDLEY us neuer."
Pierce Plowmans Credr.

" There is nothyng that ſauoureth ſo wel to a chylde,
" as the mylke of his nouryce, ne nothyng is to him
" more abhomynable than the mylke, whan it is MEDLED
" with other meate."
Chaucer. Perſons Tale. Fol. 101. pag. 2. col. 1.

" His garment was euery dele
" Ypurtrayed and ywrought with floures
" By dyuers MEDELYNG of coloures."
Rom. of the Roſe. Fol. 124. pag. 1. col. 2.

" O God (quod ſhe) ſo worldly ſelyneſſe
" Whiche clerkes callen falſe felicite
" YMEDLED is with many a bytterneſſe
" Ful anguyſhous."
Troylus. Boke 3. Fol. 177. pag. 1. col. 1.

" Some on her churches dwell
" Apparailled porely, proude of porte
" The ſeuen ſacramentes they done ſell
" In cattel catchyng is her comfort
" Of eche matter they wollen MELL."
Plowmans Tale. Fol. 97. pag. 2. col. 1.

" Amang

" Amang the Grekis MYDLIT than went we."

Douglas. Booke 2. pag. 52.

" And reky nycht within an litil thraw
" Gan thikkin ouer al the cauerne and ouerblaw,
" And with the mirknes MYDLIT ſparkis of fire."

Douglas. Booke 8. pag. 250.

" Syne to thare werk in manere of gun powder,
" Thay MYDLIT and they mixt this fereful ſouder."

Douglas. Book 8. p. 257.

" And ſtedis thrawand on the ground that weltis,
" MYDLIT with men, quhilk ȝeild the goiſt and ſweltis."

Douglas. Booke 11. pag. 387.

" With blyithnes MYDDIT hauand paneful drede."

Douglas. Booke 11. pag. 394.

" Quhil blude and brane in haboundance furth ſchede
" MYDLIT with ſand under hors fete was trede."

Douglas. Booke 12. pag. 421.

" Above all utheris Dares in that ſtede
" Thame to behald abaſit wox gretumly
" Tharwith to MELL refuſing aluterlie."

Douglas. Booke 5. pag. 141.

" Quhen Turnus all the chiftanis trublit ſaw,
" And Eneas ſare woundit hym withdraw;
" Than for this haſty hope als hate as fyre
" To MELL in fecht he caucht ardent deſyre."

Douglas. Booke 12. pag. 420.

AGAINST.

AGAINST (in the Anglo-ſaxon Ongegen) is derived by Junius from geonb.

" Dr.

" Dr. Mer. Caſaubon " *mirabiliter* (ſays Skinner) de-
" flectit a Gr. κατα.

Minſhew derives it from καθεναῦι.

I can only ſay that I believe it to be a paſt participle, derived from the ſame verb (whatever it be, for I know it not) from which comes the collateral Dutch verb *Jegenen*, to meet, *rencontrer*, to oppoſe, &c. And I am the more confirmed in this conjecture, becauſe in the room of this prepoſition the Dutch employ *jegens* from *jegenen:* and the Danes *Mod* and *Imod*, from their verb *Möd*er of the ſame meaning: and the Swedes *Emot* from their verb *Möta* of the ſame meaning. The Daniſh and Swediſh verbs from the Gothic MΩTΘΛN; whence alſo our verb, to *meet*, and the Dutch *Moeten*, *Gemoeten*.

AMID or AMIDST.

Theſe words (by Chaucer and others written Amiddes) ſpeak for themſelves. They are merely the Anglo-ſaxon On-mibban. On-mibber, in medio: and will the more eaſily be aſſented to, becauſe the *nouns Mid*, *Middle*, (i. e. Mib-tæl) and *Midſt*, are ſtill commonly uſed in our language.

ALONG.

A LONG.

On long, ſecundum longitudinem, or *On length*: "And "theſe wordes ſaid, ſhe ſtreyght her *On length* (i. e. ſhe "ſtretched herſelf ALONG) and reſted awhile."

Chaucer. Teſt. of Loue. Fol. 325. pag. 1. col. 2.

The Italians ſupply its place by *Lungo*:

"Così *Lungo* l'amate rive andai." *Petrarch.*

And the French by the obvious noun and article *Le Long*:

"Joconde là deſſus ſe remet en chemin
"Révant à ſon malheur tout *Le Long* du voyage."

La Fontaine.

So far there is no difficulty. But there was another uſe of this word formerly; now to be heard only from children or very illiterate perſons:

"King James had a faſhion, that he would never ad-"mit any to nearneſs about himſelf, but ſuch an one as "the queen ſhould commend unto him, and make ſome "ſuit on his behalf; that if the queen afterwards, being "ill treated, ſhould complain of this *Dear one*, he might "make his anſwer—"It is LONG of yourſelf, for you "were the party that commended him to me."

Archbiſhop Abbot's narrative. In Ruſhworth's Collections. Vol. I. p. 456.

The Anglo-ſaxon uſed *two* words for theſe *two* purpoſes, Andlang, Andlong, Onblong, for the firſt; and Gelang for the ſecond: and our moſt antient Engliſh writers obſerved the ſame diſtinction, uſing ENDLONG for the one, and ALONG for the other.

" She ſlough them in a ſodeine rage
" ENDELONGE the borde as thei ben ſet."
Gower. Lib. 2. Fol. 31. pag. 1. col. 2.

" Thys kynge the wether gan beholde,
" And wiſt well, they moten holde
" Her cours ENDLONGE the marche right."
Lib. 3. Fol. 53. pag. 1. col. 1.

" That nigh his houſe he lette deuiſe
" ENDELONGE upon an axell tree
" To ſette a tonne in ſuche degree
" That he it might tourne about."
Lib. 3. Fol. 54. pag. 1. col. 1.

" And euery thyng in his degree
" ENDELONGE upon a bourde he laide."
Lib. 5. Fol. 100. pag. 2. col. 2.

" His priſoners eke ſhulden go
" ENDLONGE the chare on eyther honde."
Lib. 7. Fol. 155. pag. 1. col. 1.

" Than ſee thei ſtonde on euery ſide
" ENDLONGE the ſhippes borde."
Lib. 8. Fol. 179. pag. 1. col. 2.

" Loke what day that ENDELONG Brytayne
" Ye remeue all the rockes, ſtone by ſtone,

" That they ne let ſhyppe ne bote to gone,
" Than wol I loue you beſt of any man."
Chaucer. Frankeleyns Tale. Fol. 53. pag. 1. col. 2.

" This lady rometh by the clyffe to play
" With her meyne, ENDLONGE the ſtronde."
Hypſiphile. Fol. 214. pag. 1. col. 2.

" I ſette the point ouer ENDELONGE on the label."
Aſtrolabie. Fol. 286. pag. 2. col. 1.

" I ſette the poynte of F, ENDELONGE on my labell."
Aſtrolabie. Fol. 286. pag. 2. col. 2.

" We ſlyde in ſluddes ENDLANG feill coyſtes fare."
Douglas. Booke 3. pag. 71.

" Syne eftir ENDLANGIS the ſey coiſtis bray
" Up ſonkis ſet and deſis did array."
Booke 3. pag. 75.

" ENDLANG the coiſtis ſide our nauy rade."
Booke 3. pag. 77.

" Bot than the women al, for drede and affray,
" Fled here and there, ENDLANG the coiſt away."
Booke 5. pag. 151.

" In ſchawis ſchene ENDLANG the wattir bra."
Booke 7. pag. 236.

" ENDLANG the ſtyll ſludis calme and bene."
Booke 8. pag. 243.

" For now thare ſchippis full thik reddy ſtandis,
" Brayand ENDLANG the coiſtis of thar landis."
Booke 8. pag. 260.

" The

" Ye wote your ſelfe, as wel as any wight
" Howe that your loue al fully graunted is
" To Troylus, the worthyeſt wyght
" One of the worlde, and therto trouth yplight
" That but it were on him ALONGE, ye nolde
" Him neuer falſen, whyle ye lyuen ſholde."

Chaucer. Troylus. Booke 3. Fol. 176. pag. 2. col. 2.

Once indeed (and only once, I believe) Gower has confounded them, and has uſed ALONG for both purpoſes:

" I tary forth the night ALONGE,
" For it is nought on me ALONGE
" To ſlepe, that I ſoon go."

Lib. 4. Fol. 78. pag. 2. col. 1.

Anblanz or ENDLONG is manifeſtly *On long*, But what is Lelanz or ALONG?

S. Johnſon ſays it is—" a word now out of uſe, but " truly Engliſh." He has no difficulty with it: according to him, it is—" Lelanz, a fault, Saxon."—But there is no ſuch word in Saxon as Lelanz, *a fault*. Nor is that, at any time, the meaning of this word LONG (or ALONG, as I have always heard it pronounced). *Fault* or *not Fault*, always depends upon the other words in the ſentence: for inſtance,

" Thanks

other word.—" To Long, ſays Skinner, valde deſiderare, " ut nos dicimus, *to think the time* LONG *till a man ha's a* " *thing*."

The word LONG is here lugged in by head and ſhoulders, to give ſomething of an appearance of connexion between the verb and the noun. But when we conſider, that we have, and can have, no way of expreſſing the acts or operations of the mind, but by the ſame words by which we expreſs ſome correſponding (or ſuppoſed correſponding) act or operation of the body: when (amongſt a multitude of ſimilar inſtances) we conſider that we expreſs a moderate deſire for any thing, by ſaying that we *incline* (i. e. *Bend* ourſelves) to it; will it ſurprize us, that we ſhould expreſs an eager deſire, by ſaying that we LONG, i. e. Make long, lengthen, or ſtretch out ourſelves *after* it, or *For* it? eſpecially when we obſerve, that after the verb *To incline* we ſay *To* or *Towards* it; but after the verb *To Long* we muſt uſe either the word *For* or *After*, in order to convey our meaning.

Lenʒian in the Anglo-ſaxon is *To Long*, i. e. To *make long*, To *lengthen*, To *ſtretch out*, To *produce*, *extendere*, *protendere*.

DURING.

The French participle *Durant*; from the Italian; from the Latin. The whole verb *Dure* was ſome time uſed commonly in our language.

" And al his luſte, and al his beſy cure
" Was for to loue her while his lyfe mai DURE."
Chaucer. Man of Lawes T. Fol. 19. pag. 1. col. 2.

" How ſhuld a fyſhe withouten water DURE."
Troylus. Boke 4. Fol. 186. pag. 2. col. 1.

——" Elementes that bethe diſcordable
" Holden a bonde, perpetually DURYNG,
" That Phebus mote his roſy day forthbring
" And that the mone hath lorſhip ouer the nightes."
Troylus. Boke 3. Fol. 172. pag. 1. col. 1.

" Euer their fame ſhall DURE."
Teſtament of Loue. B. 2. Fol. 315. pag. 1. col. 1.

" This affection, with reaſon knytte, DURETH in eueryche trew herte."
Ibid. Boke 3. Fol. 331. pag. 1. col. 1.

" Deſyre hath longe DURED ſome ſpeking to haue."
Ibid. Boke 1. Fol. 306. pag. 1. col. 2.

PENDING.

The French participle *Pendant*; from the Italian; from the Latin.

OPPOSITE.

The Latin participle *Oppoſitus*.

" Problemes and demaundes eke
" His wiſedome was to finde and ſeke:
" Whereof he wolde in ſondrie wiſe
" Oppoſen them that weren wiſe.
" But none of them it might beare
" Upon his worde to yeue anſwere
" OUTTAKEN one, whiche was a knight."

Gower. Conf. Am. Fol. 25. pag. 1. col. 2.

" And alſo though a man at ones
" Of all the worlde within his wones
" The treaſour might haue euery dele:
" Yet had he but one mans dele
" Towarde hymſelfe, ſo as I thynke,
" Of clothynge, and of meate and drinke.
" For more (OUTTAKE vanitee)
There hath no lorde in his degree."

Gower. Fol. 84. pag. 2. col. 2.

" For in good feith yet had I *leuer*,
" Than to coueite in ſuche aweye,
" To ben for euer till I deye
" As poore as Job; and loueles,
" OUTTAKEN one."

Gower. Lib. 5. fol. 97. pag. 1. col. 2.

" There was a clerke one Lucius,
" A courtier, a famous man,
" Of euery witte ſomwhat he can,
" OUTTAKE that hym lacketh rule,
" His owne eſtate to guyde and rule."

Gower. Lib. 5. fol. 122. pag. 2. col. 2.

" For as the fiſhe, if it be drie,
" Mote in defaute of water die:

" Right

" And from the perrel ſaif, and out of dout
" Was al the navy, OUTTAKE four ſchippis loiſt."
Douglas. Booke 5. pag. 151.

" And ſchortly euery thyng that doith repare
" In firth or feild, flude, foreſt, erth or are,
" Aſtablit lyggis ſtyl to ſleip and reſtis
" Be the ſmall birdis ſyttand on thare neſtis,
" Als wele the wyld as the tame beſtiall,
" And euery uthir thingis grete and ſmall:
" OUTTAK the mery nychtyngale Philomene,
" That on the thorne ſat ſyngand fro the ſplene."
Douglas. Prol. to Booke 13. pag. 450.

" And alſo I reſygne all my knyghtly dygnitie, mageſty " and crowne, with all the lordeſhyppes, powre and pryui- " leges to the foreſayd kingely dygnitie and crown be- " longing, and al other lordſhippes and poſſeſſyons to me " in any maner of wyſe pertaynynge, what name and " condicion thei be of; OUTTAKE the landes and poſſeſ- " ſions for me and mine obyte purchaſed and boughte."
Fabian's Chronicle. Richard the Second.

NIGH. NEAR. NEXT.

NIGH, NEAR is the Anglo-ſaxon adjective Nih, Neh, Neah, Neahz, Vicinus. And NEXT is the Anglo-ſaxon ſuperlative Neahzeſt, Nehſt.

" Forſoth this prouerbe it is no lye
" Men ſay thus alway, the *Nye* ſlye
" Maketh the ferre loue to be lothe."
Chaucer. Myllers Tale. Fol. 13. pag. 1. col. 1.

" Lo

" Lo an olde prouerbe aleged by manye wyſe: Whan bale is greateſt,
" than is bote a Nye bore."

Teſt. of Loue. Boke 2. fol. 320. pag. 2. col. 2.

Mr. Tyrwhit in his gloſſary ſays well—" *Hext* Sax. " *higheſt. Hegh. Hegheſt. Hegſt. Hext.* In the ſame " manner NEXT is formed from Negh."—But he does not well ſay that—" Next generally means the *nigheſt following*, " but ſometimes the *nigheſt preceding*." For it means ſimply the *nigheſt*, and never implies either *following* or *preceding*. As, " To ſit NEXT." &c.

INSTEAD.

From the Anglo-ſaxon On ꝑtede, In ꝑtede, i. e. *In place.* In the Latin it is *Vice* and *Loco.* In the Italian *In luogo.* In the Spaniſh *En lugar.* And in French *Au lieu.* In the Dutch it is either *In ſtede* or *In plaats.* In the German *On ſtatt.* In the Daniſh *Iſtæden.* And in the Swediſh (as we uſe either *Home* STEAD or *Home* STALL) it is Iſtaellet.

Our oldeſt Engliſh writers more rarely uſed the French word *Place*, but moſt commonly the Gothic and Anglo-ſaxon word STAÐS, Sted, Stede. The Inſtances are ſo abundantly numerous that it may ſeem unneceſſary to give any.

" But take this lore into thy wit,
" That all thyng hath tyme and STEDE:

" The

" The churche ſerueth for the bede,
" The chambre is of an other ſpeche."
Gower. Lib. 5. fol. 124. pag. 1. col. 1.

" Geffray, thou wotteſt wel this
" That euery kyndely thynge that is
" Hath a kyndely STEDE there he
" May beſt in it conſerued be."
Chaucer. Fame. Boke 2. fol. 295. p. 2. c. 2.

" Furth of that STEDE I went."
Douglas. Boke 2. pag. 59.

" But ȝe, unhappy men, fle fra this STEDE."
Douglas. Boke 3. Pag. 89.

The ſubſtantive STEAD is by no means obſolete, as S. Johnſon calls it; nothing being more common and familiar than—" *You ſhall go in their* STEAD." It is likewiſe not very uncommon in compoſition; as *Homeſtead, Bedſtead, Roadſtead* *, *Girdleſtead* †, *Noonſted* ‡, Steadfaſt, Steady, &c.

One

* We often meet with the word *Roadſtead* in Voyages, and I ſuppoſe it is ſtill a common term with all ſeafaring men.—" On Thurſday Captain " Fauchey arrived at Plymouth. The purport of his diſpatches, we con- " ceive, can only be a repreſentation of the neceſſity of evacuating L'Iſle " Dieu; as it produces nothing, has no good *Roadſted*, and is not tenable, " if not protected by a fleet."
Morning Chronicle. October 19, 1795.

" Extract of a letter from Plymouth. The Anſon man of war, of 44 " guns, rode out the ſtorm like a duck, without the leaſt damage, in the

thinks, that *Step mother* is, quaſi *Stiff mother*, from *Stief*, durus; and ſo called becauſe ſhe is commonly " *dura*, " *ſæva, immitis, rigida.*" Voſſius on the contrary thinks ſhe is ſo called, quaſi *fulciens mater*, as a *ſtiff* and *ſtrong* ſupport of the family; " quia fulcit domum cum nova hæreditate." Junius, obſerving that there is not only *Stepmother*, but alſo *Stepchild*, *Stepſon*, *Stepdaughter*, *brother*, *ſiſter*, &c. to all of whom this imputation of ſeverity cannot ſurely belong, (neither can they be ſaid *fulcire domum cum nova hæreditate*) ſays *Stepmother* is ſo called, *quaſi orphanorum mater:* " nam ꝛcepan Anglo-" ſaxonibus, et *Stiufan* Alamannis *videntur olim uſurpata*, " pro orbare." S. Johnſon, neither contented with any of the foregoing reaſoning, nor yet with the *videntur olim uſurpata*, determined alſo to try his hand (and a clumſy one God knows it is) at an etymology; but inſtead of it produced a Pun. *Stepmother*, according to him, is—" a " woman who has *ſtepped* into the place of the true " mother."

" She by her ſpells could make the moon to ſtay,
" And from the Eaſt ſhe could keep back the day,
" Raiſe miſts and fogs that could eclipſe the light,
" And with the *Noonſted* ſhe could mix the night."
Drayton's Mooncalf.

" With all our ſiſter nymphs, that to the *Noonſted* look."
Poly-olbion. Firſt Song.

But in the Daniſh collateral language, the compounds remain uncorrupted; and there they are, with a clear and unforced meaning applicable to all—*Stedfader*, *Stedmoder*, *Stedbroder*, *Stedsöſter*, *Stedbarn*, *Stedſon*, *Steddotter*. i. e. Vice, Loco, in the place of, INSTEAD of a father, a mother, a brother, &c.

ABOUT.

Spelman. "ABUTTARE, occurrere, vergere, ſcopum "appetere, finem exerere, terminare. A Gallico *abutter*, "ſeu abouter; hæc eadem ſignificant.—*La Bout* enim "*finem*, *terminum*, vel *ſcopum* deſignat: Inde Angl. *a But* "pro meta; & ABOUT, pro circa rem vel ſcopum verſare. "Vox feodalis, & agri menſoribus noſtris frequentiſſima, "qui prædiorum fines (quos ipſi *capita* vocant, Marculſus "*frontes*, Galli *Bouts*) *abuttare* dicunt in adverſam terram; "cum ſe illuc adigant aut protendant. Latera autem "nunquam aiunt *abuttare* *: ſed terram proximam ad- "jacere. La couſtume reformée de Normandie, cap. 556. —"Le Serjeant eſt tenu faire lecture des lettres, & obli- "gations, & declaration, par *Bouts* & coſtes des dites "terres ſaiſies."

* I hardly venture to ſay that I believe, the correct and exact Spelman is here miſtaken.

Junius. " BUT, Scopus. G. *But.* Fortaſſe deſumptum " eſt nomen ab illis monticellis, qui in limitibus agrorum " ab Agrimenſoribus conſtituebantur, atque ab iis *Bodones* " ſive *Botones* nuncupabantur, & ad quos, artem ſagittandi " exercentes, tela ſua veluti ad ſcopum dirigebant."

Skinner. " ABOUT ab A. S. Abuta, Ymbutan, circum " illud, quantum ad priorem ſyllabam a præp. *Ab.* hoc " a præp. Ymb, quod a præp. loquerali Lat. *Am.* Gr. " Αμφι ortum ducit, uti, ſecundum poſteriorem ſyllabam " ab A. S. Ute vel utan foris, foras, extremus, item extre- " mitas, unde & defluxit Belg. *Buyten,* quod idem ſonat; " quod enim aliud ambit, partes ejus exteriores, i. e. ex- " timam ſuperficiem attingit & obvolvit."

" ABUTT, a Fr. *Aboutir.* Vergere, confinem eſſe, ubi " ſcilicet ager unus in, vel verſus, alium protenditur, & " ei conterminus eſt: hoc a nom. *Bout,* extremitas, ter- " minus: quod ſatis manifeſtè a præp. Lat. *Ab.* & A. S. " ute, Foras, Foris, ortum trahit, q. d. quod foras pro- " tuberat vel extuberat."

" BUT, a Fr. G. *Bout,* Extremitas, Finis, Punctum, " *Aboutir,* ad finem tendere, accedere, acuminari. *But* " etiam in re nautica *Extremitatem* alicujus rei ſignat, " manifeſte Franco Galliæ originis."

Menage.

Menage. " *Bute—Botto* & *Botontinus* ſe trouvent en " cette ſignification. Fauſtus & Valerius dans le receuil " des autheurs qui ont eſcrit de *limitibus* agrorum, page " 312.—" *In limitibus ubi rariores terminos conſtituimus,* " *monticellos plantavimus de terra, quos* BOTONTINOS appel- " lavimus." Le juriſconſulte Paulus livre V de ces ſentences titre 22.—" *Qui terminos effodiunt vel exarant* " *arboreſve terminales evertunt, vel qui convellunt* BO- " DONES, &c." Cujas ſur ce lieu :——" BODONES, ſic " uno exemplari ſcriptum legimus, cujus nobis copiam " fecit Pithæus noſter. *Bodones* ſive *Botones* vicem termi- " norum præſtant. Vox eſt Menſorum, vel eorum qui de " agrorum & limitum conditionibus ſcripſerunt *."

Spelman, Junius, Skinner and Menage, all reſort to Franco-Gall. for their etymology. As for BOTO and its diminutive BOTONTINUS (which have been quoted) they are evidently the tranſlation of a Gothic word common to all the northern nations: which word, as it ſtill remains in the Anglo-ſaxon dialect, was by our anceſtors written Boda (whence our Engliſh *To* BODE and many other words)

* So, *Vitalis de Limit.* " Hi non ſunt ſemper a ferro taxati, & circa " *Botontinos* conſervantur." *Innocent. de caſ. litter.* " Alius fontanas ſub " ſe habens, ſuper ſe montem, in trivio tres *Botontinos*." *Auctor de Agrim.* " Si ſint *Botontini* terræ ex ſuperis prohibeo te ſacramentum dare."

and means the firſt outward extremity or boundary of any thing. Hence Onboꝺa, Onbuꞇa, Ābuꞇa, ABOUT.

AFTER.

AFTER (Goth. ΛƑTΛRΩ A. S. Æfteꝛ. Dutch *Agter*, *Achter*. Daniſh, *Efter*, *Bag*. Swediſh *Efter*, *Åtra*, *Achter*,) is uſed as a noun adjective in Anglo-ſaxon, in Engliſh, and in moſt of the northern languages. I ſuppoſe it to be no other than the comparative of the noun AFT: (A. S. Æfꝛ) for the retention of which latter noun in our language we are probably obliged to our ſeamen.

Hind, *Aft*, and *Back*, have all originally the ſame meaning. In which aſſertion (although AFT had not remained in our language) I ſhould think myſelf well juſtified by the authority, or rather the ſound judgment, of Mr. de Broſſes; who ſays well—"Quelquefois la ſignifi- "cation primitive nous eſt derobée, faute de monuments "qui l'indiquent en la langue. Alors cependant on la "retrouve parfois en la recherchant dans les langues "meres ou collateralles." In the Daniſh language they expreſs the ſame meaning by, *For* og *Bag*, which we expreſs by *Fore* and *Aft*, or, *Before* and *Behind*. And in the Anglo-ſaxon they uſe indifferently Behindan, Bæfꝛan, and Onbæc.

DOWN,

" a Hill; but is uſed now as if derived from the adverb:
" for it means, 1ſt. A large open *plain or valley.*"

And as an inſtance of its meaning a *valley*, he immediately preſents us with *Saliſbury Plain.*

> " *On* the *Downs* as we ſee, near Wilton the fair,
> " A haſt'ned hare from greedy greyhound go."

He then gives four inſtances more to ſhew that it means a *valley*; in every one of which it means hills or riſing grounds. To compleat the abſurdity, he then ſays, it means, " 2dly. A hill, a riſing ground; and that, *This ſenſe is very rare.*" Although it has this ſenſe in every inſtance he has given for a contrary ſenſe: nor has he given, nor could he give, any inſtance where this ſubſtantive has any other ſenſe than that which he ſays is ſo rare.—But this is like all the reſt from this quarter; and I repeat it again, the book is a diſgrace to the country.

Freret, Falconer, Wachter and De Broſſes, have all laborioufly and learnedly (but, I think, not happily) conſidered the word *Dun.*

From what Camden ſays of the antient names (*Danmonii* or *Dunmonii*, and *Dobuni*) of the inhabitants of Cornwal

Cornwal and Glouceſterſhire, and of the two rivers (*Daven* or *Dan* or *Dun* or *Don*) in Cheſhire and in Yorkſhire; it ſeems as if he ſuppoſed, that our Engliſh word DOWN came to us from the Britons.

Solinus, he obſerves, called the Corniſh men *Dunmonii*; "which name ſeems to come from their dwelling there "under hills. For their habitation all over this country "is low and in vallies; which manner of dwelling is "called in the Britiſh tongue *Danmunith*. In which ſenſe "alſo the province next adjoining is at this day named by "the Britons *Duffneint*, that is to ſay, *Low vallies*."

Of the *Dobuni* he ſays,—"This their name, I believe, "is formed from *Duffen*, a Britiſh word; becauſe the "places where they planted themſelves, were for the moſt "part low and lying under the hills."

Speaking of the river in Cheſhire, he ſays,—"Then "cometh this *Dan* or more truly *Daven*, to *Davenport*, "commonly called *Danport*."

Of the river in Yorkſhire, he ſays,—"The river *Danus*, "commonly called *Dan* or *Dune*, ſo termed, as it ſhould "ſeem, becauſe it is carried in a channel low and ſunk

"in

" in the ground: for ſo much ſignifieth *Dan* in the Britiſh " language *."

Selden, in his notes on the firſt ſong of Drayton's Poly-olbion, gives full aſſent to Camden's etymology. He ſays, —" *Duffneint*, i. e. low valleys in Britiſh, as judicious " Camden teaches me."

Milton, I doubt not on the ſame authority, calls the river " the *gulphy* DUN."

" Rivers ariſe; whether thou be the ſon
" Of utmoſt Tweed, or Ooſe, or gulphy *Dun*."

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* " Regionem illam inſedêrunt antiquitùs Britanni, qui Solino *Dunmonii* " dicti. Quod nomen ab habitatione ſub montibus factum videatur. In- " ferius enim, et convallibus paſſim per hanc regionem habitatur, quod " *Danmunith* Britannicè dicitur: quo etiam ſenſu proxima provincia *Duff-* " *neint*, i. e. Depreſſæ valles a Britannis hodie vocatur."

Pag. 133. Folio Edit. 1607.

" *Dobunos* videamus, qui olim, ubi nunc Gloceſterſhire et Oxfordſhire, " habitârunt. Horum nomen factum a *Duffen* Britannica dictione credi- " mus; quòd maxima ex parte loca jacentia et depreſſa ſub collibus in- " ſidebant." Pag. 249.

" *Dan* vel *Daven* e montibus &c. fertur ad &c. Deinde Davenport, " vulgò *Danport* accedit." Pag. 461.

" *Danus*, vulgò *Don* et *Dune*, ita, ut videtur, nominatus, quòd preſſiori " et inferiori in ſolum labitur alveo; id enim *Dan* Britannis ſignificat." Pag. 562.

And Biſhop Gibſon concurs with the ſame; tranſlating, without any diſſent, the marginal note, " *Duffen* Britan- " nicè profundum ſive depreſſum," in theſe words, " *Duffen*, " in Britiſh, deep or low."

How then, againſt ſuch authorities, ſhall I, with whatever reaſon fortified, venture to declare, that I am far from thinking that the Anglo-ſaxons received either the name of theſe rivers, or their word DUN, ADUN (which is evidently our word DOWN, ADOWN, differently ſpelled) in any manner from the Britiſh language. And as for *Duffen* (from which, with Camden, I think the words proceeded) we have it in our own language the Anglo-ſaxon, and with the ſame meaning of *ſunk*, *depreſſum*, *deep* or *low*.

If, with Camden, we can ſuppoſe the Anglo-ſaxon *Dun* to have proceeded through the gradations of

Dufen { *Duven*, *Duvn*, *Dun*, *Don*, *Down*. / *Daven*, *Davn*, *Dan*.

I ſhould think it more natural to derive both the name of the rivers * and the prepoſition from Dupen †, the paſt participle

* I ſuppoſe the river *Dove* in Staffordſhire to have its denomination from the ſame word, and for the ſame reaſon.

† The

participle of the Anglo-ſaxon verb Dupian, *mergere*, to *ſink*, to *plunge*, to *dive*, to *dip*. And the uſual prefix to the Anglo-ſaxon participles, A, in Adun, ſtrongly favours the ſuppoſition. In moſt of the paſſages too in which the prepoſition or adverb DOWN is uſed in Engliſh, the ſenſe of this participle is *clearly* expreſſed; and, without the leaſt ſtraining or twiſting, the acknowledged participle may be put inſtead of the ſuppoſed prepoſition: although there may perhaps be ſome paſſages in which the *prepoſition* DOWN is uſed, where the meaning of the participle may not *ſo plainly* appear.

UPON. UP. OVER. BOVE. ABOVE.

Theſe prepoſitions have all one common origin and ſignification, Upon. Upan. Upa.

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† The Anglo-ſaxons uſe indifferently for the paſt participle of Dupian either Dupeb, or Dupen or Dopen. I ſuppoſe this ſame verb to have been variouſly pronounced,

Dopian Dupian Dapian	Hence	Dopen. *Doven. Dovn. Doun.* DOWN. DON. Dupen. *Duven. Duvn.* DUN. DUNE. Dapen. *Daven. Davn.* DAN.
Dỳpian or Dỳpan	—	To *Dive.*

In

In the Anglo-ſaxon Uꝑa. Uꝑeꝛa. Uꝑemæꝛꞇ. are the nouns, *altus*, *altior*, *altiſſimus*.

Uꝑon, Uꝑan, Uꝑa. Altus (Fr. Th. *Uph.*) UPON. UP.

Uꝑeꝛa, Oꝑeꝛe, Oꝑeꝛ, Altior.—OVER or UPPER.

Uꝑemæꝛꞇ. Altiſſimus. UPMOST, UPPERMOST, UPPEREST, OVEREST.

Be-uꝑan or Buꝑan. BOVE.

On-buꝑan. ABOVE.

The uſe of theſe words in Engliſh as adjectives is very common; as it is alſo in all the northern languages: for the ſame words are uſed in all of them *.

" Aboue his hede alſo there hongeth
" A fruite whiche to that peine longeth:
" And that fruite toucheth euer in one
" His over lippe."

Gower. Lib. 5. Fol. 85. pag. 2. col. 2.

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* Germ. *Auf. Auber.*
Oben. Ober. Oberſte.
Dutch. *Op. Opper. Opperſte.*
Boven. Over. Overſte.
Daniſh. *Oven. Over. Overſte.*
Ober.
Swediſh. *Uppe. Öfwer. Öfwerſte.*
Up. Öfre. Ypperſt.

" Her OVER lyp wyped ſhe ſo clene
" That in her cup was no ferthynge ſene."
Prol. to Cant. Tales. Prioreſſe.

" Ful thredbare was his OVER courtpy."
Prol. to Cant. Tales. Clerke of Oxenf.

" That of his wurſhip recketh he ſo lyte
" Hys OVEREST ſloppe is not worth a myte."
Prol. to Chan. Yeman's Tale.

" By which degrees men myght climben from the " *neythereſt* letter to the UPPEREST."

Boecius. Boke 1. Fol. 221. pag. 1. col. 1.

" Why ſuffreth he ſuche flyding chaunges, that myſ- " turnen ſuche noble thynges as ben we men, that arne a " fayre perſell of the erth, and holden the UPPEREST de- " gree under God of benigne thinges."

Teſt. of Loue. Fol. 312. pag. 1. col. 1.

It is not neceſſary for my preſent purpoſe, to trace the Particles any farther than to ſome Noun or Verb of a determinate ſignification; and therefore I might here ſtop at the Anglo-ſaxon noun Uƿan, *Altus.* But I believe that Uƿon, Uƿa; UPON, UP, means the ſame as *Top* or *Head*, and is originally derived from the ſame ſource. Thus,

" Low-

" Lowlineſs is young ambition's ladder,
" Whereto the climber *Upwards* turns his face;
" But when he hath attain'd the *Topmoſt* round,
" He then unto the ladder turns his back."

Where you may uſe indifferently either *Upward*, *Topward*, or *Headward*; or *Topmoſt*, *Upmoſt*, or *Headmoſt*.

Some etymologiſts have choſen to derive the name of that part of our body from the Scythian HA, altus; or the Iſlandic HAD, altitudo; or the Gothic hanh, altus; or (with Junius) from the Greek υπατος; or Theot. HOH; or the Anglo-ſaxon *Heab*. But our Engliſh words *Head* and *Heaven* are evidently the paſt participles *Heaved* and *Heaven* of the verb to *Heave*: as the Anglo-ſaxon Heafod, Heafo, caput, and Heofen, Heafen, cœlum, are the paſt participles of the verb Heafan, Heofan, to *heave*, to *lift* up. Whence Upon alſo may eaſily be derived, and with the ſame ſignification. And I believe that the names of all abſtract relation (as it is called) are taken either from the adjectived common names of objects, or from the participles of common verbs. The relations of *place* are more commonly from the names of ſome parts of our body; ſuch as, *Head*, *Toe*, *Breaſt*, *Side*, *Back*, *Womb*, *Skin*, &c.

Wilkins ſeems to have felt ſomething of this ſort, when he made his ingenious attempt to explain the local prepoſitions by the help of a man's figure in the following Diagram. But confining his attention to ideas (in which he was followed by Mr. Locke) he overlooked the etymology of words, which are their ſigns, and in which the ſecret lay.

" For the clearer explication of theſe *local* prepoſitions " (ſays he) I ſhall refer to this following Diagram. In " which by the *ovàl* figures are repreſented the prepoſi- " tions determined to motion, wherein the *acuter* part " doth point out the tendency of that motion. The " *Squares* are intended to ſignify reſt or the term of mo- " tion. And by the *round* figures are repreſented ſuch " relative prepoſitions, as may indifferently refer either to " motion or reſt."

In

In all probability the Abbé de l'Epée borrowed his method of teaching the prepoſitions to his deaf and dumb ſcholars from this notion of Wilkins.

" Tout ce que je puis regarder directement *en Face*, eſt " *Devant* moi : tout ce que je ne peux voir ſans retourner " la tête de l'autre côte, eſt *Derriere* moi.

" S'agiſſoit-il defaire entendre qu'une action étoit paſſée ? " Il jettoit au haſard, deux ou trois fois ſa main du côte " de ſon epaule. Enfin s'il deſiroit annoncer une action " future, il faiſoit avancer ſa main droite directement de- " vant lui."

Des ſourds et muets. 2 Edit. pag. 54.

You will not expect me to waſte a word on the prepoſitions *touching*, *concerning*, *regarding*, *reſpecting*, *relating to*, *ſaving*, *except*, *excepting*, *according to*, *granting*, *allowing*, *conſidering*, *notwithſtanding*, *neighbouring*, &c. nor yet on the compound prepoſitions *In-to*, *Un-to*, *Un-till*, *Out-of*, *Through-out*, *From-off*, &c.

B.

I certainly ſhould not, if you had explained all the ſimple terms of which the latter are compounded. I ac-

knowledge that the meaning and etymology of ſome of your prepoſitions are ſufficiently plain and ſatisfactory: and of the others I ſhall not permit myſelf to entertain a decided opinion till after a more mature conſideration. *Pedetentim progredi*, was our old favourite motto and caution, when firſt we began together in our early days to conſider and converſe upon philoſophical ſubjects; and, having no fanciful ſyſtem of my own to miſlead me, I am not yet prepared to relinquiſh it. But there ſtill remain five ſimple prepoſitions, of which you have not yet taken the ſmalleſt notice. How do you account for IN, OUT, ON, OFF, and AT.

H.

Oh! As for theſe, I muſt fairly anſwer you with *Martin Luther*,—" Je les defendrois aiſément devant le Pape, mais " je ne ſçais comment les juſtifier devant le diable." With the common run of Etymologiſts, I ſhould make no bad figure by repeating what others have ſaid concerning them; but I deſpair of ſatisfying you with any thing they have advanced or I can offer, becauſe I cannot altogether ſatisfy myſelf. The explanation and etymology of theſe words require a degree of knowledge in all the antient northern languages, and a ſkill in the application of that knowledge, which I am very far from aſſuming: and, though I am almoſt

almoſt perſuaded by ſome of my own conjectures concerning them *, I am not willing, by an apparently forced and far-fetched derivation, to juſtify your imputation of etymological legerdemain. Nor do I think any farther inquiry neceſſary to juſtify my concluſion concerning the prepoſitions; having, in my opinion, fully intitled myſelf to the application of that axiom of M. de Broſſes (Art. 215.) —" La preuve connue d'un grand nombre de mots d'une " eſpece, doit etablir un precepte generale ſur les autres " mots de meme eſpece, à l'origine deſquels on ne peut " plus remonter. On doit en bonne logique juger des " choſes que l'on ne peut connoitre, par celles de même " eſpece qui ſont bien connues; en les ramenant à un " principe dont l'evidence ſe fait appercevoir par tout où " la vue peut s'etendre."

* In the Gothic and Anglo-ſaxon INNA, inna, means *Uterus, viſcera, venter, interior pars corporis.* (Inna, inne, is alſo in a ſecondary ſenſe uſed for *Cave, Cell, Cavern.*) And there are ſome etymological reaſons which make it not improbable that OUT derives from a word originally meaning *Skin.* I am inclined to believe that IN and OUT come originally from two *Nouns* meaning thoſe two parts of the body.

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ, &c.

CHAP. X.

OF ADVERBS.

B.

THE firſt general diviſion of words (and that which has been and ſtill is almoſt univerſally held by Grammarians) is into *Declinable* and *Indeclinable*. All the *Indeclinables* except the *Adverb*, we have already conſidered. And though Mr. Harris has taken away the Adverb from its old ſtation amongſt the other Indeclinables, and has, by a ſingular whim of his own, made it a ſecondary claſs of Attributives, or (as he calls them) *Attributes of Attributes*; yet neither does he nor any other Grammarian ſeem to have any clear notion of its nature and character.

B. Johnſon * and Wallis and all others, I think, ſeem to confound it with the Prepoſitions, Conjunctions and Interjections.

* "Prepoſitions are a peculiar kind of *Adverbs*, and ought to be re-
"ferred thither." *B. Johnſon's Grammar.*

All Adverbs ending in LY (the moſt prolific branch of the family) are ſufficiently underſtood: the termination (which alone cauſes them to be denominated Adverbs) being only the word LIKE corrupted; and the corruption ſo much the more eaſily and certainly diſcovered, as the termination remains more pure and diſtinguiſhable in the other ſiſter languages, the German, the Dutch, the Daniſh and the Swediſh; in which it is written *lich*, *lyk*, *lig*, *liga*. And the Encyclopædia Britannica informs us, that—" In " Scotland the word *Like* is at this day frequently uſed " inſtead of the Engliſh termination *Ly*. As, for a *goodly* " figure, the common people ſay, a *goodlike* figure."

ADRIFT

Is the paſt participle *Adrifed*, *Adrif'd*, *Adrift*, of the Anglo-ſaxon verb Dꝛıꝛan, Ābꝛıꝛan, to *Drive*.

" And quhat auenture has the hiddir DRIFFE?"

Douglas. Booke 3. pag. 79.

i. e. *Driffed* or *Driffen*.

AGHAST, AGAST.

May be the paſt participle *Agazed*.

" The French exclaim'd—The Devil was in arms.
" All the whole army ſtood *Agazed* on him."

Firſt part of Henry 6. Act 1. Sce. 1.

Agazed may mean, made to *gaze:* a verb built on the verb *To gaze.*

In King Lear (Act 2. Sce. 1.) Edmund ſays of Edgar,

——" GASTED by the noiſe I made,
" Full ſuddenly he fled."

Gaſted, i. e. made aghaſt: which is again a verb built on the participle *aghaſt.* This progreſſive building of verb upon verb is not an uncommon practice in language.

In Beaumont and Fletcher's Wit at ſeveral Weapons, (Act 2.) " Sir Gregory Fopp, *a witleſs lord of land,*" ſays of his clown,

" If the fellow be not out of his wits, then will I never
" have any more wit whilſt I live; either the ſight of the
" lady has GASTERED him, or elſe he's drunk."

I do not bring this word as an authority, nor do I think it calls for any explanation. It is ſpoken by a fool of a fool; and may be ſuppoſed an ignorantly coined or fantaſtical cant word; or corruptly uſed for *Gaſted.*

An objection may certainly be made to this derivation: becauſe the word AGAST always, I believe, denotes a conſiderable

ſiderable degree of terror; which is not denoted by the verb *To Gaze:* for we may *gaze* with delight, with wonder or admiration, without the leaſt degree of fear. If I could have found written (as I doubt not there was in ſpeech) a Gothic verb formed upon the Gothic noun ΑΓΙS, which means *Fear* and *Trembling* (the long-ſought etymology of our Engliſh word *Ague* *); I ſhould have avoided this objection,

* Junius ſays—" AGUE, febris. G. *Aigù* eſt *acutus*. Nihil nempe uſi-" tatius eſt, quam *acutas* dicere febres."

But Skinner, a medical man, was aware of objections to this derivation, which Junius never dreamed of. He therefore ſays—" *Fortaſſe* a Fr. " *Aigú*, acutus. Quia (*ſaltem in paroxyſmo*) acutus (*quodammodo*) morbus " eſt, et *acutis doloribus* exercet: licet a medicis, durationem magis quam " vehementiam hujus morbi reſpicientibus, non inter *acutas*, ſed *chronicas* " febres numeretur."

But Skinner's qualifying *paroxyſmo*, *quodammodo*, *acutis doloribus*, by which (for want of any other etymology) he endeavours to give a colour to the derivation from *Aigu*, *acutus*, will not anſwer his purpoſe: for it is not true (and I ſpeak from a tedious experience) that there are any *acute pains* in any period of the AGUE. Beſides, S. Johnſon has truly obſerved, that —" The *cold* fit is, in popular language, more particularly called the " AGUE; and the *hot*, the fever." And it is commonly ſaid—" He has " an AGUE and fever."

I believe our word AGUE to be no other than the Gothic word ΑΓΙS, fear, trembling, ſhuddering.

1. Becauſe the Anglo-ſaxons and Engliſh, in their adoption of the Gothic ſubſtantives, (moſt of which terminate in s) always drop the terminating s.

2. Becauſe,

jection, and with full aſſurance have concluded that AGAST was the paſt participle of ᚪᚱᛁᛋᚪᚾ, i. e. ᚪᚱᛁᛋ᛫᛫, ᚪᚱᛁᛋ'᛫, ᚪᚱᛁᛋᛏ. i. e. made to ſhudder, terrified to the degree of trembling. There is indeed the verb ᚪᚱᚷᚪᚾ, timere; and the paſt participle ᚪᚱᛁ᛫ᛋ, territus; and it is not without an appearance of probability, that, as *Whiles*, *Amonges*, &c. have become with us *Whilſt*, *Amongſt*, &c. ſo ᚪᚱᛁ᛫ᛋ might become AGIDST, AGIST, AGAST; or ᚪᚱᛁ᛫ᛋ might become AGISD, AGIST, AGAST. And the laſt ſeems to me the moſt probable etymology.

A G O.

Go, Ago, Ygo, Gon, Agon, Gone, Agone, are all uſed indiſcriminately by our old Engliſh writers as the paſt particple of the verb *To Go*.

G O.

" But netheles the thynge is *Da*
" This fals god was ſoone GO
" With his deceite, and held him cloſe."
Gower. Lib. 6. Fol. 138. pag. 2. col. 2.

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2. Becauſe, though the Engliſh word is written AGUE, the common people and the country people always pronounce it AGHY, or AGUY.

3. Becauſe the diſtinguiſhing mark of this complaint is, the *trembling* or *ſhuddering*; and from that diſtinguiſhing circumſtance it would naturally take its name.

4. Becauſe the French, from whom the term *Aigu* is ſuppoſed to have been borrowed, never called the complaint by that name.

" The

" The daie is GO, the nightes chaunce
" Hath derked all the bright ſonne,"
Gower. Lib. 8. Fol. 179. pag. 1. col. 2.

" But ſoth is ſayed, GO ſithen many yeres,
" That feld hath eyen, and wode hath eres."
Chaucer. Knyghtes Tale. Fol. 4. pag. 1. col. 2.

" How ofte tyme may men rede and ſene
" The treſon, that to women hath *Be Do:*
" To what fyne is ſuche loue, I can not ſene
" Or where becometh it, whan it is GO."
Chaucer. Troylus. Boke 2. Fol. 167. pag. 1. col. 2.

A GO.

" Of louers nowe a man maie ſee
" Ful many, that unkinde bee
" Whan that thei haue her wille *Do,*
" Her loue is after ſoone AGO."
Gower. Lib. 5. Fol. 111. pag. 2. col. 2.

" As god him bad, right ſo he dede
" And thus there lefte in that *ſtede*
" With him thre hundred, and no mo,
" The remenant was all AGO."
Gower. Lib. 7. Fol. 163. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Thus hath Lycurgus his wille:
" And toke his leue, and forth he went.
" But liſte nowe well to what entent
" Of rightwiſneſſe he did ſo.
" For after that he was AGO,
" He ſhope him neuer to be founde."
Gower. Lib. 7. Fol. 158. pag. 2. col. 1.

" For

" For euer the latter ende of ioye is wo,
" God wotte, worldely ioye is ſoone AGO."
Chaucer. Nonnes prieſt. Fol. 90. pag. 1. col. 1.

" For if it erſt was well, tho was it bet
" A thouſande folde, this nedeth it not enquere,
" AGO was euery ſorowe and euery fere."
Troylus. Boke 3. Fol. 181. pag. 2. col. 1.

" That after whan the ſtorme is al AGO
" Yet wol the water quappe a day or two."
Lucrece. Fol. 215. pag. 2. col. 1.

" Ful ſykerly ye wene your othes laſt
" No lenger than the wordes ben AGO."
La belle dame. Fol. 267. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Trouth ſomtyme was wont to take auayle
" In euery matere, but al that is AGO."
Aſſemble of Ladyes. Fol. 277. pag. 1. col. 1.

YGO.

" A clerke there was of Oxenforde alſo
" That unto Logike had longe YGO."
Prol. to Cant. Tales.

" To horſe is al her luſty folke YGO."
Chaucer. Dido. Fol. 212. pag. 2. col. 2.

GON.

" Thou woſt thy ſelfe, whom that I loue parde
" As I beſt can, GON ſythen longe whyle."
Troylus. Boke 1. Fol. 161. pag. 1. col. 1.

AGON.

" And euermore, whan that hem fell to ſpeke
" Of any thinge of ſuche a tyme AGON."
Troylus. Boke 3. Fol. 180. pag. 1. col. 1.

" Thou thy ſelfe, that haddeſt habundaunce of rycheſſe
" nat longe AGON."
Boecius. Boke 3. Fol. 232. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Ful longe AGON I might haue taken hede."
Annelyda. Fol. 273. pag. 1. col. 1.

GONE.

" I was right nowe of tales deſolate,
" Nere that a marchant, GONE is many a yere,
" Me taught a tale, which ye ſhullen here."
Man of Lawes Tale. Fol. 19. pag. 1. col. 1.

" But ſothe is ſaid, GONE ſithen many a day,
" A trewe wight and a thefe thynketh not one."
Squiers Tale. Fol. 28. pag. 1. col. 2.

AGONE.

" Of ſuche enſamples as I finde
" Upon this point of tyme AGONE
" I thinke for to tellen one."
Gower. Lib. 5. Fol. 87. pag. 1. col. 1.

" But erly whan the ſonne ſhone
" Men ſigh, that thei were AGONE

" And

" And come unto the kynge, and tolde,
" There was no worde, but out, alas,
" She was AGO, the mother wepte,
" The father as a wood man lepte."
Gower. Lib. 5. Fol. 104. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Whan that the myſty vapoure was AGONE
" And clere and fayre was the mornyng."
Chaucer. Blacke knyght. Fol. 287. pag. 1. col. 1.

" For I loued one, ful longe ſythe AGONE
" With al myn herte, body and ful might."
Blacke knyght Fol. 289. pag. 1. col. 2.

" Which is no more than has been done
" By knights for ladies, long AGONE."

" And many a ſerpent of fell kind,
" With wings before and ſtings behind,
" Subdu'd as poets ſay, long AGONE,
" Bold Sir George, Saint George did the dragon."
Hudibras.

Tillotſon, in a *Faſt* ſermon on a *thankſgiving* occaſion, 31ſt January, 1689, ſays,

" Twenty years AGONE."

ASUNDER.

Is the paſt participle Ꝑſundꝛen or Ꝑſundꝛed, *ſeparated* (as the particles of *ſand* are) of the verb Sondꝛian, Sundꝛian, Syndꝛian, Ꝑſundꝛian, &c. *To ſeparate.*

" In vertue and holy almeſſedede
" They liuen all, and neuer ASONDER wende
" Tyll deth departeth hem."
Chaucer. Squiers Tale. Fol. 24. pag. 2. col. 1.

" And tyl a wicked deth him take
" Hym had *leuer* ASONDRE ſhake
" And let al his lymmes ASONDRE ryue
" Than leaue his richeſſe in his lyue."
Rom. of the Roſe. Fol. 145. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Theſe ylke two that bethe in armes lafte
" So lothe to hem ASONDER gon it were."
Troylus. Boke 3. Fol. 179. pag. 2. col. 2.

" This yerde was large, and rayled al the aleyes
" And ſhadowed wel, with bloſomy bowes grene
" And benched newe, and SONDED all the wayes
" In which ſhe walketh."
Troylus. Boke 2. Fol. 167. pag. 2. col. 1.

This word (in all its varieties) is to be found in all the northern languages; and is originally from A. S. Sond. i. e. *Sand.*

ASTRAYE.

Is the paſt participle Aſtræged of the Anglo-ſaxon verb Stræzan, ſpargere, diſpergere, To *Stray*, to ſcatter.

" This preſt was drunke, and goth ASTRAYDE."
Gower. Lib. 4. Fol. 84. pag. 2. col. 1.

" And ouer this I ſigh alſo
" The noble people of Iſrael
" *Diſpers*, as ſhepe upon an hille

" Without a keper unaraied:
" And as they wenten about ASTRAIED
" I herde a voyce unto hem ſeyne."
Gower. Lib. 7. Fol. 156. pag. 2. col. 1.

" Achab to the batayle went.
" Where Benedad for all his ſhelde
" Him ſlough, ſo that upon the felde
" His people goth aboute ASTRAIE."
Gower. Lib. 7. Fol. 156. pag. 2. col. 2.

S. Johnſon ſays—To *Stray* is from the Italian *Straviare* from the Latin *extra viam.* But STRAYAN, Strеapian, Strеopian, Strеpian, Strеgian, Strægian: and Strap, Strеop, Strеo, Strеa, Strе, were uſed in our own mother tongues, the Gothic and Anglo-ſaxon; long before the exiſtence of the word *Straviare*, and the beginning of the corrupted dialect of the Latin called Italian, and even of the corrupted dialect of the Greek called Latin. And as the words *To Sunder* and *Aſunder* proceed from Sonb, i. e. *Sand:* ſo do the words To *Stray*, To *Straw*, To *Strow*, To *Strew*, To *Straggle*, To *Stroll*, and the well-named *Strawberry* (i. e. *Straw'd-berry*, *Stray-berry*) all proceed from *Straw*, or as our peaſantry ſtill pronounce it *Strab* *. And *Aſtray*, or *Aſtray'd*, means *Strawed*, ſcattered and diſperſed as the *Straw* is about the fields.

* " Me lyſt not of the chaffe ne of the *Stree*
" Make ſo longe a tale, as of the corne."
Chaucer. Man of Lawes Tale. Fol. 22. pag. 1. col. 1.

" Reaping

" Reaping where thou haſt not ſown, and gathering " where thou haſt not *ſtrawed*."

St. Matthew. Chap. xxv. Ver. 24.

ATWIST.

The paſt participle Ge-tpiſeð, Atpiſeð, Atpiſð, of the verb Tpiſan, Tpÿſan, Ge-tpÿſan, torquere, Tpiſan from Tpa, Tpæ, Tpi, Tpÿ, Tpeo, TWO.

AWRY.

The paſt participle Apþÿðeð, Apþÿðð of the verb þþÿðan, þþiðan, to writhe.

In the late Chief Juſtice Mansfield's time, for many years I rarely liſtened to his doctrines in the Court of King's Bench, without having ſtrong cauſe to repeat the words of old Gower;

" Howe ſo his mouthe be comely
" His worde ſitte euermore AWRIE."

Lib. 1. Fol. 29. pag. 2. col. 2.

ASKEW.

In the Daniſh *Skiæv*, is wry, crooked, oblique. *Skiæver*, to twiſt, to wreſt. *Skiævt*, twiſted, wreſted.

" And

" And with that worde all ſodenly
" She paſſeth, as it were ASKIE,
" All cleane out of the ladies ſight."
Gower. Lib. 4. Fol. 71. pag. 1. col. 1.

ASKANT. ASKANCE.

[Probably the Participles *Aſchuined, Aſchuins*]. In Dutch, *Schuin*, wry, oblique. *Schuinen*, to cut awry. *Schuins*, ſloping, wry, not ſtrait.

ASWOON.

The paſt participle Ꝟſuanꝺ, Ꝟſuonꝺ of the verb Suanian, Ꝟſpunan, deficere animo.

" Whan ſhe this herd, ASWOUNE down ſhe falleth
" For pitous ioy, and after her *ſwounyng*
" She both her yong children to her calleth."
Clerke of Oxenfordes Tale. Fol. 51. pag. 1. col. 1.

" And with that word ſhe fel ASWOUNE anon,
" And after, whan her ſwounyng was gon
" She riſeth up."
Doctour of Phiſikes Tale. Fol. 65. pag. 1. col. 1.

ASTOUND.

The paſt participle *Eſtonné* [Eſtonnéd] of the French verb *Eſtonner* (now written Etonner) to aſtoniſh.

" And with this worde ſhe fell to grounde
" ASWOUNE, and there ſhe laie ASTOUNDE."
Gower. Lib. 4. Fol. 83. pag. 1. col. 2.

ENOUGH.

In Dutch *Genoeg* from the verb *Genoegen*, to content, to ſatisfy. S. Johnſon cannot determine whether this word is a ſubſtantive, an adjective, or an adverb; but he thinks it is all three.

"It is not eaſy, he ſays, to determine whether this "word be an adjective or adverb; perhaps, when it is "joined with a ſubſtantive, it is an adjective, of which "*Enow* is the *Plural**. In other ſituations it ſeems an "adverb; except that, after the verb *To have* or *To be*, "either expreſſed or underſtood, it may be accounted a "ſubſtantive."

According to him, it means,—"In a ſufficient meaſure, "ſo as may ſatisfy, ſo as may ſuffice. 2. Something "ſufficient in *greatneſs or excellence*. 3. Something *equal "to a mans power or abilities*. 4. In a ſufficient degree. "5. It notes a *ſlight* augmentation of the poſitive degree. "6. Sometimes it notes *Diminution!* 7. An exclamation "noting fulneſs or ſatiety."

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* In his Grammar, he ſays,—"Adjectives in the Engliſh language are "wholly indeclinable; having neither caſe, gender, nor *number*; being "added to Subſtantives, in all relations, without any change."

In

In the Anglo-ſaxon it is Ꞇenoȝ or Ꞇenoh: and appears to be the paſt participle Ꞇenoȝeð, multiplicatum, *manifold*, of the verb Ꞇenoȝan, multiplicare.

FAIN.

The paſt participle ƿæȝeneð, ƿæȝen, ƿæȝn, lœtus, of the verb ƿæȝenian, ƿæȝnian, gaudere, lætari.

" Of that men ſpeken here and there,
" How that my lady beareth the price,
" How ſhe is faire, how ſhe is wiſe,
" How ſhe is womanliche of chere:
" Of all this thing whan I maie here
" What wonder is though I be FAINE."

Gower. Lib. 1. Fol. 23. pag. 1. col. 2.

" For which they were as glad of his commyng
" As foule is FAINE, whan the ſonne upryſeth."

Chaucer. Shypmans Tale. Fol. 69. pag. 1. col. 1.

" Na uthir wyſe the pepyl Auſoniane
" Of this glade time in hart wox wounder FANE."

Douglas. Boke 13. pag. 472.

LIEF. LIEVER. LIEVEST.

Leoƿ, Leoƿre, Leoƿeſt.

" I had as LIEF not be, as live to be in awe
" Of ſuch a thing as I myſelf."

Shakeſpeare's Iulius Cæſar.

No modern author, I believe, would now venture any of theſe words in a ſerious paſſage: and they ſeem to be cautiouſly ſhunned and ridiculed in common converſation, as a vulgarity. But they are good Engliſh words, and more frequently uſed by our old Engliſh writers, than any other word of a correſponding ſignification.

Leof (for Leofeð, or Lufaþ, or Lufoð or Luf) is the paſt participle of Lufian, To love; and always means *beloved**.

" And netheles by daies olde,
" Whan that the bokes were LEUER,
" Writyng was *beloued* euer
" Of them, that weren vertuous."

Gower. Prol. Fol. 1. pag. 1. col. 1.

" It is a unwiſe vengeance
" Whiche to none other man is LEFE
" And is unto him ſelfe grefe."

Lib. 2. Fol. 18. pag. 1. col. 2.

" And ſhe anſwerd, and bad hym go,
" And ſaide, howe that a bed all warme
" Hir LIEFE lay naked in hir arme."

Lib. 2. Fol. 41. pag. 1. col. 2.

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* " The Fader Almychty of the heuin abuf,
" In the mene tyme, unto Iuno his LUF,
" Thus ſpak; and ſayd,"—

Douglas. Booke 12. pag. 441.

" Thre

" Thre pointes whiche I ſynde
" Ben LEUEST unto mans kynde;
" The firſt of hem it is delite,
" The two ben worſhip and profite."
Lib. 5. Fol. 84. pag. 2. col. 2.

" For euery thyng is wel the LEUER
" Whan that a man hath bought it dere."
Lib. 5. Fol. 109. pag. 2. col. 1.

" Whan Rome was the worldes chiefe,
" The ſooth ſayer tho was LEEFE,
" Whiche wolde not the trouth ſpare,
" But with his worde, playne and bare,
" To themperour his ſothes tolde."
Lib. 7. Fol. 154. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Of other mens paſſion
" Take pitee and compaſſion
" And let no thyng to the be LEEF
" Whiche to an other man is grefe."
Lib. 8. Fol. 190. pag. 2. col. 1.

" They lyued in ioye and in felycite
" For eche of hem had other LEFE and dere."
Chaucer. Monkes Tale. Fol. 85. pag. 1. col. 2.

" In the ſwete ſeaſon that LEFE is."
Rom. of the Roſe. Fol. 120. pag. 2. col. 1.

" His LEEFE a roſen chapelet
" Had made, and on his heed it ſet."
Rom. of the Roſe. Fol. 124. pag. 1. col. 1.

" And hym her LEFE and dere hert cal."
Troylus. Boke 3. Fol. 176. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Had I hym neuer LEFE? By God I wene
" Ye had neuer thyng ſo LEFE (quod ſhe)."
Troylus. Boke 3. Fol. 177. pag. 1. col. 2.

" Ye that to me (quod ſhe) ful LEUER were
" Than al the good the ſunne aboute gothe."
Troylus. Boke 3. Fol. 178. pag. 2. col. 1.

" For as to me nys LEUER none ne lother."
Leg. of good Women. Prol. Fol. 205. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Remembrand on the mortall anciant were
" That for the Grekis to hir LEIF and dere,
" At Troye lang tyme ſche led before that day."
Douglas. Booke 1. pag. 13.

" Gif euir ony thanke I deſeruit toward the
" Or ocht of myne to the was LEIF, quod ſche."
Douglas. Booke 4. pag. 110.

" O thou nymphe, wourſchip of fludis clere,
" That to my ſaul is *bald* maiſt LEIF and dere."
Douglas. Book 12. pag. 410.

ADIEU. FAREWELL.

The former from the French *à dieu*, from the Italian *Addio:* the latter the imperative of Faran, to go, or to fare. So it is equally ſaid in Engliſh—How fares it? or, How goes it?—

The Dutch and the Swedes alſo ſay, *Vaarwel, Farwäl:* The Danes *Lev-vel*, and the Germans *Lebet-wohl.*

HALT.

HALT.

Means—*Hold*, Stop, (as when we ſay—*Hold your hand*), Keep the preſent ſituation, *Hold ſtill.*

In German *Still halten* is *To halt* or ſtop; and *Halten* is *To Hold.* In Dutch *Still houden*, to halt or ſtop; and *Houden*, to hold.

Menage ſays well—" *Far Alto*, proprio di quel fermarſi " che fanno le ordinanze militari: Dal Tedeſco *Halte*, che " vale, *Ferma là*; *dimora là*; imperativo del verbo *Halten*, " cioé arreſtarſi."

The Italians aſſuredly took the military term from the Germans.

Our Engliſh word HALT is the imperative of the Anglo-ſaxon verb Healban, to hold; and *Hold* itſelf is from Healban, and was formerly written HALT.

" He leyth downe his one eare all plat
" Unto the grounde, and HALT it faſt."
Gower. Lib. 1. Fol. 10. pag. 1. col. 2.

" But ſo well HALTE no man the plough,
" That he ne balketh otherwhile."
Lib. 2. Fol. 50. pag. 1, col. 1.

" The golde, whiche auarice encloſeth,
" But all to litell hym ſuppoſeth,
" Hę let it neuer out of his honde,
" But gette hym more, and HALT it faſt.
" To ſeie howe ſuche a man hath good,
" Who ſo that reaſone underſtoode,
" It is unproperliche ſayde:
" That good hath hym, and HALT him taide."
Lib. 4. Fol. 83. p. 2. c. 2. Fol. 84. p. 1. col. 1.

" Euery man, thath HALT him worth a leke,
" Upon his bare knees ought all hys lyfe
" Thanken God, that him hath ſent a wyfe."
Chaucer. Marchauntes Tale. Fol. 29. pag. 1. col. 1.

" For euery wight, whiche that to Rome went,
" HALTE not o pathe, ne alway o manere."
Troylus. Boke 1. Fol. 163. pag. 1. col. 2.

" Loue, that with an holſome alyaunce
" HALTE people ioyned, as hym lyſte hem gye."
Troylus. Boke 3. Fol. 182. pag. 1. col. 1.

L O.

The imperative of *Look*. So the common people ſay corruptly,—" *Lo*' you there now"—" *La*' you there."—

Where we now employ ſometimes LOOK and ſometimes LO, with diſcrimination; our old Engliſh writers uſed indifferently LO, LOKE, LOKETH, for this imperative. Chaucer, in the Pardoners Tale, ſays

" Al

" Al the ſoueravne actes, dare I ſay,
" Of victories in the Olde Teſtament
" Were don in abſtynence and in prayere,
" LOKETH the Byble, and there ye mowe it lere."

" LOKETH * Attyla, the great conquerour
" Dyed in his ſlepe, with ſhame and diſhonour."

" LOKE * eke howe to kynge Demetrius
" The king of Parthes, as the boke ſayth us,
" Sent him a payre of dyce of golde in ſcorne."

" *Beholde* and *ſe* that in the firſt table
" Of hye gods heſtes honourable,
" How that the ſeconde heſte of him is this,
" Take not my name in ydelneſſe amys.
" Lo, he *Rather* † forbyddeth ſuche ſwering
" Than homicide, or any other curſed thing."

Fol. 66. pag. 2. col. 2. Fol. 67. pag. 1. col. 1.

So B. Johnſon, (*Alchymiſt*, A. 2. Sc. 3.)

" For LOOK, how oft I iterate the work,
" So many times I add unto his virtue."

Here, if it had pleaſed him, he might have ſaid—LO how oft &c.

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* In both theſe places a modern writer would ſay LO.

† *Sooner, Earlier.*—He forbids ſuch ſwearing, *Before* he forbids homicide. i. e. in a *foregoing* part of the table.

And again

" *Subtle.* Why, Raſcall—
" *Face.* Lo you here, Sir."

Here, if it had pleaſed him, he might have ſaid—LOOK you here.

The Dutch correſpondent adverb is *Siet* from *Sien*, to look or ſee. The German *Siehe* or *Sihe* from *Sehen*, to ſee. The Daniſh *See* from *Seer*, to look or ſee. The Swediſh *Si*, or *Si der*, from *Se*, to look.

NEEDS.

Need-is, uſed parenthetically. It was antiently written *Nedes* and *Nede is*. *Certain is* was uſed in the ſame manner, equivalently to *certes*.

" And *certaine is* (quod ſhe) that by gettyng of good,
" be men maked good."

" I haue graunted that NEDES good folke moten ben
" myghty."

Boecius. Boke 4. Fol. 241. pag. 1. col. 1. 2.

" The

" The conſequence is falſe, NEDES the antecedent mote
" ben of the ſame condicion."

Teſt. of Loue. Boke 2. Fol. 316. pag. 1. col. 2.

" None other thynge ſignifyeth this neceſſite but onelye
" thus; That ſhal be, may nat togider be and not be.
" Euenlyche alſo it is ſothe, loue was, and is, and ſhal be,
" nat of neceſſyte; and NEDE IS to haue be al that was,
" and *nedeful is* to be, al that is."

Teſt. of Loue. Boke 3. Fol. 328. pag. 1. col. 1.

PRITHEE.

I pray thee.

TOWIT.

Though it is the infinitive of ꝓican, does not mean *To Know*, as Skinner and S. Johnſon have ſuppoſed; but *To Be known*, Sciendum. For ſo (for want of *Gerunds*, as they are moſt abſurdly called) our anceſtors uſed the Active Infinitives, as well of other verbs as of ꝓican*. Similar adverbs

* " Falſe fame is not TO DREDE, ne of wyſe perſons TO ACCEPTE."

Teſt. of Loue. Boke 1. Fol. 308. pag. 2. col. 2.

Inſtances of this uſe of the Active Infinitives in Engliſh, are very numerous; but the reaſon of it appears beſt from old tranſlations.

adverbs are thoſe of the Latin and French, *Videlicet*, *ſcilicet*, *à ſçavoir*. And it is worth noting, that the old Latin authors uſed the abbreviated *Videlicet* for *Videre licet*, when not put (as we call it) adverbially *.

" Quod ſi nec Anaxagoræ fugam, nec Socratis venenum, nec Zenonis tormenta noviſti; at Canios, at Senecas, at Soranos ſcire potuiſti. Quos nihil aliud in cladem detraxit, niſi quod noſtris moribus inſtituti, ſtudiis improborum diſſimillimi videbantur. Itaque nihil eſt quod admirere, ſi in hoc vitæ falo circumflantibus agitemur procellis, quibus hoc maxime propoſitum eſt, *peſſimis diſplicere*. Quorum quidem tametſi eſt numeroſus exercitus, SPERNENDUS tamen eſt."

Boethius de Conſol. Lib. 1. Proſa 3.

Thus tranſlated by Chaucer:

" If thou haſt not knowen the exilynge of Anaxagoras, ne the enpoyſoning of Socrates, ne the turmentes of Zeno; yet mighteſt thou haue knowen the Senecas, the Canios, and the Soranos. The whiche men nothing els ne brought to the deth, but only for they were enformed of my maners and ſemeden moſt unlyke to the ſtudies of wicked folke. And for thy thou oughteſt not to wondren, though that I in the bitter ſee be driuen with tempeſtes blowing aboute. In the which thys is my moſte purpoſe, that is to ſayne, to diſpleſen wicked men. Of whiche ſhrewes al be the hooſte neuer ſo great, it is TO DISPISE."

Fol. 222. pag. 1. col. 1.

* " *Pam.* VIDELICET parcum illum fuiſſe ſenem, qui dixerit:
" Quoniam ille illi pollicetur, qui eum cibum popoſcerit."

" *Ant.* VIDELICET fuiſſe illum nequam adoleſcentem, qui illico,
" Ubi ille poſcit, denegavit ſe dare granum tritici."

Plautus. Stichus. Act 4. Sce. 1.

PERCHANCE.

Par-eſcheant, Par-eſcheance, the participle of *Eſcheoir, Echeoir, Echoir,* to fall.

PERCASE.

Per-caſum, participle of *cadere.* Antiently written Parcas, Parcaas.

PERADVENTURE.

Antiently *Perauñter, Paraunter, Inaunter, Inaventure.*

MAYBE. MAYHAP.

In Weſtmoreland they ſay and write *Mappen.* i. e. *may happen.*

HABNAB.

Hap ne hap—happen or not happen.

" Philautus determined HAB NAB to ſend his letters."

Euphues. By John Lilly. Page 109.

PERHAPS. UPHAP.

By or through *Haps. Upon a Hap.*

" The HAPPES ouer mannes hede
" Ben honged with a tender threde."

Gower. Lib. 6. Fol. 135. pag. 2. col. 2.

" In heuen to bene loſed with God hath none ende, but " endeleſſe endureth: and thou canſte nothynge done " aryght, but thou deſyre the rumoure therof be healed " and in euery wightes eare; and that dureth but a pricke, " in reſpecte of the other. And ſo thou ſekeſt rewarde " of folkes ſmale wordes, and of vayne prayſynges. " Trewely therein thou leſeſt the guerdon of vertue, and " leſeſt the gretteſt valoure of conſcyence, and UPHAP thy " renome euerlaſtyng."

Chaucer. Teſt. of Loue. Boke 1. Fol. 311. p. 1. c. 1.

BELIKE.

This word is perpetually employed by Sir Philip Sydney, Hooker, Shakeſpear, B. Johnſon, Sir W. Raleigh, Bacon, Milton, &c. But is now only uſed in low language, inſtead of *perhaps*.

In the Daniſh language *Lykke*, and in the Swediſh *Lycka*, mean *Luck*, i. e. chance, hazard, *Hap*, fortune, adventure.

" *Dionyſius.* He thought BELIKE, if Damon were out " of the citie, I would not put him to death."

Damon and Pythias. By R. Edwards.

" Brutus

——" Brutus and Caſſius
" Are rid like madmen through the gates of Rome."

" Anth. BELIKE they had ſome notice of the people
" How I had mov'd them."

Iulius Cæſar. Act 3. Sce. 2.

" How's that? Your's, if his own! Is he not my ſon,
" except he be his own ſon? BELIKE this is ſome new
" kind of ſubſcription the gallants uſe."

Every Man in his Humour. Act 3. Sce. 7.

" Than ſhe, remembering BELIKE the continual and
" inceſſant and confident ſpeeches and courſes that I had
" held on my lord's ſide, became utterly alienated from
" me."

Sir F. Bacon's Apology.

" Will he, ſo wiſe, let looſe at once his ire,
" BELIKE through impotence, or unaware,
" To give his enemies their wiſh?"

Paradiſe Loſt. Book 1. V. 156.

A FOOT.

" Many a freſhe knight, and many a blisful route
" *On horſe* and ON FOTE, in al the felde aboute."

Chaucer. Annelida. Fol. 270. pag. 2. col. 1.

" Sum

" I ſall declare all, and reduce FUTE HATE (1)
" From the beginning of the firſt debate."
Douglas. Booke 7. pag. 205.

" The ſelf ſtound amyd the preis FUTE HOTE (2)
" Lucagus enteris into his charlote."
Douglas. Booke 10. pag. 338.

" Wyth ſic wourdis ſcho anſweris him FUTE HATE." (3)
Douglas. Booke 12. pag. 433.

" All with ane voice and hale aſſent at accorde,
" Deſiris the as for thare prince and lord;
" And ioyus ar that into feild FUTE HATE (4)
" Under thy wappinis Turnus lyis doun bet."
Douglas. Booke 13. pag. 468.

ASIDE.

" Now *hand to hand* the dynt lichtis with ane ſwak,
" Now bendis he up his burdoun with ane mynt,
" ON SYDE he bradis for to eſchew the dynt."
Douglas. Booke 5. pag. 142.

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(1) *Ex-pedi-am* et primæ revocabo exordia pugnæ. *Virg.*
Notice *Ex-ped-ire.*

(2) Interea. *Virg.*

(3) Talibus *occurrit* dictis. *Virg.*

(4) There is no word in the original of Maphæus, to explain or juſtify the FUTE HATE of Douglas in this paſſage: He barely ſays,
——" Turnumque ſub armis Exultant cecidiſſe tuis." But the *acer petivit, Expediam,* and *occurrit dictis,* of Virgil, are ſufficient.

I ſuppoſe it needleſs to notice ſuch adverbs as Aback, Abreaſt, Afront, Ahead, At hand, Beforehand, Behind-hand, &c.

ABLAZE.

" That caſten fire and flam aboute
" Both at mouth and at naſe
" So that thei ſetten all ON BLASE."
Gower. Lib. 5. Fol. 102. pag. 2. col. 2.

ABOARD.

" This great ſhyp *on anker* rode;
" The lorde cometh forth, and when he ſigh
" That other ligge ON BORDE ſo nighe."
Gower. Lib. 2. Fol. 33. pag. 2. col. 2.

" What helpeth a man haue mete,
" Where drinke lackethe ON THE BORDE."
Gower. Lib. 4. Fol. 72. pag. 2. col. 1.

" And howe he loſte hys ſtereſman
" Whiche that the ſterne, or he toke kepe,
" Smote *over the* BORDE as he ſlepe."
Chaucer. Fame. Boke 1. Fol. 294. pag. 1. col. 2.

" We war from thens affrayit, durſt nocht abide,
" Bot fled *anon*, and *within* BURD has brocht
" That faithful Greik."
Douglas. Booke 3. pag. 90.

" The burgeonit treis ON BURD they bring for aris."
Douglas. Booke 4. pag. 113.

" The ſtabill aire has calmyt wele the ſe,
" And ſouth pipand windis fare on hie
" Challancis to pas ON BORD, and tak the depe."
Douglas. Booke 5. pag. 153.

ABROAD.

" The roſe ſpred to ſpanniſhhynge,
" To ſene it was a goodly thynge,
" But it ne was ſo ſprede ON BREDE
" That men within myght knowe the ſede."
Chaucer. Rom. of the Roſe. Fol. 137. pag. 1. col. 2.

" Als fer as his crop hie ON BREDE
" Strekis in the are, as fer his route dois ſprede."
Douglas. Booke 4. pag. 115.

——" his baner quhite as floure
" In ſing of batel did ON BREDE diſplay."
Douglas. Booke 8. Pag. 240.

ADAYS.

" But this I ſee ON DAIES nowe."
Gower. Lib. 4. fol. 72. pag. 2. col. 1.

" Thus here I many a man compleine,
" That nowe ON DAIES thou ſhalte finde
" At nede, few frendes kinde."
Gower. Lib. 5. fol. 110. pag. 1. col. 1.

" But certanly the daſit blude now ON DAYIS
" Waxis dolf and dull throw myne unweildy age."
Douglas. Booke 5. pag. 140.

A NIGHTS.

" He mot one of two thynges cheſe,
" Where he woll haue hir ſuche ON NIGHT,
" Or els *upon daies* light,
" For he ſhall not haue both two."
Gower. Lib. 1. fol. 17. pag. 2. col. 2.

" For though no man wold it alowe,
" To ſlepe *leuer* than to wowe
" Is his maner, and thus ON NIGHTES
" When he ſeeth the luſty knightes
" Reuelen, where theſe women are
" Awey he ſculketh as an hare."
Gower. Lib. 4. fol. 78. pag. 1. col. 1.

" For though that wiues ben ful holy thinges
" They muſt take in patience *a nyght*
" Suche maner neceſſaryes, as ben pleſinges
" To folke that han wedded hem with ringes,
" And lay a litell her holyneſſe aſyde."
Chaucer. Man of Lawes T. Fol. 22. pag. 1. col. 1.

" Madame, the ſentence of this Latyn is,
" Woman is mannes ioye and his blis,
" For when I fele ON NYGHT your ſoft ſyde,
" Al be it that I may not on you ryde,
" For that our perche is made ſo narowe, alas,
" I am full of ioye and ſolas."
Nonnes prieſt. Fol. 89. pag. 2. col. 2.

A FIRE.

" Turnus ſeges the Troianis in grete yre,
" And al thare ſchyppis and nauy ſet IN FYRE."
Douglas. Booke 9. pag. 274.

ALIVE.

On live. i. e. *In Life* *.

" For as the fiſhe, if it be drie,
" Mote in defaute of water die:
" Right ſo without aier, ON LIUE
" No man ne beaſt might thriue."

Gower. Lib. 7. fol. 142. pag. 1. col. 2.

" For prouder woman is there none ON LYUE."

Chaucer. Troylus. Boke 2. fol. 143. p. 2. c. 2.

" The *verray* ymage of my Aſtyanax ȝing:
" Sic ene had he, and ſic fare handis tua,
" For al the warld ſic mouth and face perfay:
" And gif he war ON LIFE quhil now in fere,
" He had bene euin eild with the, and hedy pere."

Douglas. Booke 3. pag. 84.

ALOFT.

On Loft, On Luft, On Lyft, i. e. *In the Luft* or *Lyft*; or, (the ſuperfluous article omitted, as was the antient cuſtom in our language, the Anglo-ſaxon) *In Lyft, In Luft, In Loft.*

" The golde treſſed Phebus hygh ON LOFTE."

Chaucer. Troylus. Boke 5. Fol. 196. pag. 2. col. 1.

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* In the firſt book of the Teſtament of Love, Fol. 305. pag. 1. col. 1. Chaucer furniſhes another adverb of the ſame kind, to thoſe who are admirers of this *part of ſpeech*.—" Wo is hym that is *Aloue*."

" But,

" Bot, lo *anone* (ane wounder thing to tell)
" Ane huge bleis of flambys brade doun fel,
" Furth of the cluddys at the left hand ſtraucht,
" In manere of an lychtning or fyre flaucht:
" And did alycht richt in the ſamyn *ſtede*,
" Apoun the croun of fare Lauinias hede;
" And fra thine hie up IN *the* LYFT agane
" It glade away, and tharein did remane."
Douglas. Booke 13. pag. 476.

——— " With that the dow
" Heich IN *the* LIFT full glaide he gan behald,
" And with her wingis ſorand mony fald."
Douglas. Booke 5. pag. 144.

In the Anglo-ſaxon Lyfft is the *Air* or the *Clouds*. In St. Luke—" in lyfte cummende—coming in the clouds." In the Daniſh, *Luft* is *Air*, and " *At ſpronge i luften*"—to blow up into the air, or *Aloft*. In the Swediſh alſo *Luft* is *Air*. So in the Dutch, *De loef hebben*, to ſail before the wind; *loeven*, to ply to windward; *loef*, the weather gage; &c. From the ſame root are our other words, *Loft*, *Lofty*, To *Luff*, *Lee*, *Leeward*, To *Lift*, &c.

A NEW.

" The battellis war adionit now OF NEW,
" Not in manere of *landwart* folkis bargane,
" But with ſcharp ſcherand wappinnis made melle."
Douglas. Booke 7. pag. 225.

" Was

" Was it honeſt ane godly diuine wycht
" With ony mortall ſtraik to wound in ficht?
" Or ȝit ganand the ſwerd loiſt and adew
" To rendir Turnus to his brand OF NEW,
" And ſtrength increſcis to thame that vincuſt be?"
Douglas. Booke 12. pag. 441.

A R O W.

" And in the port enterit, lo, we ſee
" Flokkis and herdis of oxin and of ſee,
" Fat and tydy, rakand *ouer all quhare,*
" And trippis eik of gait *but* ony kepare,
" In the rank gers paſturing ON RAW."
Douglas. Booke 3. pag. 75.

" The pepil by him vincuſt mycht thou knaw,
" Before him paſſand per ordour all ON RAW."
Douglas. Booke 8. pag. 270.

A S L E E P.

" Whan that pyte, which longe ON SLEPE doth tary,
" Hath ſet the fyne of al my heuyneſſe."
Chaucer. La belle dame. Fol. 269. pag. 1. col. 1.

" Apoun the earth the uthir beiſtis al,
" Thare beſy thochtis ceiſſing grete and ſmal,
" Ful ſound ON SLEPE did caucht thare reſt be kind."
Douglas. Booke 9. pag. 283.

" In theſe provynces the fayth of Chryſte was all " quenchyd and IN SLEPE." *Fabian.*

AWHILE.

AWHILE.

A time. *Whil-es*, i. e. Time, that or which. *Whilſt* is a corruption; it ſhould be written as formerly, *Whiles*.

" She died, my lord, but WHILES her ſlander liv'd."
Much Ado about Nothing.

AUGHT or OUGHT.

The Anglo-ſaxon Hpıc: *a whit*, or *o whit*. N. B. *O* was formerly written for the Article, A; or for the numeral *one*. So *Naught* or *Nought*: *Na whit*, or *No whit*.

FORTH.

" Againe the knight the olde wife gan ariſe
" And ſaid; Sir knight, here FORTH lyeth no way."
Chaucer. Wife of Bathes Tale. Fol. 38. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Alas (quod he) alas, that euer I beheyght
" Of pured gold a thouſande pounde of weight
" Unto this phyloſopher, howe ſhall I do?
" I ſe no more, but that I am FORDO *:
" Myn herytage mote I *nedes* ſell,
" And ben a beggar, here may I no lenger dwell."
Frankeleyns Tale. Fol. 55. pag. 2. col. 2.

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* FOR-DO, i. e. *Forth-done*, i. e. *Done* to go FORTH; or cauſed to go FORTH, i. e. *Out of doors*. In modern language, turned out of doors.

" Loke

" Loke out of londe thou be not FORE †,
" And if ſuche cauſe thou haue, that the
" Behoueth to gone out of countre,
" Leaue hole thyn hert in hoſtage."

Rom. of the Roſe. Fol. 132. pag. 2. col. 2.

From the Latin *Fores*, *Foris*, the French had *Fors* (their modern *Hors*). And of the French *Fors*, our anceſtors (by their favourite pronunciation of *Th*) made ꝑorꝺ, FORTH: as from the French *Aſſes* or *Aſſez*, they made ASSETH, i. e. *enough*, *ſufficient*.

" Rycheſſe ryche ne maketh nought
" Hym that on treaſour ſette his thought:
" For rycheſſe ſtonte in *ſuffyſaunce*,
" And nothyng in haboundaunce:
" For *ſuffyſaunce* al onely
" Maketh menne to lyue rychely.
" For he that hath mytches tweyne
" Ne value in hys demeyne,
" Lyueth more at eaſe, and more is riche,
" Than dothe he that is chiche
" And in his barne hath, ſoth to ſayne,
" An hundred mauis of whete grayne,
" Though he be chapman or marchaunt,
" And haue of golde many beſaunt:
" For in the gettyng he hath ſuche wo,
" And in the kepyng drede alſo,
" And ſette euermore his beſigneſſe
" For to encreſe, and nat to leſſe,

† FORE, i. e. *Fors* or FORTH.

" For to augment and multiplye,
" And though on heapes that lye him by,
" Yet neuer ſhal make rycheſſe
" ASSETH unto hys gredyneſſe *."

Rom. of the Roſe. Fol. 146. pag. 2. col. 2.

The Adverbs *Outforth*, *Inforth*, *Withoutforth*, *Withinforth*, (which were formerly common in the language) have appeared very ſtrange to the moderns; but with this explanation of FORTH, I ſuppoſe, they will not any longer ſeem either unnatural or extraordinary.

" Within the hertes of folke ſhall be the biting con-
" ſcience, and *withoutforth* ſhal be the worlde all brenning."

Chaucer. Perſons Tale. Fol. 102. pag. 1. col. 2.

" Whan he was come unto his neces place,
" Where is my lady, to her folke (quod he)
" And they him tolde, and *Inforth* in gan pace,
" And founde two other ladyes ſit and ſhe."

Treylus. Boke 2. Fol. 163. pag. 2. col. 1.

* I have been compelled to make the above long extract, that my reader's judgment may have fair play; and that he may not be miſled by the interpretation given of ASSETH in the gloſſary of Urry's edition of Chaucer; where we are told, that ASSETH means—" *Aſſent*, to *Anſwer*; " from the Anglo-ſaxon Āɣe8ian, *affirmare*." When the reader recollects the *ſuffyſaunce* which is ſpoken of in the firſt part of the extract; he will have little difficulty, I imagine, to perceive clearly what ASSETH here means: for the meaning of the whole paſſage is——*ſuffiſance* alone makes riches; which *ſuffiſance* the miſer's greedineſs will never permit him to obtain.

" And than al the derkeneſſe of his miſknowing ſhall " ſeme more evidently to the ſight of his underſtandyng, " than the ſonne ne ſeemeth to the ſight *Without forthe.*"

Boecius. Boke 3. fol. 238. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Philoſophers, that hyghten Stoiciens, wende that " ymages and ſenſibilities war emprinted into ſoules fro " bodies *Withoutforth.*"

Boecius. Boke 5. fol. 250. pag. 2. col. 2.

" There the vaylance of men is demed in riches *Out-* " *forth*, wenen men to haue no proper good in them ſelfe, " but ſeche it in ſtraunge thinges."

Teſt. of Loue. Boke 2. fol. 316. pag. 2. col. 2.

" The goodneſſe (quod ſhe) of a perſon maye not ben " knowe *Outforth*, but by renome of the knowers."

Teſt. of Loue. Boke 2. fol. 319. pag. 1. col. 2.

" But he that *Outforth* loketh after the wayes of this " knot, connyng with which he ſhuld knowe the way " *Inforth*, ſlepeth for the tyme; wherfore he that wol this " way know, muſt leave the lokyng after falſe wayes " *Outforth*, and open the eyen of his conſcyence and un- " cloſe his herte."

Teſt. of Loue. Boke 2. fol. 322. pag. 1. col. 2.

" Euery

" Euery herbe ſheweth his vertue *Outforthe* from " wythin."

Teſt. of Loue. Boke 2. fol. 323. pag. 1. col. 1.

" Loue peace *Withoute forth*, loue peace *Withinforth*, " kepe peace with all men."

" There is nothinge hid from god. Thou ſhalte be " found gilty in the judgmentes of god, though thou be " hid to mens judgementes: for he beholdeth the hert, " that is *Withinforth*."

Tho. Lupſet. Gathered Counſails.

GADSO.

CAZZO, a common Italian oath (or rather obſcenity, in lieu of an oath) firſt introduced about the time of James the firſt, and made familiar in our language afterwards by our affected travelled gentlemen in the time of Charles the ſecond. See all our comedies about that period.

Ben Johnſon ridiculed the affectation of this oath at its commencement, but could not ſtop its progreſs.

" Theſe be our nimble-ſpirited CATSO's, that ha' their " evaſions at pleaſure, will run over a bog like your wild " Iriſh; no ſooner ſtarted but they'll leap from one thing

" to another, like a ſquirrel. Heigh! dance and do tricks
" in their diſcourſe, from fire to water, from water to air,
" from air to earth: as if their tongues did but e'en lick
" the four elements over and away."

Every man out of his humour. Act 2. Sce. 1.

MUCH. MORE. MOST.

Theſe adverbs have exceedingly gravelled all our etymologiſts, and they touch them as tenderly as poſſible.

MUCH.

Junius and Skinner, (whom Johnſon copies) for MUCH, irrationally refer us to the Spaniſh *Mucho.*

MORE.

Under the article MORE, (that he may ſeem to ſay ſomething on the ſubject) Junius gives us this ſo little pertinent or edifying piece of information;—" Anglicum
" *interim* MORE eſt inter illa, quæ ſaxonicum A in O con-
" vertunt; ſicuti videmus uſu adveniſſe in *ban*, bone, os,
" oſſis. *Hal*, whole, integer, ſanus. *Ham*, home, domus,
" habitatio. ſtan, ſtone, lapis, &c."

Skinner ſays—" MORE, Mo. ab A. S. Ma, Mara, Mære,
" Mare, &c. Quid ſi omnia a Lat. *Major?*"

S. Johnſon finds MORE to be Adjective, Adverb, and Subſtantive. The adjective, he ſays, is—" The compa-
" rative of *Some* or *Great*." The adverb is—" The *particle*
" that forms the comparative degree."—" Perhaps ſome
" of the examples which are adduced under the adverb,
" ſhould be placed under the ſubſtantive."—It is doubtful
" whether the word, in ſome caſes, be noun or adverb."

MOST.

Junius ſays, untruly,—" MOST, Expoſitivo nempe
" mæꝑe, fuit comparativus mæꝑꝑe, et ſuperlativus mæꝑeſt;
" et contractè mæſt."

Skinner—" Teut. *Meiſt*, feliciter alludit *Gr.* μειϛον, plu-
" rimum, maximum, contr. a μεγιϛον."

S. Johnſon again finds in MOST, an adjective, an adverb, and a ſubſtantive. Of the adverb he ſays, it is—" The
" *particle* noting the ſuperlative degree." Of the ſubſtantive he ſays—" This is a *kind* of ſubſtantive, being
" according to its ſignification, *ſingular* or *plural*." And he gives inſtances, as he conceives, of its plurality and ſingularity.——I have waſted more than a page in repeating what amounts to nothing.——

Though

Though there appears to be, there is in reality no irregularity in MUCH, MORE, MOST: nor indeed is there any ſuch thing as capricious irregularity in any part of language.

In the Anglo-ſaxon the verb Mapan, *metere*, makes regularly the præterperfect Mop, or Mope, (as the præterperfect of Slazan is *Slob*) and the paſt participle *Mowen* or Meopen, by the addition of the participial termination *en*, to the præterperfect. Omit the participial termination *en* (which omiſſion was, and ſtill is, a common practice through the whole language, with the Anglo-ſaxon writers, the old Engliſh writers, and the moderns) and there will remain Mope or Mow; which gives us the Anglo-ſaxon Mope and our modern Engliſh word Mow: which words mean *ſimply*—that which is *Mowed* or *Mown*. And as the Hay, &c. which was *mown*, was put together in a heap; hence, *figuratively*, Mope was uſed in Anglo-ſaxon to denote *any* heap: although in modern Engliſh we now confine the application of it to country produce, ſuch as *Hay-mow*, *Barley-mow*, &c. * This participle or ſubſtantive

* Gawin Douglas uſes the word MOWE, for a heap of wood, or a funeral pile.

" Under the oppin ſky, to this purpois,
" Pas on, and of treis thou mak an bing
" To be ane fyre, &c.

ſtantive (call it which you pleaſe: for, however claſſed, it is ſtill the ſame word, and has the ſame ſignification) Mow or *Heap*, was pronounced (and therefore written) with ſome variety, Ma, Mæ, Mo, Mope, Mow; which, being regularly compared, give

Ma - - -	*Ma-er*	(i. e. maꝛe) - -	*Maeſt* (i. e. mæſt)
Mæ - - -	*Mæ-er*	(i. e. mæꝛe) - -	*Mæ-eſt* (i. e. mæſt)
Mope - -	*Mow-er*	(i. e. moꝛe) - -	*Moweſt* (i. e. moſt)
Mo - - -	*Mo-er*	(i. e. MORE) - -	*Mo-eſt* (i. e. MOST)

I have here printed in the Anglo-ſaxon character, thoſe words which have come down to us ſo written in the Anglo-ſaxon writings: and in Italics, the ſame words in ſound; but ſo written, as to ſhew the written regularity of the compariſon: and in capitals, the words which are uſed in what we call Engliſh; though indeed it is only a continuation of the Anglo-ſaxon, with a little variation of the written character.

" Tharfore ſcho has hir command done ilk dele.
" But quhen the grete bing was upbeildit wele
" Of aik treis, and fyrren ſchidis dry
" Wythin the ſecrete cloys under the ſky,
" Aboue the MOWE the foreſaid bed was maid."

Booke 4. page 117.

Mo

Mo (mope, *acervus, heap*) which was conſtantly uſed by all our old Engliſh authors, has with the moderns, given place to MUCH: which has not (as Junius, Wormius, and Skinner imagined of *Mickle*) been borrowed from μεγαλος; but is merely the diminutive of MO, paſſing through the gradual changes of *Mokel, Mykel, Mochil, Muchel* (ſtill retained in Scotland) *Moche*, MUCH.

" Yes certes (quod ſhe) Who is a frayler thynge than " the fleſhly body of a man, ouer whiche haue often tyme " flyes, and yet laſſe thynge than a flye, MOKEL myght " in greuaunce and anoyenge."

Teſt. of Loue. Boke 2. fol. 319. pag. 1. col. 1.

" Opinion is while a thinge is in non certayne, and " hydde frome mens very knowlegyng, and by no parfyte " reaſon fully declared, as thus: yf the ſonne be ſo " MOKEL as men wenen, or *els* yf it be MORE than the " erth."

Teſt. of Loue. Boke 3. fol. 325. pag. 2. col. 2.

" A lytel miſgoyng in the gynning cauſeth MYKEL " errour in the end."

Teſt. of Loue. Boke 2. fol. 315. pag. 2. col. 1.

" O badde and ſtrayte bene thilke (richeſſe) that at their " departinge maketh men teneful and ſory, and in the " gatheryng

" gatheryng of hem make men nedy. MOCHE folke *at*
" *ones* mowen not togider MOCHE therof haue."

Teſt. of Loue. Boke 2. fol. 316. pag. 2. col. 1.

" Good chylde (quod ſhe) what *echeth* ſuche renome to
" the conſcience of a wyſe man, that loketh and meaſureth
" hys goodneſſe not by ſleueleſſe wordes of the people, but
" by ſothfaſtneſſe of conſcience: by god, nothynge. And
" yf it be fayre a mans name be *eched* by MOCHE folkes
" prayſing, and fouler thyng that MO folke not prayſen."

Teſt. of Loue. Boke 2. fol. 319. pag. 2. col. 1.

" Alſo ryght as thou were enſample of MOCHE FOLDE
" errour, righte ſo thou muſt be enſample of *manyfolde*
" correctioun."

Teſt. of Loue. Boke 1. fol. 310. pag. 1. col. 2.

NEVERTHELESS.

In our old authors written variouſly, *Na-the-les*, *Ne-the-les*, *Nocht-the-les*, *Not-the-les*, *Never-the-later:* its oppoſite alſo was uſed, *Wel-the-later*.

" Truely I ſay for me, ſythe I came thys Margarit to
" ſerue, durſt I neuer me diſcouer of no maner diſeaſe,
" and WEL THE LATER hath myn herte hardyed ſuch
" thynges to done, for the great bounties and worthy re-

" freſhmentes that ſhe of her grace goodly without anye
" deſert on my halue ofte hath me rekened."

Teſt. of Loue. Boke 3. fol. 332. pag. 2. col. 1.

" Habyte maketh no monke, ne wearynge of gylte
" ſpurres maketh no knyghte: NEUERTHELATER in con-
" forte of thyne herte, yet wol I otherwyſe anſwere."

Teſt. of Loue. Boke 2. fol. 322. pag. 2. col. 2.

RATHER.

In Engliſh we have *Rath*, *Rather*, *Ratheſt*; which are ſimply the Anglo-ſaxon Raðe, Raðor, Raðoꝛt. celer, velox.

Some have derived this Engliſh word RATHER from the Greek; as Mer. Caſaubon from ορθρος, " quod ſané (ſays " Skinner) longius diſtat quam mané a veſpere:" and others, with a little more plauſibility, from Ραδιος.

The Italians have received this ſame word from our northern anceſtors, and pronounce it *Ratto*, with the ſame meaning: which Menage derives either from *Raptus* or from *Rapidus*, " *Rapdus*, *Rapdo*, *Raddo*, *Ratto*."

Skinner notices the expreſſions *Rath* fruit, and *Rath* wine, from the Anglo-ſaxon Raðe; of which, after Menage, he ſays—" Neſcio an contract. a Lat. *rapidus*."

Minſhew derives *Rather* from the Lat. *Ratus*. Ray has a proverb—" The *Rath* ſower never borrows of the late."

S. Johnſon cites *Spenſer* (except himſelf, the worſt poſſible authority for Engliſh words)

" Thus is my harveſt haſten'd all to *Rathe*."

And *May*—

" *Rath* ripe and purple grapes there be."

" *Rath* ripe are ſome, and ſome of later kind."

And *Milton*—

" Bring the *Rathe* primroſe that forſaken dies."

And he adds moſt ignorantly—" To *have Rather*, This, I " think a barbarous expreſſion, *of late intruſion* into our " language; for which it is better to ſay—*will rather*."

Dr. Newton, in a note on Lycidas, ſays of the word *Rathe*—" This word is uſed by Spenſer, B. 3. Cant. 3. St. 28.—

" Too *Rathe* cut off by practice criminal."

" And Shepherd's Calendar,

" The *Rather* lambs been ſtarved with cold."

T. Warton, in his note on the ſame paſſage of Milton, ſays,—" The particular combination of, *Rathe primroſe*,

" is perhaps from a paſtoral called a Palinode by E. B. " probably *Edmond Bolton*, in England's Helicon, Edit. 1614. ſignat. B. 4.

" And made the *Rathe* and timely primroſe grow."

" In the Weſt of England, there is an early ſpecies of " apple called the *Rathe*-ripe. We have—" Rathe and " late"—in a paſtoral, in *Daviſon's* poems, Edit. 4. London, " 1621. p. 177. In Baſtard's epigrams, printed 1598, " I find—" The *Raſhed* primroſe and the violet." Lib. 1. " Epigr. 34. p. 12. 12mo. Perhaps *Raſhed* is a provin- " cial corruption from Rathe."

By the quotations of Johnſon, Newton and Warton, from Spenſer, *May*, *Bolton*, *Daviſon* and *Baſtard*, a reader would imagine that the word *Rathe* was very little authorized in the language; and that it was neceſſary to hunt diligently in obſcure holes and corners for an authority.

" And *neĩheles* there is no man
" In all this worlde ſo wiſe, that can
" Of loue temper the meaſure:
" But as it falleth in auenture.
" For witte ne ſtrength maie not helpe
" And whiche els wolde him yelpe,
" Is RATHEST throwen under foote."

Gower. Lib. 1. Fol. 7. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Some

" Some ſeyne he did well enough,
" And ſome ſeyne, he did amis.
" Diuers opinions there is.
" And commonliche in euery nede
" The werſt ſpeche is RATHEST herde."

Lib. 3. Fol. 59. pag. 1. col. 1.

" That euery loue of pure kynde
" Is fyrſt forth drawe, well I fynde:
" But netheles yet ouer this
" Deſerte dothe ſo, that it is
" The RATHER had in many place."

Lib. 4. Fol. 72. pag. 1. col. 1.

——" Who that is bolde,
" And dar travaile, and undertake
" The cauſe of loue, he ſhall be take
" The RATHER unto loues grace."

Lib. 4. Fol. 75. pag. 1. col. 2.

" But fortune is of ſuche a ſleyght,
" That whan a man is moſt on height,
" She maketh hym RATHEST for to falle."

Lib. 6. Fol. 135. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Why ryſe ye ſo RATHE? Ey, Benedicite,
" What eyleth you?"

Chaucer. Myllers Tale. Fol. 15. pag. 1. col. 1.

" O dere coſyn, Dan Johan, ſhe ſayde,
" What eyleth you ſo RATHE to a ryſe?"

Shypmans Tale. Fol. 69. pag. 1. col. 2.

" For hym my lyfe lyeth al in dout
" But yf he come the RATHER out."

Rom. of the Roſe. Fol. 141. pag. 2. col. 1.

" They wolde eftſones do you ſcathe
" If that they myght, late or RATHE."
Rom. of the Roſe. Fol. 152. pag. 1. col. 1.

" And haue my trouth, but if thou finde it ſo,
" I be thy bote, or it be ful longe,
" To peces do me drawe, and ſythen honge.
" Ye ſo ſayſt thou (quod Troylus) alas:
" But God wot it is naught the RATHER ſo."
Troylus. Boke 1. Fol. 161. pag. 2. col. 1.

" Loke up I ſay, and tel me what ſhe is
" Anon, that I may gon about thy nede,
" Knowe iche her aught, for my loue tel me this
" Than wold I hope RATHER for to ſpede."
Troylus. Boke 1. Fol. 161. pag. 2. col. 2.

" And with his ſalte teeres gan he bathe
" The ruby in his ſignet, and it ſette
" Upon the wexe delyuerlyche and RATHE."
Troylus. Boke 2. Fol. 169. pag. 1. col. 1.

" But now to purpoſe of my RATHER ſpeche."
Troylus. Boke 3. Fol. 179. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Theſe folke deſiren nowe delyueraunce
" Of Antenor that brought hem to miſchaunce.
" For he was after traytour to the toun
" Of Troy alas; they quitte him out to RATHE."
Troylus. Boke 4. Fol. 183. pag. 2. col. 1.

" But he was ſlayne alas, the more harme is,
" Unhappely at Thebes al to RATHE."
Troylus. Boke 5. Fol. 195. pag. 2. col. 1.

" Yf I (quod ſhe) haue underſtonden and knowen ut-
" terly the cauſes and the habite of thy malady, thou
" languyſheſt and art defected for deſyre and talent of thy
" RATHER fortune. She that ylke fortune onelye that is
" chaunged as thou fayneſt to thewarde, hath perverted
" the clereneſſe and the eſtate of thy corage."

Boecius. Boke 2. Fol. 225. pag. 1. col. 2.

" Whylom there was a man that had aſſayed with
" ſtryuynge wordes an other man, the which not for
" uſage of *very* vertue, but for proude vayne glorye, had
" taken upon him falſely the name of a phyloſophre.
" This RATHER man that I ſpake of, thought he wold
" aſſay, wheder he thilke were a phyloſophre or no."

Boecius. Boke 2. Fol. 230. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Diuyne grace is ſo great that it ne may not ben ful
" prayſed, and this is only the maner, that is to ſay, hope
" and prayers. For which it ſemeth that men wol ſpeke
" with God, and by reſon of ſupplycacion bene conioyned
" to thylke clereneſſe, that nys nat approched no RATHER
" or that men ſeken it and impetren it."

Boecius. Boke 5. Fol. 249. pag. 2. col. 1.

" Graunt mercy good frende (quod he)
" I thanke the, that thou woldeſt ſo

" But

" But it may neuer the RATHER be do,
" No man may my ſorowe glade."

Dreame of Chaucer. Fol. 256. pag. 1. col. 1.

" The RATHER ſpede, the ſoner may we go,
" Great coſte alway there is in taryenge
" And longe to ſewe it is a wery thynge."

Aſſemble of Ladyes. Fol. 275. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Thilke ſterres that ben cleped ſterres of the northe, " aryſen RATHER than the degree of her longytude, and " all the ſterres of the ſouthe, aryſen after the degree of " her longytude."

Aſtrolabye. Fol. 280. pag. 2. col. 1.

" But leſynges with her flatterye
" With fraude couered under a pytous face
" Accept be nowe RATHEST unto grace."

Blacke Knyght. Fol. 289. pag. 2. col. 2.

" That ſhal not nowe be tolde for me
" For it no nede is redily
" Folke can ſynge it bet than I
" For al mote out late or RATHE."

Fame. Boke 3. Fol. 302. pag. 1. col. 2.

" Who was ycrowned? by God nat the ſtrongeſt, but " he that RATHEST come and lengeſt abode and continued " in the iourney and ſpared nat to trauayle."

Teſt. of Loue. Fol. 307. pag. 1. col. 2.

" Euery

" Euery glytteryng thing is not golde, and under colour
" of fayre ſpeche many vices may be hyd and conſeled.
" Therfore I rede no wight to truſt on you to RATHE,
" mens chere and her ſpeche right guyleful is ful ofte."

Teſt. of Loue. Boke 2. Fol. 314. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Veryly it is proued that rycheſſe, dygnyte, and power,
" been not trewe waye to the knotte, but as RATHE by
" ſuche thynges the knotte to be unbound."

" ——Than (quod ſhe) wol I proue that ſhrewes as
" RATHE ſhal ben in the knotte as the good."

Teſt. of Loue. Boke 2. Fol. 319. pag. 1. col. 1.

" Ah, good nyghtyngale (quod I then)
" A lytel haſte thou ben to longe hen,
" For here hath ben the leude cuckowe
" And ſongen ſonges RATHER than haſt thou."

Cuckowe and Nyghtyngale. Fol. 351. pag. 1. col. 2.

" His feris has this pray reſſauit RAITH,
" And to thare meat addreſſis it for to graith."

Douglas. Booke 1. pag. 19.

" Quhen Paris furth of Phryge, the Troyane hird
" Socht to the ciete Laches in Sparta,
" And thare the douchter of Leda ſtal awa,
" The fare Helene, and to Troy turſit RAITH."

Douglas. Booke 7. pag. 219.

" And ſche hir lang round nek bane bowand RAITH,
" To gif thaym ſouck, can thaym culze bayth."
Douglas. Booke 8. pag. 266.

" The princis tho, quhilk ſuld this peace making,
" Turnis towart the bricht ſonnys uprifyng,
" With the ſalt melder in thare handis RAITH."
Douglas. Booke 12. pag. 413.

FIE.

The Imperative of the Gothic and Anglo-ſaxon verb ꝼIAN, ꝼian, To hate.

QUICKLY.

Quick-like: from cpic, cpicu, cpicoð, vivus, (as we ſtill oppoſe the *Quick* to the *Dead*). Ꝼpic is the paſt participle of Ꝼpiccian, vivificare. QUICKLY means, in a *life-like* or *lively* manner; in the manner of a creature that has life.

SCARCE.

The Italians have the adjective *Scarſo*;

" Queſte parole aſſai paſſano il core
" Al triſto padre, e non ſapea che fare
" Di racquiſtar la ſua figlia e l'onore,
" Perche tutti i rimedj erano SCARSI."
Il Morgante. Cant. 10. St. 128.

Which

Which Menage improbably derives from *Exparcus*. The ſame word in Spaniſh is written *Eſcaſſo*. Both the Italian and the Spaniſh words are probably of northern origin. In Dutch *Skaars* is, rare, unfrequent. It is ſtill commonly uſed as an adjective in modern Engliſh; but anciently was more common.

" Haſt thou be SCARSE or large of gifte
" Unto thy loue, whom thou ſerueſt?
" And ſaith the trouth, if thou haſt bee
" Unto thy loue or SCARSE or free."
Gower. Lib. 5. Fol. 109. pag. 1. col. 2.

" What man that SCARSE is of his good,
" And wol not gyue, he ſhall nought take."
Gower. Fol. 109. pag. 2. col. 1.

" That men holde you not to SCARCE, ne to ſparyng."
Tale of Chaucer. Fol. 80. pag. 2. col. 1.

" Loke that no man for SCARCE the holde,
" For that may greue the manyfolde."
Rom. of the Roſe. Fol. 131. pag. 1. col. 1.

SELDOM.

" I me reioyced of my lyberte
" That SELDEN tyme is founde in mariage."
Clerke of Oxenf. tale. Fol. 46. pag. 1. col. 1.

The Dutch have alſo the adjective *Zelden*, *Selten*: The Germans *Selten*: The Danes *Seldſom*: The Swedes *Sellſynt*: rare, unuſual, uncommon.

STARK.

According to S. Johnſon this word has the following ſignifications—*Stiff*, *ſtrong*, *rugged*, *deep*, *full*, *mere*, *ſimple*, *plain*, *groſs*. He ſays, "it is uſed to intend or augment "the ſignification of a word: as, *Stark mad*, mad in the "higheſt degree. It is now little uſed but in low "language."

In the Anglo-ſaxon Sꞇaɲc, Sꞇeaɲc, German *Starck*, Dutch *Sterk*, Daniſh *Stærk*, Swediſh *Stark*, as in the Engliſh, all mean *Strong*. It is a good Engliſh word; common in all our old writers, ſtill retaining its place amongſt the moderns, and never had an interval of diſuſe.

"And ſhe that helmed was in STARKE ſtoures
"And wan by force townes ſtronge and toures."
Chaucer. Monkes Tale. Fol. 85. pag. 2. col. 2.

"But unto you I dare not lye,
"But myght I ſelen or eſpye
"That ye perceyued it nothyng,
"Ye ſhulde haue a STARKE leaſyng."
Rom. of the Roſe. Fol. 154. pag. 2. col. 2.

"This

" This egle, of which I haue you tolde,
" Me flyeng at a ſwappe he hente,
" And with his ſours agayne up wente
" Me caryeng in hys clawes STARKE
" As lyghtly as I had ben a larke."

Fame. Boke 1. Fol. 294. pag. 2. col. 2.

" The followand wynd blew STERK in our tail."

Douglas. Booke 3. pag. 71.

" So that, my ſon, now art thou ſouir and STERK,
" That the not *nedis* to haue ony fere."

Douglas. Booke 8. pag. 265.

" Turnus ane litil, thocht he was STARK and ſtout,
" Begouth frawart the bargane to withdraw."

Douglas. Booke 9. pag. 306.

" Sa thou me ſaif, thy piſſance is ſa STARK,
" The Troianis glorie, nor thare victorye
" Sall na thing change nor dymynew tharby."

Douglas. Booke 10. pag. 336.

" And at ane hie balk teyt up ſche has
" With ane loupe knot ane STARK corde or lace,
" Quharewith hir ſelf ſche ſpilt with ſhameful dede."

Douglas. Booke 12. pag. 432.

" As faſt lock'd up in ſleep, as guiltleſs labour,
" When it lies STARKLY in the traveller's bones."

Shakeſpeare. Meaſure for Meaſure. A. 4. Sc. 2.

" 1. *Boor.* Come, Engliſh beer, hoſteſs. Engliſh beer,
" by th' belly.

" 2. *Boor.* STARK beer, boy: ſtout and ſtrong beer.
" So. Sit down, lads, and drink me upſey-dutch. Frolick
" and fear not."

Beaumont and Fletcher. Beggars Buſh. A. 3. Sc. 1.

VERY.

Means *True.*

" And it is clere and open that thilke ſentence of Plato,
" is VERY and ſothe."

Chaucer. Boecius. Boke 4. Fol. 241. pag. 2. col. 2.

It is merely the French adjective *Vrai*, from the Italian, from the Latin. When this word was firſt adopted from the French, (and long after) it was written by them, and by us, VERAY; which they have ſince corrupted to *Vrai*, and the Engliſh to VERY.

" For if a kynge ſhall upon geſſe
" Without VERAY cauſe drede,
" He maie be liche to that I rede."

Gower. Lib. 7. Fol. 162. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Conſtantyne thenſample and myrrour
" To princes al, in humble buxumneſſe
" To holy churche o VERAY ſuſtaynour."

Prologue to Cant. Tales.

" But

" But as Chriſte was, whan he was *On lyue*,
" So is he there VERAMENT"—(*vraiment*)
Plowmans Tale. Fol. 99. pag. 2. col. 1.

" O thou, my chyld, do lerne, I the pray,
" Vertew and VERAY labour to aſſay."
Douglas. Booke 12. pag. 425.

" Diſce, puer, virtutem ex me *Verumque* laborem:
" Fortunam ex aliis*." *Virgil.*

ONCE. AT ONCE. TWICE. THRICE.

Antiently written ANES, ANIS, ANYS, ONES, ONYS, TWIES, TWYIS, TWYISE, THRIES, THRYIS, &c. are merely the Genitives of Ane, An, ϒΝΑΙ, Tpa, Tpeȝ, Tpiȝ, Ðɲı, Ðɲẏ, &c. i. e. *One*, Two, Three (The ſubſtantive *Time*, *Turn*, &c. omitted.)

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* The word *Aliis* in this paſſage, ſhould in a modern verſion be tranſlated *Lord Grenville*, *Mr. Roſe*, *Mr. Dundas*, *Mr. Wyndham*, *Mr. Pitt*, *Lord Liverpool*, &c. Who only *aſſert* modeſtly (what our pilfering ſtewards and bailiffs will ſhortly tell us), that they hold their emoluments of office by *as good* a title, as any man in England holds his private eſtate and fair-earned property; and immediately after *prove* to us, that they hold by a much better title.—Their proof is, for the preſent only a triple or quadruple (they may take half or two thirds of our income next year) additional aſſeſſment upon our innocent property; whilſt their guilty emoluments of office (how earned we know) remain untouched.

The Italian and French have no correſpondent adverb: they ſay *Une fois, deux fois, una volta, due volte* &c. The Dutch have *Eens* for the ſame purpoſe; but often forego the advantage.

" For ONES that he hath ben blithe
" He ſhal ben after ſorie THRIES."
Gower. Lib. 5. Fol. 117. pag. 1. col. 1.

" For as the wylde wode rage
" Of wyndes maketh the ſea ſauage,
" And that was caulme bringeth to wawe,
" So for defaut and grace of lawe
" The people is ſtered all AT ONES."
Gower. Lib. 7. Fol. 166. pag. 1. col. 1.

" Ye wote yovr ſelfe, ſhe may not wedde two
" AT ONES."
Knyghtes Tale. Fol. 5. pag. 2. col. 2.

" Sythen Chriſt went neuer but ONYS
" To weddyng."
Wyfe of Bathe. Prol. Fol. 34. pag. 1. col. 1.

" And firſt I ſhrew myſelf, both blode and bones,
" If thou begyle me ofter than ONES."
Nonnes Prieſt. Fol. 91. pag. 1. col. 1.

" Sen Pallas mycht on Grekis tak ſic wraik,
" To birn thare ſchyppis, and all for ANIS ſaik
" Droun in the ſeye."
Douglas. Boke 1. pag. 14.

" My faddir cryis, How! feris, help away,
" Streik airis ATTANIS with al the force ȝe may."
Douglas. Booke 3. pag. 8.

" The

" The feblit breith ful faſt can bete and blaw,
" Ne gat he laſare ANYS his aynd to draw."
Douglas. Booke 9. pag. 307.

" THRIES ſhe turned hir aboute
" And THRIES eke ſhe gan downe loute
Gower. Lib. 5. Fol. 105. pag. 1. col. 1.

" She made a cercle about hym THRIES,
" And efte with fire of ſulphur TWIES."
Gower. Lib. 5. Fol. 105. pag. 2. col. 2.

" That hath been TWYSE hotte and TWYSE colde."
Chaucer. Cokes Prol. Fol. 17. pag. 2. col. 2.

" For as Senec ſayth: He that ouercometh his hert, " ouercometh TWISE."
Tale of Chaucer. Fol. 82. pag. 2. col. 2.

" In gold to graif thy fall TWYIS etlit he,
" And TWYISE for reuth failȝeis the faderis handis."
Douglas. Booke 6. pag. 163.

" He ſychit profoundlye owthir TWYIS or THRYIS."
Douglas. Booke 10. pag. 349.

ATWO. ATHREE.

On τpa. On ðry. *In two. In three.* The Dutch have *Intween*; the Danes *Itu.*

" And Jaſon ſwore, and ſaid ther,
" That alſo wis God hym helpe,
" That if Medea did hym helpe,
" That he his purpoſe might wynne,
" Thei ſhulde neuer part ATWYNNE."
Gower. Lib. 5. Fol. 102. pag. 2. col. 1.

" That death us ſhulde departe ATWO."
Gower. Lib. 4. Fol. 84. pag. 1. col. 1.

" And eke an axe to ſmyte the corde ATWO."
Myllers Tale. Fol. 14. pag. 1. col. 1.

" Ne howe the fyre was couched fyrſt with *Stre*,
" And than with drye ſtickes clouen ATHRE."
Knyghtes Tale. Fol. 11. pag. 1. col. 1.

ALONE. ONLY.

All-one. One-like. In the Dutch, *Een* is *One*: *All-een*, ALONE: and *All-een-lyk*, ONLY.

" So came ſhe to him priuely,
" And that was, wher he made his mone,
" Within a gardeine ALL him ONE."
Gower. Lib. 1. Fol. 25. pag. 2. col. 1.

" The ſorowe, doughter, which I make,
" Is not ALL ONELY for my ſake,
" But for the bothe, and for you all."
Gower. Lib. 1. Fol. 25. pag. 2. col. 2.

" All other leches he forſoke,
" And put him out of auenture
" ALONLY to God's cure."
Gower. Lib. 2. Fol. 45. pag. 2. col. 2.

" And

" And thus full ofte a daie for nought
" (Saufe ONLICHE of myn owne thought)
" I am ſo with my ſeluen wroth."
Gower. Lib. 3. Fol. 47. pag. 2. col. 1.

" Thre yomen of his chambre there
" ALL ONLY for to ſerue hym were."
Gower. Lib. 6. Fol. 137. pag. 1. col. 2.

" For ALL ONELYCHE of gentill loue
" My courte ſtont all courtes aboue."
Gower. Lib. 8. Fol. 187. pag. 1. col. 2.

" Thou woſt well that I am Venus,
" Whiche ALL ONELY my luſtes ſeche."
Gower. Lib. 8. Fol. 187. pag. 2. col. 1.

ANON.

Junius is right. ANON means *In one* (ſubauditur *inſtant, moment, minute.*)

" For I woll ben certayne a wedded man,
" And that ANON in all the haſt I can."
Marchauntes Tale. Fol. 29. pag. 1. col. 2.

" Than Dame Prudence, without delay or tarieng, ſent " ANONE her meſſanger."
Tale of Chaucer. Fol. 82. pag. 1. col. 2.

All our old authors uſe ANON, for *immediately, inſtantly.*

Mr. Tyrwhit, Vol. 4. Note to Verſe 381, ſays—" From " *Pro nunc*, I ſuppoſe, came *For the nunc*; and ſo, *For* " *the Nonce*. Juſt as from *Ad nunc* came ANON."—I agree with Mr. Tyrwhit, that the one is *juſt as* likely as the other."

In the Anglo-ſaxon, An means *One*, and *On* means *In*: which word *On* we have in Engliſh corrupted to *An*, before a vowel; and to A, before a conſonant; and in writing and ſpeaking have connected it with the ſubſequent word: and from this double corruption has ſprung a numerous race of Adverbs; which (only becauſe there has not been a ſimilar corruption) have no correſpondent adverbs in other languages.

Thus from On dæg, On niht, On lenge, On bræde, On bæc, On lande, On life, On middan, On nihte, On tpa, On peg; we have *Aday*, *Anight*, *Along*, *Abroad*, *Aback*, *Aland*, *Alive*, *Amid*, *Aright*, *Atwo*, *Away*: and from On An, ANON.

Gower and Chaucer write frequently *In one*: and Douglas, without any corruption, purely ON ANE.

" Thus ſayand, ſcho the bing aſcendis ON ANE."
Douglas. Booke 4. pag. 124.

IN A TRICE.

Skinner, not ſo happily as uſual, ſays—" *In a Trice*, " fort. a Dan. *at reyſe*, ſurgere, ſe erigere, attollere, q. d. " tantillo temporis ſpatio quanto quis ſe attollere poteſt."

S. Johnſon—" believes this word comes from *Trait* Fr. " corrupted by pronunciation. A ſhort time, an inſtant, " a *ſtroke*."

The etymology of this word is of ſmall conſequence; but, I ſuppoſe, we have it from the French *Trois:* and (in a manner ſimilar to ANON) it means—In the time in which one can count *Three—One, Two, Three* and away.—Gower writes it TREIS.

" All ſodenly, as who ſaith TREIS,
" Where that he ſtode in his paleis,
" He toke him from the mens ſight,
" Was none of them ſo ware, that might
" Set eie where he become."

Gower. Lib. 1. Fol. 24. pag. 2. col. 1.

The greater part of the other Adverbs have always been well underſtood: ſuch as, Gratis, Alias, Amen, Alamode, Indeed, In fact, Methinks, Forſooth, Inſooth, &c.

B.

But I ſuppoſe there are ſome adverbs which are merely *cant* words; belonging only to the vulgar; and which have therefore no certain origin nor preciſe meaning; ſuch as SPICK and SPAN, &c.

H.

SPICK, SPAN.

I will not aſſert that there may not be ſuch; but I know of none of that deſcription. It is true S. Johnſon ſays of *Spick and Span*, that "he ſhould not have expected to "find this word authorized by a polite writer." "*Span* "*new*," he ſays, "is uſed by Chaucer *, and is ſuppoſed

* Chaucer uſes it, in the third book of Troylus. Fol. 181. pag. 2. col. 1.

"This is a worde for al, that Troylus
"Was neuer ful to ſpeke of this matere.
"And for to prayſen unto Pandarus
"The bounte of his right lady dere,
"And Pandarus to thanke and maken chere.
"This tale was aye SPAN newe to begynne,
"Tyl that the nyght departed hem *atwynne*."

But I ſee no reaſon why Chaucer ſhould be blamed for its uſe; any more than Shakeſpear for uſing *Fire-new*, on a much more ſolemn occaſion.

"Maugre thy ſtrength, youth, place and eminence,
"Deſpight thy victor ſword, and *Fire-new* fortune,
"Thy valour and thy heart,—thou art a traitor."

King Lear. Act 5. Sce. 3.

"to

" to come from ſpannan, to ſtretch, *Sax.* expandere, *Lat.* " whence *ſpan*. *Span new* is therefore originally uſed of " Cloth, new extended or dreſſed at the clothier's: and " *ſpick* and *ſpan* new, is, newly extended on the ſpikes or " tenters. It is, however, a *low* word." In *ſpick* and *ſpan* however, there is nothing ſtretched upon ſpikes and tenters but the etymologiſt's ignorance. In Dutch they ſay *Spick-ſpëlder-nieuw*. And *ſpyker* means a warehouſe or magazine. *Spil* or *Spel* means a ſpindle, *ſchiet-ſpoel*, the weaver's ſhuttle; and *ſpoelder* the ſhuttle-thrower. In Dutch, therefore, *Spikſpëlder-nieuw* means, new from the warehouſe and the loom.

In German they ſay—*Span-neu* and *Funckel-neu*. *Spange* means any thing ſhining; as *Funckel* means to glitter or ſparkle.

In Daniſh *Funckelnye*.

In Swediſh *Spitt ſpangande ny*.

In Engliſh we ſay *Spick and Span-new, Fire-new, Brand-new*. The two laſt *Brand* and *Fire* ſpeak for themſelves. *Spick* and *Span-new* means *ſhining new from the warehouſe*.

B.

AYE, YEA, YES.

You have omitted the moſt important of all the Adverbs—AYE and NO. Perhaps becauſe you think Greenwood has ſufficiently ſettled theſe points—" *Ay*, he ſays, " ſeems to be a contraction of the Latin word *Aio*, as *Nay* " is of *Nego*. For our *Nay*, *Nay*; *Ay*, *Ay*; is a plain imitation " of Terence's *Negat quis? Nego. Ait? Aio.*" Though I think he might have found a better citation for his purpoſe—" An nata eſt ſponſa prægnans? vel *Ai*, vel *nega*."

H.

I have avoided AYE and NO, becauſe they are two of the moſt mercenary and miſchievous words in the language, the degraded inſtruments of the meaneſt and dirtieſt traffic in the land. I cannot think they were borrowed from the Romans even in their moſt degenerate ſtate. Indeed the Italian, Spaniſh and French * affirmative adverb, *Si*, is

* The French have another (and their principal) affirmative adverb, *Oui*: which, Menage ſays, ſome derive from the Greek ναὶ σοι, but which he believes to be derived from the Latin *Hoc eſt*, inſtead of which was pronounced *Hoce*, then *Oe*, then *Oue*, then *Oi*, and finally *Ouy*. But (though rejected by Menage) *Oui* is manifeſtly the paſt participle of *Ouir*, to hear; and is well calculated for the purpoſe of aſſent: for when the proverb ſays —" *ſilence gives conſent*,"—it is always underſtood of the ſilence, not of a deaf or abſent perſon, but of one who has both heard and noticed the requeſt.

derived

derived from the Latin, and means *Be it* (as it does when it is called an hypothetical conjunction). But our *Aye*, or *Yea*, is the Imperative of a verb of northern extraction; and means—*Have it, poſſeſs it, enjoy it.* And YES, is *Ay-es*, Have, poſſeſs, enjoy *that.* More immediately perhaps, they are the French ſingular and plural Imperative *Aye* and *Ayez*; as our corrupted *O-yes* of the Cryer, is no other than the French Imperative *Oyez*, Hear, Liſten *.

Daniſh, *Ejer*, to poſſeſs, have, enjoy. *Eja*, Aye or yea. *Eje*, poſſeſſion. *Ejer*, poſſeſſour.

Swediſh, *Ega*, to poſſeſs, *ja*, aye, yea. *Egare*, poſſeſſor.

German, *Ja*, aye, yea. *Eigener*, poſſeſſor, owner. *Eigen*, own.

Dutch, *Eigenen*, to poſſeſs, *ja*, aye, yea. *Eigenſchap*, *Eigendom*, poſſeſſion, property. *Eigenaar*, owner, proprietor.

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* "And after on the daunce went
"Largeſſe, that ſet al her entent
"For to ben honorable and free,
"Of Alexander's kynne was ſhe,
"Her moſt ioye was ywis,
"Whan that ſhe yaſe, and ſayd: HAUE THIS."
Rom. of the Roſe. Fol. 125. pag. 2. col. 1.

Which might, with equal propriety, have been tranſlated,
"When ſhe gave, and ſaid YES.

Anglo-ſax. Agen, own. Agenꝺe, proprietor. Agennyſſe, property.

NOT, NO.

As little do I think, with Greenwood, that NOT, or its abbreviate NO, was borrowed from the Latin; or, with Minſhew, from the Hebrew; or, with Junius, from the Greek. The inhabitants of the North, could not wait for a word expreſſive of diſſent, till the eſtabliſhment of thoſe nations and languages; and it is itſelf a ſurly ſort of word leſs likely to give way and to be changed than any other uſed in ſpeech. Beſides, their derivations do not lead to any meaning, the only object which can juſtify any etymological inquiry. But we need not be any farther inquiſitive, nor, I think, doubtful concerning the origin and and ſignification of NOT and NO, ſince we find that in the Daniſh *Nödig*, and in the Swediſh *Nödig*, and in the Dutch *Noode*, *Node*, and *No*, mean, *averſe*, *unwilling* *.

And

* M. L'Eveque, in his Eſſai ſur les rapports de la langue des Slaves, avec celle des anciens habitans du Latium, (prefixed to his Hiſtory of Ruſſia) has given us a curious etymology of three Latin adverbs; which I cannot forbear tranſcribing in this place, as an additional confirmation of my opinion of the Particles.—" Le changement de l' o en A doit à peine etre regardé " comme une alteration. En effet ces deux lettres ont en Slavon tant d'

" affinité,

And I hope I may now be permitted to have done with Etymology: for though, like a microſcope, it is ſometimes uſeful

" affinité, que les Ruſſes prononcent en A le tiers au moins des ſyllabes " qu'ils écrivent par un o."

" Let mot qui ſignifioit auparavant (before *Terra* was uſed) la ſurface de " la terre. Ce mot en Slavon eſt POLE; qui par l'affinité de l'o avec l'A, " a pu ſe changer en PALE. Ce qui me fait preſumer que ce mot ſe trou- " voit auſſi en Latin, c'eſt qu'il reſte un verbe qui paroit formé de ce ſub- " ſtantif; c'eſt le verbe PALO ou PALARE, errer dans le campagne: PALANS, " qui erre de coté & d'autre, qui court les champs. L'Adverbe PALAM " tire ſon origine du même mot. Il ſignifie *manifeſtement, a decouvert*, " Or, qu'eſt ce qui ſe fait *a decouvert* pourdes hommes qui habitent des " tentes ou des cabannes? C'eſt ce qui ſe fait en plein champs. Ce mot " PALAM ſemble même dans ſa formation avoir plus de rapport à la langue " Slavonne qu' à la Latine. Il ſemble qu'on diſe PALAM pour POLAMI *par* " *les champs, à travers les champs.* Ce qui me confirme dans cettee idée, " c'eſt que je ne me rappelle pas qu'il y ait en Latin d'autre Adverbe qui " ait une formation ſemblable, ſi ce n'eſt ſon oppoſé, CLAM, qui veut dire " *ſecrettement, en cachette*; & qui me paroit auſſi Slavon. CLAM ſe dit " pour KOLAMI, & par une contraction tres conforme au genie de la langue " Slavonne, KLAMI, au milieu des Pieux; c'eſt à dire dans des cabannes " qui etoient formées de *Pieux* revêtus d'écorces, de peaux, où de " branchages."

" J'oubliois l'Adverbe CORAM, qui veut dire *Devant, en preſence.*—" Il " differe de PALAM (dit Ambroiſe Calepin) en ce qu'il ſe rapporte ſeule- " ment à quelques perſonnes, & PALAM ſe rapporte a toutes: il entraîne " d'ailleurs avec lui l'idée de proximité."—Il a donc pu marquer autrefois " que l'action ſe paſſoit en preſence de quelqu'un dans un lieu circonſcrit " ou fermé. Ainſi on aura dit CORAM pour KORAMI, ou, *Mejdou Korami*; " parceque la cloture des habitations etoit ſouvent faite d'ecorce, *Kora.*"

uſeful to diſcover the minuter parts of language which would otherwiſe eſcape our ſight; yet is it not neceſſary to have it always in our hands, nor proper to apply it to every object.

B.

If your doctrine of the *Indeclinables* (which I think we have now pretty well exhauſted) is true, and if every word in all languages has a ſeparate meaning of its own, why have you left the conjunction THAT undecyphered? Why content yourſelf with merely ſaying it is an *Article*, whilſt you have left the *Articles* themſelves unclaſſed and unexplained?

I am the better pleaſed with Mr. L'Eveque's etymology, becauſe he had *no ſyſtem* to defend, and therefore cannot be charged with that partiality and prejudice, of which, after what I have advanced, I may be reaſonably ſuſpected. Nor is it the worſe, becauſe M. L'Eveque appears not to have known the ſtrength of his own cauſe: for CLAM was antiently written in Latin *calim*: (though Feſtus, who tells us this, abſurdly derives *clam* from *clavibus*, "quod his, quæ celare volumus, claudimus") and *cala* was an old Latin word for wood, or logs, or ſtakes. So Lucilius (quoted by Servius) "Scinde puer, *Calam*, ut caleas." His derivation is alſo ſtill farther analogically fortified by the Daniſh correſpondent adverbs: for in that language *Geheim*, *geheimt*, *I Hemmelighed*, (from *Hiem* home), and *I enrum* (i. e. in a room) ſupply the place of *Clam*, and *Fordagen* (or, in the face of day) ſupplies the place of *Palam*.

H.

I would fain recover my credit with Mr. Burgeſs, at leaſt upon the ſcore of *liberality*. For the freedom (if he pleaſes, harſhneſs) of my ſtrictures on my "*predeceſſors* on the "ſubject of language." I may perhaps obtain his pardon, when he has learned from Monteſquieu that—"*Rien ne* "*recule plus le progrés des connoiſances, qu'un mauvais* "*ouvrage d'un auteur celebre: parcequ' avant d' inſtruire,* "*il faut detromper:* or from Voltaire, that—La faveur "prodiguée aux mauvais ouvrages, eſt auſſi contraire aux "progrés de l'eſprit, que le déchainement contre les bons." But Mr. Burgeſs himſelf has undertaken to explain the *Pronouns:* and if I did not leave the field open to him (after his undertaking) he might perhaps accuſe me of illiberality towards my *followers* alſo. I hope the title will not offend him; but I will venture to ſay that, if he does any thing with the pronouns, he muſt be contented to *follow* the etymological path which I have traced out for him. Now the *Articles*, as they are called, trench ſo cloſely on the *Pronouns*, that they ought to be treated of together: and I rather chuſe to leave *one* conjunction unexplained, and my account of the Articles imperfect, than foreſtall in the ſmalleſt degree any part of Mr. Burgeſs's future diſcovery. There is room enough for both of us. The garden of ſcience is overrun with weeds; and whilſt

every

every coxcomb in literature is anxious to be the importer of ſome new exotic, the more humble, though (at this period of human knowlédge eſpecially) more uſeful buſineſs of *ſarculation* (to borrow an exotic from Dr. Johnſon) is miſerably neglected.

B.

If you mean to publiſh the ſubſtance of our converſation, you will probably incur more cenſure for the *ſubject* of your inquiry, than for your manner of purſuing it. It will be ſaid to be *υπερ ονε σκιας.*

H.

I know for what building I am laying the foundation: and am myſelf well ſatisfied of its importance. For thoſe who ſhall think otherwiſe, my defence is ready made:

Se queſta materia non è degna,
Per eſſer piu leggieri,
D'un huom che voglia parer ſaggio e grave,
Scuſatelo con queſto; che s'ingegna
Con queſti van penſieri
Fare il ſuo triſto tempo piu ſuave:
Perche altrove non have
Dove voltare il viſo;
Che gli é ſtato interciſo
Moſtrar con altre impreſe altra virtue.

END OF THE FIRST PART.